Difference between revisions of "Security issue: Assault"
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Potential measures that can mitigate the likelihood or impact of assault, are: |
Potential measures that can mitigate the likelihood or impact of assault, are: |
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− | * [[Measure: Directing traffic flows|Directing traffic flows]] can be effective in separating potential offenders from vulnerable groups and/or locations less controlled or controllable. Property offenders will commit crimes within their routine activity spaces. In the aggregate, this means that property crimes are most likely to occur on street segments which are |
+ | * [[Measure: Directing traffic flows|Directing traffic flows]] can be effective in separating potential offenders from vulnerable groups and/or locations less controlled or controllable. Property offenders will commit crimes within their routine activity spaces. In the aggregate, this means that property crimes are most likely to occur on street segments which are highly accessible within the road network, have higher levels of traffic (or people) flows, and include attractive targets such as apartments, bars, high schools or motels<ref>Daniel J. K. Beavon Correctional Service of Canada P. L. Brantingham and P. J. THE INFLUENCE OF STREET NETWORKS ON THE PATTERNING OF PROPERTY OFFENSES. Brantingham School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University</ref>. |
− | highly accessible within the road network, have higher levels of traffic (or people) flows, and include attractive targets such as apartments, bars, high schools or motels<ref>Daniel J. K. Beavon Correctional Service of Canada P. L. Brantingham and P. J. THE INFLUENCE OF STREET NETWORKS ON THE PATTERNING OF PROPERTY OFFENSES. Brantingham School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University</ref>. |
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* [[Measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]] can be effective on a specific offence (in preventing it or reducing its consequences), but can also be effective in reducing repeat offences if detection is swiftly followed-up by an appropriate intervention. A highly visible form of surveillance can also raise the perceived risk and act as an inhibitor. |
* [[Measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]] can be effective on a specific offence (in preventing it or reducing its consequences), but can also be effective in reducing repeat offences if detection is swiftly followed-up by an appropriate intervention. A highly visible form of surveillance can also raise the perceived risk and act as an inhibitor. |
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* [[Measure: Reaction force|Reaction force]] is required to intervene and make surveillance effective. |
* [[Measure: Reaction force|Reaction force]] is required to intervene and make surveillance effective. |
Revision as of 16:17, 21 January 2013
Contents
Security issue: Assault
Assault, in the use of this Securipedia, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence, which is covered under Sexual assault.
Description
The specific meaning of assault varies between countries, but refers to an act that causes another to fear or experience immediate and personal violence, or in the more limited sense, to fear or experience a threat of violence caused by an immediate show of force. In legal terms, assault is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear violence, and is often distinguished from battery, which involves physical contact. For the use in this Securipedia, the broader definition of assault is used, meaning that battery will be included in the use of the term assault. Sexual assault is considered separately.
Assault accounts for a relevant part of the total of recorded crime, e.g. for about 20% in the UK [1] as well as in the US [2].
Attributing circumstances
Known circumstances to attribute to the likelihood or effect of assault, are presented in the table below:
Attributing Circumstance | Influence | Description |
---|---|---|
Use of alcohol and/or drugs. | Increases level of aggression. | About one-third of the recorded assault cases are related to the use of alcohol or drugs[3]. The excessive use of alcohol and consequently the access to alcohol in bars, cafés, dance clubs and other places of entertainment, but also liquor dealers or discount stores selling alcohol in places where alcohol is consumed in the street are therefore important attributing circumstances for assault as security issue. Be aware that the type of establishment, as well as the way they are clustered can be of great influence on the extent that assault may result. A practical guide to assessing this can be found on the website of the Centre for Problem-Orientated Policing [4]. |
Large crowds. | Increases likelihood of conflict. | Rival fan groupings at a sports game or concert goers are typical examples. In July 2012, an outdoor concert at Dublin's (Ireland) Phoenix Park resulted in a litany of incidents including assaults, public order offences, and drugs seizures. The concert was attended by c. 45,000 people, and a subsequent report by the police force (An Garda Siochana) found that the park was not a suitable venue for 'outdoor electric music concerts'[5]. |
Abandoned/secluded areas and low traffic volumes (cars and/or pedestrians). | Decreases likelihood of detection. | A decreased perceived risk of detection decreases the perceived need for restraint of unwanted behaviour. |
Low level of social monitoring. | Decreases level of social correction. | A decreased perceived risk of detection and correction decreases the perceived need for restraint of unwanted behaviour. |
Low level of physical monitoring (e.g. cameras). | Decreases likelihood of detection. | This reduces the possibilities of intervening and increases the likelihood of the conflict escalating. Low levels of physical monitoring contributes to less enforcement of the law, which undermines other efforts to prevent assault and other crimes occurring. |
Long reaction times or inadequate action of reaction force. | Decreases likelihood of apprehension | Untimely or inappropriate reactions to violence lead to a perception of little control, which will increase perceived risk for the public and decrease perceived risk for the perpetrators. Also, reducing the impact of an assault (by timely intervention) will also be impossoble and lead to greater effects of incidents. |
Presence of vulnerable groups. | Increases the likelihood of conflict. | This may include communities made up of groups with different ethnic or racial backgrounds, or areas where there is a high distribution of elderly people, etc. In gender equality studies, research into the vulnerability of women in urban spaces is often conducted. Often, women, through fear, feel it necessary to consider where they are going (from point A to B through the urban environment), at what time, with whom they will travel, and even what they will wear. |
Incompatible zonings. | Increases of the likelihood of conflict. | Incompatible zonings, and activities therein, can increase the likelihood of vulnerable groups and potential offenders meeting. The composition and compatibility of adjoining land uses should be sufficiently considered by urban planners. |
Low levels of social capital. | Likelihood of offences | A low level of social capital within the community (trust, friendliness, civic involvement, etc) often reflects in elevated street levels of crime, including assault[6]. |
Affluence and deprivation. | Increases the likelihood of conflict. | Together with alcohol consumption, poverty is one of the few socio-economic causes that increases the risk of vulnerable groups such as women, children, adolescents and homosexuals[7] becoming victims of physical violence. The British Crime Survey reveals that areas with council flats, high unemployment and persons living alone or with many lone parent families, and areas with furnished flats and bedsits housing young single people are among the most at-risk of being burgled[8]. Affluent neighbourhoods where residents are absent for extended periods during a day or at weekends and areas with low levels of collective responsibility are particularly attractive to burglars as the risk of getting caught may be low. |
Impacts
Social impacts
From the social point of view, assaults can have various impacts, including generalised fear of crime and over-amplified feeling of insecurity, as well as loss of trust in institutions. There are several approaches to assess and address these impacts in urban planning that is responsive to citizens' security needs. It is particularly important to properly consider the gender perspective and the ecological perspective. The latter addresses the need to find a balance between designing out crime by infrastructure and providing reason for more assaults by building infrastructure that can be perceived by some social groups as unjustly exclusionary.
There are checklists available from research that help address social aspects of security issues such as assault. A recommendable method to involve citizens in urban planning that "designs in" those social aspects is the safety audit.
Other helpful texts on the social impact of assault can be found on the pages of Cultural criminology, Environmental design and Sociospatial perspective.
Economic impact
Assault leads to considerable costs in both a direct (primary) and a indirect (secondary) way[9]. Direct costs of assaults come in the form of:
- Preventive costs in anticipation of assaults (e.g. private security measures);
- Material and immaterial costs as a consequence of assaults (e.g. physical damage, repairs, medical costs, mental harm); and
- Responsive costs to assaults (e.g. the costs of detection and prevention, persecution, support trial, etc.).
A study undertaken in the Netherlands[10] estimated that the average costs of a physical assault in the Netherlands is EUR 5,500 per offence and a mere threat EUR 2,700.[11]. Moreover, there are costs related to behavioural changes due to a fear of victimisation and harm done to the offender’s and victim’s family, friends and acquaintances. These costs are not quantified in the above mentioned studies.
Physical assault and battery do not just create costs for the victim and public authorities, but can also have a negative impact on the whole area or local community, the so called secondary economic impact of crime. Crime prone areas with a long-standing reputation for suffering from much crime are subjects of high mobility of residents, vandalism, empty lots and buildings, businesses with extreme security measures, etc. In addition, one could consider the opportunity costs of police and other public services (like health care services for victim support), and the long term health costs and decrease in income due to the traumatising impact of assaults.
Mobility impacts
The mobility impacts depend on the size of the assault. In most cases, if it concerns only a few people, the mobility impact on the traffic flows or transportation system will be negligible.
Where the assault would lead to an obstruction of the road, traffic flows will be deteriorated, depending on the obstruction and the degree of robustness of the road network. For example, an assault in Dublin, Ireland in December 2012 resulted in one of the city centre's busiest traffic routes being diverted for an extended period while an police investigation was undertaken.
Where the assault would lead to an obstruction of a location of interest, people flows towards this location will be deteriorated. Depending on the type of location (e.g. a household or a commercial business) this obstruction will have an economic impact.
When people are injured or in danger, emergency services will be called to assist. These include the police, ambulances or fire brigades. The emergency services need to know the best route to the incident location, taking into account possible obstructions. Incident management assists in reducing the duration and impact of incidents.
Safety impacts
The safety impact of assault is minor; although the mental or physical damage of the victim can be substantial, the act of assault usually does not influence the level of safety (risk due to non-intentional causes).
Measures
Assault, be it domestic violence or some other form of assault, often occurs as a result of personal situation and conflict between persons with different views, or where alcohol or drugs have heightened emotions/aggression. From an urban planning perspective, a useful and practical aid in decision-making and policy formulation is enhanced interaction between the law enforcement agency and the planning sector. For example, by acquiring the spatial datasets of incidents of reported assault, it may be possible for planners to create a 'hotspots' map of area within the urban environment where a higher proportion of assaults have occurred over time. From this, urban planners could consider what measures could address this problem, and could direct resources where available.
Potential measures that can mitigate the likelihood or impact of assault, are:
- Directing traffic flows can be effective in separating potential offenders from vulnerable groups and/or locations less controlled or controllable. Property offenders will commit crimes within their routine activity spaces. In the aggregate, this means that property crimes are most likely to occur on street segments which are highly accessible within the road network, have higher levels of traffic (or people) flows, and include attractive targets such as apartments, bars, high schools or motels[12].
- Surveillance can be effective on a specific offence (in preventing it or reducing its consequences), but can also be effective in reducing repeat offences if detection is swiftly followed-up by an appropriate intervention. A highly visible form of surveillance can also raise the perceived risk and act as an inhibitor.
- Reaction force is required to intervene and make surveillance effective.
- Target removal can be achieved by removing circumstances that make people vulnerable, or designing out for vulnerable groups. The ethical aspect of doing so should be always be considered. Secluded areas make people more vulnerable to assault and should be avoided in the design of an area. By designing the road network such that traffic flows are spread over the whole area, secluded areas can be prevented. Traffic simulation models (e.g. Urban Strategy, Dynasmart) can help with this by estimating traffic flows for alternative road designs.
- Controlling disinhibitors such as alcohol can directly decrease the problem. A careful design with compatible land uses and activities .
- Creating awareness / stimulating conscience can act as an inhibitor, especially if adopted by the general public.
- Screening where possible and ethical, can act as an effective way to exclude known offenders.
- Access control should be employed in combination with screening to prevent unauthorised access.
- Deflection by providing other releases for aggression (examples?)
Footnotes and references
- ↑ http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/crime-research/hosb1011/hosb1011?view=Binary, page 28
- ↑ http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus06.pdf, table 1
- ↑ http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus06.pdf, table 32
- ↑ http://www.popcenter.org/problems/assaultsinbars/
- ↑ http://www.breakingnews.ie/ireland/man-on-disability-benefit-charged-with-phoenix-park-gig-assault-569201.html
- ↑ Eibner, C. and Evan, W. (2001) Relative Deprivation, Poor Health Habits and Mortality. Available at: http://wws-roxen.princeton.edu/chwpapers/papers/eibner_evans.pdf
- ↑ See e.g.: Straus, M.A, and R.J. Gelles (2009); Zavaschi, M.Z. et al. (2002) http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?pid=S1020-49892002001100006&script=sci_arttext&tlng=es; Huebner, D.M. et al. (2003) http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/full/10.2105/AJPH.94.7.1200
- ↑ Haining, Prof. R. (2010) Analysing Crime Patterns. Available at: http://www.guardianpublic.co.uk/crime-data-burglaries-comment
- ↑ Primary economic impact (or direct effects) are generally defined as the initial, immediate economic output generated by a specific cause (in this case a criminal offence). Secondary economic impact (or indirect effects) are generated each time a subsequent transaction is made, for example, the impact of crime on the real estate value in the neighborhood.
- ↑ Source: SEO (2007).The costs of crime.
- ↑ This is relatively much compared to the average costs of e.g. vandalism (EUR 700 – EUR 950 per case) of property crimes (EUR 1,400 – 1,900 per case), but far less than sexual offences (EUR 48,000 per case) and murder (± EUR 3.2 million) Source: SEO, 2007
- ↑ Daniel J. K. Beavon Correctional Service of Canada P. L. Brantingham and P. J. THE INFLUENCE OF STREET NETWORKS ON THE PATTERNING OF PROPERTY OFFENSES. Brantingham School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University
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