Security issue: Mass killing

Ambulances on the street after the 2005 London Bombings

Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.

Description

We see that the target of fanatics can be either persons, objects, or both. This category of security issues focusses on the threat directed towards people. When directed at objects, it falls under the category of destruction by fanatics.

The motives for destroying objects by fanatics can mostly be found in the amount of attention that this yields. This motive gives a very good clue of who and what locations might be potential targets for fanatics: not only should an attack yield a fair amount of attention, but also it should be the kind of attention that would help the fanatics' 'cause'. Depending on the fanatics faction, this can entail a wide variety of reactions; for some factions, negative attention is not unwanted. We see this in the 11 September 2001 attack on the New York Trade Center. Although this generated almost uniformly negative responses in the western world, this was received with joy by the responsible faction (al-Qaeda).

Sometimes, an object is used as a force multiplier for an attack directed at people. This can be used on urban objects if:

• the object can be potentially harmful to humans (such as chemical plants, oil/gas refineries and storages, nuclear plants, etcetera)
• the object provides an essential service to the well-being of humans and belongs to the critical infrastructure. In this case, its failure can bring harm to the people.

The presence of such an object in the vicinity of large groups of people can raise the attractiveness and attainability for an attack by fanatics and therefore increase the risk. Aside from force multiplier targets, heavily populated areas which are either 'soft targets' or 'symbolic gestures' will often be selected areas by would be attackers.

Contributing circumstances

Known circumstances to influence the likelihood or effect of robbery are presented in the table below:

Contributing Circumstance	Influence	Description
Attractive locations for robbery	Increases success rate of robbery	Some locations are by nature particularly suited for robbery, by the fact that they are relatively deserted, lack surveillance, have potential victims and offer many easy exits to flee the crime scene. Examples of such locations include parking lots and garages, parks, fields, playgrounds, and areas near public transportation and ATMs.
Lack of surveillance.	Decreases risk of detection.	A low level of surveillance, particularly round-the-clock surveillance, decreases the perceived risk of detection for a perpetrator and thereby increases the attractiveness.
Long reaction times or inadequate action of intervention force.	Decreases likelihood of apprehension	Untimely or inappropriate reactions to violence lead to a perception of little control, which will increase perceived risk for the public and decrease perceived risk for the perpetrators.
High levels of robbery in the vicinity.	Increases likelihood of targeting.	The distance to known places where offenders live matters. On average, robbers travel 2,1 km to commit their crimes, and the chance of a neighbourhood to be chosen reduces with every km distance from the offender's home.
High levels of unemployment	Increases likelihood of targetting	High levels of unemployment are correlated with higher levels of property crime .
High expected levels of drug- or alcohol abuse	Reduces inhibitions for crime	The presence of regular abusers of alcohol or drugs has a strong correlation with the occurrence of robbery, often thought to be caused by the need for financing an addiction. Studies show that about 35% of all robbery is committed under the influence of alcohol.
Presence of excitement or distractions	Increases vulnerability of victims	A legitimate distraction enables the robber to gain contact with the victim without causing alarm. Street robbers could perceive people who are distracted (e.g., using a cell phone, drunk, and/or unfamiliar with their surroundings) as easier to approach and overpower. Distracting circumstances such as road works, which require a detour in unfamiliar surroundings, special events or holidays can also provide the distractions that aid robbers.

• the predictable presence of large groups of people
• the predictable presence of a group of people who's death or harm would have great impact
• location perceived as attainable target

Socio economic causes

The roots of terrorism can also be found in certain poor or unfavourable conditions such as relative economic deprivation (manifested in poverty, income inequality, etc.), socio-economic change (fostered by the process of for example modernisation) and economic and political integration. (The roots of) crime is closely related to poverty, social exclusion, wage and income inequality, cultural and family background, level of education and other economic and social factors.

Impacts

Social impact

• psychological trauma
• reduced perception of safety

Economic impact

The effects of mass killing in terms of economic consequences are complex. Terrorist events and violent crime not only lead to material and immaterial costs for those who have become victimized, but also forces local and national authorities to spend billions on the prevention of terrorism and the detection, prosecution and punishment of terrorists (the primary economic impact of terrorism).

The material costs (e.g. loss of productivity) and immaterial costs (e.g. suffering, pain, sorrow, and loss of enjoyment of life) of mass killing events are generally expressed in terms of the value per statistical life (VSL). "The value per statistical life represents an individual’s willingness to exchange income or wealth for small changes in the likelihood of survival, rather than purchasing other goods or services". The VSL ranges from € 1.4 million to € 2.1 million (2009 prices) in the EU. However, according to Robinson et al. (2010) “terrorism-related risks may be perceived as more dreaded and ambiguous, and less controllable and voluntary, than the workplace risks underlying many VSL estimates”. “These factors may increase the VSL appropriate for terrorism risks, possibly doubling the value”.

In addition to the primary economic impacts, terrorism and violent crime cause the disruption of economic entities, which have not been direct targets of the attack (the secondary economic impacts of terrorism).

Mobility impact

• effects of measures (airport checks, etc.)

Safety impact

• deaths, wounded
• physical damage to urban objects in the vicinity of the targeted group

Measures

• Target hardening
• Access control
• Directing traffic flows
• Removing means
• Surveillance
• Intervention force
• Screening
• Target removal
• Removal of crime motivator
• Controlling disinhibitors
• Facilitating compliance
• Deflection
• Ownership
• Maintenance

• Intelligence
• Surveillance (including CCTV)
• Intervention force
• Distribution of government assets, and compatibility of land uses
• Physical protection (reinforced barriers, etc) - acess points for pedestrians and vehicles should have protective measures too
• Prevent opportunities for hiding
• Construction methods and materials that mitigate structural collapse - WP2 and WP4
• Restricted access to basement parking spaces associated with government and other buildings
• Solid-to-void-ratios in the context of balancing aesthethics with adequate security
• Advocate evacuation routes within building standards/regulations
• Planning for emergency services - urban areas should be planned with emergency services requirements and access considered
• Orientation of buildings with regard to roads, etc. (to prevent penetrative attacks and ram raiding).
• Reinforced landscaping objects (bollards screened by planting, large trees, etc.) and traffic calming measures