Difference between revisions of "Perception of (in)security and risks"
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=Perception of (in)security= |
=Perception of (in)security= |
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+ | '''Perception and perceived (in)security''' is strongly determined by culture, by social and cultural values. Different perceptions and disputes about [[risk]] and [[security]] can be linked to competing worldviews: Conceptions of risk, security and solutions to security problems vary according to the organization of political and social relations. |
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+ | Risk is always selected from within a society, based on cultural backgrounds. Risk is considered a ‘social construct’ and cannot be assessed against an ‘objective’ risk. |
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− | The general assumption of social and cultural approaches to the '''perception of (in)security''' is that phenomena such as [[Cultural_criminology|fear of crime]] depend on culturally embedded meanings of risk. They are thus seen by cultural approaches more as an indicator of the collective memory of particular events as shaped by political response, media framing etc. than of citizens’ actual security beliefs/perceptions. |
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+ | Perception of security and risks is gender-dependent which leads to different urban protection needs. Understanding the various situations and individual needs should inform all aspects of urban planning and management. |
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− | For example, immigrant cultures may be interpreted as the cause of social radicalization processes that mount up to threats to internal security (such as in France or the Netherlands); differently, a user security culture may be interpreted as a social firewall against IT security offences (as it is the case in Sweden). These factors also influence the [[Infrastructure|perception of the criticality of infrastructure]]. Nevertheless, also the UN-HABITAT study concluded that “''the perception of insecurity in cities depends largely upon the substantial amount and constant flow of information that urban residents receive from many sources''”<ref>UN-HABITAT United Nations UN Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) (2007a): Inclusive and Sustainable Urban Planning: A Guide for Municipalities. Volume 1. United Nations UN Settlements Programme UNON Publishing Service Section. Online: http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/listItemDetails.aspx?publicationID=2662 [01-11-2011].</ref>, and this could include the semiotics of built environment. |
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+ | * Risk information and design features of urban infrastructure influence citizens’ perception of the risk that infrastructure is at. |
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+ | “[…]''the perception of insecurity in cities depends largely upon the substantial amount and constant flow of information that urban residents receive from many sources.''”<ref>United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT (2007a): Enhancing urban safety and security. London: Earthscan. Retrieved from: http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/listItemDetails.aspx?publicationID=2432 [last access: 2012-05-23]:19.</ref> |
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+ | *Optimized risk communication can help reduce the gap between perceived/felt and ‘factual’ risk/security. |
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+ | ==Security related aspects and benefits== |
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+ | * Citizens' perception is largely independent from objective risk. Only focusing on objective risk reduction will not prevent problems in perceived risks. |
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+ | * Usually there is a gap between subjective (perceived or felt) risks and objective (factual) risks. This influences individual and public behaviour and response. |
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+ | * Technical/technological only solutions will not succeed in risk reduction. Risk is also impacted by social behavior which again results from social perception. |
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+ | * Including gender-related and group-specific differences in perception and views on risks and security allows for specific responds. This helps to decrease specific risk situations and increase security. |
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+ | * Unperceived risks remain unanswered. However, perception of risks allows for risk response and mitigative action. This is the basis for a common [[security culture]]. |
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+ | * Different aspects of urban dynamics (e.g. pedestrians, bicycle riders, public transport) are an important part of city life and can therefore influence the perception of (in-)security in urban areas. |
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+ | ==Approaches how to address it== |
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+ | * Consider relevant public [[security culture|security cultures]] on both the level of government and the level of citizens; |
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+ | * Base security design and measures on citizens’ perception of insecurity, feeling of [[vulnerability]] and acceptance of technological solutions for [[security]] problems; |
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+ | * Inform citizens on risks of urban spaces/places before and after planning implementations; |
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+ | * Inform citizens on specific structural, design and material choices (see: [[designing in]] and [["designing out" approach|designing out]]); |
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+ | * Involve citizens in planning decisions and processes to consider their views and requests ([[citizen participation]]); |
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+ | * Consider gender and group specific risk views and security associations; |
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+ | * Adapt planning decisions according to citizens views and adopt specific requests; |
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+ | * Compensate gaps in risk perception vs. factual risks by adequate risk communication. |
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+ | * Planning tools aiming at increasing urban [[resilience]] should be sensitive to the social context to which they are applied. |
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− | ==Perception of (in)security and its relevance to urban planning== |
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− | Public perception of security with respect to built environment has a couple of practical ramifications for strategic [[urban planning]]. Different aspects of urban dynamics (e.g. pedestrians, bicycle riders, public transport) are an important part of city life and can therefore influence the perception of (in-)security in urban areas. The importance of defining and analyzing the notion of individual security perception (as opposed to a given factual security situation) for the planning of public (urban) space has to be stressed. |
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− | It follows that planning tools aiming at increasing urban [[resilience]] should be sensitive to the social context to which they are applied. Their development and use should be based on an analysis of relevant public [[security culture|security cultures]] on both the level of government and the level of citizens. In particular, the design and use of tools should be based on citizens’ perception of insecurity, feeling of [[vulnerability]] and acceptance of technological solutions for [[security]] problems. |
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− | It requires a “''multicultural sensibility for planning''”, which includes considering how cultures, “''which prescribe members’ relations with the community, orient their actions, and, among other things, suggest how they might use formal planning processes.''”<ref>Baum, H. S. (2000): Culture Matters–But It Shouldn’t Matter Too Much. In: Burayidi, M. A. (ed.): Urban Planning in a Multicultural Society, Westport, CT: Greenwood:115.</ref>. |
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+ | ==Related subjects== |
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+ | * [[Security culture]] |
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+ | * [[Culture aspects]] |
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− | ==Security enhancing urban planning== |
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− | [[Urban planning]] decisions sensitive of security aspects should integrate in a broader way citizens’ perception of [[security]] in urban spaces, appreciating that this is a multidimensional process depending on various factors. The use of urban planning tools should be based on an analysis of relevant public security cultures on both the level of government and the level of citizens. In particular, the design and use of tools should be based on citizens’ perception of insecurity, feeling of vulnerability and acceptance of technological solutions for security problems. Essentially, culture and society-related parameters of urban planning include, among others, different user groups (user cultures), value conflicts and competencies of the urban planning agencies involved in the process. |
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− | [[Security]] problems accumulate in specific areas and also depend on the way public space is used. Lessons learned highlight some important urban planning elements, such as barrier-free mobility, sufficient lighting, spaces enabling communication and networking, as well as providing low-speed traffic lanes. Undisturbed access to public space and use of facilities is an important indicator of a positive assessment of personal security. Discursive strategies and related public communication measures are an important asset in reducing public disorder phenomena, while actual experiences of insecurity are often found to be rumors. Public space often has to serve multiple and often conflicting interests, politically or economically motivated, which has proven counterproductive both to the planning and everyday use. In this regard, it is important to consider the question: Security for whom? This entails the setting up of an analytical framework that allows for involving all relevant actors in the process of urban planning. Several methods are available to implement citizen participation. |
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− | ==Options to integrate perception in the planning process== |
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− | The awareness of planning capabilities should be sharpened in the future, both to contribute to vulnerability identification as well as to strengthen resilience. Analyzing the individuals’ perception of its security can play a key role in this. For example, while the need to provide for sufficient lighting clearly shapes the planning process of urban public space, thorough analysis of the relevant users and user groups are required to better assess how lighting can contribute to heighten individual security perception and to reduce “fear” in public space. Following a participatory approach by involving citizens, the neighbourhood and prospective users in the urban planning process can impact social control and the “user experience” of the facility. |
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− | An initial checklist for [[Requirements_to_enhance_resilience|requirements]] to identify vulnerabilities in order to enhance resilience can be derived from this, for appropriate consideration in urban planning. |
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Revision as of 17:11, 11 October 2012
Contents
Perception of (in)security
Perception and perceived (in)security is strongly determined by culture, by social and cultural values. Different perceptions and disputes about risk and security can be linked to competing worldviews: Conceptions of risk, security and solutions to security problems vary according to the organization of political and social relations.
Risk is always selected from within a society, based on cultural backgrounds. Risk is considered a ‘social construct’ and cannot be assessed against an ‘objective’ risk. Perception of security and risks is gender-dependent which leads to different urban protection needs. Understanding the various situations and individual needs should inform all aspects of urban planning and management.
- Risk information and design features of urban infrastructure influence citizens’ perception of the risk that infrastructure is at.
“[…]the perception of insecurity in cities depends largely upon the substantial amount and constant flow of information that urban residents receive from many sources.”[1]
- Optimized risk communication can help reduce the gap between perceived/felt and ‘factual’ risk/security.
- Citizens' perception is largely independent from objective risk. Only focusing on objective risk reduction will not prevent problems in perceived risks.
- Usually there is a gap between subjective (perceived or felt) risks and objective (factual) risks. This influences individual and public behaviour and response.
- Technical/technological only solutions will not succeed in risk reduction. Risk is also impacted by social behavior which again results from social perception.
- Including gender-related and group-specific differences in perception and views on risks and security allows for specific responds. This helps to decrease specific risk situations and increase security.
- Unperceived risks remain unanswered. However, perception of risks allows for risk response and mitigative action. This is the basis for a common security culture.
- Different aspects of urban dynamics (e.g. pedestrians, bicycle riders, public transport) are an important part of city life and can therefore influence the perception of (in-)security in urban areas.
Approaches how to address it
- Consider relevant public security cultures on both the level of government and the level of citizens;
- Base security design and measures on citizens’ perception of insecurity, feeling of vulnerability and acceptance of technological solutions for security problems;
- Inform citizens on risks of urban spaces/places before and after planning implementations;
- Inform citizens on specific structural, design and material choices (see: designing in and designing out);
- Involve citizens in planning decisions and processes to consider their views and requests (citizen participation);
- Consider gender and group specific risk views and security associations;
- Adapt planning decisions according to citizens views and adopt specific requests;
- Compensate gaps in risk perception vs. factual risks by adequate risk communication.
- Planning tools aiming at increasing urban resilience should be sensitive to the social context to which they are applied.
Dimensions with impact on citizens security perception in urban places
Dimensions | Aspects to consider in urban planning |
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People | Diversity
Marginalized people
Local experts
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Objects | Light/Lighting
Visibility/overviewability and vitalization
Plants/maintenance of green areas
Environmental pollution
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Dynamic elements | Good orientation/overview of public spaces
Traffic speed and circulation
Public places as meeting points
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Image/Identity of places | Image/Identity
|
Related subjects
Footnotes and references
- ↑ United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT (2007a): Enhancing urban safety and security. London: Earthscan. Retrieved from: http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/listItemDetails.aspx?publicationID=2432 [last access: 2012-05-23]:19.
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