Measure type: Surveillance

Surveillance is the measure of monitoring the behaviour, activities, or other changing information, usually of people for the purpose of influencing, managing, directing, or protecting.

Monitoring of traffic is a related activity which can be used for general traffic management or incident management.

Description

Surveillance is the first step in the reaction chain detection-perception-interpretation-formulating action-acting. The essence of surveillance lies in the detection of the actual situation. This can be done in various ways:

• by dedicated observers on location
• remotely by dedicated observers
• by the public

Examples

By dedicated observers on location

Police officer on surveillance

Observation of the situation by dedicated observers on location can be done either by observers that are incognito, or observers that are clearly distinguishable. Both strategies have their advantages:

• observation by observers that are incognito can reveal the situation in its natural behaviour, undisturbed by the fact that it is observed. This can reveal behaviour (and its causes) that otherwise remain undetected.
• observation by observers that are clearly distinguishable can convey the presence of authority and exert a mitigating effect on the behaviour of the observed.

Remotely by dedicated observers

Security cameras in the street

Monitoring with the help of cameras (CCTV) has become a common method throughout all Europe to combat crime and terrorism. In the UK more than 4 million cameras have been installed (The Associated Press, 2007).

By the public

Example of an Amber Alert SMS

This concerns involving (a select part of) the public in the detection of crime. This can both be facilitated by electronic means and more traditional means. Examples of both approaches can be found in:

• The USA 'Eagle Eyes' initiative of the Air Force office of Special Investigation
• 'Veilige wijk' The Hague
• Amber alert
• Gulfport Alternative Policing strategy

Essential conditions

• For surveillance to be effective, an observer needs to be able to oversee an area.
• In order for surveillance to have the intended effects, it is essential that the reaction chain is unbroken. As often the links in the reaction chain are managed by different people or organisations, the communication in this chain is of vital essence.

Requirements to the urban environment

The extent to which an area can be overseen by an observer is highly dependent on

• the available positions for the observer
• the field of vision, which is directly related to the geometry of the space
• the lighting conditions

Effectiveness

The effectiveness of surveillance against crime is rooted in three effects:

• its contribution to the reaction chain
• the mitigating effect of clearly visible observation/observants
• the contribution it can have to the prosecution of crime (gathering evidence and leads)

As such, it can be effective to all modi operandi that can be mitigated by a reaction force or by the presence of authority. These are:

• burglary
• ram-raiding
• pickpocketing
• robbery with assault
• snatch theft
• car theft
• physical assault
• sexual assault
• vandalism
• Grafitti
• Antisocial behaviour

Economic effectiveness

Surveillance measures intend to increase the level of security, lowering the costs of security threats. Security measures, however, also require time and money by private agents, companies/developers and the public authorities, exacting economic cost/impact. The costs of surveillance measures contain the relatively straightforward direct expenditures on capital equipment and operational costs (both temporary and permanent), and in addition generate various types of secondary effects. Whether the costs are making sense from an economic point of view, depends on many factors, and can be answered by two distinct sets of questions:

1. Are the envisioned surveillance measures cost effective from a socio-economic point of view, or are there better alternatives?
2. Which specific agents (individuals, companies, sectors, authorities) are affected by the surveillance measures, and to which extend? How do the envisioned measures adjust the behaviour of these agents, and of course the behaviour of criminals/terrorists?

Economic tools can help the decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security (of course in collaboration with insights from criminology, sociology, etc.).

Effectiveness of remote surveillance

Economic effectiveness

The current debate about CCTV (camera surveillance) with regards to its cost-effectiveness is pointing out the following topics:

• Empirical research finds that the overall crime rates drop in the areas with CCTV, but not in all cases and situations. Furthermore, crimes committed in the heat of the moment, such as assaults are in general not affected by the presence of cameras.
• Total costs of CCTV far exceed that of the camera hardware alone.
• To be effective, surveillance systems should be fully integrated into law enforcement practices.

Side effects

Side effects of surveillance can be:

• increased perception of unsafety by the public (some research suggests observation of increased public security measures such as video surveillance of public places reduces citizens social fear of crime but increases their personal fear of crime (e.g. breaking and entering of their homes)
• increased perception of safety by the public
• decreased perception of privacy by the public
• overconfidence
• reflective fear; for example, critics argue that information technology-based solutions to security problems (including the use of video surveillance) are not suited to confront threats but only to reassure the public that something is being done. This facilitates the rise of a security culture of moral panic as illustrated by the London bombings in 2005.

Side effects of remote surveillance

• CCTV and the displacement effect

Situational crime prevention measures such as camera surveillance are subject of displacement effects. A UK-study (2009) empirically tested this thesis in the UK on 13 CCTV projects and concludes that spatial displacement of crime due to camera surveillance does occur, but not in a frequent and uniform way across space and types of offences