Security issue: Mass killing - Revision history

Puck at 14:22, 13 November 2020

2020-11-13T14:22:38Z

Albert at 11:17, 1 February 2017

2017-02-01T11:17:41Z

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2014-02-13T15:22:51Z

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2014-02-13T15:21:44Z

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2014-02-13T15:19:48Z

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2014-02-13T15:19:29Z

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2014-02-13T15:18:16Z

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2014-02-13T15:17:55Z

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2014-02-13T15:17:22Z

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2014-02-13T15:15:53Z

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-[[Category:Threat]][[Category:Safety]]
+[[Category:Threat]]
+[[Category:Safety]]
-[[File:Russell_square_ambulances.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Ambulances on the street after the 2005 London Bombings]]'''Mass killing''' is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of [[human intent|willful action]] by [[fanatic]]s: terrorists or criminal activists.
+[[File:Russell_square_ambulances.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Ambulances on the street after the 2005 London Bombings]]'''Mass killing''' is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of [[human intent|willful action]] by [[fanatic]]s: [[Terrorism|terrorists]] or criminal activists.
-== Description ==
+==Description==
 The target of fanatics can be persons, objects, or both. This category of security issue focusses on the threat directed towards people. When directed at objects, it falls under the category of [[security issue: Destruction by fanatics|destruction by fanatics]].
@@ Line 9: / Line 10: @@
 The [[The economics of terrorist behaviour|roots of terrorism]] can also be found in certain poor or unfavourable conditions such as relative economic deprivation (manifested in poverty, income inequality, etc.), socio-economic change (fostered by the process of for example modernisation) and economic and political integration<ref>Schneider, F., T. Brück, and Karaisl, M. (2008). A survey of the Economics of Security. Economics of Security Working Paper 1.</ref>. ([[The economics of crime|The roots of) crime]] is closely related to poverty, social exclusion, wage and income inequality, cultural and family background, level of education and other economic and social factors<ref>Buananno, P. (2003). The Socioeconomic Determinantes of Crime. A Review of the Literature. Working Paper Series, No.63. University of Milan.</ref>.
-== Contributing circumstances ==
+==Contributing circumstances==
 Known circumstances to influence the likelihood or effect of mass killing are presented in the table below:
 {| class="wikitable"
 |-
-! width=150 | Contributing Circumstance !!width=150| Influence !! Description
+! width="150" |Contributing Circumstance!! width="150" |Influence!!Description
 |-
-| Presence of crowds or busy places. || Increases attractiveness || As the object of mass killing is to kill or injure as many people as possible, places where many people gather form an attractive target. The predictability of crowds adds to the attractiveness.
+|Presence of crowds or busy places.||Increases attractiveness||As the object of mass killing is to kill or injure as many people as possible, places where many people gather form an attractive target. The predictability of crowds adds to the attractiveness.
 |-
-| Presence of prominent objects and/or ideological associations. || Increases attractiveness || For an attack to have the desired effect (in the eyes of terrorists), it needs to attract wide attention and be associated with their 'cause'. Prominent objects will assure attention, objects which can be associated to their ideological beliefs will assure the 'right' message will be carried. One should realise that what constitutes a prominent or ideologically attractive object  should be assessed from the viewpoint of the fanatic and these can either be very specific or general.
+|Presence of prominent objects and/or ideological associations.||Increases attractiveness||For an attack to have the desired effect (in the eyes of terrorists), it needs to attract wide attention and be associated with their 'cause'. Prominent objects will assure attention, objects which can be associated to their ideological beliefs will assure the 'right' message will be carried. One should realise that what constitutes a prominent or ideologically attractive object  should be assessed from the viewpoint of the fanatic and these can either be very specific or general.
 |-
-| Presence of safety threats that could be misused. || Increases attractiveness || Sometimes, an object is used as a force multiplier for an attack directed at people. This can be used on [[urban object]]s if:
+|Presence of safety threats that could be misused.||Increases attractiveness||Sometimes, an object is used as a force multiplier for an attack directed at people. This can be used on [[urban object]]s if:
-* the object can be potentially harmful to humans (such as chemical plants, oil/gas refineries and storages, nuclear plants, etcetera)
+*the object can be potentially harmful to humans (such as chemical plants, oil/gas refineries and storages, nuclear plants, etcetera)
-* the object provides an essential service to the well-being of humans and belongs to the critical infrastructure. In this case, its failure can bring harm to the people.
+*the object provides an essential service to the well-being of humans and belongs to the critical infrastructure. In this case, its failure can bring harm to the people.
 The presence of such an object in the vicinity of large groups of people can raise the attractiveness and attainability for an attack by fanatics and therefore increase the risk.
 |-
-| Lack of surveillance and attention. || Decreases risk of detection. || A low level of surveillance or attention, decreases the risk of detection (particularly in the preparation phase of an attack) for a perpetrator and thereby increases the attractiveness.
+|Lack of surveillance and attention.||Decreases risk of detection.||A low level of surveillance or attention, decreases the risk of detection (particularly in the preparation phase of an attack) for a perpetrator and thereby increases the attractiveness.
 |-
-| Long reaction times or inadequate action of intervention force. || Decreases likelihood of apprehension || Untimely or inappropriate reactions to violence lead to a perception of little control, which will increase perceived risk for the public and decrease perceived risk for the perpetrators.
+|Long reaction times or inadequate action of intervention force.||Decreases likelihood of apprehension||Untimely or inappropriate reactions to violence lead to a perception of little control, which will increase perceived risk for the public and decrease perceived risk for the perpetrators.
 |}
-== Impacts ==
+==Impacts==
 ===Social impact===
 Mass killing often results in psychological trauma of victims, bystanders, and society as a whole. It may also result in a general perception of insecurity. Both these results can decrease the level of societal resilience.
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 The material costs (e.g. loss of productivity) and immaterial costs (e.g. suffering, pain, sorrow, and loss of enjoyment of life)  of mass killing events are generally expressed in terms of the value per statistical life (VSL). "The value per statistical life represents an individual’s willingness to exchange income or wealth for small changes in the likelihood of survival, rather than purchasing other goods or services"<ref>Source: Robinson, L.A., J.K. Hammitty, J.E. Aldyz and A.K.J. Baxteryy
-(2010): Valuing the Risk of Death from Terrorist Attacks. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management. Vol.7, Issue 1, Article 14.</ref>. The VSL ranges from € 1.4 million to € 2.1 million (2009 prices) in the EU<ref> Jost, G., Allsop, R., Steriu, M. & Popolizio, M. (2011): 2010 Road safety target outcome: 100,000 fewer deaths since 2001. 5th Road Safety PIN Report. European Transport Safety Council ETSC, Brussels.</ref>. However, according to a specialists Robinson ''et al''. (2010)<ref name="RobinsonEA"> Robinson, L.A. et al. (2010): Valuing the Risk of Death from Terrorist Attacks. ''Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management''. Vol.7, Issue 1, Article 14.</ref> “terrorism-related risks may be perceived as more dreaded and ambiguous, and less controllable and voluntary, than the workplace risks underlying many VSL estimates”. “These factors may increase the VSL appropriate for terrorism risks, possibly doubling the value”<ref name="RobinsonEA"/>.
+(2010): Valuing the Risk of Death from Terrorist Attacks. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management. Vol.7, Issue 1, Article 14.</ref>. The VSL ranges from € 1.4 million to € 2.1 million (2009 prices) in the EU<ref> Jost, G., Allsop, R., Steriu, M. & Popolizio, M. (2011): 2010 Road safety target outcome: 100,000 fewer deaths since 2001. 5th Road Safety PIN Report. European Transport Safety Council ETSC, Brussels.</ref>. However, according to a specialists Robinson ''et al''. (2010)<ref name="RobinsonEA"> Robinson, L.A. et al. (2010): Valuing the Risk of Death from Terrorist Attacks. ''Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management''. Vol.7, Issue 1, Article 14.</ref> “terrorism-related risks may be perceived as more dreaded and ambiguous, and less controllable and voluntary, than the workplace risks underlying many VSL estimates”. “These factors may increase the VSL appropriate for terrorism risks, possibly doubling the value”<ref name="RobinsonEA" />.
 In addition to the primary economic impacts, terrorism and violent crime cause the disruption of economic entities, which have not been direct targets of the attack (the [[Economic effects of terrorism#Secondary economic impact of terrorism|secondary economic impacts of terrorism]])<ref name="ftn27"> Source: Schneider, F., T. Brück and D. Meierrieks (2009): The Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey.</ref>. Security measures can prevent destruction by fanatics, but not without [[Economic effects of anti-terrorism security measures|costs]]. Access control or screening, for example, is costly and there is always the risk of [[The economics of terrorist behaviour#Dynamic interaction between terrorism and counter-terrorism|terrorist displacement]]<ref>The relocation of crime/terrorism from one place, time, target, offence, or tactic to another as a result of some crime prevention initiative</ref>. With the help of [[Economic tools|economic tools]] such as [[Social cost-benefit analysis|social cost-benefit analysis]] it is possible to overview the costs and future benefits of security measures in order to decide which types of measures are best suited for a specific urban planning situation.
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 A successful mass killing attack can do massive physical and/or bodily damage. The collateral damages from an attack can sometimes be so high that they weaken structures and unsafe situation arise. However, compared to the direct effects of a successful attack, these risks are usually minor.
-== Measures ==
+==Measures==
 *[[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]] can be done by making it harder to take weapons of mass destruction to a vulnerable location, e.g. by separating traffic flows so car bombs cannot come close to masses of people, or by separating locations where such weapons might possibly come from masses of people by hardened obstacles, reducing the effect of the weapon. For support on construction methods and materials that mitigate explosion effects and structural collapse one can use the VITRUV [[image:VITRUV logo.png|x30px|link=]] [[Plan level tools]] and [[Detail level tools]]. With the Detail level tool one can also assess secondary costs for mobility impacts, for example if a street or rails is destroyed.
 *[[Measure: Access control|Access control]], combined with [[Measure: Directing traffic flows|directing traffic flows]] can be used to assure all traffic entering and exiting a location passes at certain, predestined points. This allows for all traffic to be monitored (Surveillance) or even screened (see below).
 *[[Measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]] can help to detect suspicious activities, like left luggage or groups of people monitoring the situation (in a preparation phase of the attack).

@@ Line 56: / Line 56: @@
 == Measures ==
-*[[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]] can be done by making it harder to take weapons of mass destruction to a vulnerable location, e.g. by separating traffic flows so car bombs cannot come close to masses of people, or by separating locations where such weapons might possibly come from masses of people by hardened obstacles, reducing the effect of the weapon. For support on construction methods and materials that mitigate explosion effects and structural collapse one can use the VITRUV [[image:VITRUV logo.png|x30px|link=]] [[Plan level tools]] and [[Detail level tools]], available via the [http://www.vitruv-project.eu/index.html VITRUV website]. With the Detail level tool one can also assess secondary costs for mobility impacts, for example if a street or rails is destroyed.
+*[[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]] can be done by making it harder to take weapons of mass destruction to a vulnerable location, e.g. by separating traffic flows so car bombs cannot come close to masses of people, or by separating locations where such weapons might possibly come from masses of people by hardened obstacles, reducing the effect of the weapon. For support on construction methods and materials that mitigate explosion effects and structural collapse one can use the VITRUV [[image:VITRUV logo.png|x30px|link=]] [[Plan level tools]] and [[Detail level tools]]. With the Detail level tool one can also assess secondary costs for mobility impacts, for example if a street or rails is destroyed.
 *[[Measure: Access control|Access control]], combined with [[Measure: Directing traffic flows|directing traffic flows]] can be used to assure all traffic entering and exiting a location passes at certain, predestined points. This allows for all traffic to be monitored (Surveillance) or even screened (see below).
 *[[Measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]] can help to detect suspicious activities, like left luggage or groups of people monitoring the situation (in a preparation phase of the attack).

@@ Line 56: / Line 56: @@
 == Measures ==
-*[[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]] can be done by making it harder to take weapons of mass destruction to a vulnerable location, e.g. by separating traffic flows so car bombs cannot come close to masses of people, or by separating locations where such weapons might possibly come from masses of people by hardened obstacles, reducing the effect of the weapon. For support on construction methods and materials that mitigate explosion effects and structural collapse one can use the VITRUV [[image:VITRUV logo.png|x20px|link=]] [[Plan level tools]] and [[Detail level tools]], available via the [http://www.vitruv-project.eu/index.html VITRUV website]. With the Detail level tool one can also assess secondary costs for mobility impacts, for example if a street or rails is destroyed.
+*[[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]] can be done by making it harder to take weapons of mass destruction to a vulnerable location, e.g. by separating traffic flows so car bombs cannot come close to masses of people, or by separating locations where such weapons might possibly come from masses of people by hardened obstacles, reducing the effect of the weapon. For support on construction methods and materials that mitigate explosion effects and structural collapse one can use the VITRUV [[image:VITRUV logo.png|x30px|link=]] [[Plan level tools]] and [[Detail level tools]], available via the [http://www.vitruv-project.eu/index.html VITRUV website]. With the Detail level tool one can also assess secondary costs for mobility impacts, for example if a street or rails is destroyed.
 *[[Measure: Access control|Access control]], combined with [[Measure: Directing traffic flows|directing traffic flows]] can be used to assure all traffic entering and exiting a location passes at certain, predestined points. This allows for all traffic to be monitored (Surveillance) or even screened (see below).
 *[[Measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]] can help to detect suspicious activities, like left luggage or groups of people monitoring the situation (in a preparation phase of the attack).

@@ Line 56: / Line 56: @@
 == Measures ==
-*[[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]] can be done by making it harder to take weapons of mass destruction to a vulnerable location, e.g. by separating traffic flows so car bombs cannot come close to masses of people, or by separating locations where such weapons might possibly come from masses of people by hardened obstacles, reducing the effect of the weapon. For support on construction methods and materials that mitigate explosion effects and structural collapse one can use the VITRUV [[image:VITRUV logo.png|x15px]] [[Plan level tools]] and [[Detail level tools]], available via the [http://www.vitruv-project.eu/index.html VITRUV website]. With the Detail level tool one can also assess secondary costs for mobility impacts, for example if a street or rails is destroyed.
+*[[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]] can be done by making it harder to take weapons of mass destruction to a vulnerable location, e.g. by separating traffic flows so car bombs cannot come close to masses of people, or by separating locations where such weapons might possibly come from masses of people by hardened obstacles, reducing the effect of the weapon. For support on construction methods and materials that mitigate explosion effects and structural collapse one can use the VITRUV [[image:VITRUV logo.png|x20px|link=]] [[Plan level tools]] and [[Detail level tools]], available via the [http://www.vitruv-project.eu/index.html VITRUV website]. With the Detail level tool one can also assess secondary costs for mobility impacts, for example if a street or rails is destroyed.
 *[[Measure: Access control|Access control]], combined with [[Measure: Directing traffic flows|directing traffic flows]] can be used to assure all traffic entering and exiting a location passes at certain, predestined points. This allows for all traffic to be monitored (Surveillance) or even screened (see below).
 *[[Measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]] can help to detect suspicious activities, like left luggage or groups of people monitoring the situation (in a preparation phase of the attack).

@@ Line 56: / Line 56: @@
 == Measures ==
-*[[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]] can be done by making it harder to take weapons of mass destruction to a vulnerable location, e.g. by separating traffic flows so car bombs cannot come close to masses of people, or by separating locations where such weapons might possibly come from masses of people by hardened obstacles, reducing the effect of the weapon. For support on construction methods and materials that mitigate explosion effects and structural collapse one can use the VITRUV [[image:VITRUV logo.png|x5px]] [[Plan level tools]] and [[Detail level tools]], available via the [http://www.vitruv-project.eu/index.html VITRUV website]. With the Detail level tool one can also assess secondary costs for mobility impacts, for example if a street or rails is destroyed.
+*[[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]] can be done by making it harder to take weapons of mass destruction to a vulnerable location, e.g. by separating traffic flows so car bombs cannot come close to masses of people, or by separating locations where such weapons might possibly come from masses of people by hardened obstacles, reducing the effect of the weapon. For support on construction methods and materials that mitigate explosion effects and structural collapse one can use the VITRUV [[image:VITRUV logo.png|x15px]] [[Plan level tools]] and [[Detail level tools]], available via the [http://www.vitruv-project.eu/index.html VITRUV website]. With the Detail level tool one can also assess secondary costs for mobility impacts, for example if a street or rails is destroyed.
 *[[Measure: Access control|Access control]], combined with [[Measure: Directing traffic flows|directing traffic flows]] can be used to assure all traffic entering and exiting a location passes at certain, predestined points. This allows for all traffic to be monitored (Surveillance) or even screened (see below).
 *[[Measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]] can help to detect suspicious activities, like left luggage or groups of people monitoring the situation (in a preparation phase of the attack).