Checklists for dimension consideration
Revision as of 12:39, 29 March 2012 by Stephen (talk | contribs) (→9.5 Types of citizen participation for use in urban planning consultation processes)
Contents
- 1 Checklists for dimension consideration
- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 Dimensions to consider in order to enhance citizens perception of safety in urban crowded places[1]
- 1.3 Factors that affect citizens perception of risk
- 1.4 Indicators for the perception of criticality of infrastructures
- 1.5 Impact of critical infrastructure failure on citizens and society
- 1.6 9.5 Types of citizen participation for use in urban planning consultation processes
- 1.7 Footnotes and references
- 2 MAP
Checklists for dimension consideration
Introduction
t.b.e.
Dimensions to consider in order to enhance citizens perception of safety in urban crowded places[1]
Various dimensions must be considered in order to enhance citizens perception of safety in urban crowded places:
Dimensions with impact on citizens security perception in urban places | Aspects to consider in urban planning |
---|---|
People | Diversity
Marginalized people
Local experts
|
Objects | Light/Lightening
Clarity and vitalization
Plants/maintenance of green areas
Environmental pollution
|
Dynamic elements | Good orientation/overview of public spaces
Traffic speed and circulation
Public places as meeting points
|
Image/Identity of places | Image/Identity
|
Factors that affect citizens perception of risk
Introduction and Sources: t.b.e.
Factor | Description/Example |
---|---|
Voluntariness | Risks from activities considered to be involuntary or imposed (for example, exposure to chemicals and radiation from a terrorist attack using chemical weapons or dirty bombs) are judged to be greater, and are therefore less readily accepted, than risks from voluntary activities (such as smoking, sunbathing or mountain climbing). |
Controllability | Risks from activities considered to be under somebody else’s control (such as the release of nerve gas in a coordinated series of terrorist attacks) are judged to be greater, and are less readily accepted than those from activities considered to be under the control of the individual (such as driving an automobile or riding a bicycle). |
Familiarity | Risks resulting from activities viewed as unfamiliar (such as travel leading to exposure to exotic-sounding infectious diseases) are judged greater than risks resulting from activities viewed as familiar (such as household work). |
Fairness | Risks from activities believed to be unfair or to involve unfair processes (such as inequities in the location of medical facilities) are judged greater than risks from “fair” activities (such as widespread vaccinations). |
Benefits | Risks from activities that seem to have unclear, questionable or diffused personal or economic benefits (for example, proximity to waste-disposal facilities) are judged to be greater than risks resulting from activities with clear benefits (for example, employment or automobile driving). |
Catastrophic potential | Risks from activities associated with potentially high numbers of deaths and injuries grouped in time and space (for example, major terrorist attacks using biological, chemical or nuclear weapons) are judged to be greater than risks from activities that cause deaths and injuries scattered (often apparently randomly) in time and space (for example, household accidents). |
Understanding | Poorly understood risks (such as the health effects of long-term exposure to low doses of toxic chemicals or radiation) are judged to be greater than risks that are well understood or self-explanatory (such as pedestrian accidents or slipping on ice). |
Uncertainty | Risks that are relatively unknown or highly uncertain (such as those associated with genetic engineering) are judged to be greater than risks from activities that appear to be relatively well known to science (such as actuarial risk data related to automobile accidents). |
Effects on children | Activities that appear to put children specifically at risk (such as drinking milk contaminated with radiation or toxic chemicals or pregnant women exposed to radiation or toxic chemicals) are judged to carry greater risks than more-general activities (such as employment). |
Victim identity | Risks from activities that produce identifiable victims (such as an individual worker exposed to high levels of toxic chemicals or radiation, or a child who falls down a well) are judged to be greater than risks from activities that produce statistical victim profiles (such as automobile accidents). |
Dread | Risks from activities that evoke fear, terror or anxiety due to the horrific consequences of exposure (for example to HIV, radiation sickness, cancer, Ebola or smallpox) are judged to be greater than risks from activities that do not arouse such feelings or emotions regarding exposure (for example to common colds or household accidents). |
Trust | Risks from activities associated with individuals, institutions or organizations lacking in trust and credibility (for example, chemical companies or nuclear power plants with poor safety records) are judged to be greater than risks from activities associated with trustworthy and credible sources (for example, regulatory agencies that achieve high levels of compliance from regulated industries). |
Media attention | Risks from activities that generate considerable media attention (such as anthrax attacks using the postal system or accidents at nuclear power plants) are judged to be greater than risks from activities that generate little media attention (such as occupational accidents). |
Accident history | Activities with a history of major accidents or incidents, or frequent minor accidents or incidents (such as leaks from waste-disposal facilities) are judged to carry greater risks than activities with little or no such history (such as recombinant DNA experimentation). |
Reversibility | The risks of potentially irreversible adverse effects (such as birth defects from exposure to a toxic substance or radiation) are judged to be greater than risks considered to be reversible (for example, sports injuries). |
Personal stake | Activities viewed as placing people or their families personally and directly at risk (such as living near a waste-disposal site) are judged to carry greater risks than activities that appear to pose no direct or personal threat (such as the disposal of waste in remote areas). |
Ethical and moral status | Risks from activities believed to be ethically objectionable or morally wrong (such as providing diluted or outdated vaccines for an economically distressed community) are judged to be greater than the risks from ethically neutral activities (such as the side-effects of medication). |
Human versus natural origin | Risks generated by human action, failure or incompetence (such as negligence, inadequate safeguards or operator error) are judged to be greater than risks believed to be caused by nature or “acts of god” (such as exposure to geological radon or cosmic rays).” |
Indicators for the perception of criticality of infrastructures
Introduction and sources: t.b.e.
Indicator | Effects to subjective protection requirements | Empirical determination |
---|---|---|
Experienced/expected extent/duration/season of infrastructure breakdown | Multiplication of breakdown consequences (e.g. power breakdown in winter season; disruption of passenger transport) raise subjective protection requirement. |
|
Direct experience of the breakdown | Visibility and direct experience increase subjective protection requirements; however, disruptions not perceived can rather evoke unrealistic security perception. |
|
Impact on/impairment of one’s own life due to protection measures (e.g. obstructions in air traffic due to security checks) | Weighing of expected benefits from critical infrastructure protection and expected costs/affection influences subjective protection requirement: subjective protection requirement is assessed higher in favour of the expected benefit |
|
Irreversibility of critical infrastructure breakdown and it’s effects (such as cascading effects from supply disruptions; material loss from flood events) | Irreversibility enhances subjective protection requirement. |
|
Individual infrastructure dependence (e.g. canalization-due hygienic measures, water and food supply) | Individual dependence enhances subjective protection requirement. |
|
Degree of physical effects caused by infrastructure breakdown (e.g. starvation due to supply chain breakdown; medical undersupply due to disruption of health and emergency services) | Physical effects perceived to be threatening raise the subjective protection requirement. |
|
Evidence of critical infrastructure benefit | Acknowledgement of the benefit of an infrastructure increases its acceptance compared with another less acknowledged; subjective protection requirement is raised accordingly. |
|
Optionality in infrastructure use | „Voluntariness“ and alternatives for infrastructure use lower the subjective protection requirement |
|
Controllability of both use/functioning of the infrastructure (e.g. car driving vs. plane) | Perception of one’s own capability to control the infrastructure reduces the subjective protection requirement. |
|
Familiarity with infrastructure and comprehension of functioning | The relationship between the level of information/knowledge and vulnerability awareness influences the subjective protection requirement: familiarity by trend increases subjective protection requirement. |
|
Spectacularity and media attention for a potential infrastructure breakdown | High spectacularity and media attention result in high subjective protection requirement. |
|
Unique identity and cultural value of the infrastructure (e.g. St. Peter’s basilica in Rome) | Disruption/destruction of cultural infrastructures can go beyond the material loss and trigger identity crises such as deep uncertainty as a consequence, increasing subjective protection requirement. |
|
Degree of details in media coverage on the effects of potential critical infrastructure breakdown | The more details media reports contain on potential impacts from infrastructure breakdown, the higher the subjective protection requirement |
|
Association of infrastructure with maintenance or improvement of material status | Expected restriction of one’s own lifestyle cause subjective protection requirement. |
|
Direct/indirect exposure of one’s own infrastructure and material values due to infrastructure breakdown | Perceived high degree of affection increases subjective protection requirement. |
|
Experienced/expected individual economic loss/economic cascading effects | According perception of the degree of critical infrastructure dependencies raises subjective protection requirement. |
|
Ownership structure of critical infrastructure | Subjective protection requirements can be influenced according to ownership structure (public vs. private owners; domestic/foreign owners) |
|
Geographical vicinity to critical infrastructure | A simple preference for protection of local infrastructure (assumed for geographical vicinity) or vice versa, rejection and awe of involved costs (assumed for geographical distance) both affect the subjective protection requirement. |
|
Effects of infrastructure breakdown on vulnerable groups (children, elderly in need of care) | Perceived affection of vulnerable groups increases subjective protection requirement. |
|
Hitherto publicly known critical infrastructure breakdowns | Knowledge of formerly happened and similar breakdowns either raises or decreases the subjective protection requirement (reflective fear vs. over-amplification). |
|
Disaster potential of the critical infrastructure (e.g. risks from natural hazards) | Highly perceived/known disaster potential increases subjective protection requirement. |
|
Impairment of infrastructure due to anthropogenic actions (human failure, false usage, accidents, terrorist acts etc.) | Reduced subjective perception of risk or impairment decreases subjective protection requirement |
|
Impact of critical infrastructure failure on citizens and society
Types of societal impact of critical infrastructure breakdown can be viewed on http://securipedia.eu/mediawiki/index.php/Infrastructure#tab=Infrastructure
9.5 Types of citizen participation for use in urban planning consultation processes
Introduction and source: t.b.e. Stakeholders, Stakeholder Involvement,
Type of participation | Concept |
---|---|
Information |
|
Consultation |
|
Consensus building |
|
Decision-making |
|
Risk-sharing |
|
Partnership |
|
Self-management |
|
Footnotes and references
MAP
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