Difference between revisions of "Security culture"
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
=Security culture= |
=Security culture= |
||
| + | '''Security culture''' is a theoretical concept of analysis that also provides guidelines for practical use. It is based on a cognitive concept (that looks into how groups of people perceive things and how this perception can be explained and to some extend predicted, as well as modified). |
||
| − | '''Security culture''' |
||
| + | |||
| + | ==Criminological accounts== |
||
| + | '''Criminological accounts''', culture as a concept is often blurred and simply equated with everyday living conditions and conditions of social exclusion and in-group/out-group formation. Culture is also often accounted for in the limited scope of a normative behavioural concept. For example, criminological research has typically identified the following cultural (and socialization-related) factors in relation with crime occurrence and risk of crime (actual threat)<ref>Rob(ert Douglas) White and Daphne Habibis, Crime and Society. Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press, 67-68. </ref>: |
||
| + | *Cultural norms that define masculinity and act as enablers for the practice of violence by marginalized young men, feeling themselves excluded from normal paths of enacting the gender-specific norms they have been socialized into, in order to demonstrate virility. |
||
| + | *Cultural norms that define masculinity and dehumanize people who derive from the dominant culture of normalcy (e.g. violence against homosexual males) |
||
| + | *Political culture providing a breeding ground for hate crimes against people representing otherness. |
||
| + | *Ideological constructions of social systems such as the family that involves a sense of right of – even violent – control e.g. of men over women. |
||
| + | *Cultural norms of acceptable violence such as in sport, schools and entertainment that can however trigger excesses of violence. |
||
| + | |||
| + | |||
| + | ==Security culture as a specific approach== |
||
| + | Security culture as a specific approach/tool for analysis can by applied on two levels of analysis: |
||
| + | |||
| + | *the citizen level (focusing on perceptions of security/insecurity) and |
||
| + | *the government level (focusing on security-enhancing interventions). |
||
| + | |||
| + | Security culture as a specific approach investigates assessments of pre-existing world-views, styles of perception and standard operating procedures that guide public security/security threat perceptions, as well as the perception of security research and technology-based security solutions. It does so by four key drivers described below (normative values, knowledge, symbols, action repertories). A further, cross-cutting aspect of analysis is the cultural selection of risks that can be developed into scenarios for future “securitisation” and “de-securitisation” (see Balzacq 2011), that is basically, which aspects of life are going to be – or not to be – perceived as security-related in the future (e.g. corruption could be perceived as a prior economic issue, as a prior criminal justice issue, or as a prior security issue). |
||
| + | |||
| + | ==Basic assumption== |
||
| + | The general assumption of cultural approaches to the perception of (in)security is that things such as fear of crime depend on culturally embedded meanings of risk, largely following the “cultural theory of risk”<ref>See especially Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture. Berkeley, CA et al.: University of California Press, 1982</ref>. This theory assumes that different perceptions and disputes about risk and security can be linked to competing worldviews: conceptions of risk, security and solutions to security problems vary according to the organization of political and social relations. Risks and security threats are selected as important because this reinforces established interpretations and relations within a culture, thus reproducing the symbolic foundations of a community. |
||
| + | |||
| + | For example, immigrant cultures may be interpreted as the cause of social radicalisation processes that mount up to threats to internal security (such as in France or the Netherlands); differently, a user security culture may be interpreted as a social firewall against IT security offences (as it is the case in Sweden). |
||
| + | |||
| + | ==Four models== |
||
| + | A (chronologically) first school of thought (model I) understands culture as the ideational representation of foundational decisions about basic normative values (e.g. democracy, European integration, justice liberty and security), which shape the normative arena in which political decisions then take place. Seminal authors are Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963)<ref>Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, NJ: University of Princeton Press, 1963.</ref>. |
||
| + | |||
| + | A second school of thought (model II) sees cultural factors as cognitive forms by which members of social communities make sense of reality, attribute meaning to facts as well as save and reproduce knowledge and their interpretation of the world. A seminal author is Clifford Geertz (1973)<ref>Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973.</ref>. |
||
| + | |||
| + | A third school of thought (model III) conceives of culture as common symbols of a (national or even transnational) community to which members of a society orient their action and which are a kind of software for operating interfaces between actors (e.g. EU Member States) and overarching structures (i.e. European institutions for security research coordination and governance). The cultural key to the functioning of such interfaces is seen as a system of symbols that is flexible enough to reflect and adapt to new threats and challenges. A seminal author is Robert Wuthnow (1984)<ref>Robert Wuthnow et al., Cultural Analysis. The Work of Peter L. Berger, Mary Douglas, Michel Foucault, and Jürgen Habermas. Boston, MA et al.: Routledge/Kegan Paul, 1984.</ref>. |
||
| + | |||
| + | A fourth school (model IV) conceives of culture as action repertories, that is, individual (or proprietary) experience-based strategies associated with individual attributions of meaning and normative convictions. This concept is strong in explaining how existing strategies and courses of action may determine which policy goals are developed or met, rather than strategies and courses of action being allotted to defined goals. A seminal author is Ann Swidler (1986)<ref>Ann Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” American Sociological Review 51 (1986): 273-286.</ref>. |
||
| + | |||
| + | |||
| + | |||
| + | |||
| + | |||
| − | Draft workspace |
||
* identify and analyze the social context to which the tool is applied; |
* identify and analyze the social context to which the tool is applied; |
||
Revision as of 16:00, 3 April 2012
Contents
Security culture
Security culture is a theoretical concept of analysis that also provides guidelines for practical use. It is based on a cognitive concept (that looks into how groups of people perceive things and how this perception can be explained and to some extend predicted, as well as modified).
Criminological accounts
Criminological accounts, culture as a concept is often blurred and simply equated with everyday living conditions and conditions of social exclusion and in-group/out-group formation. Culture is also often accounted for in the limited scope of a normative behavioural concept. For example, criminological research has typically identified the following cultural (and socialization-related) factors in relation with crime occurrence and risk of crime (actual threat)[1]:
- Cultural norms that define masculinity and act as enablers for the practice of violence by marginalized young men, feeling themselves excluded from normal paths of enacting the gender-specific norms they have been socialized into, in order to demonstrate virility.
- Cultural norms that define masculinity and dehumanize people who derive from the dominant culture of normalcy (e.g. violence against homosexual males)
- Political culture providing a breeding ground for hate crimes against people representing otherness.
- Ideological constructions of social systems such as the family that involves a sense of right of – even violent – control e.g. of men over women.
- Cultural norms of acceptable violence such as in sport, schools and entertainment that can however trigger excesses of violence.
Security culture as a specific approach
Security culture as a specific approach/tool for analysis can by applied on two levels of analysis:
- the citizen level (focusing on perceptions of security/insecurity) and
- the government level (focusing on security-enhancing interventions).
Security culture as a specific approach investigates assessments of pre-existing world-views, styles of perception and standard operating procedures that guide public security/security threat perceptions, as well as the perception of security research and technology-based security solutions. It does so by four key drivers described below (normative values, knowledge, symbols, action repertories). A further, cross-cutting aspect of analysis is the cultural selection of risks that can be developed into scenarios for future “securitisation” and “de-securitisation” (see Balzacq 2011), that is basically, which aspects of life are going to be – or not to be – perceived as security-related in the future (e.g. corruption could be perceived as a prior economic issue, as a prior criminal justice issue, or as a prior security issue).
Basic assumption
The general assumption of cultural approaches to the perception of (in)security is that things such as fear of crime depend on culturally embedded meanings of risk, largely following the “cultural theory of risk”[2]. This theory assumes that different perceptions and disputes about risk and security can be linked to competing worldviews: conceptions of risk, security and solutions to security problems vary according to the organization of political and social relations. Risks and security threats are selected as important because this reinforces established interpretations and relations within a culture, thus reproducing the symbolic foundations of a community.
For example, immigrant cultures may be interpreted as the cause of social radicalisation processes that mount up to threats to internal security (such as in France or the Netherlands); differently, a user security culture may be interpreted as a social firewall against IT security offences (as it is the case in Sweden).
Four models
A (chronologically) first school of thought (model I) understands culture as the ideational representation of foundational decisions about basic normative values (e.g. democracy, European integration, justice liberty and security), which shape the normative arena in which political decisions then take place. Seminal authors are Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963)[3].
A second school of thought (model II) sees cultural factors as cognitive forms by which members of social communities make sense of reality, attribute meaning to facts as well as save and reproduce knowledge and their interpretation of the world. A seminal author is Clifford Geertz (1973)[4].
A third school of thought (model III) conceives of culture as common symbols of a (national or even transnational) community to which members of a society orient their action and which are a kind of software for operating interfaces between actors (e.g. EU Member States) and overarching structures (i.e. European institutions for security research coordination and governance). The cultural key to the functioning of such interfaces is seen as a system of symbols that is flexible enough to reflect and adapt to new threats and challenges. A seminal author is Robert Wuthnow (1984)[5].
A fourth school (model IV) conceives of culture as action repertories, that is, individual (or proprietary) experience-based strategies associated with individual attributions of meaning and normative convictions. This concept is strong in explaining how existing strategies and courses of action may determine which policy goals are developed or met, rather than strategies and courses of action being allotted to defined goals. A seminal author is Ann Swidler (1986)[6].
- identify and analyze the social context to which the tool is applied;
- use a comprehensive concept to identify vulnerability in order to reflect the multidimensionality of threats;
- designed to also identify and address future factors of vulnerability and resilience;
- identify citizens’ self-perceptions of vulnerability and resilience;
- identify citizens’ self-perception of their coping capabilities;
- analyze the distribution of gaps between felt and factual security across society;
- analyze the relevant public security cultures on both the level of government and the level of citizens.
Related articles
Footnotes and references
- ↑ Rob(ert Douglas) White and Daphne Habibis, Crime and Society. Oxford et al.: Oxford University Press, 67-68.
- ↑ See especially Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture. Berkeley, CA et al.: University of California Press, 1982
- ↑ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, NJ: University of Princeton Press, 1963.
- ↑ Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
- ↑ Robert Wuthnow et al., Cultural Analysis. The Work of Peter L. Berger, Mary Douglas, Michel Foucault, and Jürgen Habermas. Boston, MA et al.: Routledge/Kegan Paul, 1984.
- ↑ Ann Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” American Sociological Review 51 (1986): 273-286.
MAP
<websiteFrame>
website=http://securipedia.eu/cool/index.php?wiki=securipedia.eu&concept=Security_culture
height=1023
width=100%
border=0
scroll=auto
align=middle
</websiteFrame>
<headertabs/>
