Checklists for dimension consideration

Checklists for dimension consideration

Introduction

t.b.e.

Dimensions to consider in order to enhance citizens perception of safety in urban crowded places

Various dimensions must be considered in order to enhance citizens perception of safety in urban crowded places:

Dimensions with impact on citizens security perception in urban places	Aspects to consider in urban planning
People	Diversity Usage patterns of an urban area and related needs of the user(inclusive spaces) Facilitation of usage possibilities for different types of people (integrative spaces) Allow communication through the design of public spaces (meeting points) Marginalized people Marginalized people not only use public space, they also rely on it The usage of public space should be encouraged and supported by planning toilets, banks etc. Create roofed areas (sheltered installations) with no specific function Local experts Local experts, like policeman or social workers of a public place, can easily identify and broach (social) issues of the area and therefore represent an important source of information and for urban planners In each planning step, urban planners should involve interdisciplinary teams, consisting of planners and local experts
Objects	Light/Lightening Public places should be designed in areas with different illumination types In order to avoid “hot spots of fear”, the planning of main streets, parks, pedestrian underpasses, subways etc. should consider powerful lightening and clear visible areas Clarity and vitalization Urban planners should use more glazed materials to facilitate the visibility and an easy overview of public places Improve social security by using robust and sustainable materials Plants/maintenance of green areas Consider esthetic and functional aspects of green areas Avoid planning green tunnels and green areas with no visibility and clear overview Environmental pollution Environmental pollution increases the citizens perception of insecurity on public spaces. Therefore urban planners should promote long-lasting and sustainable materials Effective and use-oriented urban planning focuses also on reducing environmental pollution (e.g. waste bins, free toilets)
Dynamic elements	Good orientation/overview of public spaces Urban planning should concentrate on the overview of urban areas for the purpose of orientation Use a clear guidance system for important functional areas, like subway, stations of public transports or pedestrian underpasses. Introduce adequate usage concepts for different mobility patterns (e.g. pedestrian, bicycle) Important target points/destinations should be visible from a longer distance Traffic speed and circulation Introduce adequate usage concepts for different traffic patterns (e.g. bicycle, public transports) Concentrate both on functional and esthetic aspects of public spaces – allow the possibility of “shared space” in order to enable urban and social skills (competences) Public places as meeting points The urban planning process should provide concepts for different comfortable and “cozy” public spaces, where people living in the same urban area can spend time together, get to know each other etc: familiar encounters in the residential area increase the subjective sense of security.
Image/Identity of places	Image/Identity In this context, image means the reputation of a place, meanwhile identity is characterized by the history and usage of it. It is very important that urban planners consider these two aspects to create secure and agreeable rehabilitation of places. Diverse actions of public participation helps to integrate elements of identity and image of a public space in the urban planning process Each step of the urban planning process should consider aspects of identity and image of urban areas

Factors that affect citizens perception of risk

Introduction and Sources: t.b.e.

Factor	Description/Example
Voluntariness	Risks from activities considered to be involuntary or imposed (for example, exposure to chemicals and radiation from a terrorist attack using chemical weapons or dirty bombs) are judged to be greater, and are therefore less readily accepted, than risks from voluntary activities (such as smoking, sunbathing or mountain climbing).
Controllability	Risks from activities considered to be under somebody else’s control (such as the release of nerve gas in a coordinated series of terrorist attacks) are judged to be greater, and are less readily accepted than those from activities considered to be under the control of the individual (such as driving an automobile or riding a bicycle).
Familiarity	Risks resulting from activities viewed as unfamiliar (such as travel leading to exposure to exotic-sounding infectious diseases) are judged greater than risks resulting from activities viewed as familiar (such as household work).
Fairness	Risks from activities believed to be unfair or to involve unfair processes (such as inequities in the location of medical facilities) are judged greater than risks from “fair” activities (such as widespread vaccinations).
Benefits	Risks from activities that seem to have unclear, questionable or diffused personal or economic benefits (for example, proximity to waste-disposal facilities) are judged to be greater than risks resulting from activities with clear benefits (for example, employment or automobile driving).
Catastrophic potential	Risks from activities associated with potentially high numbers of deaths and injuries grouped in time and space (for example, major terrorist attacks using biological, chemical or nuclear weapons) are judged to be greater than risks from activities that cause deaths and injuries scattered (often apparently randomly) in time and space (for example, household accidents).
Understanding	Poorly understood risks (such as the health effects of long-term exposure to low doses of toxic chemicals or radiation) are judged to be greater than risks that are well understood or self-explanatory (such as pedestrian accidents or slipping on ice).
Uncertainty	Risks that are relatively unknown or highly uncertain (such as those associated with genetic engineering) are judged to be greater than risks from activities that appear to be relatively well known to science (such as actuarial risk data related to automobile accidents).
Effects on children	Activities that appear to put children specifically at risk (such as drinking milk contaminated with radiation or toxic chemicals or pregnant women exposed to radiation or toxic chemicals) are judged to carry greater risks than more-general activities (such as employment).
Victim identity	Risks from activities that produce identifiable victims (such as an individual worker exposed to high levels of toxic chemicals or radiation, or a child who falls down a well) are judged to be greater than risks from activities that produce statistical victim profiles (such as automobile accidents).
Dread	Risks from activities that evoke fear, terror or anxiety due to the horrific consequences of exposure (for example to HIV, radiation sickness, cancer, Ebola or smallpox) are judged to be greater than risks from activities that do not arouse such feelings or emotions regarding exposure (for example to common colds or household accidents).
Trust	Risks from activities associated with individuals, institutions or organizations lacking in trust and credibility (for example, chemical companies or nuclear power plants with poor safety records) are judged to be greater than risks from activities associated with trustworthy and credible sources (for example, regulatory agencies that achieve high levels of compliance from regulated industries).
Media attention	Risks from activities that generate considerable media attention (such as anthrax attacks using the postal system or accidents at nuclear power plants) are judged to be greater than risks from activities that generate little media attention (such as occupational accidents).
Accident history	Activities with a history of major accidents or incidents, or frequent minor accidents or incidents (such as leaks from waste-disposal facilities) are judged to carry greater risks than activities with little or no such history (such as recombinant DNA experimentation).
Reversibility	The risks of potentially irreversible adverse effects (such as birth defects from exposure to a toxic substance or radiation) are judged to be greater than risks considered to be reversible (for example, sports injuries).
Personal stake	Activities viewed as placing people or their families personally and directly at risk (such as living near a waste-disposal site) are judged to carry greater risks than activities that appear to pose no direct or personal threat (such as the disposal of waste in remote areas).
Ethical and moral status	Risks from activities believed to be ethically objectionable or morally wrong (such as providing diluted or outdated vaccines for an economically distressed community) are judged to be greater than the risks from ethically neutral activities (such as the side-effects of medication).
Human versus natural origin	Risks generated by human action, failure or incompetence (such as negligence, inadequate safeguards or operator error) are judged to be greater than risks believed to be caused by nature or “acts of god” (such as exposure to geological radon or cosmic rays).”

Indicators for the perception of criticality of infrastructures

Introduction and sources: t.b.e.

Indicator	Effects to subjective protection requirements	Empirical determination
Experienced/expected extent/duration/season of infrastructure breakdown	Multiplication of breakdown consequences (e.g. power breakdown in winter season; disruption of passenger transport) raise subjective protection requirement.	Interviews, surveys analyses of available case-studies (e.g. on power breakdowns)
Direct experience of the breakdown	Visibility and direct experience increase subjective protection requirements; however, disruptions not perceived can rather evoke unrealistic security perception.	Analyses of available case-studies (e.g. on nuclear accidents or on supply)
Impact on/impairment of one’s own life due to protection measures (e.g. obstructions in air traffic due to security checks)	Weighing of expected benefits from critical infrastructure protection and expected costs/affection influences subjective protection requirement: subjective protection requirement is assessed higher in favour of the expected benefit	Interviews, surveys behaviour analyses
Irreversibility of critical infrastructure breakdown and it’s effects (such as cascading effects from supply disruptions; material loss from flood events)	Irreversibility enhances subjective protection requirement.	Interviews, surveys
Individual infrastructure dependence (e.g. canalization-due hygienic measures, water and food supply)	Individual dependence enhances subjective protection requirement.	Interviews, surveys consumption analyses
Degree of physical effects caused by infrastructure breakdown (e.g. starvation due to supply chain breakdown; medical undersupply due to disruption of health and emergency services)	Physical effects perceived to be threatening raise the subjective protection requirement.	Analyses of available case-studies (e.g. on power breakdowns)
Evidence of critical infrastructure benefit	Acknowledgement of the benefit of an infrastructure increases its acceptance compared with another less acknowledged; subjective protection requirement is raised accordingly.	Interviews, surveys analyses of user frquency
Optionality in infrastructure use	„Voluntariness“ and alternatives for infrastructure use lower the subjective protection requirement	Interviews, surveys
Controllability of both use/functioning of the infrastructure (e.g. car driving vs. plane)	Perception of one’s own capability to control the infrastructure reduces the subjective protection requirement.	Interviews, surveys
Familiarity with infrastructure and comprehension of functioning	The relationship between the level of information/knowledge and vulnerability awareness influences the subjective protection requirement: familiarity by trend increases subjective protection requirement.	Interviews, surveys regression analyses
Spectacularity and media attention for a potential infrastructure breakdown	High spectacularity and media attention result in high subjective protection requirement.	Interviews, surveys media analyses
Unique identity and cultural value of the infrastructure (e.g. St. Peter’s basilica in Rome)	Disruption/destruction of cultural infrastructures can go beyond the material loss and trigger identity crises such as deep uncertainty as a consequence, increasing subjective protection requirement.	Interviews, surveys analyses of demographic/statistical data
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