Security issue: Destruction by fanatics

Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This belongs to::threat is exerted out of wilful action by either terrorists or criminal activists.

Description

We see that the subject of fanatics (terrorists or criminal activists) can be either persons, objects, or both. This category of security issues focusses on the threat directed towards objects. When directed at people, it falls under the category of mass killing.

The motives for destructing objects by fanatics can mostly be found in the amount of attention that this yields. This motive gives a very good clue of what might be potential targets for fanatics: not only should its destruction yield a fair amount of attention, but also it should be the kind of attention that would help the fanatics' 'cause'. Depending on the fanatics faction, this can entail a wide variety of reactions; for some factions, negative attention is not unwanted. We see this in the 11 September 2001 attack on the New York Trade Center. Although this generated almost uniformly negative responses in the western world, this was received with joy by the responsible faction (al-Qaeda).

Another motive for attacking objects is as a force multiplier for an attack on people. This can be used on urban objects if:

• the object can be potentially harmful to humans (such as chemical plants, oil/gas refineries and storages, nuclear plants, etcetera)
• the object provides an essential service to the well-being of humans and belongs to the critical infrastructure. In this case, its failure can bring harm to the people.

If either of these conditions is true, one should be aware that in the eyes of fanatics seeking mass killing, it could be perceived as an attractive object and appropriate measures could be in order.

Contributing circumstances

Known circumstances to influence the likelihood or effect of robbery are presented in the table below:

Contributing Circumstance	Influence	Description
Presence of attractive objects.	Increases attractiveness	Studies have shown that some objects are more attractive for fanatics than others. These various objects can be classified into categories of equal attractiveness. For the assessment of the attractiveness of a location, Securban determines the highest category that has objects that are also present on the location under investigation.
Presence of objects with symbolic value.	Increases attractiveness	For an attack to have the desired effect (in the eyes of terrorists), it needs to be associated with their 'cause'. Objects which can be associated to their ideological beliefs will assure the 'right' message will be carried. One should realise that what constitutes an ideologically attractive object should be assessed from the viewpoint of the fanatic.
Presence of prominent objects.	Increases attractiveness	For an attack to have the desired effect (in the eyes of terrorists), it needs to attract wide attention. Damage to prominent objects will do this and this makes these objects more attractive to fanatics.
Location with symbolic value.	Increases attractiveness	For an attack to have the desired effect (in the eyes of terrorists), it needs to be associated with their 'cause'. Objects situated on a location that has an association to their ideological beliefs will further assure the 'right' message will be carried. As an example, a mosque carries some ideological value, but if this mosque is located in Jerusalem or even on the temple mount, its ideological value increases multifold.
Presence of safety threats that could be misused.	Increases attractiveness	Sometimes, an object is used as a force multiplier for an attack directed at people. This can be used on urban objects if: the object can be potentially harmful to humans (such as chemical plants, oil/gas refineries and storages, nuclear plants, etcetera) the object provides an essential service to the well-being of humans and belongs to the critical infrastructure. In this case, its failure can bring harm to the people. The presence of such an object in the vicinity of large groups of people can raise the attractiveness and attainability for an attack by fanatics and therefore increase the risk.
Lack of surveillance and attention.	Decreases risk of detection.	A low level of surveillance or attention, decreases the risk of detection (particularly in the preparation phase of an attack) for a perpetrator and thereby increases the attractiveness.
Long reaction times or inadequate action of intervention force.	Decreases likelihood of apprehension	Untimely or inappropriate reactions to violence lead to a perception of little control, which will increase perceived risk for the public and decrease perceived risk for the perpetrators.

• attractive object
• perceived as attainable target
• destruction would 'further the cause'

Socio-economic causes

The roots of terrorism can also be found in certain poor or unfavourable conditions such as relative economic deprivation (manifested in poverty, income inequality, etc.), socio-economic change (fostered by the process of for example modernisation) and economic and political integration. Crime is closely related to poverty, social exclusion, wage and income inequality, cultural and family background, level of education and other economic and social factors.

Related links:

• The economics of terrorist behaviour
• The economics of crime

Impacts

The remaining lower part of the World Trade Center in New York City

The impacts of destruction by fanatics can range from fairly minor to very severe, but for the persons involved the act are almost invariably traumatic.

The example of the September 2001 attacks are well-known, but one should realise that many more terrorist factions exist. One of the manifestations of destruction of properties is destruction by fanatics that are concerned with the preservation of the ecosystem, also known as Eco-terrorism. These activities range from sabotage, to arson and even the firing of rockets.

A list of current organisations that are designated as being of a terrorist nature, can be found on Wikipedia on the page List_of_designated_terrorist_organizations.

In order to assess the attractiveness of any urban object for this threat, one should compare the motives and prevailing attack methods of each of these terrorist groups with the properties of the object at hand. As these threats will change over the years and the object will not (interim alterations left aside), the urban planner should rather plan its measures for generic types of terrorist organisations.

Social impacts

Known social impacts of destruction by fanatics include changing citizens perception of (in)security and fear of crime. This usually happens in a way that has an effect on the gap between "felt" and "factual" security, since individuals tend to make - correct or incorrect - reasoning on societal security as a whole based on immediate environmental clues. This is known as the "broken glass phenomenon".

Economic impact

Destruction by fanatics leads to considerable costs in both a direct (primary) and a indirect (secondary) way. Direct costs of destruction by fanatics come in the form of:

• Preventive costs in anticipation of destruction by fanatics (e.g. security measures, insurance);
• Material and immaterial costs as a consequence of destruction by fanatics (e.g. physical damage, repairs, medical costs, mental harm); and
• Responsive costs to destruction by fanatics (e.g. the costs of detection and prevention, prosecution, support trial, etc.).

Terrorist events and violent crime not only lead to material and immaterial costs for those who have become victimized, but also forces local and national authorities to spend billions on the prevention of terrorism and the detection, prosecution and punishment of terrorists (the primary economic impact of terrorism).

In addition to the primary economic impacts, terrorism and violent crime cause the disruption of economic entities which have not been direct targets of the attack (the secondary economic impacts of terrorism).

Measures

• Target hardening can be done by making it harder to take weapons of mass destruction to a vulnerable location, e.g. by separating traffic flows so car bombs cannot come close to attractive or vulnerable objects, reducing the effect of the weapon. For support on construction methods and materials that mitigate explosion effects and structural collapse one can use the Plan level tools and Detail level tools.
• Access control, combined with directing traffic flows can be used to assure all traffic entering and exiting a location passes at certain, predestined points. This allows for all traffic to be monitored (Surveillance) or even screened (see below).
• Directing traffic flows in its own can be used to separate possible threats from potential targets. By directing car traffic from vulnerable locations, the risk from attacks by car (such as car bombs or ramming by car) can substantially be reduced.
• Surveillance can help to detect suspicious activities, like cars parked at prohibited locations or groups of people monitoring the situation (in a preparation phase of the attack).
• Intervention forces can be used to act when suspicious activities have been detected. These intervention forces range from normal guards, who can investigate the seriousness of reports made by the public to bomb squads.
• Screening can be used to test a flow of traffic for suspicious signs. This can include metal detectors, trained personnel looking for people carrying suspicious luggage, random car searches, etcetera. The gravity of the measures taken should always be in balance with the threat and the nature of the location.