Difference between revisions of "Security issue: Destruction by fanatics"

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== Contributing circumstances ==
 
== Contributing circumstances ==
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Known circumstances to influence the likelihood or effect of robbery are presented in the table below:
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{| class="wikitable"
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|-
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! width=150 | Contributing Circumstance !!width=150| Influence !! Description
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| Presence of crowds or busy places. || Increases attractiveness || As the object of mass killing is to kill or injure as many people as possible, places where many people gather form an attractive target. The predictability of crowds adds to the attractiveness.
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|-
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| Presence of prominent objects and/or ideological associations. || Increases attractiveness || For an attack to have the desired effect (in the eyes of terrorists), it needs to attract wide attention and be associated with their 'cause'. Prominent objects will assure attention, objects which can be associated to their ideological beliefs will assure the 'right' message will be carried. One should realise that what constitutes a prominent or ideologically attractive object should be assessed from the viewpoint of the fanatic and these can either be very specific or general.
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|-
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| Presence of safety threats that could be misused. || Increases attractiveness || Sometimes, an object is used as a force multiplier for an attack directed at people. This can be used on [[urban object]]s if:
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* the object can be potentially harmful to humans (such as chemical plants, oil/gas refineries and storages, nuclear plants, etcetera)
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* the object provides an essential service to the well-being of humans and belongs to the critical infrastructure. In this case, its failure can bring harm to the people.
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The presence of such an object in the vicinity of large groups of people can raise the attractiveness and attainability for an attack by fanatics and therefore increase the risk.
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|-
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| Lack of surveillance and attention. || Decreases risk of detection. || A low level of surveillance or attention, decreases the risk of detection (particularly in the preparation phase of an attack) for a perpetrator and thereby increases the attractiveness.
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| Long reaction times or inadequate action of intervention force. || Decreases likelihood of apprehension || Untimely or inappropriate reactions to violence lead to a perception of little control, which will increase perceived risk for the public and decrease perceived risk for the perpetrators.
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|}
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* [[attractive object]]
 
* [[attractive object]]
 
* perceived as attainable target
 
* perceived as attainable target

Revision as of 12:53, 3 April 2013

Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This belongs to::threat is exerted out of wilful action by either terrorists or criminal activists.

Description

We see that the subject of fanatics (terrorists or criminal activists) can be either persons, objects, or both. This category of security issues focusses on the threat directed towards objects. When directed at people, it falls under the category of mass killing.

The motives for destructing objects by fanatics can mostly be found in the amount of attention that this yields. This motive gives a very good clue of what might be potential targets for fanatics: not only should its destruction yield a fair amount of attention, but also it should be the kind of attention that would help the fanatics' 'cause'. Depending on the fanatics faction, this can entail a wide variety of reactions; for some factions, negative attention is not unwanted. We see this in the 11 September 2001 attack on the New York Trade Center. Although this generated almost uniformly negative responses in the western world, this was received with joy by the responsible faction (al-Qaeda).

Another motive for attacking objects is as a force multiplier for an attack on people. This can be used on urban objects if:

  • the object can be potentially harmful to humans (such as chemical plants, oil/gas refineries and storages, nuclear plants, etcetera)
  • the object provides an essential service to the well-being of humans and belongs to the critical infrastructure. In this case, its failure can bring harm to the people.

If either of these conditions is true, one should be aware that in the eyes of fanatics seeking mass killing, it could be perceived as an attractive object and appropriate measures could be in order.

Contributing circumstances

Known circumstances to influence the likelihood or effect of robbery are presented in the table below:

Contributing Circumstance Influence Description
Presence of crowds or busy places. Increases attractiveness As the object of mass killing is to kill or injure as many people as possible, places where many people gather form an attractive target. The predictability of crowds adds to the attractiveness.
Presence of prominent objects and/or ideological associations. Increases attractiveness For an attack to have the desired effect (in the eyes of terrorists), it needs to attract wide attention and be associated with their 'cause'. Prominent objects will assure attention, objects which can be associated to their ideological beliefs will assure the 'right' message will be carried. One should realise that what constitutes a prominent or ideologically attractive object should be assessed from the viewpoint of the fanatic and these can either be very specific or general.
Presence of safety threats that could be misused. Increases attractiveness Sometimes, an object is used as a force multiplier for an attack directed at people. This can be used on urban objects if:
  • the object can be potentially harmful to humans (such as chemical plants, oil/gas refineries and storages, nuclear plants, etcetera)
  • the object provides an essential service to the well-being of humans and belongs to the critical infrastructure. In this case, its failure can bring harm to the people.

The presence of such an object in the vicinity of large groups of people can raise the attractiveness and attainability for an attack by fanatics and therefore increase the risk.

Lack of surveillance and attention. Decreases risk of detection. A low level of surveillance or attention, decreases the risk of detection (particularly in the preparation phase of an attack) for a perpetrator and thereby increases the attractiveness.
Long reaction times or inadequate action of intervention force. Decreases likelihood of apprehension Untimely or inappropriate reactions to violence lead to a perception of little control, which will increase perceived risk for the public and decrease perceived risk for the perpetrators.
  • attractive object
  • perceived as attainable target
  • destruction would 'further the cause'

Socio-economic causes

The roots of terrorism can also be found in certain poor or unfavourable conditions such as relative economic deprivation (manifested in poverty, income inequality, etc.), socio-economic change (fostered by the process of for example modernisation) and economic and political integration[1]. Crime is closely related to poverty, social exclusion, wage and income inequality, cultural and family background, level of education and other economic and social factors[2].

Related links:

Impacts

The remaining lower part of the World Trade Center in New York City

The impacts of destruction by fanatics can range from fairly minor to very severe, but for the persons involved the act are almost invariably traumatic.

The example of the September 2001 attacks are well-known, but one should realise that many more terrorist factions exist. One of the manifestations of destruction of properties is destruction by fanatics that are concerned with the preservation of the ecosystem, also known as Eco-terrorism. These activities range from sabotage, to arson and even the firing of rockets[3].

A list of current organisations that are designated as being of a terrorist nature, can be found on Wikipedia on the page List_of_designated_terrorist_organizations.

In order to assess the attractiveness of any urban object for this threat, one should compare the motives and prevailing attack methods of each of these terrorist groups with the properties of the object at hand. As these threats will change over the years and the object will not (interim alterations left aside), the urban planner should rather plan its measures for generic types of terrorist organisations.

Social impacts

Known social impacts of destruction by fanatics include changing citizens perception of (in)security and fear of crime. This usually happens in a way that has an effect on the gap between "felt" and "factual" security, since individuals tend to make - correct or incorrect - reasoning on societal security as a whole based on immediate environmental clues. This is known as the "broken glass phenomenon".

Economic impact

Destruction by fanatics leads to considerable costs in both a direct (primary) and a indirect (secondary) way[4]. Direct costs of destruction by fanatics come in the form of:

  • Preventive costs in anticipation of destruction by fanatics (e.g. security measures, insurance);
  • Material and immaterial costs as a consequence of destruction by fanatics (e.g. physical damage, repairs, medical costs, mental harm); and
  • Responsive costs to destruction by fanatics (e.g. the costs of detection and prevention, prosecution, support trial, etc.).

Terrorist events and violent crime not only lead to material and immaterial costs for those who have become victimized, but also forces local and national authorities to spend billions on the prevention of terrorism and the detection, prosecution and punishment of terrorists (the primary economic impact of terrorism).

In addition to the primary economic impacts, terrorism and violent crime cause the disruption of economic entities which have not been direct targets of the attack (the secondary economic impacts of terrorism)[5].

Mobility impact

Safety impact

Measures

  • intelligence
  • surveillance
  • intervention force

Footnotes and references

  1. Schneider, F., T. Brück, and Karaisl, M. (2008). A survey of the Economics of Security. Economics of Security Working Paper 1.
  2. Buananno, P. (2003). The Socioeconomic Determinants of Crime. A Review of the Literature. Working Paper Series, No.63. University of Milan.
  3. see: wikipedia:Eco-terrorism#Examples of tactics
  4. Primary economic impact (or direct effects) are generally defined as the initial, immediate economic output generated by a specific cause (in this case a criminal offence). Secondary economic impact (or indirect effects) are generated each time a subsequent transaction is made, for example, the impact of crime on the real estate value in the neighbourhood.
  5. Source: Schneider, F., T. Brück and D. Meierrieks (2009). The Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey.