Difference between revisions of "Environmental psychology"

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Environmental psychology<ref> E.g. Nasar 2011.</ref> has as its main tenet that the meaning intentionally embodied in built environment is not always decoded by citizens as intended. Environmental cognition cannot be designed. A related approach from urban planning is to avoid stressful and potentially threatening feelings of being lost in large buildings, and resulting perceived threat by providing “legibility”<ref>Lynch 1960.</ref> so that “one can comprehend and navigate environments”<ref>Nasar 2011: 165.</ref> . An example would be “securitization” as an emerging process: We cannot just decide about security by way of planning, such as “designing out” crime or “designing in” protection and [[Resilience|resilience]]. Therefore, it is important that urban designs “incorporate public meanings” and citizens’ images of places, including – one can add – those of “secure” or “safe” places<ref>Nasar 2011: 166.</ref>.
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Environmental psychology<ref> E.g. Nasar 2011.</ref> has as its main tenet that the meaning intentionally embodied in built environment is not always decoded by citizens as intended. Environmental cognition cannot be designed. A related approach from urban planning is to avoid stressful and potentially threatening feelings of being lost in large buildings, and resulting perceived threat by providing “legibility”<ref>Lynch 1960.</ref> so that “one can comprehend and navigate environments”<ref>Nasar 2011: 165.</ref> . An example would be “securitization” as an emerging process: We cannot just decide about security by way of planning, such as “designing out” crime or “designing in” protection and [[Resilience|resilience]]. Therefore, it is important that urban designs “incorporate public meanings” and citizens’ images of places, including – one can add – those of “secure” or “safe” places<ref>Nasar 2011: 166.</ref>.
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As a result, also the identification of “weak points” in urban environments from a security culture point of view has to be seen as socially negotiated and constructed sense-making that takes place in cultural contexts<ref>Falkheimer/Mats 2006.</ref>. Debates in urban design though have often disregarded this aspect, rather centring on “which good design determines good behavior”<ref>Whitzman 2011: 670.</ref>.
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As a result, also the identification of “weak points” in urban environments from a security culture point of view has to be seen as socially negotiated and constructed sense-making that takes place in cultural contexts<ref>Falkheimer/Mats 2006.</ref>. Debates in urban design though have often disregarded this aspect, rather centring on “which good design determines good behavior”<ref>Whitzman 2011: 670.</ref>.
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However, additional aspects have to be considered so to arrive at a comprehensive view to inform security-conscious urban planning decisions. For example, conflicts between different social groups about public space are a democratic phenomenon that should not be subject to designing-out; security aspects of urban design should not be overly mainstreamed because planning to increase security of excluded groups may also contribute to making cities safer; and desire for security should not inform urban planning to contribute to threatening citizens’ rights of expression and dissent, owing to the old principle that city air should make people free, rather than constrain them<ref>Cf. Whitzman 2011: 670-671.</ref>.
 
However, additional aspects have to be considered so to arrive at a comprehensive view to inform security-conscious urban planning decisions. For example, conflicts between different social groups about public space are a democratic phenomenon that should not be subject to designing-out; security aspects of urban design should not be overly mainstreamed because planning to increase security of excluded groups may also contribute to making cities safer; and desire for security should not inform urban planning to contribute to threatening citizens’ rights of expression and dissent, owing to the old principle that city air should make people free, rather than constrain them<ref>Cf. Whitzman 2011: 670-671.</ref>.
   

Revision as of 14:05, 20 March 2012

Environmental psychology[1] has as its main tenet that the meaning intentionally embodied in built environment is not always decoded by citizens as intended. Environmental cognition cannot be designed. A related approach from urban planning is to avoid stressful and potentially threatening feelings of being lost in large buildings, and resulting perceived threat by providing “legibility”[2] so that “one can comprehend and navigate environments”[3] . An example would be “securitization” as an emerging process: We cannot just decide about security by way of planning, such as “designing out” crime or “designing in” protection and resilience. Therefore, it is important that urban designs “incorporate public meanings” and citizens’ images of places, including – one can add – those of “secure” or “safe” places[4].

As a result, also the identification of “weak points” in urban environments from a security culture point of view has to be seen as socially negotiated and constructed sense-making that takes place in cultural contexts[5]. Debates in urban design though have often disregarded this aspect, rather centring on “which good design determines good behavior”[6].

However, additional aspects have to be considered so to arrive at a comprehensive view to inform security-conscious urban planning decisions. For example, conflicts between different social groups about public space are a democratic phenomenon that should not be subject to designing-out; security aspects of urban design should not be overly mainstreamed because planning to increase security of excluded groups may also contribute to making cities safer; and desire for security should not inform urban planning to contribute to threatening citizens’ rights of expression and dissent, owing to the old principle that city air should make people free, rather than constrain them[7].

References

  1. E.g. Nasar 2011.
  2. Lynch 1960.
  3. Nasar 2011: 165.
  4. Nasar 2011: 166.
  5. Falkheimer/Mats 2006.
  6. Whitzman 2011: 670.
  7. Cf. Whitzman 2011: 670-671.