Difference between revisions of "Security culture"
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=Security culture= |
=Security culture= |
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'''Security culture''' is a cognitive concept, that |
'''Security culture''' is a cognitive concept, that |
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| − | * looks into how groups of people perceive things and how this perception can be explained/predicted/modified; |
+ | * looks into how groups of people perceive things and how this [[Perception of (in)security|perception]] can be explained/predicted/modified; |
| − | * depends on culturally embedded meanings of risk. |
+ | * depends on culturally embedded meanings of [[risk]]. |
| − | Behaviour has cultural roots that need to be understood. Cultural conceptions of risk, security and solutions to security problems vary according to the organization of political and social relations, common values, worldviews of a system/culture. |
+ | Behaviour has cultural roots that need to be understood. Cultural conceptions of risk, [[security]] and solutions to security problems vary according to the organization of political and social relations, common values, worldviews of a system/culture. |
Criminological research has typically identified cultural (and socialization-related) factors in relation with crime occurrence and risk of crime (actual threat): cultural norms, political culture, ideological constructions. Security consciousness becomes a culture when a community as a whole adopts this awareness and demonstrates that those behaviours which violate security are unacceptable. |
Criminological research has typically identified cultural (and socialization-related) factors in relation with crime occurrence and risk of crime (actual threat): cultural norms, political culture, ideological constructions. Security consciousness becomes a culture when a community as a whole adopts this awareness and demonstrates that those behaviours which violate security are unacceptable. |
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| ⚫ | Counter-terrorism design reflects a nations security culture in terms of terrorism security, which is varying across nations and is particularly pronounced in countries with higher attack histories. Counter-terrorism good design is considered to include risk response and integrating protective security measures. |
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*the ''citizen level'' (focusing on [[Perception of (in)security|perceptions of security/insecurity]]) and |
*the ''citizen level'' (focusing on [[Perception of (in)security|perceptions of security/insecurity]]) and |
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*the ''government level'' (focusing on security-enhancing interventions). |
*the ''government level'' (focusing on security-enhancing interventions). |
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# Security culture impacts behaviour in a positive or negative way. |
# Security culture impacts behaviour in a positive or negative way. |
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# If public/social perception of risks and security remains unconsidered in security installations and measures, these measures are often ineffective: |
# If public/social perception of risks and security remains unconsidered in security installations and measures, these measures are often ineffective: |
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| ⚫ | * Counter-terrorism design reflects a nations security culture in terms of terrorism security, which is varying across nations and is particularly pronounced in countries with higher attack histories (government level). Counter-terrorism good design is considered to include risk response and integrating protective security measures. |
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| + | ==Approaches how to address it== |
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| + | *Consider public perceptions and conceptions of risk and security (from studies, surveys etc.); |
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| + | *Involve citizens (see: [[citizen participation]]) in the planning process to find out: |
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| + | - Would they use and accept the planned structures/objects/security installations? |
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| + | - Do the planned issues correspond to their ideas? |
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| + | - What would they need to feel safer? |
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| + | - Do they realize the risk/security problem and the need of the measure? |
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| + | - Do they need additional information and education? |
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| + | *Provide information on backgrounds: planning principles and standards, national security concerns and problems, ways and options to counteract, handling of new installations etc. |
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| ⚫ | For example, criminological research has typically identified the following cultural (and socialization-related) factors in relation with crime occurrence and risk of crime (actual threat)<ref>Rob(ert Douglas) White and Daphne Habibis, Crime and Society. Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 67-68. </ref>: |
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| − | Security culture as a specific approach investigates assessments of pre-existing world-views, styles of perception and standard operating procedures that guide public security/security threat perceptions, as well as the perception of security research and technology-based [[security]] solutions. |
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| − | It does so by four key drivers described below (normative values, knowledge, symbols, action repertories). A further, cross-cutting aspect of analysis is the cultural selection of risks that can be developed into scenarios for future “securitization” and “de-securitization”,<ref>Cf. Thierry Balzacq (ed.): Securitization theory: how security problems emerge and dissolve. London: Routledge, 2011.</ref> that is basically, which aspects of life are going to be – or not to be – perceived as security-related in the future (e.g. corruption could be perceived as a prior economic issue, as a prior criminal justice issue, or as a prior security issue). |
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| − | ==Basic assumption== |
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| − | The general assumption of cultural approaches to the perception of (in)security is that things such as [[cultural criminology|fear of crime]] depend on culturally embedded meanings of risk, largely following the “cultural theory of risk”<ref>See especially Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture. Berkeley, CA et al.: University of California Press, 1982</ref>. This theory assumes that different perceptions and disputes about risk and security can be linked to competing worldviews: conceptions of risk, security and solutions to security problems vary according to the organization of political and social relations. Risks and security threats are selected as important because this reinforces established interpretations and relations within a culture, thus reproducing the symbolic foundations of a community. |
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| − | For example, immigrant cultures may be interpreted as the cause of social radicalization processes that mount up to threats to internal security (such as in France or the Netherlands); differently, a user security culture may be interpreted as a social firewall against IT security offences (as it is the case in Sweden). |
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| − | ==Four models== |
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| − | A (chronologically) first school of thought ('''Model I''') understands culture as the ideational representation of foundational decisions about basic normative values (e.g. democracy, European integration, justice liberty and security), which shape the normative arena in which political decisions then take place. Seminal authors are Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963)<ref>Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, NJ: University of Princeton Press, 1963.</ref>. |
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| − | A second school of thought ('''Model II''') sees cultural factors as cognitive forms by which members of social communities make sense of reality, attribute meaning to facts as well as save and reproduce knowledge and their interpretation of the world. A seminal author is Clifford Geertz (1973)<ref>Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973.</ref>. |
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| − | A third school of thought ('''Model III''') conceives of culture as common symbols of a (national or even transnational) community to which members of a society orient their action and which are a kind of software for operating interfaces between actors (e.g. EU Member States) and overarching structures (i.e. European institutions for security research coordination and governance). The cultural key to the functioning of such interfaces is seen as a system of symbols that is flexible enough to reflect and adapt to new threats and challenges. A seminal author is Robert Wuthnow (1984)<ref>Robert Wuthnow et al., Cultural Analysis. The Work of Peter L. Berger, Mary Douglas, Michel Foucault, and Jürgen Habermas. Boston, MA et al.: Routledge/Kegan Paul, 1984.</ref>. |
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| − | A fourth school ('''Model IV''') conceives of culture as action repertories, that is, individual (or proprietary) experience-based strategies associated with individual attributions of meaning and normative convictions. This concept is strong in explaining how existing strategies and courses of action may determine which policy goals are developed or met, rather than strategies and courses of action being allotted to defined goals. A seminal author is Ann Swidler (1986)<ref>Ann Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” American Sociological Review 51 (1986): 273-286.</ref>. |
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| − | ==Criminological accounts== |
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*Cultural norms that define masculinity and act as enablers for the practice of violence by marginalized young men, feeling themselves excluded from normal paths of enacting the gender-specific norms they have been socialized into, in order to demonstrate virility. |
*Cultural norms that define masculinity and act as enablers for the practice of violence by marginalized young men, feeling themselves excluded from normal paths of enacting the gender-specific norms they have been socialized into, in order to demonstrate virility. |
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| − | ==Checklist for consideration of security culture in urban planning== |
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Revision as of 15:52, 11 October 2012
Contents
Security culture
Security culture is a cognitive concept, that
- looks into how groups of people perceive things and how this perception can be explained/predicted/modified;
- depends on culturally embedded meanings of risk.
Behaviour has cultural roots that need to be understood. Cultural conceptions of risk, security and solutions to security problems vary according to the organization of political and social relations, common values, worldviews of a system/culture.
Criminological research has typically identified cultural (and socialization-related) factors in relation with crime occurrence and risk of crime (actual threat): cultural norms, political culture, ideological constructions. Security consciousness becomes a culture when a community as a whole adopts this awareness and demonstrates that those behaviours which violate security are unacceptable.
Security culture can be applied at two levels of analysis:
- the citizen level (focusing on perceptions of security/insecurity) and
- the government level (focusing on security-enhancing interventions).
- Security culture impacts behaviour in a positive or negative way.
- If public/social perception of risks and security remains unconsidered in security installations and measures, these measures are often ineffective:
- People behave according to their cultural roots and not because planners want them to do so – accordingly they react to security measures differently.
- Citizens’s conceptions of security solutions are based on their cultural roots, the cultural norms of the society and organization forms they live in: they have certain expectations and pictures, also from new objects/places/measures.
- Citizens conceptions and perceptions strongly correlate with history and what they individually recall: did the region/nation face severe security problems in history? How did the region/nation/government handle this? – If there is awareness, the need for protection is more urgent.
- Counter-terrorism design reflects a nations security culture in terms of terrorism security, which is varying across nations and is particularly pronounced in countries with higher attack histories (government level). Counter-terrorism good design is considered to include risk response and integrating protective security measures.
Approaches how to address it
- Consider public perceptions and conceptions of risk and security (from studies, surveys etc.);
- Involve citizens (see: citizen participation) in the planning process to find out:
- Would they use and accept the planned structures/objects/security installations? - Do the planned issues correspond to their ideas? - What would they need to feel safer? - Do they realize the risk/security problem and the need of the measure? - Do they need additional information and education?
- Provide information on backgrounds: planning principles and standards, national security concerns and problems, ways and options to counteract, handling of new installations etc.
- Identify and analyze the social context to which the tool/measure is applied;
- Use a comprehensive concept to identify vulnerability in order to reflect the multidimensionality of threats;
- Identify and address future factors of vulnerability and resilience;
- Identify citizens’ self-perceptions of vulnerability and resilience;
- Identify citizens’ self-perception of their coping capabilities;
- Analyze the distribution of gaps between felt and factual security across society;
- Analyze the relevant public security cultures on both the level of government and the level of citizens.
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For example, criminological research has typically identified the following cultural (and socialization-related) factors in relation with crime occurrence and risk of crime (actual threat)[1]:
- Cultural norms that define masculinity and act as enablers for the practice of violence by marginalized young men, feeling themselves excluded from normal paths of enacting the gender-specific norms they have been socialized into, in order to demonstrate virility.
- Cultural norms that define masculinity and dehumanize people who derive from the dominant culture of normalcy (e.g. violence against homosexual males)
- Political culture providing a breeding ground for hate crimes against people representing otherness.
- Ideological constructions of social systems such as the family that involves a sense of right of – even violent – control e.g. of men over women.
- Cultural norms of acceptable violence such as in sport, schools and entertainment that can however trigger excesses of violence.
Personal vs. social fear of crime
Among the important results from security culture analysis on the citizen level is the distinction between “personal” and social fear of crime and its interrelation[2]:
- Personal fear of crime (crime perceived as an individual or an individualized problem)
Actual insecurity particularly increases social fear of crime (perception of crime as a problem “out there”) but decreases personal fear of crime (perception of crime as an individual concern).
- Social fear of crime (crime perceived as a problem “out there” in the society, irrespective of personal impact)
Social fear of crime reduces personal fear of crime: Strong knowledge and interpretative contexts present on the national level are a cultural factor that decreases citizens’ individual perception of insecurity.
Critics
Security culture has not remained uncontested. This is in particular because it typically lacks empirical substantiation. Other concepts, as for example applied in urbanization studies, strongly argue that differences between actual and perceived security are mainly media constructs, especially the salience media assign to crime incidents so to grasp public fear and catch attention for their product. Referring to studies in the UK, readers of boulevard newspapers (“tabloids”) have twice the probability to exhibit specific fear of crime (violence, burglary and car crime) than readers of quality press (“broadsheets”).[3] This assumption nevertheless deserves contextualization, for which culture also appears to be a relevant dimension. In fact, readers of tabloids arguably belong to different social strata by trend than readers of higher quality press, and may be confronted with more difficult realities. Therefore, empirical results of this kind should be complemented by an analysis of the social, if not cultural context.
Footnotes and references
- ↑ Rob(ert Douglas) White and Daphne Habibis, Crime and Society. Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 67-68.
- ↑ Andrea Jerković/Alexander Siedschlag: Primary Interpretation of Survey Findings to Identify National Citizen Security Cultures. WWEDU Center for European Security Studies, Analytical Standpoint, no. 12 (November 2008). Retrieved from http://www.european-security.info/asp12.pdf [2012-04-03].
- ↑ United Nations Human Settlements Programme, Enhancing Urban Safety and Security: Global Report on Human Settlements 2007. London: Earthscan 2007 <http://mirror.unhabitat.org/pmss/getElectronicVersion.aspx?nr=2432&alt=1>, ch. 3.
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