https://securipedia.eu/api.php?action=feedcontributions&user=Florian&feedformat=atomSecuripedia - User contributions [en]2024-03-29T10:51:20ZUser contributionsMediaWiki 1.34.0https://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Deflection&diff=13466Measure type: Deflection2013-11-21T12:05:49Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Measure]]'''Deflection''' is the [[measure]] of reducing risk by creating circumstances that direct criminals to less critical objects or redirects the motivational causes into non-criminal means of expression.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
[[Image:Urinal Fly.JPG|thumb|right|300px|A fly drawn in a urinal, a deflection measure to prevent visitors from aiming at other 'targets']]This is the channelling of potentially criminal or aggressive behaviour in more pro-social directions by means of architectural, equipment, and related alterations.<br />
<br />
== Examples ==<br />
* Provision of graffiti boards and mural programs where graffiti artist may legally express themselves<br />
* Interesting wallpaper, daily newspaper, chalkboard on bathroom wall<br />
* Providing activity centres, sport halls or skateboard terrains for potentially loitering youth<br />
* Separating incompatible public by designing some areas to appeal to only one group and other areas to the other group<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
Security issues where this measure can be effective and influenced by the urban planner, are:<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Burglary</span>{{#info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || <span style="color:silver">Physical assault</span>{{#info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || <span style="color:silver">Destruction by riots</span>{{#info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || <span style="color:silver">Mass killing</span>{{#info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Ram-raiding</span>{{#info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| <span style="color:silver">Sexual assault</span>{{#info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || <span style="color:silver">Destruction of property by fanatics</span>{{#info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Pickpocketing</span>{{#info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || [[Security issue: Vandalism| Vandalism]]{{#info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Robbery</span>{{#info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || [[Security issue: Graffiti| Graffiti]]{{#info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Raid</span>{{#info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || <span style="color:silver">Antisocial Behaviour</span>{{#info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Vehicle theft</span>{{#info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
As this measure does not actually reduce crime, but rather directs the crime to less critical targets, the measure is best suited for crimes that are (more or less) acceptable in specific places, such as vandalism or graffiti. For more serious crimes that would be unacceptable in any circumstance, this measure is not applicable.<br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
The use of deflection methods encourages responsible use of urban spaces by providing a suitable outlet for activities which would otherwise take place in an anti-social manner. Deflection is becoming an important tool for urban planners, enabling them to facilitate the protection of urban spaces which would otherwise be the target of criminal or anti-social activities. From a planning perspective, it is important to ensure that facilities which are designed to accommodate deflection are seen as a more attractive option than those that would otherwise be used.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
Before redirecting crime to another target one should be well aware of the possible consequences for that new target and its surroundings. For example, opening a skateboard park to get rid of loitering youth can cause inconvenience at the skateboard park due to the noise of rolling skateboards, an increase of vandalism in the surroundings or harassments in the bus to and from the skateboard park.<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
Deflection may result in displacing risk and hazard from one urban area to another. The measure should be assessed in the broader context of the public interest. While the public interest is a question of continuous debate, both in its general principles and case-by-case applications, it requires a conscientiously held view of the policies and actions that best serve the entire community. An important [[Social aspects|social aspect]] is the responsiveness of the measure of deflection to citizens' felt security needs. Measures will only be responsive if they are based on identification of citizens’ self-perceptions of vulnerability and resilience as well as their relation to/interaction with resilience-enhancing measures centred on built infrastructure. <br />
<br />
Deflecting risk is no substitute for continuously informing citizens of risks, how to assess risks, and how to prepare for risks. <ref> Dennis S. Mileti/John H. Sorensen: Communication of Emergency Public Warnings. A Social Science Perspective and State-of-the-Art Assessment. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, 1990.</ref><br />
<br />
Practical addressing of social aspects and aspects of [[security culture]] as they relate to the measure of deflection can best be accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure of deflection should include tests of usability in relevant social contexts. A suitable method is for example [[appreciative planning]] that helps work out shared and consensual perspectives on security aspects in the urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Deflection mitigates the chance of a security threat, but at the same time demands some kind of investment in time, capital and effort by private agents, companies/developers and the public authorities, exacting [[Economic impact|economic costs]]. Together these benefits and costs are referred to as [[Economic impact of security measures|economic impact of security measures]]. The costs of deflection contains the relatively straightforward [[Primary economic impact|direct expenditures]] on capital equipment and operational costs (both temporary and permanent) such as investments and investments in activity centres, sport halls or graffiti boards. In addition, deflection measures generate various types of [[Secondary economic impact|secondary effects]] due to its effect on society (e.g. less fear and crime is good for local business and consumer confidence).<br />
<br />
Whether the costs are making sense from an economic point of view, depends on many factors, and can be answered by two distinct sets of questions (see also the [[Economic tools#Economic assessment step by step|'''flow chart''']] of an economic assessment):<br />
# Are the envisioned measures cost effective from a socio-economic point of view, or are there better alternatives?<br />
# Which specific agents (individuals, companies, sectors, authorities) are affected by the envisioned measures, and to which extend? How do the envisioned measures alter the behaviour of these agents, and of course the [[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|behaviour of criminals/terrorists (in economic terms)]]? <br />
<br />
[[Economic tools]] can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security (of course in collaboration with insights from criminology, sociology, etc.). In terms of benefit-cost ratio, deflection can be considered as a type of security measure which in a relatively subtle way increases security, in contrast to measures such as security guards, big concrete walls and barb wire that may be pervasive, but can also arouse feelings of fear and anxiety<ref>Coaffee, J., P. O’Hare, and M. Hawkesworth (2009): The Visibility of (In)security: The Aesthetics of Planning Urban Defences Against Terrorism. Security Dialogue 2009 40:489.</ref>. Hence, deflection is an example of the [[designing out approach]], or as an aspect of [[Sustainable design|sustainable design]], which seeks a balanced consideration of social, economic, cultural and environmental aspects in urban design. In general, these measures demand larger investments than traditional security measures, but at the same time they are able to avoid future costs due to the long-term prevention of crime.<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
The road network can be designed in such a way that areas where visiting people or vehicles are not wanted will attract less traffic, for example by making the roads to these areas less attractive (lower speed limit, speed bumps etc.). Or, the other way around, by providing good and easily accessible roads between the origin/destination pairs that have to accommodate a lot of traffic. Also ''green waves'' (successive intersections where the green times are tuned such that drivers will experience successive green traffic lights on their route) can be established on these roads, while larger red times on intersections can be used to make other routes less attractive.<br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Deflection may come with [[Ethics aspects|ethics]] issues of distributive justice, such as risks of reifying uneven distribution of security in society. Architectural alterations to support deflection can contribute to selective delivery of security, making some groups of citizens more secure, and other groups of citizens more vulnerable. This may be, for example, the case in a situation where deflection in some area displaces crime to another community. This illustrates the need to provide norms and standards beyond frameworks for built infrastructure<br />
<br />
In general, pinpointing specific ethics aspects in resilience-enhancing measures needs to consider, among other things, citizen security cultures and citizens' personal concerns. There are no ethics considerations that can be planned or implemented without prior identification and addressing of citizens' perceptions. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
Major [[Legal aspects|legal aspects]] of deflection include balancing measures of deflection that may be seen as compulsory to some extent, with freedom to act and other fundamental rights. <br />
<br />
VITRUV offers a [[Legal_aspects#Summary_table_of_legal_aspects_in_urban_planning|summary checklist]] and a [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_legal_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods]] to assess legal aspects in resilience-enhancing urban planning.<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Maintenance&diff=13465Measure type: Maintenance2013-11-21T12:03:34Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Measure]]'''Maintenance''' is the [[measure]] of discouraging crime by designing places with management and maintenance in mind.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
Research has shown that a lack of maintenance can act as a disinhibitor for certain crimes. A lack of maintenance over the environment can be seen as "a signal that there is little or no surveillance over an area, that there is little or no social authority exerting control over an area, and that consequently deviant behaviour may be tolerated"<ref>Wolfe Mary K., Mennis Jeremy, ''Does vegetation encourage or suppress urban crime? Evidence from Philadelphia, PA'', Landscape and Urban Planning 108 (2012) 112– 122</ref>. Whereas the maintenance itself is usually not a concern of the urban planner, the design for easy maintenance (including repair) is.<br />
<br />
== Examples ==<br />
* Coated walls for easy removal of graffiti<br />
* Modular street furniture that can quickly be replaced or repaired if damaged<br />
* Street designed for mechanized cleaning, i.e. wide enough and without inaccessible nooks and crannies<br />
* Greenery chosen for easy maintenance<br />
* Design of the public space to support maintenance, such as providing easy access for maintenance (e.g. support for cleaning of windows on higher floors), preventing wind corners where debris might gather, designing traffic flows to prevent litter in inaccessible places.<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
Security issues where this measure can be effective and influenced by the urban planner, are:<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Burglary| Burglary]]{{#info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || <span style="color:silver">Physical assault</span>{{#info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || <span style="color:silver">Destruction by riots</span>{{#info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || <span style="color:silver">Mass killing</span>{{#info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Ram-raiding</span>{{#info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| <span style="color:silver">Sexual assault</span>{{#info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || <span style="color:silver">Destruction of property by fanatics</span>{{#info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Pickpocketing</span>{{#info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || [[Security issue: Vandalism| Vandalism]]{{#info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Robbery</span>{{#info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || [[Security issue: Graffiti| Graffiti]]{{#info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Raid</span>{{#info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || <span style="color:silver">Antisocial Behaviour</span>{{#info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Vehicle theft</span>{{#info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
Designing for easy maintenance can be most effectively implemented in cooperation with the persons or organisations responsible for this maintenance.<br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
The maintainability of urban spaces should be an important element in the decision making process for developments which pass through the urban planning system. This system can be used to ensure that appropriate measures are in place which will guarantee sufficient upkeep is both possible and takes place, in order to prevent areas of dilapidation or neglect, and to present an image of a well cared for and therefore well surveilled location.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
One should be careful to provide easy access for maintenance indiscriminately, as this might result in criminals (burglars, vandals) misusing this to facilitate their crimes. <br />
<br />
A lack of maintenance can lead to unsafe situations (such as sharp edges being exposed) and an increase in vulnerability (such as mouldered door posts which are easy to break).[[Image:Vandalised picnic table - geograph.org.uk - 782295.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Vandalised picnic table, showing sharp edges and unsafe for use]] By designing for easy maintenance, these risks can be minimized, as repairs can be executed quickly. <br />
<br />
By assuring a well-maintained public space, the risk of bad maintenance working as an incentive to other crimes can be avoided.<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
The main [[Social aspects|social]] consideration behind the measure of maintenance is the "broken windows" paradigm <ref>G Kelling, C Coles: Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities. New York: Free Press, 1996.</ref> that comes from community policing. It is based on the experience that when a broken window in a building is left unrepaired, soon all the windows in that building are broken. The generalised lesson is that minor crime causes fear and creates a perception of disorder and insecurity. Reversely, close maintenance can prevent those perceptions from rising. However, maintenance alone does not change [[security culture]] nor the overall setting of urban environments. It should therefore be considered that over-maintenance could have negative impact on societal resilience. For example, visible strong protective built infrastructure makes people to underestimate risks and also makes them reluctant to adopt protective measures at individual and social levels, thus potentially undermining societal resilience. <ref> Dennis S. Mileti/John H. Sorensen: Communication of Emergency Public Warnings. A Social Science Perspective and State-of-the-Art Assessment. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, 1990.</ref> <br />
<br />
Practical addressing of social aspects and aspects of [[security culture]] as they relate to the measure of maintenance can best be accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure should include usability tests in relevant social contexts. This can be supported by citizen participation methods such as the [[safety audit]] or [[appreciative planning]] that, among other things. focus on collecting and integrating perspectives in multicultural environments.<br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Urban objects generate annual expenditures such as building services, utilities, repairs and maintenance. On the benefit side, maintenance extends the economic life of assets, has a positive environmental impact, improves social aspects like employee well-being, and mitigates crime and vandalism (also referred to as positive [[External effects|externalities]]). In addition, asset maintenance creates [[Economic effects of anti-crime security measures#Indirect (secondary) benefits of security|secondary economic impact]] due to the re-spending of maintenance fees by maintenance workers, contractors, etc.<br />
<br />
Whether extra focus on maintenance in order to increase security makes sense from an economic point of view, depends on many factors and is case dependent (see also the [[Economic tools#Economic assessment step by step|'''flow chart''']] of an economic assessment). One should first of all compare the potential cost-benefits with other alternatives. Secondly, one has to take in account which parties are affected by the increase in maintenance, who is paying for it and last but not least, how the envisioned measures adjust the [[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|behaviour of criminals/terrorists (in economic terms)]].<br />
<br />
[[Economic tools]] such as the [[social cost-benefit analysis]] (first question) and [[Economic Impact Study|economic impact study]] (second question) can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security (of course in collaboration with insights from criminology, sociology, etc.).<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
Maintenance of mobility structures mainly concerns road maintenance.<br />
Like all structures, roads deteriorate over time. Deterioration is primarily due to accumulated damage from vehicles, however environmental effects such as frost heaves, thermal cracking and oxidation often contribute <ref>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Road#Maintenance</ref>.<br />
<br />
Pavements are designed for an expected service life or design life. In some parts of the United Kingdom the standard design life is 40 years for new bitumen and concrete pavement. Maintenance is considered in the whole life cost of the road with service at 10, 20 and 30 year milestones.[33] Roads can be and are designed for a variety of lives (8-, 15-, 30-, and 60-year designs). <br />
<br />
Virtually all roads require some form of maintenance before they come to the end of their service life. Pro-active agencies use pavement management techniques to continually monitor road conditions and schedule preventive maintenance treatments as needed to prolong the lifespan of their roads. Technically advanced agencies monitor the road network surface condition with sophisticated equipment such as laser/inertial Profilometers. These measurements include road curvature, cross slope, asperity, roughness, rutting and texture. This data is fed into a pavement management system, which recommends the best maintenance or construction treatment to correct the damage that has occurred.<br />
<br />
Maintenance treatments for asphalt concrete generally include thin asphalt overlays, crack sealing, surface rejuvenating, fog sealing, micro-milling and surface treatments. Thin surfacing preserves, protects and improves the functional condition of the road while reducing the need for routing maintenance, leading to extended service life without increasing structural capacity. <ref>^ "Thin Surfacing - Effective Way of Improving Road Safety within Scarce Road Maintenance Budget" (PDF). Paper for presentation at the 2005 Annual Conference of the Transportation Association of Canada in Calgary, Alberta. Transportation Association of Canada. 2005. Archived from the original on 2008-04-07. Retrieved 2007-05-14.</ref><br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Design for easy maintenance may incur [[Ethics aspects|ethics]] issues of distributive justice, such as risks of reifying uneven distribution of security in society. Creating built urban infrastructure that facilitates maintenance can contribute to selective delivery of security, making some groups of citizens more secure, and other groups of citizens more vulnerable. This may be, for example, the case in a situation, where increase in maintenance in some area displaces crime to another community. <br />
<br />
In general, pinpointing specific ethics aspects in resilience-enhancing measures needs to consider, among other things, citizen security cultures and citizens' personal concerns. There are no ethics considerations that can be planned or implemented without prior identification and addressing of citizens' perceptions. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
Main [[Legal aspects|legal]] aspects to consider related to the measure of maintenance include city and building codes, as well as general health and safety requirements. <br />
<br />
VITRUV offers a [[Legal_aspects#Summary_table_of_legal_aspects_in_urban_planning|summary checklist]] and a [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_legal_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods]] to assess legal aspects in resilience-enhancing urban planning.<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Ownership&diff=13464Measure type: Ownership2013-11-21T12:00:42Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Measure]]'''Ownership''' is the [[measure]] of reducing risk by establishing an environment where there is a clear separation between public and private space.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
Research<ref>Goldstein, Arnold P., ''Controlling Vandalism: The Person-Environment Duet'', School oriented interventions, pp 290-321</ref> has shown that a lack of ownership can act as a disinhibitor for certain crimes, as "Uncertainty of ownership can reduce responsibility and increase the likelihood of crime and anti-social behaviour going unchallenged". Ownership is described as "Places that promote a sense of ownership, respect, territorial responsibility and community".<br />
<br />
The level of ownership is expressed in a clear distinction between public, semi-private/communal and private space:<br />
# Will it be clear to users — including potential offenders and capable guardians — which space is public, communal, semi-private and private?<br />
# Are the boundaries between public, communal and private space signified in the most appropriate manner, be it a physical barrier or a psychological barrier such as changes in paving, surface texture/colour, landscaping and signage?<br />
# Will the place have an identity of its own?<br />
# Are all those who should feel ownership involved in defining the place’s identity?<br />
# Are barriers of a high quality of design in their detailing and appropriate to their local context?<br />
<br />
== Examples ==<br />
[[Image:Wood fence.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Wood fence, indicating a clear distinction between public and private space. The open structure does not restrict surveillance,]]<br />
* Providing a clear demarcation between public and private territory by fences, paving, surface texture/colour, landscaping, planting and/or signage.<br />
* Increasing the felt level of responsibility for the environment by involving residents and users. This can be achieved in a number of ways, such as town centre management partnerships, tenant management organisations, community development trusts, regeneration programmes and management trusts<ref>Home Office, ''Safer Places. The planning system and crime prevention'', 2004</ref>.<br />
* Involving the community in the design of (parts of) communal spaces.<br />
* Increasing a sense of communality by using distinct and common design features, like colours or architecture.<br />
* Hiring of unemployed youths as subway vandalism inspectors.<br />
* "[http://www.acorp.uk.com/Station%20Adoption%20main.html Adopt-a-station]" antivandalism programs.<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
Security issues where this measure can be effective and influenced by the urban planner, are:<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Burglary| Burglary]]{{#info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || <span style="color:silver">Physical assault</span>{{#info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || <span style="color:silver">Destruction by riots</span>{{#info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || <span style="color:silver">Mass killing</span>{{#info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Ram-raiding</span>{{#info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| <span style="color:silver">Sexual assault</span>{{#info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || <span style="color:silver">Destruction of property by fanatics</span>{{#info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Pickpocketing</span>{{#info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || [[Security issue: Vandalism| Vandalism]]{{#info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Robbery</span>{{#info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || [[Security issue: Graffiti| Graffiti]]{{#info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Raid| Raid]]{{#info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || <span style="color:silver">Antisocial Behaviour</span>{{#info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Vehicle theft</span>{{#info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
The form of measures that are most suited to provide ownership depend on the location and use of the object. High fences and landscape that actively impede access are most appropriate in places that are vulnerable to crime, such as the back of dwellings. Lower barriers, hedges and bushes are also highly useful to signify the public/private divide.<br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
Urban planning has an important role to play in facilitating the delineation of spaces and allowing the clear illustration of ownership, while also preserving the functionality, surveillance and (in some examples) permeability which is required of it. By making the concept of ownership clearly visible, the likelihood of criminal or anti-social behaviour can be reduced. In this way, it will be possible to ensure that such spaces retain a positive role within the overall urban fabric.<br />
<br />
'Ownership' from an urban planning perspective may not necessarily mean full legal onwership, but rather it represents a sense of pride or ownership that a person may have with the environment through a care and interest in it.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
Wherever an increased sense of ownership leads to an increase in social cohesion, this may lead to an increased social concern to one another. This concern can lead to a decrease in security issues (by for example the public not accepting aggression to an fellow resident), or in safety issues (like people providing first aid to an injured fellow resident after an accident).<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
Ownership is a way to address the specific and particular security problems and public security cultures a city or community has. Each city and community is distinct, with specific population characteristics, physical spaces, government structures, values, and history. Each will thus have its these characteristics co-determine whether urban design will be accepted by citizens and used appropriately. At the same time, decentralisation and privatisation decrease opportunities for coherent collective action and often reinforce the uneven distribution of power over resources.<br />
<br />
The main [[Social aspects|social]] consideration behind the measure of ownership is that an individual has a sense of 'belonging to' and 'holding a share of'. A favourable and attractive design of built infrastructure, increases citizens' preparedness to respond resilience to crime, terrorism and disaster. Since vulnerability changes with the type of hazard,<ref>S. Schneiderbauer, D. Ehrlich: Social Levels and Hazard (In)dependence in Determining Vulnerability, in J. Birkmann (ed.): Measuring Vulnerability to Natural Hazards: Towards Disaster Resilient Societies, pp. 78-102 (p. 81).</ref> the measure of ownership is not a 'one size fits all' approach. <br />
<br />
The measure of ownership needs careful assesment and planning in order to be responsive to citizens' felt security needs. It will be responsive if based on identification of citizens’ perceptions of vulnerability and resilience. Moreover, ownership-supporting built infrastructure may have negative impact on societal resilience. Research has shown, that prominent protective built infrastructure (such as walls and fences) can make people to underestimate risks and also makes them reluctant to adopt individual protective measures, thus potentially undermining societal resilience.<ref> Dennis S. Mileti/John H. Sorensen: Communication of Emergency Public Warnings. A Social Science Perspective and State-of-the-Art Assessment. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, 1990.</ref> Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that resilience-enhancing measures are no substitute for continuously confronting citizens with risks, how to assess risks, and how to prepare for realisation of risks.<ref> Dennis S. Mileti/John H. Sorensen: Communication of Emergency Public Warnings. A Social Science Perspective and State-of-the-Art Assessment. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, 1990.</ref> This means that the measure of ownership requires a [[comprehensive approach]]. <br />
<br />
Practical addressing of the social aspects and aspects of [[security culture]] in planning and implementaion of the measure of ownership can best be accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure of ownership should include tests of usability social contexts. Suitable related methods that at the same time can promote citizens' sense of ownership, for example include [[appreciative planning]] or [[local open dialogue]].<br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Privatising public space for security purposes does not necessarily imply that the involved actors also actually 'own' the specific urban object/environment in legal and financial terms. Increasing the involvement of residents and users with the help of regeneration programmes or "adoption"-programmes, for example, does not make these people the legal owner of the specific urban objects, but does increase the involvement of the members of a community. <br />
<br />
The costs of 'ownership' measures contain the relatively straightforward [[Primary economic impact|direct expenditures]] on capital equipment and operational costs (both temporary and permanent) such as investment in design features or hiring unemployed youths. <br />
In addition, ownership generate various types of [[Secondary economic impact|secondary effects]] related to the perceived security in an area (less crime is good for business). Whether the costs are making sense from an economic point of view, depends on many factors, and can be answered by two distinct sets of questions (see also the [[Economic tools#Economic assessment step by step|'''flow chart''']] of an economic assessment):<br />
# Are the envisioned 'ownership' measures cost effective from a socio-economic point of view, or are there better alternatives?<br />
# Which specific agents (individuals, companies, sectors, authorities) are affected by the surveillance measures, and to which extend? How do the envisioned measures alter the behaviour of these agents, and, of course, the [[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|behaviour of criminals/terrorists (in economic terms)]]?<br />
<br />
''Case example: Cost-effective security programmes for schools''<br />
{{quote|The Department of Education and Training in Western Australia initiated in 1999 a successful security risk management programme helping school principals to evaluate existing security measures and determine cost-effective levels of security to meet the risks faced by their schools <ref>[http://www.oecd.org/education/country-studies/centreforeffectivelearningenvironmentscele/38162484.pdf OECD (2007): School Security Assessment Programme in Australia. PEB Exchange 2007/3 ISSN 1609-7548]</ref>. Part of this assessment was the draft of a treatment plan for which the principal provided a description of the school plan, including costs of individual security measures and the applied locations. The programme was very successful in reducing the number of offences (13 - 40%) and cost of crime (30 - 70%)<ref>This excepts the result of one particular school which dealt with an isolated crime occurrence of stolen computers during the programme evaluation.</ref> against relatively small investment costs between $27,000 and $49,000 (AUD). One of the suggested security measures was ownership/territorial reinforcement in which not only staff and students are involved, but also the community through the School Watch Programme. Other measures were target hardening, surveillance, landscape management and lighting.}}<br />
<br />
[[Economic tools]] can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security (of course in collaboration with insights from criminology, sociology, etc.).<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
Mobility infrastructure is usually public, though private roads may exist, which is usually indicated with signs which prohibit entering for public users. Also companies often own a private parking area which is only accessible to employees and visitors of the company. This is usually regulated with a barrier with intercom at the entrance.<br />
<br />
Furthermore there can be made a distinction between public and private means of transport. The difference is usually clear (e.g. public buses and private cars), though in some cases it could be unclear if a taxi is an 'offical' public taxi or some private vehicle pretending to be a taxi. Especially in less developed countries (such as Indonesia), transport is offered by all sorts of vehicles ((mini)buses, taxis, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cycle_rickshaw rickshaw/becak], scooters) and many not regulated by offical public transport companies. It may be unclear if a bus is an 'official' bus and prices are not regulated. This will create a less safe environment for using public transport. Often touts will offer transport for very high prices to tourists, drive unsafe and/or use unsafe vehicles. This can be approved by making clear which are the 'official' bus- or taxi companies, e.g. using a uniform colour and published schedule and prices, using fixed bus stop locations, or asking the taxi driver for a taxi permit or taxi with regulated taximeter.<br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Ownership-enhancing measures may incur [[Ethics aspects|ethics]] issues of distributive justice, such as risks of reifying uneven distribution of security in society. Creating sense of ownership may in the final analysis contribute to selective delivery of security, making some groups of citizens more secure, and other groups of citizens more vulnerable. This may be the case in a situation where increase in ownership in one community displaces crime to another community. It may furthermore the case that enhancement of ownership will be – unintendedly – at the expense of other groups of citizens, for example reducing their rights to movement, etc. <br />
<br />
In general, pinpointing specific ethics aspects in resilience-enhancing measures needs to consider, among other things, citizen security cultures and citizens' personal concerns. There are no ethics considerations that can be planned or implemented without prior identification and addressing of citizens' perceptions. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
Ownership is a legal measure to recognize the power and obligations of public authorities, especially municipalities, to control the urban development process by formulating land and land use policies in which individual interests of land and other property owners can coexist with other social, cultural, and environmental interests espoused by other socio-economic groups and inhabitants of cities as a whole. <br />
<br />
Prior [[Legal aspects|legal]] considerations related to ownership include property rights and building codes, as well as the possible involvement of environmental regulations and legislation for stability of housing. <br />
<br />
VITRUV offers a [[Legal_aspects#Summary_table_of_legal_aspects_in_urban_planning|summary checklist]] and a [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_legal_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods]] to assess legal aspects in resilience-enhancing urban planning.<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Facilitating_compliance&diff=13463Measure type: Facilitating compliance2013-11-21T11:49:09Z<p>Florian: </p>
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<div>[[Category:Measure]]'''Facilitating compliance''' is the [[measure]] of reducing risk by decreasing crime by making it easier for the public to behave according to the local rules.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
The idea behind facilitating compliance is to reduce circumstances that might be used as excuse for committing crimes. For example, not having public waste bins might be used as an excuse for littering, long lines as excuse to get in without paying or a dilapidated appearance as an excuse for vandalism.<br />
<br />
== Examples ==<br />
* Providing ample waste bins<br />
* Providing 'graffiti boards' where messages can legally be painted<br />
* Providing public urinals<br />
* Using [[Measure: Directing traffic flows| directing traffic flows]] to ease right and discourage wrong behaviour, like one-way turnstiles to discourage using an exit for entry or clear signs indicating the preferred route around a closed or one-way road.<br />
* Providing taxi stops in bar district to prevent driving under influence<br />
* Rehabilitation programs for addicts<br />
* Ensuring a adequate level of [[Measure: Maintenance| maintenance]]<br />
* Making clear rules are monitored and acted upon[[Image:Welsh bilingual cycling sign 2.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Sign in Wales indicating a prohibition to bicycle and at the same time that these rules are monitored and acted upon.]]<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
Security issues where this measure can be effective and influenced by the urban planner, are:<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Burglary</span>{{#info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || <span style="color:silver">Physical assault</span>{{#info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || <span style="color:silver">Destruction by riots</span>{{#info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || <span style="color:silver">Mass killing</span>{{#info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Ram-raiding</span>{{#info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| <span style="color:silver">Sexual assault</span>{{#info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || <span style="color:silver">Destruction of property by fanatics</span>{{#info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Pickpocketing</span>{{#info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || <span style="color:silver">Vandalism</span>{{#info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Robbery</span>{{#info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || <span style="color:silver">Graffiti</span>{{#info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Raid| Raid]]{{#info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || <span style="color:silver">Antisocial Behaviour</span>{{#info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Vehicle theft</span>{{#info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
When taken right, measures to facilitate compliance can be quite natural and subtle to the public and be seen as an extra service rather than as a restriction. One should realize the limitation of this measure though, as it primarily targets the 'opportunity crimes' and it will therefore be better suited to low-level crimes like antisocial behaviour, graffiti and vandalism and less suited to the higher-level crimes. <br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
Instances of poor quality urban spaces and dilapidated environments discourage the voluntary adherence of rules, encouraging undesirable activity.<br />
<br />
In order to facilitate people to comply with existing rules, an efficient and effective urban planning process is required to address an area’s underlying vulnerabilities and disinhibitors of crime. For example, by designing for easier maintenance and promoting a sense of ownership, a perception of oversight in an area can be established by the urban planner. This will reduce the circumstances which are being used as an excuse for committing crimes and will promote rule compliance.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
Facilitating compliance can both be used to serve security and safety goals; warning people for dangerous situations and informing them about a requirement to use hard hats in a construction area is an example of the latter. As the measure of facilitating compliance does not impose new rules, but only provides incentives and support to voluntarily uphold existing rules, this measure has no side effects.<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
An important [[Social aspects|social aspect]] of facilitating compliance is the responsiveness of this measure to citizens' felt security needs. In general, it is not easy to address citizens' by built infrastructure in order to influence their behaviour in using that infrastructure. The reason for this is that – among other things due to [[culture aspects]] – citizens ‘read’ built urban environment in different ways: One central tenet in [[environmental psychology]] is that meaning intentionally embodied in built environment is not always decoded by citizens' according to that intention. <br />
<br />
Practical addressing of social aspects and aspects of [[security culture]] as they apply to facilitating compliance can best be accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure of facilitating compliance should include tests of usability in relevant social contexts. Suitable methods to assess the appropriateness of the measure of facilitating compliance from the citizen point of view, and that can also help supporting implementation of the measue, include [[Planning for Real]]. This helps assess risks and how to address it, giving emphasis on cultural contexts. At the same time, the method aims at creating conducive contexts for security-enhancing cooperation among neighbours, experts and local interest groups.<br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Facilitating compliance (see the case example below) mitigates the chance of a security threat. There are however costs involved with the improvement of urban security, also referred to as the "Costs of Mitigation"<ref>Rose, A & S. Chatterjee (2011): Benefits and Costs of Counter-Terrorism Security Measures in Urban Areas. Research sponsor: Department of Homeland Security: 6-7.</ref>, <br />
Together these benefits and costs are referred to as [[Economic impact of security measures|economic impact of security measures]]. The costs of facilitating compliance contains the relatively straightforward [[Primary economic impact|direct expenditures]] on capital equipment and operational costs (both temporary and permanent) such as investments in public urinals, rehabilitation programmes for addicts, waste bins, etc. In addition, facilitating compliance measures generate various types of [[Secondary economic impact|secondary effects]] related to the perception of security in an area that translates itself in economic outcome (e.g. more consumer confidence, an impulse for local business and trade, etc.).<br />
<br />
Whether the costs are making sense from an economic point of view, depends on many factors, and can be answered by two distinct sets of questions (see also the [[Economic tools#Economic assessment step by step|'''flow chart''']] of an economic assessment):<br />
# Are the envisioned measures cost effective from a socioeconomic point of view, or are there better alternatives?<br />
# Which specific agents (individuals, companies, sectors, authorities) are affected by the envisioned measures, and to which extend? How do the envisioned measures alter the behaviour of these agents, and, of course, the [[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|behaviour of criminals/terrorists (in economic terms)]]? <br />
<br />
''Case example: Fake security systems''<br />
{{quote|With the help of fake security systems (camera's, signs, dog warnings, etc.) one can create the impression of a monitored secure asset without the high investment and maintenance costs of the real version. This kind of security is all about perceived security.}}<br />
<br />
[[Economic tools]] can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security (of course in collaboration with insights from criminology, sociology, etc.).<br />
<br />
In terms of benefit-cost ratio, facilitating compliance can be considered as a type of security measure which in a relatively subtle way increases security, in contrast to measures such as security guards, big concrete walls and barb wire that may be pervasive, but can also arouse feelings of fear and anxiety<ref>Coaffee, J., P. O’Hare, and M. Hawkesworth (2009): The Visibility of (In)security: The Aesthetics of Planning Urban Defences Against Terrorism. Security Dialogue 2009 40:489.</ref>. Hence, facilitating compliance is an example of the [[designing out approach]], or as an aspect of [[Sustainable design|sustainable design]], which seeks a balanced consideration of social, economic, cultural and environmental aspects in urban design. In general, these kind of measures demand larger initial investments than traditional security measures, but at the same time they are able to avoid future costs due to the long-term prevention of crime.<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
There are several possibilites to facilitate compliance of traffic. As written above, this can be done using measures for [[measure: Directing traffic flows|directing traffic flows]] to ease right and discourage wrong behaviour, like one-way turnstiles to discourage using an exit for entry or clear signs indicating the preferred route around a closed or one-way road. <br />
<br />
One of the principles of the Dutch approach ''Sustainable Safety'' is predictability, which is a means of facilitating compliance as well. As explained in <ref name="duurzaamveilig">http://bicycledutch.wordpress.com/2012/01/02/sustainable-safety/</ref>, road design should be so consistent that road users instantly understand what they can expect and what is expected of them on a certain type of street or road. The road design itself gives information about the type of road/street. If the street is paved with bricks, there are parked cars and the street is shared with cyclists and gives access to homes, the road user will instantly know and feel this is a 30km/h (19mph) local access street. However, if the road has two carriageways separated by a median, there is no parking and cyclists have their own cycle paths, it is clear to the road user that this is a through road.<br />
<br />
Another principal of the Sustainable Safety approach is ''Forgivingness''; Humans make errors and willingly or unwillingly break rules. This is a given that cannot be changed. So roads and streets should be designed in such a way that this natural human behavior does not lead to crashes and injuries. An example is a shoulder with a semi-hard pavement. A road user coming off the main road will not crash immediately; the semi-hard shoulder will give this road user the ability to get back to the main carriageway. The equivalent for cyclists is a curb with a different angle; 45 degrees in stead of 90 degrees. Hitting this curb with your front wheel will not immediately result in a fall. Forgivingness towards other road users is enhanced when road design leads to a predictable behavior of road users. A result of this principle is that motorized traffic sometimes gives priority to cyclists even if they don’t have it. Because it is so clear where the cyclists want or need to go the motorist anticipates their behavior and gives the cyclist more room than he or she is legally obliged to, often to the surprise of especially foreign cyclists <ref name="duurzaamveilig"/>.<br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Facilitating compliance first requires the selection of those areas and types of risk where compliance is sought to be facilitated. This involves [[Ethics aspects|ethics]] issues because limited resources will probably not allow addressing all relevant urban areas. This may lead to the creation of different levels of security in society. Therefore, investigating human and societal needs regarding target hardening should be a priority. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
Major [[Legal aspects|legal aspects]] include balancing of facilitation of compliance that may be seen as compulsory to some extent, with freedom to act and other fundamental rights. VITRUV offers a [[Legal_aspects#Summary_table_of_legal_aspects_in_urban_planning|summary checklist]] and a [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_legal_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods]] to assess legal aspects in resilience-enhancing urban planning.<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Target_removal&diff=13462Measure type: Target removal2013-11-21T11:41:20Z<p>Florian: </p>
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<div>[[Category:Measure]]Target removal is the [[measure]] of reducing risk by either removing the perceived attractive aspects from an [[attractive object]], or removing the object as a whole.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
If appropriately employed, target removal is one of most effective approaches to crime prevention<ref>[http://www.popcenter.org/library/crimeprevention/volume_01/01poyner.pdf Poyner, Barry, ''what works in crime prevention: an overview of evaluations'', crime prevention studies, 1993]</ref>, as it removes the object or subject suited to commit the crime to.<br />
<br />
== Examples ==<br />
* Removal of money-carrying devices such as pay phones from high-loitering areas[[Image:Pay-phone-TPE97.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Replacement of money pay phones by phones accepting only electronic payments can effectively reduce theft.]]<br />
* Omission of ground-level windows against vandalism<br />
* Concealing or placing out of reach of vulnerable parts<br />
* Using inlaid signs instead of mounted signs against vandalism<br />
* Removal of vandalism-prone street furniture, plants or fixtures or replacing them with less attractive targets<br />
* Removing people vulnerable for robbery and/or assault from high-risk locations by providing alternative routes or means of transport.<br />
* Removing masses as attractive target for fanatics by [[designing out]] crowds and busy places<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
Security issues where this measure can be effective and influenced by the urban planner, are:<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Burglary|Burglary]]{{#info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || [[Security issue: Assault|Physical assault]]{{#info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || <span style="color:silver">Destruction by riots</span>{{#info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || [[Security issue: Mass killing|Mass killing]]{{#info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Ram raid|Ram-raiding]]{{#info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| [[Security issue: Sexual assault|Sexual assault]]{{#info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || <span style="color:silver">Destruction of property by fanatics</span>{{#info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Pickpocketing|Pickpocketing]]{{#info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || [[Security issue: Vandalism|Vandalism]]{{#info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Robbery|Robbery]]{{#info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || [[Security issue: Grafitti|Graffiti]]{{#info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Raid</span>{{#info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || [[Security issue: Antisocial behaviour|Antisocial Behaviour]]{{#info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Vehicle theft|Vehicle theft]]{{#info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
There are no specific environmental conditions required to make target removal effective, but a good target removal measure does require a good understanding what makes a situation attractive for a perpetrator and some creativity to remove the attractiveness of a target without impairing the function of the object (too much).<br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
Urban planning must consider how groups which are particularly vulnerable to criminal acts (women, the elderly etc.) can be removed from high risk locations. This could mean removing needs for such groups to visit these places. For example, bus stops should not be located in isolated areas where potential for entrapment is high. In addition, public facilities such as restrooms, benches and luggage lockers should not be placed in locations of poor visibility where people have the opportunity to loiter. Urban planning should seek to strike a balance between removing a positive contribution to the urban area (e.g. a bus stop) set against the impact such an action may/may not have on reducing crime at this location.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
Some targets might serve a role in providing safety, such as fire extinguishers that are regularly vandalised. Removing these should be done only after considering their effect on safety.<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
Target removal is an example of the [[designing out approach]], or an aspect of [[sustainable design|sustainable design]], which seeks a balanced consideration of [[Social aspects|social,]] economic, [[Culture aspects|cultural,]] and environmental aspects in urban design. For related measures to be effective and accepted by the public, the need to be responsive to the prevailing [[security culture]]. This can best be accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure of target removal should include usability tests in relevant social contexts. The [[safety audit]] is one of the practical measures that could be used. <br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Target removal deters security threats and mitigates its effects, preventing material and immaterial damage for (potential) victims, and [[Economic effects of crime#Secondary economic impact of crime|secondary]] economic damage to local and regional economies (in terms of e.g. a decrease in investments by companies or the relocation of resources). At the same time, however, security measures demand an investment in time, capital and effort by private agents, companies/developers and the public authorities, exacting [[Economic impact|economic costs]]. Together these benefits and costs are referred to as [[Economic impact of security measures|economic impact of security measures]]. The costs of target removal contains the relatively straightforward [[Primary economic impact|direct expenditures]] on capital equipment and operational costs such as investments in mounted signs against vandalism or omission of ground-level windows. In addition, target removal measures generate various types of [[Secondary economic impact|secondary effects]] as a result of subsequent rounds of expenditure ('re-expenditures') of business companies, households and public authorities outside the security market.<br />
<br />
Whether the act of target removal as a security measures makes sense from an economic point of view, depends on many factors and is case dependent (see the [[Economic tools#Economic assessment step by step|'''flow chart''']] of an economic assessment). One should first of all compare the potential benefits and costs with other alternatives such as target hardening, access control or punishment. Secondly, one has to take into account which parties are affected by the act of removing means, who is paying for it, whose activities are affected by it, and so on. And last but not least, how the envisioned measure alters the [[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|behaviour of criminals/terrorists (in economic terms)]].<br />
<br />
[[Economic tools]] can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security. In terms of benefit-cost ratio, target removal can be considered as a type of security measure which in a relatively subtle way increases security, in contrast to measures such as security guards, big concrete walls and barb wire that may be pervasive, but can also arouse feelings of fear and anxiety<ref>Coaffee, J., P. O’Hare, and M. Hawkesworth (2009): The Visibility of (In)security: The Aesthetics of Planning Urban Defences Against Terrorism. Security Dialogue 2009 40:489.</ref>. Since target removal belongs to the the [[designing out approach]], and is as aspect of [[Sustainable design|sustainable design]], it seeks a balanced consideration of a variety of aspects in urban design. In general, this demands larger investments than traditional security measures, but at the same time they are able to avoid future costs due to the long-term prevention of crime.<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
As described above, an example of target removal is removing people vulnerable for robbery and/or assault from high-risk locations by providing alternative routes or means of transport. For example, providing more means of public transport or new routes guiding around poor or dangerous areas. Another example, removing masses as attractive target for fanatics by designing out crowds and busy places, can be achieved by providing more open spaces and squares while avoiding areas/corners that cannot be overseen, or by making more areas of a city attractive by creating for example alternative shopping areas and places to go out in other parts of the city, including appropriate road and public transport means.<br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Removing targets can also mean to remove opportunities, such impacting citizens’ freedom to act. An increase in security may be echoed by an increase in restrictions. This needs to be assessed on a case by case basis that considers, among other things, citizen security cultures and citizens' personal concerns. There are no [[Ethics aspects|ethics]] considerations that can be planned or implemented without prior identification and addressing of citizens' perceptions. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
[[Legal aspects|Legal]] considerations concerning target removal include the right to remove the target, as defined - or not defined - by applicable property law. <br />
<br />
VITRUV offers a [[Legal_aspects#Summary_table_of_legal_aspects_in_urban_planning|summary checklist]] and a [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_legal_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods]] to assess legal aspects in resilience-enhancing urban planning. <br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Surveillance&diff=13461Measure type: Surveillance2013-11-21T11:32:47Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Ethics]]<br />
[[Category:Measure]]<br />
[[Category:Mobility]]<br />
[[Category:Social]]<br />
'''Surveillance''' is the [[measure]] of monitoring the behaviour, activities, or other changing information, usually of people for the purpose of influencing, managing, directing, or protecting.<ref>[[wikipedia:Surveillance]]</ref><br />
<br />
[[Traffic management#Traffic monitoring|Monitoring of traffic]] is a related activity which can be used for general [[Traffic management|traffic management]] or [[Traffic management#Incident management|incident management]].<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
Surveillance is the first step in the reaction chain ''detection-perception-interpretation-formulating'' ''action-acting''. The essence of surveillance lies in the detection of threats in the actual situation. This can be done in various ways:<br />
* by dedicated observers on location<br />
* remotely by dedicated observers<br />
* by the public<br />
<br />
==Examples==<br />
===By dedicated observers on location===<br />
[[File:UDPolice1.jpg|thumb|right|Police officer on surveillance]]Observation of the situation by dedicated observers on location can be done either by observers that are incognito, or observers that are clearly distinguishable. Both strategies have their advantages:<br />
* observation by observers that are incognito can reveal the situation in its natural behaviour, undisturbed by the fact that it is observed. This can reveal behaviour (and its causes) that otherwise remain undetected.<br />
* observation by observers that are clearly distinguishable can convey the presence of authority and exert a mitigating effect on the behaviour of the observed.<br />
<br />
===Remotely by dedicated observers===<br />
[[File:Surveillance_cameras.jpg|thumb|right|Security cameras in the street]]Monitoring with the help of cameras (CCTV) has become a common method throughout all Europe to combat crime and terrorism. In the UK more than 4 million cameras have been installed (The Associated Press, 2007).<br />
<br />
===By the public===<br />
[[File:Amber_Alert_SMS.jpg|thumb|right|Example of an Amber Alert SMS]]This concerns involving (a select part of) the public in the detection of crime. This can both be facilitated by electronic means and more traditional means. Examples of both approaches can be found in:<br />
* The USA 'Eagle Eyes' initiative of the Air Force office of Special Investigation<ref>http://www.osi.andrews.af.mil/eagleeyes/index.asp</ref><br />
* 'Veilige wijk' The Hague<ref>link to be added</ref><br />
* Amber alert<ref>[[wikipedia: AMBER Alert]]</ref><br />
* Gulfport Alternative Policing strategy<ref>http://www.ci.gulfport.ms.us/police/gaps.html</ref><br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
The effectiveness of surveillance against crime is rooted in three effects:<br />
* its contribution to the reaction chain<br />
* the mitigating effect of clearly visible observation/observants<br />
* the contribution it can have to the prosecution of crime (gathering evidence and leads)<br />
<br />
Security issues where this measure can be effective and influenced by the urban planner, are:<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
!colspan="4"|Security issues<br />
|-<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Burglary|Burglary]]{{#info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || [[Security issue: Assault|Physical assault]]{{#info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || [[Security issue: Destruction by riots| Destruction by riots]]{{#info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || [[Security issue: Mass killing| Mass killing]]{{#info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Ram raid|Ram-raiding]]{{#info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| [[Security issue: Sexual assault|Sexual assault]]{{#info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || [[Security issue: Destruction by fanatics| Destruction of property by fanatics]]{{#info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Pickpocketing|Pickpocketing]]{{#info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || [[Security issue: Vandalism|Vandalism]]{{#info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Robbery|Robbery]]{{#info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || [[Security issue: Grafitti|Graffiti]]{{#info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Raid|Raid]]{{#info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || [[Security issue: Antisocial behaviour|Antisocial Behaviour]]{{#info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Vehicle theft|Vehicle theft]]{{#info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
In order for surveillance to have the intended effects, it is essential that the reaction chain is unbroken. As often the links in the reaction chain are managed by different people or organisations, the communication in this chain is of vital essence.<br />
<br />
For surveillance to be effective, an observer needs to be able to oversee an area. In an urban context, the extent to which an area can be overseen by an observer is highly dependent on<br />
* the available positions for the observer<br />
* the field of vision, which is directly related to the geometry of the space<br />
* the lighting conditions<br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
Natural surveillance in public spaces can be promoted through effective urban planning which provides for a diverse mix of land uses. Different types of users will be involved with different types of land use at different times of the day and night. A diverse mix of land uses therefore ensures that there will be a continuous presence of people in the environment throughout the day. This can help inhibit particular categories of crime which rely on areas to be deserted or sparsely populated at particular times of the day.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
Situational crime prevention measures such as camera surveillance are subject of [[Economic effects of anti-crime security measures#Crime displacement|displacement effect]]s. A UK-study (2009)<ref>Waples, S., M. Gill, and P. Fisher (2009). ''Does CCTV displace crime?'' Sage Publications.</ref> empirically tested this thesis in the UK on 13 CCTV projects and concludes that spatial displacement of crime due to camera surveillance does occur, but not in a frequent and uniform way across space and types of offences<ref>Violence against persons, for example, increased dramatically, which (according to the authors) "could be explained by the increase in reporting due to the cameras or due to the national upward trend in recorded violent crime."</ref><br />
<br />
Highly visible forms of surveillance can raise the prominence of an object, which can raise the attractiveness of the object for fanatics.<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
[[Social aspects|Social]] side effects of surveillance can be:<br />
* Increased perception of (un)safety by the public (some research suggests that measures such as video surveillance of public places reduces citizens' social fear of crime but increases their personal fear of crime (e.g. <br />
* Decreased perception of privacy by the public<br />
* [[Risk#Objective_and_subjective_risk|Overconfidence]] <br />
* Reflective fear: the idea that (as some critics argue) information technology-based solutions to security problems (including the use of video surveillance) are not suited to confront threats but only to reassure the public that something is being done. This facilitates the rise of a security culture of moral panic as illustrated by the London bombings in 2005.<ref>Alexander Siedschlag: The Concept of Security in the EU, in: Maximilian Edelbacher et al. (eds.): Global Security and the Financial Crisis. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press (Taylor & Francis Group), pp. 51-64 (p. 59).</ref><br />
<br />
In general, technology-based measures such as surveillance should consider that security mainly refers to the people and society, and that technical solutions are not effective without the acceptance and participation of the public. This acceptance is, among other things, rooted in [[security culture]].<br />
<br />
Practical addressing of social aspects and aspects of [[security culture]] in security-related urban planning can be best accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure of surveillance should include usability tests in relevant social contexts. [[Planning for Real]] and [[local open dialogue]] are examples of practical methods to use.<br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Surveillance measures intend to increase the level of security, detecting security issues and mitigating the negative [[Economic effects of crime|(economic) effects of security threats]] such as property crime, compulsive crime and violent conflicts. Considering the large amount of security issues that can effectively be influenced with the help of this measure, it is no wonder that surveillance is widely used by urban planners in all kinds of shapes and forms. And indeed, the economic benefits of crime detection and mitigation as a result of the use of e.g. surveillance measures do not just limit themselves to the prevention of material and immaterial damage, but also generate positive economic spin-off effects for the local and regional economy ([[Secondary economic impact|indirect]] economic effects). After all, the increased perception of security positively influences the socio-economic composition of a community and generates all kinds of positive economic effects like an increase in investments, property values and tourist spendings.<br />
<br />
Security measures, nevertheless, also require investment in capital, time and money exacting [[Economic impact|economic cost/impact]]. These costs contain the relatively straightforward [[Primary economic impact|direct expenditures]] such as investments in police officers, cameras in the street, public awareness programmes, etc., and in addition various types of [[Secondary economic impact|secondary effects]]. CCTV cameras, for instance, are intended to detect security threats and increase the perception of security, but they can also (unintendedly) make people feel more aware of security threats, creating an 'unwelcoming feeling' with additional negative economic effects. <br />
<br />
To find out if investing in surveillance makes sense from an economic point of view, one should first of all find out what type of surveillance will have the least negative economic effects in terms of permanent (maintenance) costs and secondary economic effects in comparison to the expected benefits (in terms of a reduction in crime and an increase in perceived security). Subsequently, one should compare these results with other types of security measures like intervention forces, ownership, deflection, etc. The final question to be answered is how stakeholders like citizens and business owners (but also the criminals and terrorists<ref>The so-called [[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour]]</ref> will react to the envisioned surveillance measures. To illustrate these points, we added two case examples:<br />
<br />
''Case example: remote surveillance by dedicated observer''<br />
{{quote|The current debate about CCTV (camera surveillance) with regards to its cost-effectiveness is pointing out the following topics:<br />
* Empirical research finds that the overall crime rates drop in the areas with CCTV, but not in all cases and situations<ref> See, ''e.g.'':Priks, M. (2010): The Effect of Surveillance Cameras on Crime: Evidence from the Stockholm Subway. Cameron, A., E. Kolodinski, H. May, N. Williams (2008): Measuring the Effects of Video Surveillance on Crime in Los Angeles. CRB-8-007. USC School of Policy, Planning and Development.</ref>. Furthermore, crimes committed in the heat of the moment, such as assaults are in general not affected by the presence of cameras.<br />
* Total costs of CCTV far exceed that of the camera hardware alone<ref> See ''e.g.'':http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/08/08-007.pdf, and http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/dec/22/cctv-surveillance-police-cost</ref>.<br />
* To be effective, surveillance systems should be fully integrated into law enforcement practices.}}<br />
<br />
''Case example: dedicated surveillance on location''<br />
{{quote|Stewart and Mueller (2008)<ref name =Stewart>Stewart, M.G., J. Mueller (2008): A risk and cost-benefit assessment of United States aviation security measures. Springer Science.</ref> performed a cost-benefit analysis of the Federal Air Marshal Service and hardening cockpit doors as security measures against terrorist events like 9/11. They conclude that even if the Federal Air Marshal Service prevents one 9/11 replication each decade, the $900 million annual spending on Air Marshal Service fails a [[Social cost-benefit analysis|cost-benefit analysis]] at an annual estimated cost of $180 million per life saved (compared to a [[Social cost-benefit analysis#Value of a statistical life (VASL)|societal willingness to pay]] to save a life of $1 - $10 million per saved life). On the other hand, Stewart and Mueller <ref name =Stewart></ref> conclude that with $40 million per year, [[Measure: Target hardening|target hardening]] of cockpit doors is one of the most cost-effective security measures with an annual cost of $800,000 per life saved.}}<br />
<br />
The case examples above illustrate why it is important to research the positive and negative economic effects of a particular security measure. [[Economic tools]] can help the urban planner with this in order to prevent wasteful expenditures or come up with innovative concepts like 'surveillance by the public' (a cost-effective way to generate surveillance).<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
In the mobility field, surveillance is often applied for enforcement of speed limits or other traffic rules such as only parking at the allowed spaces.<br />
<br />
For speed limit enforcement, surveillance is usually applied with a radar system to measure the speed and a camera with flasher to detect the car driver by its license plate. Also trajectory control is applied, where all drivers are detected at both ends of a trajectory, after which their average speed is calculated and checked against the speed limit.<br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Surveillance is an instance of [http://www.focusproject.eu/web/focus/wiki/-/wiki/ESG/Securitization#section-Securitisation-SecuritisationAndSurveillance securitisation], for example the advocation of big and potentially intrusive measures in the name of security, where the concept of security becomes quite broad.<ref> Cf. Salter, M. B. (2010). Surveillance. In J. P. Burgess (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies. London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group.</ref> Surveillance can involve a variety of [[Ethics aspects|ethics]] issues, such as: [[Culture aspects|cultural differences]] in citizens' perception of security technologies and their acceptability as well as need to provide norms and standards beyond frameworks for built infrastructure (such as respect for privacy and fundamental rights). <br />
<br />
Pinpointing specific ethics aspects in resilience-enhancing measures need to consider citizen security cultures and citizens' personal concerns. There are no ethics considerations that can be planned or implemented without prior identification and addressing of citizens' perceptions. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
Main [[Legal aspects|legal]] considerations relate to the impact of surveillance-related measures on privacy, collection and use of personal data, and human rights. <br />
<br />
VITRUV offers a [[Legal_aspects#Summary_table_of_legal_aspects_in_urban_planning|summary checklist]] and a [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_legal_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods]] to assess legal aspects in resilience-enhancing urban planning. <br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Removing_means&diff=13460Measure type: Removing means2013-11-21T11:30:40Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Measure]]Removing means is the [[measure]] of reducing risk by reducing the availability of tools or other means conductive to crime.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
[[Image:Mary Plantation Guest House Side Ladder.JPG|thumb|right|300px|A ladder can be an inviting tool for a burglar]]Many forms of crime require tools or materials: burglars use tools to force entry, vandals will use objects to destroy, graffiti artist require spray paint or markers. By making the access to these required tools more difficult, committing the crimes is made more difficult. <br />
<br />
This form of crime reduction is most prominently effective in situations where the required tools are available at or close to the crime location. Arson as a form of vandalism for instance, thrives on the presence of flammable goods and burglars can be greatly aided by the presence of a ladder. Making sure these goods are not present, or not accessible can therefore increase the effort needed to commit these crimes.<br />
<br />
== Examples ==<br />
Some examples of removing (the access to) means, are:<br />
* Providing strict access control to debris-prone areas like construction/demolition sites <br />
* Placement of vandalism prone elements far from "hang-out" areas<br />
* Providing lockable sheds for storage of ladders and tools<br />
* Providing an in-house switch for external power sockets (which can otherwise be used by burglars to operate power tools)<br />
* Designing vandal-proof street furniture which can not be deconstructed into elements which can be used as tools for further vandalising.<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
Security issues where this measure can be effective and influenced by the urban planner, are:<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Burglary| Burglary]]{{#info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || <span style="color:silver">Physical assault</span>{{#info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || [[Security issue: Destruction by riots|Destruction by riots]]{{#info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || <span style="color:silver">Mass killing</span>{{#info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Ram-raiding</span>{{#info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| <span style="color:silver">Sexual assault</span>{{#info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || <span style="color:silver">Destruction of property by fanatics</span>{{#info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Pickpocketing</span>{{#info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || [[Security issue: Vandalism|Vandalism]]{{#info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Robbery</span>{{#info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || <span style="color:silver">Graffiti</span>{{#info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Raid</span>{{#info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || <span style="color:silver">Antisocial Behaviour</span>{{#info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Vehicle theft</span>{{#info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
For this measure to be used effectively, one should have the means to control the access to materials required for committing the crime. This is most prominently the case if these materials are available on location.<br />
<br />
Although this measure relies for a large part on awareness and alertness of residents and municipal services, the urban planner can provide conditions that are either beneficial or detrimental to the removal of means. This is expressed in a well-considered mix and location, functions, design and placement of street furniture. For example, as not placing a glass bus stop in line of sight of a skateboard track. Another example is designing structures in which an easy and effective access control can be maintained, such as providing sturdy and lockable storage space or harden the access to the rear of a residence.<br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
In urban planning terms, reducing the means which are conducive to crime can involve strategies such as the careful locating of public facilities (which are vulnerable to crime such as vandalism) away from crime generating land uses such as schools, entertainment facilities or bars.<br />
<br />
The placement of bins (which can be used as mobile platforms) or trees should be carefully considered to avoid creating unnecessary advantages for opportunistic criminals to gain entry into windows etc.<br />
<br />
Urban spaces benefit from natural surveillance measures which can reduce the prevalence of crime in overlooked or seldom visited areas.<br />
An analysis on whether measures to harden targets should be applied will also assist in identifying areas of potential vulnerability, removing the opportunity to vandalise and cause damage.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
Some means that can be misused by offenders, serve a role in providing safety, such as fire escapes. Removing these should be done only after considering their effect on safety.<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
An important [[Social aspects|social aspect]] is that removing means can impact citizens' agency, or perception thereof. This can have an effect on citizens capacity to adopt protective measures, which again can influence societal resilience. Practical addressing of social aspects and aspects of [[security culture]] in security-related urban planning can best be accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure of removing means should include usability tests in relevant social contexts. [[Participatory Diagnosis]] is an example of a method to use.<br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Removing means mitigates and deters security threats preventing material damage, policing effort, mental harm, etc. At the same time, however, removing measures demands an investment in time and effort by private agents, companies/developers, and the public authorities, exacting economic costs. Together these benefits and costs are referred to as the [[Economic impact of security measures|economic impact of security measures]]. <br />
<br />
The costs of removing means contain the relatively straightforward [[Primary economic impact|direct expenditures]] on capital equipment and operational costs (both temporary and permanent) such as the investment costs in vandal-proof street furniture or the in-house switch for external power sockets. In addition, removing means generates various types of [[Secondary economic impact|secondary effects]]. In essence, by making the access to certain required tools more difficult will not just limit the mobility of criminals, but also that of the owners and users exacting costs since time is money. <br />
<br />
Whether the act of removing means as a security measures makes sense from an economic point of view, depends on many factors and is case dependent. One should, first of all, compare the potential cost-benefits with other alternatives such as [[measure: Target hardening|target hardening]] or [[Measure: Removal of crime motivator|removal of crime motivator]]. Secondly, one has to take in account which parties are affected by the act of removing means, who is paying for it, whose activities are affected by it, and so on. And last but not least, how the envisioned measure alter the [[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|behaviour of criminals/terrorists]]. [[Economic tools]] such as a business case or an economic impact study can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security (of course in collaboration with insights from criminology, sociology, etc.).<br />
<br />
''Case example: Effectiveness of removing means:''<br />
{{quote| In the same way the Association of British Insurers (ABI)<ref>Association of British Insurers (2006): Securing the Nation: The Case for Safer Homes</ref> performed a cost-benefit analysis on [[Measure: Target hardening#Economic considerations|target hardening]] measures for home security, one could do the same for the measure 'removing means'. In general, if there are no means to enter a home, there will also be less burglaries so these measures could be considered as Security By Design measures. The ABI concluded that SBD-measures in total yield benefits of over £1,170 per household (in 20 years), nearly double the average cost of the introduced measures. Removing means will with no doubt contribute to this result.}}<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
There are no important mobility considerations of the measure Removing means, since mobility and mobility infrastructure is not a tool that can be removed for committing a crime (except for [[Measure: Access control|access control]], as described in the Examples section) and removing tools that can be used to commit a crime (e.g. a ladder) don't influence mobility.<br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Removing means also can mean to remove opportunities for agency, such impacting citizens’ freedom to act. Increase in security may be echoed by increase in restrictions. This needs to be assessed on a case by case basis that considers, among other things, citizen security cultures and citizens' personal concerns. <br />
<br />
There are no [[Ethics aspects|ethics]] considerations that can be planned or implemented without prior identification and addressing of citizens' perceptions. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
Main [[Legal aspects|legal]] considerations relate to the impact of the removal of means on legal power and on freedom to act. <br />
<br />
VITRUV offers a [[Legal_aspects#Summary_table_of_legal_aspects_in_urban_planning|summary checklist]] and a [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_legal_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods]] to assess legal aspects in resilience-enhancing urban planning. <br />
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{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Directing_traffic_flows&diff=13453Measure type: Directing traffic flows2013-11-21T11:09:45Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Mobility]][[Category:Measure]][[Category:Safety]]<br />
'''Directing flows of people''' is a form of a [[Traffic management|traffic management]] measure that can mitigate the [[likelihood]] of a security event (preventive direction of flows of people) or reduce the [[impact]] of a security event(reactive direction of flows of people).<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
Directing traffic flows is a [[Traffic management|traffic management]] measure of directing the traffic in a preferred way. Whereas this usually is done from a traffic management perspective to improve throughput of a road network<ref>For example, when a certain route is congested, the traffic can be guided to an alternative route with a dynamic route information panel (DRIP). The measure is also applied to increase safety, such as for instance to prevent flows of traffic from colliding, manage crowds or to support [[Evacuation Management|evacuation management]] in case of emergencies.</ref>, it can also be applied to increase security. In this case, the measure is usually intended to separate potential offenders from locations or circumstances where they might do harm. Examples of direction of traffic flows for security reasons include building barriers for vehicles, to provide safe transportation to and from entertainment centres across high-risk areas, to ensure a car-free zone around a building as a protection against car bombs or to separate pedestrians from motorcycles to prevent [[robbery|snatch theft]]. As a measure to reduce the consequences of an incident, crowd control at large events or transportation [[hub]]s can prevent the outbreak of disorder or riots<ref>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crowd_control</ref><ref>[[Image:Evacuation modeling pedestrians.jpeg|thumb|right|300px|Evacuation modelling using the pedestrian simulation model STEPS.]] Pedestrian simulation can help model the flow of pedestrians. The modelling of the individual movement of pedestrians results in a description of macroscopic pedestrian flow and allows e.g. the evaluation of escape routes, the design of pedestrian facilities and the study of more theoretical questions. A typical example of a pedestrian simulation model is [http://www.mottmac.com/skillsandservices/software/stepssoftware/ STEPS]</ref>.<br />
<br />
A traffic flow measure can be directed at all traffic, or only certain modes of transportation. For example, a water obstacle would be effective against all road transportation, a gravel pit would stop rolling vehicles, but not pedestrians, and an average fence would stop pedestrians, but not ramming vehicles.<br />
<br />
==Examples==<br />
Examples of directing traffic flow measures are:<br />
===By physical route guidance===<br />
* Signposts[[Image:Corstorphine signpost.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Signpost indicating clear routes to popular destinations]]<br />
* Traffic signs<br />
* Route guidance with Dynamic Route Information Panels (DRIP)<br />
* Route guidance and traffic information provision via navigation systems<br />
<br />
===By hard and soft [[barrier]]s blocking unwanted traffic flows===<br />
* Elevation to stop rolling vehicles or discourage pedestrians<br />
* Water or gravel barrier[[Image:Kantorengebouw Westraven in Utrecht.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Use of water as friendly barrier]]<br />
* Green barrier<br />
* [[Bollard]]s<br />
* Traffic slowing measures, such as speed ramps, discouraging rat running[[image:Rat run.svg|thumb|right|300px|Speed decreasing measures can decrease the appeal of shortcuts as rat-running routes.]]<br />
<br />
=== By psychological barriers or route guidance ===<br />
* By indicating wanted pathways by lighting<br />
* By discouraging unwanted pathways by making them seem dead-end<br />
* By intentionally designing one route to be more attractive than another (for example intentionally making an alternative road look narrow and obscure for cars, or by planning popular attractions for tourists to be along a defined route)<br />
<br />
=== By providing natural, direct routes ===<br />
* Designing pathways directly and obviously to main points of interest equipped with all required security features[[Image:Basingstoke station.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Basingstoke station featuring explicit, direct access routes]]<br />
* Increasing traffic flows in desired main through routes in a city by facilitating shorter travel times with green waves and thereby reducing traffic in less desired areas.<br />
<br />
===By regulation===<br />
* One-way streets<br />
* Prohibited places<br />
* Restricted access (for, for example, certain kinds of traffic or at specific times)[[image:Noratrun.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Restricted acces: traffic sign prohibiting a right turn during rush hours]]<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
Security issues where this measure can be effective and influenced by the urban planner, are:<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Burglary|Burglary]]{{#info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || [[Security issue: Assault|Physical assault]]{{#info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || [[Security issue: Destruction by riots|Destruction by riots]]{{#info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || <span style="color:silver"><br />
Mass killing</span>{{#info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Ram raid|Ram-raiding]]{{#info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| [[Security issue: Sexual assault|Sexual assault]]{{#info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || [[Security issue: Destruction by fanatics|Destruction of property by fanatics]]{{#info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Pickpocketing|Pickpocketing]]{{#info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || [[Security issue: Vandalism|Vandalism]]{{#info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Robbery|Robbery]]{{#info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || [[Security issue: Grafitti|Graffiti]]{{#info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Raid|Raid]]{{#info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || [[Security issue: Antisocial behaviour|Antisocial Behaviour]]{{#info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Vehicle theft|Vehicle theft]]{{#info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
For measures on traffic flows to be effective, the measures should match the docility of the targeted traffic flows. For instance, an average fence can be very effective against the average pedestrian, but less effective against an motivated vandal and hardly effective at all against a fanatic terrorist. In an urban context, the realisation form of a measure should conform to the targeted public, threat level and surroundings: high, unfriendly walls will be inappropriate in a shopping area and low, open fences are inappropriate for high-risk objects.<br />
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=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
Measures to direct traffic flows provide a useful mechanism for reducing the opportunity for criminal activity.<br />
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Where possible, access to vulnerable areas (such as residential estates) should be restricted to as few routes as possible and should be designed to serve the needs of the development rather than any through traffic. Unrestricted opportunities to access, familiarise, offend and escape should be avoided. However, the intent is to disallow unintended behaviour and not to inconvenience legitimate users.<br />
<br />
Consideration should be given toward the needs and separation between different traffic types, if applicable, such as pedestrian and motor traffic. Desired routes for each mode should be clearly delineated and natural surveillance should play a role in facilitating voluntary compliance of such rules.<br />
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However any measure to direct traffic flows must take accessibility into consideration, particularly for emergency vehicles and evacuations.<br />
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=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
When directing traffic flows, its impact on [[traffic safety]] should always be considered. Another safety aspect of limiting mobility is the issue of [[evacuation management]], as the ability to evacuate quickly in case of emergencies can be an important element in providing safety.<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
The measure of directing traffic flows needs to consider general aspects of the [[designing out]] approach and its [[Designing_out#Critics|critics]]. Another important [[Social aspects|social aspect]] is the responsiveness of this measure to citizens' felt security needs. Measures such as directing traffic flows will only be responsive if they are based on identification of citizens' self-perceptions of vulnerabilities and security gaps. Aditionally, it must not be forgotten that resilience-enhancing measures are no substitute for continuously informing citizens' with risks, how to assess risks, and how to prepare for realisation of risks.<ref> Dennis S. Mileti/John H. Sorensen: Communication of Emergency Public Warnings. A Social Science Perspective and State-of-the-Art Assessment. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, 1990.</ref><br />
<br />
Practical addressing of social aspects and aspects of [[security culture]] in security measures such as directing traffic flows can best be accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure of directing traffic flows should include usability tests in relevant social contexts. The [[Sociospatial_perspective|sociospatial perspective]] is an example of an approach to do so.<br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Transportation infrastructure is a crucial component of every economy as it enables the transport of resources from one location to the other. Roads, public transportation, hubs, etc., however, can also be (ab)used by criminals and terrorists for their activities, or be targeted themselves. Both result in negative [[Economic effects of crime|economic effects]] for society, ranging from [[Primary economic impact|direct]] material damage to [[Secondary economic impact|indirect]] economic effects as a result of a limitation of mobility (e.g. when transportation hubs are being damaged). Directing traffic flows (see the case example below) aims to prevent the occurrence of security threats and/or limit the negative effects of it (including the economic effects). Nevertheless, security measures do not just result in benefits, but also imply costs (the [[Economic effects of security measures|economic effects of security measures]]).<br />
<br />
The above mentioned costs of traffic flow management measures contain the relatively straightforward direct expenditures on capital equipment and operational costs (both temporary and permanent), such as the investment in bollards, traffic signs and water barriers. On top of that, traffic flow measures generate various types of secondary (indirect) effects that will have an impact on the economy as a whole. The reason behind this is that, although managed traffic flows will result in a more robust mobility of goods and persons, one has to bear in mind that mobility (as a whole) will be limited as well. Traffic rules such as speed limits, for instance, aim to improve safety and the robustness of the road network, but at the same time increase travel time for road users (since they cannot drive as fast as wished for in all cases). Indirectly, this limited accessibility could lead to negative economic effects as a result of the less efficient transportation of goods, skills and persons. These negative impacts will reduce the functioning of the markets in the local economy, reduce the functioning of labour markets and attribute to less scale and agglomeration advances due to a decreased market size.<br />
<br />
''Case example: Effectiveness of traffic management:''<br />
{{quote|"The application of horizontal deflections (e.g. bends and chicanes) that are enforced by VSBs [Vehicle Security Barriers] will limit hostile vehicle approach speed thus reducing the effectiveness of a penetrative vehicle impact. In turn, this can reduce the requirements and associated '''costs''' of countermeasures and provide opportunities to deploy discreetly integrated protection. Although effective for road-safety engineering purposes, traffic calming using vertical deflections (e.g. road humps) is not an effective security measure as it provides a negligible speed reduction against a determined vehicle-born attack."(CPNI, 2011)<ref>Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (2011): Integrated Security; A Public Realm Design Guide for Hostile Vehicle Mitigation.</ref>. Hence, VSBs are making more sense from an economic point of view than, for instance, traffic calming measures such as road bumps. The reason behind this is that VSBs do not just reduce the risk of a penetrative vehicle impact, but also reduce investments in other security measures and on top of that enables discreet protection (generating economic benefits for the local economy).}}<br />
<br />
Whether or not traffic flow measures make sense from an economic point of view depends on many factors. Involved urban planners should start to ask themselves which security issue has to be resolved, and if traffic flow measures are the right instrument for this particular issue. In addition, the urban planner should research alternative measures that might be more effective (in terms of a better benefit-cost ratio), and involve the direct and indirect effects on stakeholders, including the criminals and terrorists that might alter their behaviour (in economic terms, [[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|the economics of crime/terrorism]]). These steps are summarised in this step by step [[Economic tools#Economic assessment step by step|'''flow chart''']] of an economic assessment. [[Economic tools]] can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security (of course in collaboration with insights from criminology, sociology, etc.).<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
An essential aspect for effectively closing or discouraging pathways is that an alternative route should be clearly available.<br />
<br />
A good road design should be such that most traffic chooses the routes as preferred by the road manager to accommodate the largest traffic flows, and not the less preferred routes such as small routes within city centres. For example, there should be clear access routes to larger ring roads and motorways with sufficient capacity leading out of urban districts.<br />
<br />
Information about alternative routes can be given to the road users with a Dynamic Information Panel (DRIP). Usually a few alternative routes are given with their actual travel times. People are thus encouraged to choose the route with the lowest travel time, which helps to reduce congestion on the alternative route. See also [[Traffic management|traffic management]].<br />
<br />
Traffic flows can also be directed by giving traffic information via navigation systems or smart phone applications. An example of a recent development with smart phone applications is an app for pedestrians during large events that indicates the crowdedness of certain areas, based on localization of other app users or blue tooth detection. This app was launched for the Dutch coronation event, though at the latest moment crowdedness indicator functionality was withdrawn out of fear that so much bandwidth would be used that emergency services couldn't communicate anymore. Another example is a parking reservation app <ref>http://www.TNO.nl</ref>. This app will guide the drivers to a parking close to their destination, which can be reserved beforehand. This prevents long waiting queues and chaos at the entrances of parking garages. Another way to do this is with Parking Guidance Information signs, showing the number of free parking spaces in several parking garages.<br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Directing traffic flows may only decrease risk to high-status buildings such as embassies. This can raise [[Ethics aspects|ethics aspects]] related to distributive justice since the measure can carry the risk of reifying uneven distribution of security in society: It may contribute to selective delivery of security, contributing to making only some groups of citizens more secure. Another aspect is the interaction between built infrastructures and human rights (e.g. rights to access and supply). This illustrates the need to provide norms and standards beyond frameworks for built infrastructure.<br />
<br />
In general, pinpointing specific ethics aspects in resilience-enhancing measures needs to consider, among other things, citizen security cultures and citizens' personal concerns. There are no ethics considerations that can be planned or implemented without prior identification and addressing of citizens' perceptions. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
Main [[Legal aspects|legal]] considerations relevant to the measure of directing traffic flows relate to traffic lots and the admissible causes for investigatory stops.<ref>Ken Wallentine: Current Legal Issues in Traffic and Investigatory Stops. Paper presented at the 2009 Justice Court Spring Conference, http://www.kenwallentine.com/downloads/Current%20Legal%20Issues%20inTraffic%20and%20Investigatory%20Stops.pdf</ref> <br />
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VITRUV offers a [[Legal_aspects#Summary_table_of_legal_aspects_in_urban_planning|summary checklist]] and a [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_legal_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods]] to assess legal aspects in resilience-enhancing urban planning. <br />
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{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Access_control&diff=13452Measure type: Access control2013-11-21T10:55:31Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Measure]]'''Access control''' is the [[measure]] of reduction of risk by regulating and controlling the flows of traffic into and out of an area or object.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
Access control encompasses all modes of traffic. The aim of access control is to determine who can or can't enter a particular area. This discrimination can be done on various characteristics such as whether one possesses a a ticket, has registered in advance, the time of day, the place of entry, the mode of transport, etcetera.<br />
<br />
[[Image:BL33nw.JPG|thumb|right|300px|Boom barrier at a parking]][[Image:Bussluse 05-04-06 02.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Bus trap]]This approach involves architectural features, mechanical and electronic devices, and related means for maintaining prerogatives over the ability to gain entry. Both dynamic measures (moving, acting such as boom barriers or guards) and static measures (passive, such as bus traps or heightened curbs) can function as access control mechanisms. <br />
Another application of access control are environmental zones or low-emission zones (LEZ) with the aim of improving the air quality. Only low-emitting or zero emission vehicles are allowed to a LEZ [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low-emission_zone]].<br />
<br />
==Examples==<br />
Various means of access control are feasible, such as:<br />
* Electromagnetic doors, openable only by qualified personnel<br />
* Door guards<br />
* [[Barrier]]s, both static and dynamic<br />
* Partitioning off of selected areas during "downtime" hours<br />
* Reduced number of building entrances<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
This measure can be effective to a range of security issues. These are:<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Burglary</span>{{#info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || <span style="color:silver">Physical assault</span>{{#info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || [[Security issue: Destruction by riots|Destruction by riots]]{{#info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || [[Security issue: Mass killing|Mass killing]]{{#info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Ram-raiding</span>{{#info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| [[Security issue: Sexual assault|Sexual assault]]{{#info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || [[Security issue: Destruction by fanatics|Destruction of property by fanatics]]{{#info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Pickpocketing</span>{{#info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || <span style="color:silver">Vandalism</span>{{#info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Robbery</span>{{#info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || <span style="color:silver">Graffiti</span>{{#info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Raid</span>{{#info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || <span style="color:silver">Antisocial Behaviour</span>{{#info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Vehicle theft|Vehicle theft]]{{#info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
For access control to work, one has to make sure that alternative entry routes are made impossible. For example, erecting a control post at a stadium is useless if the entrance next to it is unguarded. This means that for this measure to work, the access control has to be active at all entry points and all other access to the area has to be sufficiently blocked.<br />
<br />
In practice this means that this measure usually needs to be accompanied by other measure types, such as [[Measure: Target hardening| target hardening]] and/or [[Measure: Directing traffic flows| directing traffic flows]] to prevent uncontrolled or allowing for undesignated entry points.<br />
<br />
For access control to be effective in an urban context, the object or area should support a careful consideration of access and exit points, conforming to the use of the object or area. This holds both for the number of accesses and exits and the measures used to enforce it. A football stadium, for instance, can enforce rather imposing access control measures, in some cases extending to screening and the use of violence to enforce it and still requires quick access and exit of multitudes of people. At a service-oriented facility, this type of access control would be out of place and inappropriate and less imposing and more user-friendly measures of access control are required.<br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
Measures to control access to public space should ensure a balance between design for crime prevention and design for the effective use of an environment by legitimate users. Rather than focusing only on organised and mechanical strategies of access control (such as physical barriers), more natural strategies such as territorial reinforcement should be promoted where possible. The clear delineation of spaces (public, private, transitional) serves to reduce ambiguity for users as well as making it easier to identify offenders.<br />
<br />
Planning considerations should account for any inconvenience faced by legitimate users, while seeking to design features that will deny offenders access to targets and reduce their possible opportunities of escape. A considered approach will avoid the ‘militarisation’ of spaces in favour of communicating the nature of public, private and transitional areas to users.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/Security considerations ===<br />
Access control measures tend to be highly visible. This can raise the prominence of an object, which can raise the attractiveness of the object for fanatics.<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
Access control is a technology-based measure to increase resilience. From the [[Social aspects|social]] point of view, any technology-based measure should consider that security mainly refers to the people and society. Material measures to protect should still suggest a sense of welcoming, openness, and inclusiveness.<ref>Coaffee, J. (2010): Protecting Vulnerable Cities: The UK's Resilience Response to Defending Everyday Urban Infrastructure. In: International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 4, 939-954. Retrieved from: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2010/86_4coaffee.pdf [last access: 2012-04-13].</ref> Moreover, in public area's technical solutions are not as effective without the acceptance and participation of the public. This acceptance is, among other things, rooted in [[security culture]].<br />
<br />
Protective and resilience-enhancing measures directed at infrastructure, such as access control, can have negative impact on resilience of social infrastructure and societal resilience. For example, visible protection such as access control points makes people to underestimate risks but makes them reluctant to adopt protective measures themselves as well. This could undermine societal resilience and limit the effects of other measures that are not based on technology, such as [[Measure:_Ownership|ownership]].<ref> Dennis S. Mileti/John H. Sorensen: Communication of Emergency Public Warnings. A Social Science Perspective and State-of-the-Art Assessment. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, 1990.</ref> In addition to this, informing citizens with risks, how to assess risks, and how to prepare for realisation of risks is important.<ref> Dennis S. Mileti/John H. Sorensen: Communication of Emergency Public Warnings. A Social Science Perspective and State-of-the-Art Assessment. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, 1990.</ref> <br />
<br />
Practical addressing of social aspects and aspects of [[security culture]] in security measures such as access control can be best accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure of access control should include usability tests in relevant social context. The [[Sociospatial_perspective|sociospatial perspective]] is an example of an approach to do so.<br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Access control mitigates the negative [[Economic impact of security threats|(economic) effects of security threats]]. These economic benefits reach beyond the reduction of material and immaterial damage since security threats also indirectly influence the local/regional and national economies, the so-called [[Economic effects of crime#Secondary economic impact of crime|secondary economic impact (of crime)]]. Nevertheless, preventive measures such as access control do require investments, exacting [[Economic impact|economic costs]]. Together, these benefits and costs of security measures are referred to as the [[Economic impact of security measures|economic impact of security measures]]. <br />
<br />
The cost of access control measures contains the relatively straightforward [[Primary economic impact|direct expenditures]] on capital equipment and operational costs (both temporary and permanent). In addition access control measures generate various types of [[Secondary economic impact|secondary effects]]. Tighter access security, for example, may imply longer delivery times and disruption of global supply chains and of finely-tuned just-in-time delivery systems<ref name="ftn44"> Stevens (2004): The emerging Security Economy: An Introduction. Published in: OECD (2004): The Security Economy. ISBN 92-64-10772-X</ref>. In addition, access control measures such as closed roller shutters or big chain locks in shopping streets are classic examples of measures that create an unwelcome environment. This 'unwelcome environment' in return, creates negative indirect economic effects as a result of a reduction of the perceived security and quality of the environment. As a final example, access control measures can cause negative indirect effects for commercial venues like convenience stores. These negative effects are caused by a decrease in accessibility, reducing the amount of customers and increasing the costs of distribution.<br />
<br />
In order to decide if access control measures make sense from an economic point of view, the urban planner should not just map both the costs and benefits of access control measures for the particular case (both direct and indirect), but also wonder if there exist potential alternative security measures that have a better value for money ([[Social cost-benefit analysis|benefit-cost ratio]])<ref>See also the [[Economic tools#Economic assessment step by step|'''flow chart''']] of an economic assessment.</ref>. On top of that, one should always consider how stakeholders (citizens, suppliers, customers, employees, etc.) are affected by the considered measures, and to which extend. Will customers, for example, refrain from a visit to a certain shopping mall due to the severe access control measures? And how will potential criminals/terrorists react? Will they easily find ways to avoid the foreseen security measures, or will the access control measure force them to look for other targets ([[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|the economics of criminal/terrorist behaviour]])? <br />
<br />
''Case example: Examples of cost-effective stand-off security measures against terrorist bomb attacks''<br />
{{quote|One effective way to prevent a terrorist bomb attack is to create (physical) distance between an urban object and a potential detonation location (as addressed with the help of the [[Plan level tools|plan]] and [[Detail level tools|detail]] level tools in [http://www.vitruv-project.eu/ VITRUV]). This could be done with relatively expensive security guards at checkpoints outside the premise of buildings, but also with the help of access control measures that by design create a stand-off zone preventing trucks and cars to come near a building, for instance with the help of some type of (automatic) bollards or natural barriers (e.g. use of water or trees, etc.).}}<br />
<br />
[[Economic tools]] can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security (of course in collaboration with insights from criminology, sociology, etc.).<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
At closed entrances (if only to a particular mode of transport) information should be made available when and where a person/vehicle might gain access.<br />
<br />
Access control in the field of mobility is also applied for congestion charging, for example with the aim to improve the air quality. In London this is applied with camera control with license plate recognition at the entrances/exits of the city. <br />
<br />
In public transport, access control is sometimes applied with chipcards and automatic gates. The chipcards can be personnal. Access is only given to people with a valid chipcard with sufficient saldo. <br />
<br />
At private (company) parkings, acces is often regulated with an automatic barrier and a pole with communication connection to e.g. the reception desk or chipcard (electromagnetic?) control; only people with a company chipcard or people with an appointment to a known employee of the company will get access.<br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Identification of people at access control point can raise [[Ethics aspects|ethics]] issues, such as collection and use of personal data. Another aspect are interactions between built infrastructures and human rights (e.g. rights to access and supply). In this context, it is important to consider that access control can have the unintended consequence of systematically excluding certain types of people from access to certain urban space. Therefore, access control can turn out to by a kind of over-sophisticated measure. To prevent issues, one should make sure to be transparent about the discrimination criteria and make sure these conform to anti-discrimination legislation and customs.<br />
<br />
In general, pinpointing specific ethics aspects in resilience-enhancing measures needs to consider, among other things, citizen security culture and citizens' personal concerns. There are no ethics considerations that can be planned or implemented without prior identification and addressing of citizens' perceptions. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
[[Legal aspects|Legal]] considerations related to access control include protection of privacy (e.g. since access control may involve [[Measure:_Surveillance|surveillance]]) and addressing issues such as liability or professional negligence. As noted under [[Measure:_Access_control#Ethics_considerations|ethics considerations]], legislation relevant to prevent or mitigate discrimination-related issues should be carefully explored. <br />
<br />
VITRUV offers a [[Legal_aspects#Summary_table_of_legal_aspects_in_urban_planning|summary checklist]] and a [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_legal_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods]] to assess legal aspects in resilience-enhancing urban planning. <br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Target_hardening&diff=13451Measure type: Target hardening2013-11-21T10:49:31Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Measure]]<br />
'''Target hardening''' is the [[Measures|measure]] of strengthening the security by increasing the required effort to commit crimes to or at an object.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
Target hardening involves all measures that make committing a crime more difficult and reduce the opportunities for criminals to achieve their goal. Dependent on the type of crime the realisation of this measure can take various forms, ranging from teaching self-defence to potential victims of assault to bomb-proofing buildings against terrorists. In general the aim of target hardening is not to make objects completely resistant to attack, but to increase the risk of an attack to a level where the risk outweighs the gain of the crime as perceived by the offender. For example, by increasing the time it takes to overcome the measures.<br />
<br />
==Examples==<br />
Examples of target hardening can be categorised by the type of attack they oppose:<br />
===Against forced entry===<br />
* Toughened glass (acrylic, polycarbon, etc.)[[Image:Bulletproof glass window after a burglary attempt.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Bullet-proof glass after a burglary attempt]]<br />
* Latticework or screens to cover windows<br />
* Deadbolt and vertical-bolt locks and door anchor hinges with non-removable pins<br />
* Metal door/window shutters<br />
* Tamper-proof screws in fittings[[Image:Screws - tamper resistant slotted.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Tamper-proof screw]]<br />
* [[Bollard]]s and indirect routes against ramming<br />
* Vertical metal or small-mesh (unclimbable) fencing<br />
* Steeply angled roofs with parapets and ridges<br />
<br />
===Against destruction===<br />
* Concrete or steel picnic tables, benches, bleachers[[Image:EU-EE-Tallinn-Pirita-Merivälja-bus stop.JPG|thumb|right|300px|Bus stop in Talinn, erected in hardened design after several vandalism incidents]]<br />
* Trash receptacles bolted to concrete bases<br />
* Hardened rubber or plastic swing seats<br />
* Fire-retardant paint<br />
* High-impact plastic or steel fixtures<br />
* Rough-play-tolerant adventure playgrounds<br />
* Slash-proof and steel-framed seats<br />
* Graffiti repellent spray on graffiti prone objects<br />
* Tamper-proof sign hardware and fasteners<br />
<br />
===Against bombs===<br />
* Stand-off zones where no unauthorized access is possible<br />
* Increasing bomb resistance for vulnerable (parts of) objects<br />
* Locating vulnerable structures behind other, bomb-resistant or sacrificial structures<ref>To assess the enhancement of these measures the [[Detail level tools|Detail level tool]] can be used.</ref><br />
<br />
===Against toxins and air-borne agents===<br />
* Detectors <br />
* Closable air vents<br />
* Filter systems<br />
* Unreachable air intakes<br />
* Alternative air intakes<br />
* Emergency forced air circulation<br />
<br />
===Against violence===<br />
* Separating traffic flows of for instance pedestrians and motor cycles to prevent snatch theft<br />
<br />
===Against all of the above===<br />
* Early warning (alarms, emergency button) of action force or action force present[[File:JRW Emergency Button Located.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Emergency button in Metro in Japan]]<br />
* Quick response of action force (by for instance optimizing access from police station to area)<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
This measure can be effective to a range of security issues. These are:<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Burglary|Burglary]]{{#info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || <span style="color:silver">Physical assault</span>{{#info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || [[Security issue: Destruction by riots|Destruction by riots]]{{#info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || [[Security issue: Mass killing| Mass killing]]{{#info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Ram raid|Ram-raiding]]{{#info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| <span style="color:silver">Sexual assault</span>{{#info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || [[Security issue: Destruction by fanatics|Destruction of property by fanatics]]{{#info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Pickpocketing</span>{{#info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || [[Security issue: Vandalism|Vandalism]]{{#info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Robbery|Robbery]]{{#info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || [[Security issue: Grafitti|Graffiti]]{{#info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Raid</span>{{#info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || <span style="color:silver">Antisocial Behaviour</span>{{#info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens`. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Vehicle theft</span>{{#info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
The realisation form of a measure should conform to the targeted public, threat level and surroundings: stand-off zones will be inappropriate in a shopping area and only deadbolted doors and windows are inappropriate for high-risk objects.<br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
Generally mechanisms for target hardening affect the scale of buildings and developments, as well as the micro-detailing of facades and streetscape furniture. <br />
<br />
Urban planning techniques, such as land use analysis, can identify if vulnerabilities are present, and whether target hardening is an appropriate measure to consider in reducing the opportunity for criminal activity to occur. If taken into account during the development process, urban planning considerations can aid in the application of target hardening measures that compliment development goals instead of harming them. An example of this could be where the detailing design measures applied to hardening shop frontages are changed to replace external roller shutters (negative connotations and attractors of crime) with equally practical, yet more aesthetic options, such as strengthened security glass frontages, that engender a better atmosphere<ref>Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, Designing Out Crime, 2008, http://www.rbkc.gov.uk/pdf/designingoutcrime_spd.pdf</ref>.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
Target hardening measures aimed to improve security can have both positive and negative impacts on safety: <br />
* Removing a door can harden a building against unauthorised entry, but can also reduce evacuation speed in case of emergencies such as fire<br />
* Replacing normal glass by toughened glass increases resilience both against security threats such as burglars, and safety threats such as tornadoes.<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
In relation to target hardening [[Social aspects|social aspects]] are of particular importance, that should consider that resilience cannot only be found in hazard-resisiting buildings but also in adaptive social systems. Resilience essentially includes societal resilience, and this is linked to citizens’ acceptance of security-enhancing measures. For that reason, security by design should consider the visible impact of security measures and should be as unobtrusive as possible. <br />
<br />
In addition to this, it is important to consider that design features of target hardening influence citizens’ perception of that infrastructure being at risk. Various measures which are assumed to mitigate or prevent have various effects on citizens’ perception. Design features also influence the general perception of criticality of that infrastructure. These two are important aspects of [[security culture]]. For example, concrete picnic tables have a more intimidating effect on citizens’ perception of security that hardened, colourful rubber lunch tables.<br />
<br />
Furthermore, protective and resilience-enhancing measures can have a negative impact on resilience of social infrastructure and societal resilience. For example, research has shown that visible strong protective built infrastructure makes people to underestimate real risks but makes them reluctant to adopt protective measures themselves, thereby potentially undermining societal resilience.<ref> Dennis S. Mileti/John H. Sorensen: Communication of Emergency Public Warnings. A Social Science Perspective and State-of-the-Art Assessment. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, 1990.</ref> Moreover, it must not be forgotten that resilience-enhancing measures are no substitute for continuously confronting citizens with risks, how to assess risks, and how to prepare for realisation of risks.<ref> Dennis S. Mileti/John H. Sorensen: Communication of Emergency Public Warnings. A Social Science Perspective and State-of-the-Art Assessment. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, 1990.</ref> <br />
<br />
Practical addressing of social aspects and aspects of [[security culture]] in security-related urban planning can best be accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, by [[citizen participation]] and should include tests of balancing between effectiveness of the measure (usability) and its friendliness (the negative effect on citizens’ perception).<br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Target hardening deters several types of security threats, mitigates the negative effects of these events, and also has some positive externalities like reducing fear of crime, and heating bills<ref> Association of British Insurers (2006): Securing the Nation: The Case for Safer Homes.</ref> (see the case example below). Target hardening measures, however, do require time and financial means by private agents, companies/developers and the public authorities, exacting [[Economic impact|economic costs]]. Together these benefits and costs are referred to as [[Economic impact of security measures|economic impact of security measures]]. The costs of surveillance measures contain the relatively straightforward [[Primary economic impact|direct expenditures]] on capital equipment and operational costs (both temporary and permanent), and in addition generate various types of [[Secondary economic impact|secondary effects]]. These secondary economic effects are the result of subsequent rounds of expenditure ('re-expenditures') of business companies, households and public authorities outside the security market.<br />
<br />
Whether the costs are making sense from an economic point of view, depends on many factors, and can be answered by two distinct sets of questions (see also the [[Economic tools#Economic assessment step by step|'''flow chart''']] of an economic assessment):<br />
# Are the envisioned target hardening measures cost effective from a socioeconomic point of view, or are there better alternatives?<br />
# Which specific agents (individuals, companies, sectors, authorities) are affected by the target hardening measures, and to which extend? How do the envisioned measures alter the behaviour of these agents, and, of course, the [[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|behaviour of criminals/terrorists (in economic terms)]]? <br />
<br />
''Case example: A [[Social cost-benefit analysis|cost-benefit analysis]] of safer homes:''<br />
{{quote|The Association of British Insurers (ABI)<ref>Association of British Insurers (2006): Securing the Nation: The Case for Safer Homes</ref> performed a cost-benefit analysis on target hardening measures for home security. The analysis was based on the estimates of the average household cost of burglary (£3,300), the average cost of Security By Design (SBD) target hardening (£630), burglary rates (average 2.7 - 6.7% range), and socio-economic demographics. The per household net present value benefit of target hardening measures was projected over 20 years, yielding benefits of over £1,170 per household. As a result, the average household benefits are nearly double the average cost of the introduced security measures.}}<br />
<br />
[[Economic tools]] can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security (of course in collaboration with insights from criminology, sociology, etc.). An illustrative example of efficient target hardening is [[Sustainable design#Security related aspects of sustainable design|sustainable design]], since it combines energy efficiency with security and qualitative design. In contrast, target hardening measures like big concrete walls or window bars in retail areas are classic examples of measures which create an unwelcome environment. Instead these measures create an [[Secondary economic impact|indirect economic impact]] as a result of a reduced perceived security and environmental quality.<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
Some target hardening measures work by limiting the mobility or [[Accessibility|accessibility]] to a certain location or area, for example by obstacles such as [[Bollard|bollards]], barriers or low speed roads with narrows. Though this helps to prevent certain crimes, it has a negative effect on the accessibility in general. <br />
<br />
The other way around, in some cases it may help to increase accessibility in order to ensure that emergency services can reach an incident location as quickly as possible (see also [[Incident management|incident mangement]]).<br />
<br />
Routes between certain nodes are particularly vulnerable to crime, for example- homes that are on the route from a large bar may be vulnerable to vandalism and other types of minor disorder as well as to burglary. Planners can use this knowledge to help prevent crime when designing roads and accessibility routes in new communities.<br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Target hardening requires selection of targets that are worth hardening. This involves [[Ethics aspects|ethics]] issues because limited resources will probably not allow addressing all relevant targets. This may lead to the creation of different levels of security in society. This illustrates the need to provide norms and standards beyond frameworks for built infrastructure. <br />
<br />
Investigating human and societal needs regarding target hardening should be a priority. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
<br />
[[Legal aspects|Legal]] considerations should include issuing of disclaimers since the proposed measures do not come with a guarantee for success. Duty of care aspects may also be involved. Target hardening as a measure to protect objects vs. as a measure to protect people may also involve different legal aspects. VITRUV offers a [[Legal_aspects#Summary_table_of_legal_aspects_in_urban_planning|summary checklist]] and a [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_legal_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods]] to assess legal aspects in resilience-enhancing urban planning. <br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Safety_audit&diff=13381Safety audit2013-11-19T14:06:56Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Ethics]]<br />
[[Category:Legal]]<br />
[[Category:Safety]]<br />
[[Category:Social]]<br />
The '''Safety Audit''' is a [[citizen participation]] method originally designed by the Metropolitan Action Committee on Violence Against Women and Children (METRAC) in Toronto, striving for building womens’ skills and making their communities safer.<ref>UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women. Retrieved from: http://www.endvawnow.org/en/articles/262-ask-questions-about-womens-safety-in-the-city.html.</ref> Women’s safety audits are an internationally acknowledged practice, that help equip women and communities to identify what kind of corrective measures are needed to improve personal safety in urban settings. <br />
<br />
Safety Audits encourage local and context-specific solutions to issues of insecurity. They promote partnerships as well as joint solutions between residents and their local governments. Moreover safety audits help to evaluate and identify features in a community with the goal to reduce crime and improve the resident's safety and the areas security in general.<br />
<br />
==Process description==<br />
Usually, a Safety Audit starts with a group of residents, and possibly other community members, who meet and discuss spaces in their community that feel unsafe. Safety audit groups generally work best when members are diverse and therefore represent a variety of safety and security concerns (e.g. younger and older participants, disabled, different ethnic backgrounds). Unsafe spaces might include a shopping centre parking lot, a pathway between residences, a water source, or a public housing development. After the safety audit group has chosen an unsafe space, they go together to that and note the factors or characteristics that they think make it unsafe.<br />
<br />
==How does it support in planning of secure public spaces?==<br />
* Supports identifying factors/spots/spaces evoking unsafe feelings (characteristics that make a space feel unsafe might include poor lighting, negative graffiti messages, an isolated location, and others);<br />
* Supports gathering information on [[perception of (in)security and risks]];<br />
* Supports gaining insights into [[culture aspects]].<br />
<br />
==Links and further reading==<br />
* Extensive Audit Checklist. Retrieved from: http://www.endvawnow.org/en/articles/262-ask-questions-about-womens-safety-in-the-city.html [last access: 2012-08-16].<br />
* The Safety Audit Initiative of Toronto. Retrieved from: http://www.toronto.ca/safetyaudits/index.htm [last access: 2012-10-22].<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Victimisation&diff=13380Victimisation2013-11-19T13:29:36Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Social]]<br />
[[File:ae.png|25px|right|This is a page providing background in a specific field of expertise]]<br />
''' Victimisation ''' is the process of becoming, or the fact of having become, or feeling as, a victim. <br />
<br />
In criminology and crime statistics, this is often referred to as an objective fact, and the victimisation rate (e.g. for a certain type of crime) is taken as an objective figure.<ref>Cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victimisation</ref>. But victimisation is strongly related to [[Perception of (in)security|perception of risks]]: It can also be a social fact - people can 'feel' as victims, whether or not they are victims or affected by a crime, etc. <br />
<br />
==Fear of crime==<br />
In [[cultural criminology]], victimisation is understood as an objective, measurable concept, and criticized for that character. It is contrasted with the concept of 'fear of crime' that addresses the psychological and social aspects of becoming or feeling like a victim, and policy strategies, that focus more on changing public [[Perception of (in)security|perception]] than changing the [[security]] situation:<br />
<br />
"''Fear of crime has come to be regarded as a problem in and for itself, quite distinct from actual crime and victimisation, and distinctive policies have been developed to aim to reduce fear levels, rather than to reduce crime.''"<ref> Garland D.: The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001, 10.</ref><br />
<br />
==Security related aspects==<br />
*High victimisation rates, both in objective and in social feeling terms, have high relevance for objective and perceived urban security and risks.<br />
* Victimisation reflects the [[threat|threats]] and [[risk|risks]] an urban community is subjected to. <br />
* Victimisation reflects the [[security culture]] of a community.<br />
<br />
==Approaches how to address it==<br />
*Consider victimisation concepts and trends in security related planning projects.<br />
*Consider security culture in security related planning projects.<br />
*Consider perception of local communities in security related planning projects.<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Designing_out&diff=13379Designing out2013-11-19T13:20:23Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Measure]] [[Category:Safety]] [[Category:Social]] [[Category:Threat]]<br />
The '''designing out''' approach aims to reduce [[crime]] and [[Urban terrorism|terrorism]] risk by appropriately shaped built infrastructure. By designing out, the urban environment becomes less attractive as a working ground for criminals and terrorists. Desigining out is one of several methodes of [[environmental design]] to realise [[crime prevention by design]].<br />
<br />
The approach to designing out assumes that certain types and locations of urban space are significantly more attractive to perpetrators than others, mainly for social and cultural reasons (cf. Geason, Wilson 1989)<ref>Geason S., Wilson P. R.: Designing out Crime. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1989. Retrieved from: http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/9/E/8/%7B9E810185-7D54-4480-8EEC-D92D84C3FB36%7Dcpted.pdf [last access: 2011-11-05].</ref>. Therefore, the choice of urban targets is seen as mainly driven by factors such as maximum visibility of casualties, vulnerable and actually harmed people, maximum media exposure and potential for vast spread of fear among the wider population. <br />
<br />
Urban planning centred on ''designing out'' helps increase urban [[security]] efficiently. It aims for reducing criminal behaviour, terrorist actions and anti-social behaviour. A converse concept is [[designing in]].<br />
<br />
==Security related aspects and benefits==<br />
*Design can impact (criminal/terrorist) behaviour in a positive or negative way.<br />
*Designing out can mitigate, lessen or even prohibit criminal or terrorist acts.<br />
*Designing out reduces crime and terrorist risks and consequences.<br />
*Designing out decreases vulnerability and increases resilience.<br />
<br />
==Approaches how to address it==<br />
*Consider designing out principles (e.g. HM Government[http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/crowded-places/design-tech-issues?view=Binary])<br />
*Get familiar with designing out initiatives (e.g. International CPTED Association[http://www.cpted.net/])<br />
*Get familiar with general design aspects and structural / material aspects<br />
*Integrate considerations on response and emergency measures in the planning process<br />
<br />
==Designing out principles for urban planning== <br />
===Structural principles===<br />
Practical designing out principles limit the damage of terrorist attacks by specific [[environmental design]] of built infrastructure. These principles include structural/material aspects such as: <br />
*Access control; <br />
*Stand off distances, to keep people and bomber vehicles away from targets; <br />
*Laminated glass; <br />
*Framed structures; <br />
*Bombshelter areas, etc. <br />
<br />
===Social/psychological principles===<br />
General design aspects with mainly psychological designing out effects include the following <ref>Cf. "PluS Initial Report" by LKA NI 2010 LKA NI (eds.): PluS Initial Report Planning Urban Security. Hannover: Landeskriminalamt Niedersachsen, 2010. Retrieved from: http://www.plus-eu.com/docs/PLUS-Initial-Report-online.pdf [last access: 2012-05-23].</ref><br />
*Orientation; <br />
*Good overview; <br />
*Visibility; <br />
*Lighting (physical surveillance); <br />
*Video installations (formal/organised surveillance);<br />
*Accessibility (access control); <br />
*Vibrant urban environment and multiple social functions; <br />
*Responsibility; <br />
*Natural/informal surveillance ("Eyes on the Street"):<br />
*Avoiding conflicts; <br />
*Ensuring maintenance;<br />
*Etc.<br />
<br />
For sustainable implementation of “designing out”, following factors need to be considered throughout the planning process<ref>Cf. "PluS Initial Report" by LKA NI 2010 LKA NI (eds.): PluS Initial Report Planning Urban Security. Hannover: Landeskriminalamt Niedersachsen, 2010. Retrieved from: http://www.plus-eu.com/docs/PLUS-Initial-Report-online.pdf [last access: 2012-05-23].</ref><br />
<br />
# Integration of citizens through communication and [[Citizen participation|participation methods]]; <br />
# Willingness of the participants to be part of a [[security]] partnership; <br />
# Decentralisation and localisation; <br />
# Commitment. <br />
<br />
==Critics==<br />
Designing out concepts can help reducing fear of crime, but at the same time it can soon raise ethical questions, for example by separating out different ‘types of people’. For example, certain types architectures (often together with commercial policing by private companies) offer middle-class citizens new types of privacy and crime free zones in public commercial malls and places. This usually separates out other ethical groups.<ref>Garland D.: The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001, 6-11.</ref> <br />
<br />
See also [[ethics aspects]].<br />
<br />
==Links and further Information==<br />
*To understand economic effects of designing out crime see [[Economic effects of anti-crime security measures]].<br />
*The [http://www.rbkc.gov.uk/pdf/designingoutcrime_spd.pdf Designing Out Crime Supplementary Planning Document] provides guidance for developers and planners how to incorporate the principles of designing out crime in all development proposals.<br />
*[http://www.designingoutcrime.com/ The Australian Designing Out Crime (DOC) research centre] (NSW Department of Attorney General and Justice, in partnership with the University of Technology Sydney) applies a ‘Design Thinking’ approach and is a recognised as a leader in innovative, creative and socially responsive design. DOC explores problems to obtain an in-depth understanding of factors contributing to crime in specific problem situations.<br />
*A platform for various activities, initiatives and knowledge/tool exchange is offered by the [http://www.designoutcrime.org/ Design Out Crime Research Centre (AU)]. <br />
*[http://www.doca.org.uk/ DOCA Designing Out Crime Association] (UK) provides a forum on the concept of designing out crime to promote safer communities and reduce anti-social behaviour. <br />
*A project called [http://www.designcouncil.org.uk/our-work/challenges/security/design-out-crime/ “Design out Crime”] highlights design role and demonstrates how design can help to prevent crime. It provides the [http://www.designcouncil.org.uk/our-work/challenges/Security/Design-out-crime/Design-out-crime-guide/ Designers' Guide] for free download.<br />
*Information and support for local organisations, practitioners, and communities how to create safer communities and environments can be found on the [http://www.cpted.net/ International CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) Association]. <br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Ethics_aspects&diff=13378Ethics aspects2013-11-19T13:15:58Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Ethics]]<br />
" The field of '''ethics''' (or moral philosophy) involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong behaviour."<ref>Fieser J. (2009). Ethics, in: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy IEP. Retrieved from: http://www.iep.utm.edu/ethics</ref [last access: 2012-03-14].</ref> An [[urban planning]] system that comprehensively gathers and considers [[is goal for::security]] information is one that enables a society to address the causes of security problems, not just their symptoms, in order to address ethics issues in terms both of rights and of responsibilities that a planning system must be based on. However, decisions about how to configure and live within the built environment have ethics dimensions that are sometimes hard to see.<ref> For overviews, see: Barrett C. D.: Everyday Ethics for Practicing Planners. Washington, DC: AICP, 2001; Howe E.: The Nature of Ethical Issues. Acting on Ethics in Planning. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994; Marcuse P.: Professional Ethics and Beyond: Values in Planning, in: Wachs M.(ed): Ethics in Planning. Rutgers: Center for Urban Policy Research, 1985.</ref><br />
<br />
==Ethics of urban planning==<br />
[[File:Ethics_pyramid.jpg|thumbs|right|300px|Ethical pyramid Brucelius s.a.]]<br />
*It is the duty of planners to ensure that political goals for building development and the provision of public service are implemented without being influenced by pressure by special interests and by their superiors.<br />
*The primary obligation of urban planners is to serve the public interests and recognise the comprehensive and long-range nature of planning decisions. <br />
*Planners should avoid conflict of interests and not seek or offer other favours and benefits. <br />
*Respecting the professional code of ethics includes maintaining the public confidence through not using confidential information for financial gain.<br />
<br />
The public interest is a question of continuous debate. Both in its general principles and in case-by-case applications, it requires a conscientiously held view of the policies and actions that best serve the entire community.<br />
<br />
===Ethics pyramid===<br />
The challenge to implement ethics aspects in security-related urban planning decisions is illustrated in the form of the “ethical planning pyramid” (Brucelius s.a.)<ref>Brucelius B. (s.a.): Ethical urban planning – Is there such a thing?, in: Sustainability. Journal from the Swedish Research Council FORMAS. Retrieved from http://sustainability.formas.se/en/Issues/Issue-3-October-2009/Content/Articles/Ethical-urban-planning--is-there-such-a-thing/ [last access: 2012-05-19]. </ref>.<br />
<br />
==Security-related aspects==<br />
<br />
==="Generic" ethics aspects===<br />
In addressing of security issues, generic ethics aspects lead to questions such as the following:<ref> Kirkman R.: The Ethics of Metropolitan Growth. The Future of our Built Environment. Continuum: London, 2010. Retrieved from: http://www.continuumbooks.com/books/detail.aspx?BookId=134405&SubjectId=1020&Subject2Id=1387. </ref><br />
<br />
* How was the project chosen?<br />
* Are the goals of the project worth reaching?<br />
* Are the means used to reach the goals of the project appropriate?<br />
* Does the project conflict with projects other individuals or groups are pursuing?<br />
* Is the project self-defeating?<br />
<br />
===Ethics dimensions of built environment===<br />
Decisions about how to configure and live within the built environment have ethics dimensions that are not always obvious. In order to provide practical guidance on ethics implications of metropolitan growth, questions relating to well-being, justice, sustainability and legitimacy should be considered.<ref>Kirkman R.: The Ethics of Metropolitan Growth. The Future of our Built Environment. Continuum: London, 2010, 8. Retrieved from: http://www.continuumbooks.com/books/detail.aspx?BookId=134405&SubjectId=1020&Subject2Id=1387. </ref> Key questions of environmental ethics that bring in the most immediate concerns of ordinary people include the following:<ref>Kirkman R.: The Ethics of Metropolitan Growth. The Future of our Built Environment. Continuum: London, 2010, 8. Retrieved from: http://www.continuumbooks.com/books/detail.aspx?BookId=134405&SubjectId=1020&Subject2Id=1387. </ref><br />
<br />
* Is the selected place a good place to live? (Well-being)<br />
* Who gets to benefit from that place, and who does not? (Justice)<br />
* How long can the place last? (Sustainability)<br />
* Who should make decisions about the place? (Legitimacy)<br />
<br />
==Approaches to addressing ethics aspects in security-related urban planning==<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|-<br />
| <br />
* '''Address ethics aspects in an investigative way:''' Decisions about how to configure and live within the built environment have ethics dimensions that are sometimes hard to see.<br />
<br />
* '''Critically address planning requirements, including identified legal and culture aspects of security, in the light of ethics aspects:''' For example, security by design should be checked against risks of de-constructing security as a public good (such as common accessibility of public space, etc.). <br />
<br />
* '''Identify risks of reifying uneven distribution of security in society:''' Urban design addressing security aspects may unconsciously contribute to selective delivery of security, contributing to making secure or wealthy citizens more secure, and vulnerable or less prosperous citizens more vulnerable. <br />
<br />
* '''Actively contribute to limiting potential for abuse''' (e.g., criminal or terrorist) of sensitive planning information and data. <br />
<br />
* '''Involve citizens in planning decisions:''' This not only increases legitimacy of planning decisions, but it is also a requirement from basic principles such as ownership and community goals.<br />
<br />
* '''Consider the various situations, [[comprises::Perception of (in)security and risks|perceptions of (in)security and risks]], needs as well as perspectives of men and women:''' Such consideration should inform all aspects of urban planning, which should actively identify and respond to gender-specific perceptions of security and needs for protective measures. <br />
<br />
|}<br />
<br />
=== Practical checklists and methods===<br />
* [[can be done by::Checklists_for_dimension_consideration|Checklist on culture, legal and ethics aspects of addressing security issues in urban planning]]. <br />
* [[can be done by::Stakeholder-rated methods]] to consider ethics aspects in urban planning<br />
* [[can be done by::Determination of security aspects - methods for urban planners]]<br />
<br />
===American Planning Association (APA) ethics principles===<br />
The American Planning Association (APA),<ref>http://www.planning.org.</ref> a not-for-profit educational organisation with various contributions in community planning, developed a guide to ethics conduct for all who participate in the process of planning as advisers, advocates and decision makers. The set of principles for all who participate in the process of planning accentuate the necessity for the highest standards of fairness and honesty among all participants and guide all who aspire to professionalism.<br />
<br />
These ethics principles derive both from the general values of society and from the planner's special responsibility to serve the public interest. In order to faithfully serve the public interest, planning participants should have the following characteristics:<ref>The American Planning Association: Ethical principles in planning. Retrieved from: http://www.planning.org/ethics/ethicalprinciples.htm.</ref><br />
<br />
* Recognise the rights of citizens to participate in planning decisions;<br />
* Facilitate citizens involvement and active participation and full, clear and accurate information on planning issues;<br />
* Strive for fair, honest and independent judgement from decision makers and advisers;<br />
* Clarify community goals, objectives and policies in plan-making;<br />
* Protect the integrity of the natural environment and the heritage of the built environment;<br />
* Pay attention to the long range consequences of present actions;<br />
* Consider “personal interest” of all participants (citizens);<br />
* Abstain completely from decision maker’s personal interests, influencing gifts or favours;<br />
* Do not participate as an advisor or decision maker on any plan or project in which they have previously participated as an advocate and vice versa; <br />
* Serve as advocates only when the client's objectives are legal and consistent with the public interest; <br />
* Do not misuse confidential information and not misrepresent facts or distort information for the purpose of achieving a desired outcome; <br />
* Respect the rights of all persons (according to civil rights laws and regulations);<br />
* Consider [[Gender perspective|gender perspectives]], perceptions and needs.<br />
<br />
===Citizen participation and acceptance===<br />
There are different cultural approaches to decision making in urban planning, and [[can be done by::citizen participation]] can be realised in several ways. Citizen involvement in urban planning processes contributes to increase security by: <br />
<br />
* Reducing inequality and social tension;<br />
* Incorporating the knowledge, productivity, social and physical capital of the poor in city development;<br />
* Increasing local ownership of development processes and programs.<br />
<br />
Closer matching and balancing of planning with local needs by involving citizens and [[can be done by::stakeholders]] enhances broader citizen acceptance of security decisions and the implementation of security technologies. Public acceptance is recognized as an important issue in security and urban planning policies and mirrors trust in political decisions and actors.<br />
<br />
The United Nations Human Settlements Programme(UN-HABITAT)<ref>United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT): Human settlements in crisis. Inclusive and Sustainable Urban Planning: A Guide for Municipalities, vol. 1, 2007. An Introduction to Urban Strategic Planning.UNION Publication Service Section. Retrieved from: http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/listItemDetails.aspx?publicationID=2662 [last access: 2011-11-01].</ref> ''Guide for Municipalities'' gives a resume of various types of citizen participation for use in urban planning consultation processes.<br />
<br />
==Further reading==<br />
* C. D. Barrett: Everyday Ethics for Practising Planners. AICP: Washington, D.C., 2001.<br />
* E. Howe: The Nature of Ethical Issues. Acting on Ethics in Planning. Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick, 1994.<br />
* P. Marcuse: Professional Ethics and Beyond: Values in Planning. In: M. Wachs (ed): Ethics in Planning. Rutgers: Center for Urban Policy Research, 1985. <br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Environmental_psychology&diff=13278Environmental psychology2013-11-12T11:31:02Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Social]]<br />
[[File:ae.png|25px|right|This is a page providing background in a specific field of expertise]]<br />
'''Environmental psychology'''<ref> E.g. Nasar J. L.: Environmental Psychology and Urban Design, in: Banerjee T., Loukaitou-Sideris A. (eds.): Companion to Urban Design. London/New York: Routledge, 2011, 162-174.</ref> focuses on the interplay between society/social individuals and their (structural) surroundings. The term "environment" encompasses natural environment and built environment, but also social settings as well as learning and informational environments. <br />
Environmental psychology is both value and problem oriented and addresses the complexity of societal problems on the basis of human-environment interactions and the perception of environment.<br />
<br />
==Security-related aspects==<br />
* Urban environment impacts social behaviour in a positive or negative way.<br />
* [[Security]] or [[Resilience|resilience]] is determined by (urban) environment and the interactions with society/humans.<br />
<br />
But:<br />
<br />
* [[Security]] or [[Resilience|resilience]] cannot just be designed by way of planning. <br />
* Environmental/security/risk cognition cannot be designed.<br />
* The meaning intentionally embodied in built environment is not always decoded by citizens as intended.<br />
* The identification of “weak points”/insecurities in urban environments takes place in cultural context. <ref>Falkheimer J., Mats H.: Multicultural Crisis Communication: Towards a Social Constructionist Perspective, in: Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 14, no. 4., 2006.</ref> It is socially negotiated and/or constructed.<br />
<br />
==Approaches how to address it==<br />
* Consider interactions between (urban) environment and social behaviour/reactions.<br />
* Consider local/regional [[security culture]] in planning projects.<br />
* Consider local/regional perception of (in)security/risks in planning projects.<br />
* Involve citizens in the planning process (see [[citizen participation]]).<br />
* Urban design should avoid stressful and potentially threatening feelings of being lost in large buildings.<ref>Lynch K.: The Image of the City. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960.</ref><br />
* Urban design should “incorporate public meanings” and citizens’ images of places, including those of “secure” or “safe” places.<ref> Nasar J. L.: Environmental psychology and urban design, in: Banerjee T., Loukaitou-Sideris A. (eds.): Companion to Urban Design. London/New York: Routledge, 2011, 162-174, 166.</ref><br />
* Desire for security should not inform urban planning to contribute to threatening citizens’ rights of expression and dissent.<ref>Cf. Whitzman C.: Secure cities, in: Banerjee T., Loukaitou-Sideris A. (eds.): Companion to Urban Design. London/New York: Routledge, 2011, 670-671.</ref><br />
<br />
==Related subjects==<br />
*[[Ecological perspective]]<br />
*[[Environmental design]]<br />
*[[New urbanism]]<br />
*[[Designing out]]/[[designing in]]<br />
*[[Culture aspects]]<br />
*[[Security culture]]<br />
*[[Securitisation]]<br />
*[[Perception of (in)security|Perception of (in)security/risks]]<br />
*[[Ethics aspects]]<br />
*[[Resilience]]<br />
*[[Vulnerability]]<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Environmental_psychology&diff=12691Environmental psychology2013-07-09T11:08:44Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Social]]<br />
[[File:ae.png|25px|right|This is a page providing background in a specific field of expertise]]<br />
'''Environmental psychology'''<ref> E.g. Nasar J. L.: Environmental Psychology and Urban Design, in: Banerjee T., Loukaitou-Sideris A. (eds.): Companion to Urban Design. London/New York: Routledge, 2011, 162-174.</ref> focuses on the interplay between society/social individuals and their (structural) surroundings. The term "environment" encompasses natural environment and built environment, but also social settings as well as learning and informational environments. <br />
Environmental psychology is both value and problem oriented and addresses the complexity of societal problems on the basis of human-environment interactions and the perception of environment.<br />
<br />
==Security-related aspects==<br />
* Urban environment impacts social behaviour in a positive or negative way.<br />
* [[Security]] or [[Resilience|resilience]] is determined by (urban) environment and the interactions with society/humans.<br />
<br />
But:<br />
<br />
* [[Security]] or [[Resilience|resilience]] cannot just be designed by way of planning. <br />
* Environmental/security/risk cognition cannot be designed.<br />
* The meaning intentionally embodied in built environment is not always decoded by citizens as intended.<br />
* The identification of “weak points”/insecurities in urban environments takes place in cultural contexts. <ref>Falkheimer J., Mats H.: Multicultural Crisis Communication: Towards a Social Constructionist Perspective, in: Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 14, no. 4., 2006.</ref> It is socially negotiated and/or constructed.<br />
<br />
==Approaches how to address it==<br />
* Consider interactions between (urban) environment and social behaviour/reactions.<br />
* Consider local/regional [[security culture]] in planning projects.<br />
* Consider local/regional perception of (in)security/risks in planning projects.<br />
* Involve citizens in the planning process (see [[citizen participation]]).<br />
* Urban design should avoid stressful and potentially threatening feelings of being lost in large buildings.<ref>Lynch K.: The Image of the City. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960.</ref><br />
* Urban design should “incorporate public meanings” and citizens’ images of places, including those of “secure” or “safe” places.<ref> Nasar J. L.: Environmental psychology and urban design, in: Banerjee T., Loukaitou-Sideris A. (eds.): Companion to Urban Design. London/New York: Routledge, 2011, 162-174, 166.</ref><br />
* Desire for security should not inform urban planning to contribute to threatening citizens’ rights of expression and dissent.<ref>Cf. Whitzman C.: Secure cities, in: Banerjee T., Loukaitou-Sideris A. (eds.): Companion to Urban Design. London/New York: Routledge, 2011, 670-671.</ref><br />
<br />
==Related subjects==<br />
*[[Ecological perspective]]<br />
*[[Environmental design]]<br />
*[[New urbanism]]<br />
*[[Designing out]]/[[designing in]]<br />
*[[Culture aspects]]<br />
*[[Security culture]]<br />
*[[Securitisation]]<br />
*[[Perception of (in)security|Perception of (in)security/risks]]<br />
*[[Ethics aspects]]<br />
*[[Resilience]]<br />
*[[Vulnerability]]<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Gender_perspective&diff=12690Gender perspective2013-07-09T10:41:04Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Ethics]]<br />
[[Category:Social]]<br />
[[File:ae.png|25px|right|This is a page providing background in a specific field of expertise]]<br />
The '''gender perspective''' is not only about women in society. It is about the ways women and men interact and their ability to access resources and opportunities, in their communities depending on their being a woman or a man. Therefore, when any type of survey or analysis of a society is undertaken, it is important to have data that reflects the situation of women in comparison to the situation of men and vice versa.<ref>United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT): Inclusive and Sustainable Urban Planning: A Guide for Municipalities, in: UNON Publishing Service Section, volume 1, 2007. United Nations UN Settlements Programme. Retrieved from: http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/listItemDetails.aspx?publicationID=2662 [last access: 2011-11-01]. </ref> <br />
<br />
==Gender perspective in the urban planning process==<br />
There are various inequalities in society based on class, wealth, race, gender, disability, age, or other cultural factors. These factors make equal participation of all members of society in planning processes more difficult. It is necessary to ensure that all these voices are heard and considered. In addition to this approach, it is important to clarify what a [[gender perspective]] actually means when undertaking urban planning.<br />
<br />
Women and men have different perceptions of security and further more different urban protection needs. Thus, „''gender is not only about women in society. It is about the ways women and men interact and their ability to access resources and opportunities in their communities depending on their being a woman or a man. Therefore, when any type of survey or analysis of a society is undertaken, it is important to have data that reflects the situation of women in comparison to the situation of men and vice versa''“. <ref>United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT): Inclusive and Sustainable Urban Planning: A Guide for Municipalities, in: UNON Publishing Service Section, volume 1, 2007, 26. Retrieved from: http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/listItemDetails.aspx?publicationID=2662. [last access: 2011-11-01].</ref><br />
<br />
Understanding the various situations, individual needs and perspectives of men and women therefore should inform all aspects of urban planning and management in a non-dogmatic way, as proposed by the United Nations Human Settlements Programme<ref>United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT): Inclusive and Sustainable Urban Planning: A Guide for Municipalities, in: UNON Publishing Service Section, volume 1, 2007, 26. Retrieved from: http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/listItemDetails.aspx?publicationID=2662 [last access: 2011-11-01].</ref>:<br />
<br />
==Gender perspective and urban planning strategies==<br />
Women and men have different perceptions of security, which leads to different urban protection needs. Understanding the various situations, individual needs and perspectives of men and women should inform all aspects of urban planning and management, as summarised in the following table:<ref>According to United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT): Inclusive and Sustainable Urban Planning: A Guide for Municipalities, in: UNON Publishing Service Section, volume 1, 2007, 26. Retrieved from: http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/listItemDetails.aspx?publicationID=2662 [last access: 2011-11-01]. </ref><br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|-<br />
! Having a Gender Perspective in urban planning does NOT mean … !! Having a Gender Perspective in urban planning DOES involve …<br />
|-<br />
| Focusing only on women; || Looking at the inequalities between men and women;<br />
|-<br />
| Treating women only as a [[Vulnerable group|vulnerable group]]; || Recognizing that both men and women are actors in the planning process;<br />
|-<br />
| Treating women and men exactly the same; || Designing planning strategies that take the inequalities and differences of men and women into account;<br />
|-<br />
| Striving for numerically equal participation between men and women; || Moving beyond only counting the number of male and female participants to focus on the substance of their involvement as well as the impact of planning on men and women;<br />
|-<br />
| Assuming that all women (or all men) will have the same interests, views or priorities; || Recognizing the differences between different groups of men and women (based on age, ethnicity, socio-economic status, etc.);<br />
|-<br />
| Focusing only on employment equity issues within organizations; || Recognising that equal opportunities for women within organisations is only one aspect of gender equality;<br />
|-<br />
| Assuming who does what work, and who holds what responsibilities; || Understanding the specific situation and documenting the actual conditions and priorities.<br />
|}<br />
<br />
A practical method to integrate the gender perspective into strategic urban planning processes is the [[Participatory Diagnosis]].<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Cultural_criminology&diff=12689Cultural criminology2013-07-09T10:33:21Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Safety]]<br />
[[Category:Social]]<br />
[[File:ae.png|25px|right|This is a page providing background in a specific field of expertise]]<br />
'''Cultural criminology''' is and approach to considering the broader societal contexts of crime, crime prevention, and consequences of preventive measures. It is particularly critical of [[crime prevention by design]]. <br />
<br />
==Description==<br />
Conversely to an overly technological approach to security, '''cultural criminology''' considers dynamic change, pluralism of values, and ethnic diversity.<ref>Garland D.: The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001.</ref> [[Culture aspects|Culture aspects]] in urban planning can for the most part be referred to the approach of cultural criminology.<br />
<br />
For example, fear of crime can be read as being a cultural factor in the context of the change of the political culture of response to crime. Fear of crime formerly was attributed to localised and situational anxiety, but was later recognised to be a major social problem and characterised by contemporary culture.<br />
<br />
In a similar vein as [[New_urbanism|New Urbanism]], cultural criminology entails a concept of [[vulnerability]] and [[resilience]].<br />
<br />
==Security related aspects and benefits==<br />
Safety measures and security installations solely based on technological approaches can be ineffective if the cultural background of crime situations remain unconsidered. For example, youth criminology in schools is raising although technical solutions are implemented. Additional social and school programs might be required.<br />
Often, political response is required to ease the social tension (e.g. youth unemployment).<br />
<br />
==Approaches how to address it==<br />
*Consider crime situation and cultural/social backgrounds;<br />
*Find planning solutions for socially disadvantaged (new/other recreation areas, social facilities etc.);<br />
*Integrate socially disadvantaged into public places;<br />
*Avoid exclusion of certain groups.<br />
<br />
==Related subjects==<br />
* [[Culture aspects]]<br />
* [[New_urbanism|New Urbanism]]<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Cultural_criminology&diff=12688Cultural criminology2013-07-09T10:32:19Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Safety]]<br />
[[Category:Social]]<br />
[[File:ae.png|25px|right|This is a page providing background in a specific field of expertise]]<br />
'''Cultural criminology''' is and approach to considering the broader societal contexts of crime, crime prevention, and consequences of preventive measures. It is particularly critical of [[crime prevention by design]]. <br />
<br />
==Description==<br />
Conversely to an overly technological approach to security, '''cultural criminology''' considers dynamic change, pluralism of values, and ethnic diversity.<ref>Garland D.: The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001.</ref> [[Culture aspects|Culture aspects]] in urban planning can for the most part be referred to the approach of cultural criminology.<br />
<br />
For example, fear of crime can be read as being a cultural factor in the context of the change of the political culture of response to crime. Fear of crime formerly was attributed to localised and situational anxiety, but was later recognised to be a major social problem and characterised by contemporary culture.<br />
<br />
In a similar vein as [[New_urbanism|New Urbanism]], cultural criminology entails a concept of [[vulnerability]] and [[resilience]].<br />
<br />
==Security related aspects and benefits==<br />
Safety measures and security installations solely based on technological approaches can be ineffective if the cultural background of crime situations remain unconsidered. For example youth criminology in schools is raising although technical solutions are implemented. Additional social and school programs might be required.<br />
Often, political response is required to ease the social tension (e.g. youth unemployment).<br />
<br />
==Approaches how to address it==<br />
*Consider crime situation and cultural/social backgrounds;<br />
*Find planning solutions for socially disadvantaged (new/other recreation areas, social facilities etc.);<br />
*Integrate socially disadvantaged into public places;<br />
*Avoid exclusion of certain groups.<br />
<br />
==Related subjects==<br />
* [[Culture aspects]]<br />
* [[New_urbanism|New Urbanism]]<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Community_safety_approach&diff=12687Community safety approach2013-07-09T10:30:19Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Safety]]<br />
[[Category:Social]]<br />
The '''community safety approach'''<ref>Matthews R., Pitts J. : Crime, Disorder and Community Safety. A New Agenda?. London/New York: Routledge, 2001. </ref> advocates a general shift in infrastructural, political, and public conceptions of security, from situational prevention to [[safety]] and [[security]] of a community as a whole. This requires a particular “multicultural sensibility for planning”, including how cultures “''orient their actions,[... or] suggest how they might use formal planning processes.''”<ref>Baum H. S.: Culture Matters – But It Shouldn't Matter Too Much, in: Burayidi M. A. (ed.): Urban Planning in a Multicultural Society. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000, 115.</ref> <br />
<br />
The community safety approach builds upon the approach of [[Cultural criminology|cultural criminology]] to combine material or artifactual aspects with social aspects of culture. It rests on the idea of making risks and threats visible and encouraging citizens to get involved in structural prevention. This is based on strengthened neighbourhoods and informal, social control. [[Urban planning]] and architecture naturally would have an important role to play in realizing such an approach.<br />
<br />
==Security-related aspects and benefits==<br />
*Supports situational [[crime]] and [[Urban terrorism|terrorist]] prevention by using structural (e.g. [[designing out approach|designing out]]/[[designing in]]) measures;<br />
*Considers infrastructural aspects to reduce security threats;<br />
*Supports individual and community reaction to crime and terrorist threats; <br />
*Supports community response activities by facilitating response and emergency measures.<br />
<br />
==Approaches how to address it==<br />
*Follow a [[comprehensive approach]] to urban planning:<br />
:- Consider infrastructural/structural requirements to [[safety]] and [[security]];<br />
:- Consider political requirements to safety and security;<br />
:- Consider societal and community requirements to safety and security.<br />
*Include multicultural aspects and culturally related requirements;<br />
*Integrate [[citizen participation]] as a standard procedure in security related urban planning;<br />
*Consider prevention, mitigation and response aspects in urban planning project (see [[crisis management cycle]]).<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Risk&diff=12686Risk2013-07-09T10:21:16Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Safety]]<br />
[[Category:Social]]<br />
[[Category:Threat]]<br />
<br />
[[File:ae.png|25px|right|This is a page providing background in a specific field of expertise]]'''Risk''' is a measure for the expectation of undesirable outcome [[has attribute::impact]] to realise. This expectation concerns both the [[has attribute::likelihood]] and magnitude of the undesired outcome. Quantified levels of risk are often used to enable an assessment of risk in order to establish if they fall within acceptable limits or to determine which risks pose the highest [[has attribute::threat]].<br />
<br />
== Definitions ==<br />
There is no universally accepted definition for risk. A prominent definition of risk is provided in the ISO 31000:2009 risk management standard, <ref name="iso31000">See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_31000</ref> where risk is defined as the ‘effect of uncertainty on objectives’ and both positive and negative effects are included. As this definition is of a high conceptual level and can be counter-intuitive, for the purpose of this wiki, the definition as mentioned above will be used.<br />
<br />
== Objective and subjective risk==<br />
There are two aspects of the determination of risks: the risks that are in fact present ([[consists of::Risk#About objective risk|objective risks]]), and the risks as they are perceived ([[consists of::Risk#Perception_of_risk|subjective risks]]). One would expect the two to be very similar, but studies have shown they can (and often do) differ quite a bit.<br />
<br />
===About subjective risk===<br />
Results from urban planning decisions can influence citizens’ perception of risk including the distraction of their risk perception for more objective risk levels. Conversely, citizens’ risk perception can result in societal demands on urban planning. Several specific aspects as addressed in the following are worth consideration in strategic urban planning. These aspects among others include indicators for citizens’ subjective perception of criticality of infrastructure and need to protect it, including by appropriate urban planning measures. Conversely, infrastructure that results from urban planning may also influence subjective assessment of its criticality and contribution to security or susceptibility to natural or anthropogenic (“man made”) risk. <br />
<br />
Risk perception is strongly influenced by various subjective factors that drag it from objective risk figures. Factors such as overconfidence, loss aversion, individual experience, temporal factors, capacity of remembering, level of information and knowledge, public discourse, stigmatisation, cultural factors, orientation of values, confidence in institutions, etc. <ref>Cf. Covello V. T. et. al.: Risk Communication, the West Nile Virus Epidemic, and Bioterrorism: Responding to the Communication Challenges Posed by the Intentional or Unintentional Release of a Pathogen in an Urban Setting. Journal of Urban Health: Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine, vol. 78, no. 2, 2001, 382-391.<br />
<br />
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies. Future Global Shocks. Improving Risk Governance. Preliminary Version. OECD Publication Service, 2011; Proske D.: Katalog Risiken - Risiken und ihre Darstellung. Dresden: Eigenverlag, 2004, 167-174. Retrieved from: http://www.qucosa.de/fileadmin/data/qucosa/documents/71/1218786958574-1736.pdf.<br />
<br />
Slovic P. et al.: Facts and Fears: Societal Perception of Risk, in: Monroe K.B., Abor A. (eds.): Advances In Consumer Research, vol. 08, Association For Consumer Research, 1981, 497-502. Retrieved from: http://www.acrwebsite.org/volumes/display.asp?id=5844.<br />
<br />
Sterr H. et al.: Risikomanagement im Küstenschutz in Norddeutschland, in: Felgentreff C., Glade T.: Naturrisiken und Sozialkatastrophen. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2008,345-346.<br />
<br />
Zwick M., Renn O.: Risikokonzepte jenseits von Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeit und Schadenserwartung, in: Felgentreff C., Glade T.: Naturrisiken und Sozialkatastrophen. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2008, 85-95.</ref> <br />
<br />
This is relevant to urban planners since they have some means to direct the perceived security or at the very least has means to predict it and account for it in planning. <br />
Addressing of risk in planning should be coherent with societal risk perception and views.<ref>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies. Future Global Shocks. Improving Risk Governance. Preliminary Version. OECD Publication Service, 2011<br />
<br />
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): Emerging Risks in the 21st Century. An Agenda for Action. Paris: OECD Publication Service, 2003, 54-56. Retrieved from: http://www.unisdr.org/eng/library/Literature/7754.pdf [last access: 2011 07 28].</ref><br />
Adequate risk management and public communication can help urban planners to prevent negative effects from public risk perception or misperception, and related public demands on or acceptance of urban design. However, effects of urban planning decisions can also distract citizens’ risk perception from more objective risk levels. <br />
<br />
To do so, the complexity of individual and social mechanisms of risk perception has to be appreciated.<ref> Coppola D. P.: Introduction to International Disaster Management. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007, 162. </ref> Humans usually do not fear statistically highly ranked threats to life and health (such as car accidents, food poisoning, cancer and others), whereas they are disproportionately wary of spectacular hazards, even if related vulnerabilities are low.<br />
<br />
===About objective risk===<br />
Although terminology may vary, two widely accepted elements in the definition of risk are the inclusion of likelihood and magnitude and to a lesser extent, the fact that to arrive at a measure of risk, the two should be multiplied.<br />
A simple, but widely used definition of risk is therefore<br />
<br />
<big>'''Risk''' = '''Likelihood'''</big> of event realizing <big>'''X''' '''Impact'''</big> (expected loss in case the accident realises).<br />
<br />
Many variations exist, for example by distinguishing between the likelihood of a threat realizing (also called probability) and the likelihood that that threat will affect an object ([[has attribute::vulnerability]]). An example would be storm damage: The probability would reflect the likelihood of a storm at the object, the vulnerability would reflect the likelihood that this storm would cause damage and the impact would reflect the extent of damage that would occur if the storm would cause damage. The quantified risk formula associated with this definition is<br />
<br />
<big>'''Risk''' = '''Likelihood'''</big> of event realising <big>'''X''' '''Vulnerability'''</big> (probability of realised event impacting object) <big>'''X''' '''Impact'''</big> (expected loss in case the accident realises and impacting object).<br />
<br />
Most commonly, likelihood can be quantified by statistical analysis. The likelihood of weather events occurring, for example, has been the subject of long and well-established study and has a solid statistical basis. Wherever statistical data can predict the future, likelihood can be interpreted to equal probability.<br />
<br />
====Problems with the use of probability====<br />
A precondition for statistical analysis to be valid is that the future can be predicted on the basis of events in the past and this does not hold for all situations. Particularly in security analysis, the use of statistical analysis for the determination of likelihood is highly debatable as:<br />
* The likelihood of occurrence is influenced by the vulnerability (compare the risk of flooding with the risk of burglary: Whereas the likelihood of high water occurring is independent of dykes being erected, the likelihood of a burglary attempt occurring at a building depends on the doors having visible locks or not). <br />
* The likelihood is influenced by external factors (measures taken at one place can influence the likelihood for burglary at another place (crime displacement or waterbed effect))<br />
* The likelihood is subject to rational beings who can act against trends (a criminal will actively look for the weakest link, irrespective of choices made in the past if the last three attacks where (unsuccessful) hostage takings, is that an indication that the next one will also be a hostage taking, or is it likely that the next one will be a different attack method?)<br />
* Some forms of crime (particularly the more extreme forms, such as mass killing or destructions by fanatics) have a very low rate of occurrence, which is a problem for the accumulation of enough data to assure the validity of statistical analysis.<br />
<br />
A way to overcome these problems is to substitute '''attractiveness''' (the extent to which criminals are likely to choose the object over another object) for probability and '''conceivability''' (the extent to which criminals are deemed able to be successful) for vulnerability. In this way, assumptions about historical data predicting future events can be avoided.<br />
<br />
===Uses of risk assessment===<br />
Risk assessment is used to get a good understanding of the various circumstances that might have a negative impact on the realisation of your goals. In other words, it can be used as a systematic way to survey the weak spots in your plans and do something about it before they cause problems.<br />
<br />
The [[opposed by::Concept level tools#Risk Assessment tool (SecuRbAn|SecuRbAn]] tool is a tool to quickly do a high-level risk assessment on planned urban development, developed in the context of the VITRUV project.<br />
<br />
==Sources of risk==<br />
One way to typify types of risk is by their causes. A cause for risk is called a [[is caused by::threat]]. Threats can be classified into [[is the opposite of::safety]] threats, consisting of [[is caused by::natural threat|natural threat]]s, [[is caused by::human failure]], [[is caused by::technical failure]], [[is caused by::failure of critical services]] and [[is the opposite of::security]] threats which are due to [[is caused by::human intent]].<br />
<br />
==Related subjects==<br />
* [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_analysis Risk analysis]<br />
* [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_assessment Risk assessment]<br />
* [http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/global_health_risks/en/ Health risks]<br />
* [[Risk communication]]<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Critical_infrastructure&diff=12685Critical infrastructure2013-07-09T09:58:54Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Mobility]]<br />
[[Category:Urban environment]]<br />
[[Category:Urban object]]<br />
[[File:ae.png|25px|right|This is a page providing background in a specific field of expertise]]<br />
In the EU, '''[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_infrastructure critical infrastructures]''' (commonly abbreviated as CI) are those physical and information technology facilities, networks, services, and assets, which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, [[safety]], [[security]] and/or economic well-being of citizens or the effective functioning of societies or governments in EU Member States countries.<ref>EU: Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the Identification and Designation of European Critical Infrastructures and the Assessment of the need to Improve their Protection. Official Journal of the European Union L 345/75, 2008. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:EN:PDF [last access: 2010-10-14].</ref><br />
<br />
==Critical infrastructure protection==<br />
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_infrastructure_protection Critical infrastructure protection] (CIP) has become a major issue in civil [[security]], [[Crisis management cycle|crisis and emergency management]] and natural hazard management. The [[all-hazard approach]] has gained ground on the international scale, and the [[comprehensive approach]] in security policies and [[security research]] has been advanced in order to meet current and future [[threat|threats]] and [[risk|risks]] based on better integrated information, assessment, policies and capabilities. Basically, owners, operators and respective member states hold the responsibility for Critical Infrastructure Protection. <br />
<br />
The [http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_terrorism/l33260_en.htm European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP)]<ref>Commission of the European Communities: COM(2006) 786 final Communication from the Commission on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection. Brussels, 2006. Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0786en01.pdf [last access: 2012-05-23].</ref><ref>see also http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_terrorism/l33260_en.htm; http://www.euinfrastructure.com/article/critical-infrastructure-protection/ [last access: 2012-05-23].</ref> points out the [[all-hazard approach]] (prioritizing [[Urban terrorism|terrorism]]) and the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity, confidentiality, [[stakeholders|stakeholder]] cooperation, proportionality and sector-by-sector approach <ref>EU: Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the Identification and Designation of European Critical Infrastructures and the Assessment of the Need to Improve their Protection. Official Journal of the European Union L 345/75: 3, 2008. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:EN:PDF [last access: 2010-10-14]</ref>. The framework comprises the identification and designation of CI, an action plan, the establishment of a Critical Infrastructures Warning Information Network (CIWIN) and a CIP Contact and Expert Group; further the support of the member states, a contingency planning and the external dimension. The objectives to guarantee European-wide adequate and equal protection levels, minimal single points of failure, and rapid and tested recovery processes were defined earlier on <ref>Commission of the European Communities: COM(2005) 576 final. Green Paper on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (presented by the Commission), 2005. Retrieved from http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf/EC_-_Green_Paper_on_CI_-_17.11.2005.pdf [last access: 2011-07-14].</ref>. Together with the EU Member States, the European Commission will develop guidelines and thresholds for criteria application. As a first step the directive addressed the energy and transport sectors differentiating sub-sectors for each (electricity, oil, gas respectively road, rail, air, inland waterways transport, ocean and short sea shipping, and ports).<br />
<br />
===European policy landscape around Critical Infrastructure Protection===<br />
[[File:CIP_EUpolicies.jpg|500px|thumb|center]]<br />
<br />
==Critical infrastructure sectors and sector designation==<br />
The concept of '''Critical Infrastructures''' (CI) and '''CI sectors''' is not self-evident. Rather, sector designation is a permanent process of awareness rising on the political level, characterised by spatial and temporal variation. It is influenced by various national trends, by the political situation, current crises, and disasters. Traditional and consensual sectors have been identified to be physical-technical infrastructures. Industrial-commercial CI sectors have evolved stepwise. By trend, multiple socio-cultural CI sectors have been only recently acknowledged to be of concern for society and added to the conventional sector spectrum.<br />
<br />
[[File:Grafik CI Sector Classification.jpg|400px|thumb|right|'''Critical infrastructure sector classification''']]<br />
<br />
Involving increasing accuracy and detailed perspectives, the process of designation is dependent on public and trans-boundary discussion and views, but also on subjective/political perception, region-specific priorities and economic values. <ref>Cf. Metzger Jan: Das Konzept Schutz kritischer Infrastrukturen hinterfragt, in: Wenger A.: Bulletin 2004 zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik, Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik,2004. Retrieved from http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/SSN/.../doc_6804_259_de.pdf [last access: 2011-06-09].</ref>.<br />
<br />
The EU approach so far has covered the following critical infrastructure:<br />
<br />
* Energy Installations and Networks;<br />
* Communications and Information Technologies;<br />
* Transport;<br />
* Water;<br />
* Production, Storage and Transport of Dangerous Goods;<br />
* Food;<br />
* Health Care;<br />
* Finance;<br />
* Government.<br />
<br />
The EU encourages the Member States to set up national programmes for designation and qualitative and quantitative aspects, to accomplish sector identification and dependency studies and to elaborate a common terminology, general criteria, guidelines and procedures as a first step. Further steps include identification of deficiencies, suggestions for measures and financing, the implementation of minimum protection standards and their surveillance.<br />
<br />
The EU-Directive 2008/114/EC introduces a practice to identify and designate European Critical Infrastructures (ECI), committing each Member State to designating potential ECI according to the EU-definition and according to cross-sectoral criteria (casualties, economic, and public effects), and sector specific criteria (taking into account individual sector characteristics). Further criteria to be considered, as addressed in the European Programme of Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), are geographic scope of impact (when disrupted or destroyed), severity and consequences (public, economic, environmental, political and psychological effects and public health consequences), or geographic and sector specific dependencies.<br />
<br />
== Criticality of infrastructure ==<br />
'''Infrastructure criticality''' is generally set at varying variables:<br />
*Symbolic criticality vs. systemic criticality (Metzger 2004);<br />
*Dimension-based perspective: the geographic dimension of disruption and breakdown (local to international), the magnitude (low to massive) and the time factor (short term to long term) (IRGC 2007);<br />
<br />
'''EU criteria for criticality''' (EU 2008)<ref>EU: Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the Identification and Designation of European Critical Infrastructures and the Assessment of the Need to Improve their Protection. Official Journal of the European Union L 345/75, 2008. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:EN:PDF [last access: 2010-10-14].</ref> refer to cross-cutting criteria described as:<br />
<br />
*''Casualties criterion'' (potential number of fatalities or injuries);<br />
*''Economic effects criterion'' (economic loss and/or degradation of products or services; potential environmental effects);<br />
*''Public effects criterion'' (impact on public confidence, physical suffering and disruption of daily life; including the loss of essential services).<br />
<br />
Divergence in the assessment of criticality generally results from diverging national situations and (legislative and cultural) preconditions: Are there culturally valuable goods? Are there hazardous chemical and industrial goods? Are there security facilities? In case of positive answers to such questions, these sectors usually are assessed to be critical and risk prone both in definition and in the political perception and discourse.<br />
Objective quantification and determination of criticality are doubtful. Hence, qualitative knowledge of physical [[risk|risks]] and social vulnerabilities is essential to determine indicators and factors, such as [[Social risk perception and communication of risk|risk perception]], individual cognition, political discourses, loss of trust, and public reaction to disastrous events and counter-/mitigating measures.<br />
<br />
== Perception of criticality ==<br />
The systematic analyses of citizens' perceived criticality of infrastructure and necessity to protect it is an essential component for the determination of security demands as a public good, also as related to strategic urban planning. A state of the art review leads to the following indicators for citizens’ subjective needs to provide for protection of critical infrastructure, as well as of their over-perception or under-perception of the criticality of that infrastructure.<ref>Cf. Results from the Project SFI@SFU: Development of an Austrian Centre for Comprehensive Security Research at Sigmund Freud Private University Vienna (http://www.sfi-sfu.eu) in the Austrian National Security Research Programme KIRAS, funded by the Austrian Ministry of Technology, Transport and Innovation (bmvit); Project Deliverable 2.3: ''Integrierte Risikobewertungssystematik (comprehensive risk assessment) und subjektive Schutzbedürfnisbewertung für kritische Infrastruktur'' (not published), p. 98.</ref> The determination of the perception of criticality of infrastructure and related protection requirements is not only an important subjective component, influenced by generic laws of human risk perceptions as well as by cultural features, that needs considering in sector designation and prioritisation of protective measures for built infrastructure. It is also in important factor to consider in urban planning that seeks legitimacy and public acceptance. <br />
<br />
Knowledge of such kind can, for example, help urban planners to design in protective measures that not only reflect objective vulnerability but also citizens’ security cultures. Thus, public support for urban planning that is conscious of security aspects can be enhanced and citizens’ acceptance of resulting built infrastructure enhanced. <br />
<br />
===List of indicators for assessment of subjective protection requirements of critical infrastructure===<br />
[[File:CI_perception.jpg|500px|thumb|center]]<br />
<br />
From this list of indicators, it also follows that subjective protection requirements, similar to [[Perception of (in)security|perception]], highly depend on individual level of information and knowledge. Thus, strategic urban planning should be accompanied by a full-fledged public communication strategy in addressing security aspects. Personal experience and confrontation with critical infrastructure breakdown play an essential role in citizens’ subjective perception of criticality and requirements to protect, as does the individual direct use of the respective critical infrastructure.<br />
<br />
In order to enhance citizens perception of safety in urban places various dimensions must be considered (view [[Checklists_for_dimension_consideration|Practical checklists]]).<br />
<br />
==Impact of critical infrastructure failure on citizens and society<ref>Security Research Project SFI@SFU (http://www.sfi-sfu) results</ref>==<br />
It is generally acknowledged that failure of critical infrastructure, such as malfunctions and accidents in transportation, health service and emergency care or power supply, has an impact on the social components of a system. If an infrastructure-endangering event occurs, domino effects and/or cascading effects are very likely due to interference or outages of the critical infrastructure. Since crises and disasters always take place in (social) contexts, those effects have the potential to bring different sectors of society to standstill, especially because of the multiple vulnerabilities of the social system and its indispensable connections with different critical infrastructure sectors. Beyond negative psycho-social consequences on the affected community, natural disasters or other types of critical infrastructure breakdown affect the society also from the urban planners point of view, for example through physical loss of structures, homes, entire parts of cities, etc.<br />
Following an analysis of several case studies that were based on interviews with disaster victims, site investigations and questionnaire surveys as well as <ref>Platz U.: Vulnerabilität von Logistikstrukturen im Lebensmittelhandel. Eine Studie zu den Logistikstrukturen des Lebensmittelhandels, möglichen Gefahrenquellen und den Auswirkungen verschiedener Gefahren bei einem Ereigniseintritt. Landwirtschaftsverlag Münster-Hiltrup.(Serie Band: Schriftenreihe des Bundesministeriums für Verbraucherschutz, Ernährung und Landwirtschaft : Reihe A, Angewandte Wissenschaft; 512 / ISBN-ISSN-ISMN: 3-7843-0512-1), 2006. Retrieved from http://www.ble.de/cln_099/nn_467872/SharedDocs/Downloads/03__Vorsorge/Ernaehrungsvorsorge/Literatur/Vulnerabilitaet.html#Inhalt [last access: 2011-03-31]; Picou J. S., Martin C. G.: Community Impacts of Hurricane Ivan: A Case Study of Orange Beach, Alabama. Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Social Work, University of South Alabama, 2006. Retrieved from http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/research/qr/qr190/qr190.html [last access: 2011-04-12].; Lasley C. B., Simpson D. M., Rockaway T. D., Weigel T.: Understanding Critical Infrastructure Failure: Examining the Experience of Biloxi and Gulfport Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina. Study made by: Center for Hazards Research and Policy Development, University of Louisville, 2007. Retrieved from http://hazardcenter.louisville.edu/images/Research/sgerfinalprojectworkingpaper.pdf [last access: 2011-04-11].; Queste A.: Dissertationsarbeit Vulnerabilität der Kritischen Infrastruktur Wasserversorgung gegenüber Naturkatastrophen. Universität Bielefeld, 2009. Retrieved from http://bieson.ub.uni-bielefeld.de/volltexte/2010/1635/pdf/KRITIS_queste.pdf [last access: 2011-04-11]; Birkmann J., Bach C., Guhl S., Witting M., Welle T., Schmude M.: State of the Art der Forschung zur Verwundbarkeit Kritischer Infrastrukturen am Beispiel Strom/Stromausfall. Schriftreihe Sicherheit Nr. 2 Forschungsforum Öffentliche Sicherheit, Freie Universität Berlin, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.sicherheit-forschung.de/publikationen/schriftenreihe/sr_v_v/sr_2.pdf [last access: 2011-05-12].; Lorenz D. F.: Kritische Infrastrukturen aus der Sicht der Bevölkerung. Schriftreihe Sicherheit Nr. 3 Forschungsforum Öffentliche Sicherheit, Freie Universität Berlin, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.sicherheit-forschung.de/publikationen/schriftenreihe/sr_v_v/sr_3.pdf [last access: 2011-05-04]; Verdon-Kidd D.C., Kiem A.S., Willgoose G., Haines P.: East Coast Lows and the Newcastle/Central Coast Pasha Bulker storm. Report for the National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility, Australia, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.nccarf.edu.au/sites/default/files/FINAL%202-East%20Coast%20Lows(2).pdf [last access: 2011-04-12].</ref>, different types of impact of critical infrastructure failure on citizens and society can be summarised. They also represent aspects to address in forward-looking, resilience-enhancing urban planning. It can be concluded that the complexity of the consequences from critical infrastructure failure increases with increasing citizens’ factual as well as felt dependence on that infrastructure. <br />
<br />
===Types of impact of critical infrastructure failure on citizens and society===<br />
[[File:Grafik_Social_Imp_CI_failure.jpg|700px|thumb|center]]<br />
<br />
== Critical infrastructure protection and urban planning==<br />
[[Urban planning]] and critical infrastructure planning are inseparably linked. Hence, EU Critical Infrastructure Protection policy will inevitably have an impact on future critical infrastructure planning and, thus, urban planning.<br />
<br />
There are several foreseeable future [[legal aspects]] that urban planning should address pre-emptively and that can be expected to have an influence on security issues. Aspects of critical infrastructure protection could be addressed in forward-looking urban planning based on the European Commission’s Staff Working Paper on Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management (European Commission 2010)<ref>European Commission: Commission Staff Working Paper. Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management. SEC(2010) 1626 final. Brussels, 2010. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/civil_protection/civil/pdfdocs/prevention/COMM_PDF_SEC_2010_1626_F_staff_working_document_en.pdf [last access: 2011-06-18].</ref>. <br />
*Accordingly, uniform risk analyses based on standardised criteria to establish a Common Risk Management Framework (CRMF) should be promoted. The [http://www.vitruv-project.eu/consortium.html VITRUV] tools make an important contribution towards this. <br />
*At European level, the aim is to focus efforts and contributions for a European Risk Atlas, serving as a further basis for an adequate coherent [[All-hazard approach|all-hazard]] risk policy due to be established by 2014 (European Commission 2010). These policies and risk assessment and mapping outcomes will expectedly affect future urban planning as well as require legal adaptation of planning requirements. <br />
<br />
With respect to intentional hazards and [[threat|threats]] (above all [[urban terrorism]]) urban planning will be increasingly required to support critical infrastructure protection. Designing in and [[designing out approach|designing out approaches]] aim to reduce risk due to crime and terrorism and are important [[Crisis management cycle|mitigation]] instruments in critical infrastructure protection at an early stage of planning.<br />
<br />
Sustainable cities are also vis-à-vis [[Natural threat|natural hazards]] and global environmental change. The [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:288:0027:0034:en:pdf EU Flood Directive 2007/60/EC], entered into force on 26 November 2007, commits Member States to undertake actions on the assessment and management of flood risks. Outcomes of these assessments are expected to be integrated in future comprehensive urban and management planning .<br />
<br />
In this context, following examples from the [http://www.focusproject.eu/web/focus/home FOCUS] project<ref>FOCUS Project: FOCUS (Foresight Security Scenarios – Mapping Research to a Comprehensive Approach to Exogenous EU Roles): Deliverable 4.2: Literature and small-world study on future nature-related disasters. Retrieved from: http://www.focusproject.eu/web/focus/downloads/-/document_library_display/1QpQ/view/15032/1005?_110_INSTANCE_1QpQ_redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.focusproject.eu%2Fweb%2Ffocus%2Fdownloads%2F-%2Fdocument_library_display%2F1QpQ%2Fview%2F15032 [last access: 2013-06-17]. </ref> respectively from EU guidelines and directives also have relevance for critical infrastructure protection in urban planning from a societal security point of view: <br />
*City planning should take account of increasing frequency and intensity of heat waves by making use of and enhancing natural processes to cool the cities, such as facilitating natural circulations, be it along rivers, from mountains and valleys surrounding cities, etc., introducing more vegetation into the city (roofs, façades, parks, recreational areas, etc.).<br />
*Building standards should be adapted to assure optimal interaction with the sun (e.g. large input in winter, small input in summer e.g. through sun shades positioned outside the building); make use of natural ventilation; use the best possible materials in terms of isolation properties; etc.<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Critical_infrastructure&diff=12684Critical infrastructure2013-07-09T09:53:04Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Mobility]]<br />
[[Category:Urban environment]]<br />
[[Category:Urban object]]<br />
[[File:ae.png|25px|right|This is a page providing background in a specific field of expertise]]<br />
In the EU, '''[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_infrastructure critical infrastructures]''' (commonly abbreviated as CI) are those physical and information technology facilities, networks, services, and assets, which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, [[safety]], [[security]] and/or economic well-being of citizens or the effective functioning of societies or governments in EU Member States countries.<ref>EU: Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the Identification and Designation of European Critical Infrastructures and the Assessment of the need to Improve their Protection. Official Journal of the European Union L 345/75, 2008. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:EN:PDF [last access: 2010-10-14].</ref><br />
<br />
==Critical infrastructure protection==<br />
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_infrastructure_protection Critical infrastructure protection] (CIP) has become a major issue in civil [[security]], [[Crisis management cycle|crisis and emergency management]] and natural hazard management. The [[all-hazard approach]] has gained ground on the international scale, and the [[comprehensive approach]] in security policies and [[security research]] has been advanced in order to meet current and future [[threat|threats]] and [[risk|risks]] based on better integrated information, assessment, policies and capabilities. Basically, owners, operators and respective member states hold the responsibility for Critical Infrastructure Protection. <br />
<br />
The [http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_terrorism/l33260_en.htm European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP)]<ref>Commission of the European Communities: COM(2006) 786 final Communication from the Commission on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection. Brussels, 2006. Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0786en01.pdf [last access: 2012-05-23].</ref><ref>see also http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_terrorism/l33260_en.htm; http://www.euinfrastructure.com/article/critical-infrastructure-protection/ [last access: 2012-05-23].</ref> points out the [[all-hazard approach]] (prioritizing [[Urban terrorism|terrorism]]) and the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity, confidentiality, [[stakeholders|stakeholder]] cooperation, proportionality and sector-by-sector approach <ref>EU: Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructures and the Assessment of the need to Improve their Protection. Official Journal of the European Union L 345/75: 3, 2008. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:EN:PDF [last access: 2010-10-14]</ref>. The framework comprises the identification and designation of CI, an action plan, the establishment of a Critical Infrastructures Warning Information Network (CIWIN) and a CIP Contact and Expert Group; further the support of the member states, a contingency planning and the external dimension. The objectives to guarantee European-wide adequate and equal protection levels, minimal single points of failure, and rapid and tested recovery processes were defined earlier on <ref>Commission of the European Communities: COM(2005) 576 final. Green Paper on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (presented by the Commission),2005. Retrieved from http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf/EC_-_Green_Paper_on_CI_-_17.11.2005.pdf [last access: 2011-07-14].</ref>. Together with the EU Member States, the European Commission will develop guidelines and thresholds for criteria application. As a first step the directive addressed the energy and transport sectors differentiating sub-sectors for each (electricity, oil, gas respectively road, rail, air, inland waterways transport, ocean and short sea shipping, and ports).<br />
<br />
===European policy landscape around Critical Infrastructure Protection===<br />
[[File:CIP_EUpolicies.jpg|500px|thumb|center]]<br />
<br />
==Critical infrastructure sectors and sector designation==<br />
The concept of '''Critical Infrastructures''' (CI) and '''CI sectors''' is not self-evident. Rather, sector designation is a permanent process of awareness rising on the political level, characterised by spatial and temporal variation. It is influenced by various national trends, by the political situation, current crises, and disasters. Traditional and consensual sectors have been identified to be physical-technical infrastructures. Industrial-commercial CI sectors have evolved stepwise. By trend, multiple socio-cultural CI sectors have been only recently acknowledged to be of concern for society and added to the conventional sector spectrum.<br />
<br />
[[File:Grafik CI Sector Classification.jpg|400px|thumb|right|'''Critical infrastructure sector classification''']]<br />
<br />
Involving increasing accuracy and detailed perspectives, the process of designation is dependent on public and trans-boundary discussion and views, but also on subjective/political perception, region-specific priorities and economic values. <ref>Cf. Metzger Jan: Das Konzept Schutz kritischer Infrastrukturen hinterfragt, in: Wenger A.: Bulletin 2004 zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik, Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik,2004. Retrieved from http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/SSN/.../doc_6804_259_de.pdf [last access: 2011-06-09].</ref>.<br />
<br />
The EU approach so far has covered the following critical infrastructure:<br />
<br />
* Energy Installations and Networks;<br />
* Communications and Information Technologies;<br />
* Transport;<br />
* Water;<br />
* Production, Storage and Transport of Dangerous Goods;<br />
* Food;<br />
* Health Care;<br />
* Finance;<br />
* Government.<br />
<br />
The EU encourages the Member States to set up national programmes for designation and qualitative and quantitative aspects, to accomplish sector identification and dependency studies and to elaborate a common terminology, general criteria, guidelines and procedures as a first step. Further steps include identification of deficiencies, suggestions for measures and financing, the implementation of minimum protection standards and their surveillance.<br />
<br />
The EU-Directive 2008/114/EC introduces a practice to identify and designate European Critical Infrastructures (ECI), committing each Member State to designating potential ECI according to the EU-definition and according to cross-sectoral criteria (casualties, economic, and public effects), and sector specific criteria (taking into account individual sector characteristics). Further criteria to be considered, as addressed in the European Programme of Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), are geographic scope of impact (when disrupted or destroyed), severity and consequences (public, economic, environmental, political and psychological effects and public health consequences), or geographic and sector specific dependencies.<br />
<br />
== Criticality of infrastructure ==<br />
'''Infrastructure criticality''' is generally set at varying variables:<br />
*Symbolic criticality vs. systemic criticality (Metzger 2004);<br />
*Dimension-based perspective: the geographic dimension of disruption and breakdown (local to international), the magnitude (low to massive) and the time factor (short term to long term) (IRGC 2007);<br />
<br />
'''EU criteria for criticality''' (EU 2008)<ref>EU: Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the Identification and Designation of European Critical Infrastructures and the Assessment of the Need to Improve their Protection. Official Journal of the European Union L 345/75, 2008. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:EN:PDF [last access: 2010-10-14].</ref> refer to cross-cutting criteria described as:<br />
<br />
*''Casualties criterion'' (potential number of fatalities or injuries);<br />
*''Economic effects criterion'' (economic loss and/or degradation of products or services; potential environmental effects);<br />
*''Public effects criterion'' (impact on public confidence, physical suffering and disruption of daily life; including the loss of essential services).<br />
<br />
Divergence in the assessment of criticality generally results from diverging national situations and (legislative and cultural) preconditions: Are there culturally valuable goods? Are there hazardous chemical and industrial goods? Are there security facilities? In case of positive answers to such questions, these sectors usually are assessed to be critical and risk prone both in definition and in the political perception and discourse.<br />
Objective quantification and determination of criticality are doubtful. Hence, qualitative knowledge of physical [[risk|risks]] and social vulnerabilities is essential to determine indicators and factors, such as [[Social risk perception and communication of risk|risk perception]], individual cognition, political discourses, loss of trust, and public reaction to disastrous events and counter-/mitigating measures.<br />
<br />
== Perception of criticality ==<br />
The systematic analyses of citizens' perceived criticality of infrastructure and necessity to protect it is an essential component for the determination of security demands as a public good, also as related to strategic urban planning. A state of the art review leads to the following indicators for citizens’ subjective needs to provide for protection of critical infrastructure, as well as of their over-perception or under-perception of the criticality of that infrastructure.<ref>Cf. Results from the Project SFI@SFU: Development of an Austrian Centre for Comprehensive Security Research at Sigmund Freud Private University Vienna (http://www.sfi-sfu.eu) in the Austrian National Security Research Programme KIRAS, funded by the Austrian Ministry of Technology, Transport and Innovation (bmvit); Project Deliverable 2.3: ''Integrierte Risikobewertungssystematik (comprehensive risk assessment) und subjektive Schutzbedürfnisbewertung für kritische Infrastruktur'' (not published), p. 98.</ref> The determination of the perception of criticality of infrastructure and related protection requirements is not only an important subjective component, influenced by generic laws of human risk perceptions as well as by cultural features, that needs considering in sector designation and prioritisation of protective measures for built infrastructure. It is also in important factor to consider in urban planning that seeks legitimacy and public acceptance. <br />
<br />
Knowledge of such kind can, for example, help urban planners to design in protective measures that not only reflect objective vulnerability but also citizens’ security cultures. Thus, public support for urban planning that is conscious of security aspects can be enhanced and citizens’ acceptance of resulting built infrastructure enhanced. <br />
<br />
===List of indicators for assessment of subjective protection requirements of critical infrastructure===<br />
[[File:CI_perception.jpg|500px|thumb|center]]<br />
<br />
From this list of indicators, it also follows that subjective protection requirements, similar to [[Perception of (in)security|perception]], highly depend on individual level of information and knowledge. Thus, strategic urban planning should be accompanied by a full-fledged public communication strategy in addressing security aspects. Personal experience and confrontation with critical infrastructure breakdown play an essential role in citizens’ subjective perception of criticality and requirements to protect, as does the individual direct use of the respective critical infrastructure.<br />
<br />
In order to enhance citizens perception of safety in urban places various dimensions must be considered (view [[Checklists_for_dimension_consideration|Practical checklists]]).<br />
<br />
==Impact of critical infrastructure failure on citizens and society<ref>Security Research Project SFI@SFU (http://www.sfi-sfu) results</ref>==<br />
It is generally acknowledged that failure of critical infrastructure, such as malfunctions and accidents in transportation, health service and emergency care or power supply, has an impact on the social components of a system. If an infrastructure-endangering event occurs, domino effects and/or cascading effects are very likely due to interference or outages of the critical infrastructure. Since crises and disasters always take place in (social) contexts, those effects have the potential to bring different sectors of society to standstill, especially because of the multiple vulnerabilities of the social system and its indispensable connections with different critical infrastructure sectors. Beyond negative psycho-social consequences on the affected community, natural disasters or other types of critical infrastructure breakdown affect the society also from the urban planners point of view, for example through physical loss of structures, homes, entire parts of cities, etc.<br />
Following an analysis of several case studies that were based on interviews with disaster victims, site investigations and questionnaire surveys as well as <ref>Platz U.: Vulnerabilität von Logistikstrukturen im Lebensmittelhandel. Eine Studie zu den Logistikstrukturen des Lebensmittelhandels, möglichen Gefahrenquellen und den Auswirkungen verschiedener Gefahren bei einem Ereigniseintritt. Landwirtschaftsverlag Münster-Hiltrup.(Serie Band: Schriftenreihe des Bundesministeriums für Verbraucherschutz, Ernährung und Landwirtschaft : Reihe A, Angewandte Wissenschaft; 512 / ISBN-ISSN-ISMN: 3-7843-0512-1), 2006. Retrieved from http://www.ble.de/cln_099/nn_467872/SharedDocs/Downloads/03__Vorsorge/Ernaehrungsvorsorge/Literatur/Vulnerabilitaet.html#Inhalt [last access: 2011-03-31]; Picou J. S., Martin C. G.: Community Impacts of Hurricane Ivan: A Case Study of Orange Beach, Alabama. Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Social Work, University of South Alabama, 2006. Retrieved from http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/research/qr/qr190/qr190.html [last access: 2011-04-12].; Lasley C. B., Simpson D. M., Rockaway T. D., Weigel T.: Understanding Critical Infrastructure Failure: Examining the Experience of Biloxi and Gulfport Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina. Study made by: Center for Hazards Research and Policy Development, University of Louisville, 2007. Retrieved from http://hazardcenter.louisville.edu/images/Research/sgerfinalprojectworkingpaper.pdf [last access: 2011-04-11].; Queste A.: Dissertationsarbeit Vulnerabilität der Kritischen Infrastruktur Wasserversorgung gegenüber Naturkatastrophen. Universität Bielefeld, 2009. Retrieved from http://bieson.ub.uni-bielefeld.de/volltexte/2010/1635/pdf/KRITIS_queste.pdf [last access: 2011-04-11]; Birkmann J., Bach C., Guhl S., Witting M., Welle T., Schmude M.: State of the Art der Forschung zur Verwundbarkeit Kritischer Infrastrukturen am Beispiel Strom/Stromausfall. Schriftreihe Sicherheit Nr. 2 Forschungsforum Öffentliche Sicherheit, Freie Universität Berlin, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.sicherheit-forschung.de/publikationen/schriftenreihe/sr_v_v/sr_2.pdf [last access: 2011-05-12].; Lorenz D. F.: Kritische Infrastrukturen aus der Sicht der Bevölkerung. Schriftreihe Sicherheit Nr. 3 Forschungsforum Öffentliche Sicherheit, Freie Universität Berlin, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.sicherheit-forschung.de/publikationen/schriftenreihe/sr_v_v/sr_3.pdf [last access: 2011-05-04]; Verdon-Kidd D.C., Kiem A.S., Willgoose G., Haines P.: East Coast Lows and the Newcastle/Central Coast Pasha Bulker storm. Report for the National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility, Australia, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.nccarf.edu.au/sites/default/files/FINAL%202-East%20Coast%20Lows(2).pdf [last access: 2011-04-12].</ref>, different types of impact of critical infrastructure failure on citizens and society can be summarised. They also represent aspects to address in forward-looking, resilience-enhancing urban planning. It can be concluded that the complexity of the consequences from critical infrastructure failure increases with increasing citizens’ factual as well as felt dependence on that infrastructure. <br />
<br />
===Types of impact of critical infrastructure failure on citizens and society===<br />
[[File:Grafik_Social_Imp_CI_failure.jpg|700px|thumb|center]]<br />
<br />
== Critical infrastructure protection and urban planning==<br />
[[Urban planning]] and critical infrastructure planning are inseparably linked. Hence, EU Critical Infrastructure Protection policy will inevitably have an impact on future critical infrastructure planning and, thus, urban planning.<br />
<br />
There are several foreseeable future [[legal aspects]] that urban planning should address pre-emptively and that can be expected to have an influence on security issues. Aspects of critical infrastructure protection could be addressed in forward-looking urban planning based on the European Commission’s Staff Working Paper on Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management (European Commission 2010)<ref>European Commission: Commission Staff Working Paper. Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management. SEC(2010) 1626 final. Brussels, 2010. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/civil_protection/civil/pdfdocs/prevention/COMM_PDF_SEC_2010_1626_F_staff_working_document_en.pdf [last access: 2011-06-18].</ref>. <br />
*Accordingly, uniform risk analyses based on standardised criteria to establish a Common Risk Management Framework (CRMF) should be promoted. The [http://www.vitruv-project.eu/consortium.html VITRUV] tools make an important contribution towards this. <br />
*At European level, the aim is to focus efforts and contributions for a European Risk Atlas, serving as a further basis for an adequate coherent [[All-hazard approach|all-hazard]] risk policy due to be established by 2014 (European Commission 2010). These policies and risk assessment and mapping outcomes will expectedly affect future urban planning as well as require legal adaptation of planning requirements. <br />
<br />
With respect to intentional hazards and [[threat|threats]] (above all [[urban terrorism]]) urban planning will be increasingly required to support critical infrastructure protection. Designing in and [[designing out approach|designing out approaches]] aim to reduce risk due to crime and terrorism and are important [[Crisis management cycle|mitigation]] instruments in critical infrastructure protection at an early stage of planning.<br />
<br />
Sustainable cities are also vis-à-vis [[Natural threat|natural hazards]] and global environmental change. The [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:288:0027:0034:en:pdf EU Flood Directive 2007/60/EC], entered into force on 26 November 2007, commits Member States to undertake actions on the assessment and management of flood risks. Outcomes of these assessments are expected to be integrated in future comprehensive urban and management planning .<br />
<br />
In this context, following examples from the [http://www.focusproject.eu/web/focus/home FOCUS] project<ref>FOCUS Project: FOCUS (Foresight Security Scenarios – Mapping Research to a Comprehensive Approach to Exogenous EU Roles): Deliverable 4.2: Literature and small-world study on future nature-related disasters. Retrieved from: http://www.focusproject.eu/web/focus/downloads/-/document_library_display/1QpQ/view/15032/1005?_110_INSTANCE_1QpQ_redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.focusproject.eu%2Fweb%2Ffocus%2Fdownloads%2F-%2Fdocument_library_display%2F1QpQ%2Fview%2F15032 [last access: 2013-06-17]. </ref> respectively from EU guidelines and directives also have relevance for critical infrastructure protection in urban planning from a societal security point of view: <br />
*City planning should take account of increasing frequency and intensity of heat waves by making use of and enhancing natural processes to cool the cities, such as facilitating natural circulations, be it along rivers, from mountains and valleys surrounding cities, etc., introducing more vegetation into the city (roofs, façades, parks, recreational areas, etc.).<br />
*Building standards should be adapted to assure optimal interaction with the sun (e.g. large input in winter, small input in summer e.g. through sun shades positioned outside the building); make use of natural ventilation; use the best possible materials in terms of isolation properties; etc.<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Critical_infrastructure&diff=12683Critical infrastructure2013-07-09T09:47:35Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Mobility]]<br />
[[Category:Urban environment]]<br />
[[Category:Urban object]]<br />
[[File:ae.png|25px|right|This is a page providing background in a specific field of expertise]]<br />
In the EU, '''[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_infrastructure critical infrastructures]''' (commonly abbreviated as CI) are those physical and information technology facilities, networks, services, and assets, which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, [[safety]], [[security]] and/or economic well-being of citizens or the effective functioning of societies or governments in EU Member States countries.<ref>EU: Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the Identification and Designation of European Critical Infrastructures and the Assessment of the need to Improve their Protection. Official Journal of the European Union L 345/75, 2008. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:EN:PDF [last access: 2010-10-14].</ref><br />
<br />
==Critical infrastructure protection==<br />
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_infrastructure_protection Critical infrastructure protection] (CIP) has become a major issue in civil [[security]], [[Crisis management cycle|crisis and emergency management]] and natural hazard management. The [[all-hazard approach]] has gained ground on the international scale, and the [[comprehensive approach]] in security policies and [[security research]] has been advanced in order to meet current and future [[threat|threats]] and [[risk|risks]] based on better integrated information, assessment, policies and capabilities. Basically, owners, operators and respective member states hold the responsibility for Critical Infrastructure Protection. <br />
<br />
The [http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_terrorism/l33260_en.htm European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP)]<ref>Commission of the European Communities: COM(2006) 786 final Communication from the Commission on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection. Brussels, 2006. Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0786en01.pdf [last access: 2012-05-23].</ref><ref>see also http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_terrorism/l33260_en.htm; http://www.euinfrastructure.com/article/critical-infrastructure-protection/ [last access: 2012-05-23].</ref> points out the [[all-hazard approach]] (prioritizing [[Urban terrorism|terrorism]]) and the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity, confidentiality, [[stakeholders|stakeholder]] cooperation, proportionality and sector-by-sector approach <ref>EU: Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructures and the Assessment of the need to Improve their Protection. Official Journal of the European Union L 345/75: 3, 2008. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:EN:PDF [last access: 2010-10-14]</ref>. The framework comprises the identification and designation of CI, an action plan, the establishment of a Critical Infrastructures Warning Information Network (CIWIN) and a CIP Contact and Expert Group; further the support of the member states, a contingency planning and the external dimension. The objectives to guarantee European-wide adequate and equal protection levels, minimal single points of failure, and rapid and tested recovery processes were defined earlier on <ref>Commission of the European Communities: COM(2005) 576 final. Green Paper on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (presented by the Commission),2005. Retrieved from http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf/EC_-_Green_Paper_on_CI_-_17.11.2005.pdf [last access: 2011-07-14].</ref>. Together with the EU Member States, the European Commission will develop guidelines and thresholds for criteria application. As a first step the directive addressed the energy and transport sectors differentiating sub-sectors for each (electricity, oil, gas respectively road, rail, air, inland waterways transport, ocean and short sea shipping, and ports).<br />
<br />
===European policy landscape around Critical Infrastructure Protection===<br />
[[File:CIP_EUpolicies.jpg|500px|thumb|center]]<br />
<br />
==Critical infrastructure sectors and sector designation==<br />
The concept of '''Critical Infrastructures''' (CI) and '''CI sectors''' is not self-evident. Rather, sector designation is a permanent process of awareness rising on the political level, characterised by spatial and temporal variation. It is influenced by various national trends, by the political situation, current crises, and disasters. Traditional and consensual sectors have been identified to be physical-technical infrastructures. Industrial-commercial CI sectors have evolved stepwise. By trend, multiple socio-cultural CI sectors have been only recently acknowledged to be of concern for society and added to the conventional sector spectrum.<br />
<br />
[[File:Grafik CI Sector Classification.jpg|400px|thumb|right|'''Critical infrastructure sector classification''']]<br />
<br />
Involving increasing accuracy and detailed perspectives, the process of designation is dependent on public and trans-boundary discussion and views, but also on subjective/political perception, region-specific priorities and economic values. <ref>Cf. Metzger Jan: Das Konzept Schutz kritischer Infrastrukturen hinterfragt, in: Wenger A.: Bulletin 2004 zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik, Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik,2004. Retrieved from http://kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/SSN/.../doc_6804_259_de.pdf [last access: 2011-06-09].</ref>.<br />
<br />
The EU approach so far has covered the following critical infrastructure:<br />
<br />
* Energy Installations and Networks;<br />
* Communications and Information Technologies;<br />
* Transport;<br />
* Water;<br />
* Production, Storage and Transport of Dangerous Goods;<br />
* Food;<br />
* Health Care;<br />
* Finance;<br />
* Government.<br />
<br />
The EU encourages the Member States to set up national programmes for designation and qualitative and quantitative aspects, to accomplish sector identification and dependency studies and to elaborate a common terminology, general criteria, guidelines and procedures as a first step. Further steps include identification of deficiencies, suggestions for measures and financing, the implementation of minimum protection standards and their surveillance.<br />
<br />
The EU-Directive 2008/114/EC introduces a practice to identify and designate European Critical Infrastructures (ECI), committing each Member State to designating potential ECI according to the EU-definition and according to cross-sectoral criteria (casualties, economic, and public effects), and sector specific criteria (taking into account individual sector characteristics). Further criteria to be considered, as addressed in the European Programme of Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), are geographic scope of impact (when disrupted or destroyed), severity and consequences (public, economic, environmental, political and psychological effects and public health consequences), or geographic and sector specific dependencies.<br />
<br />
== Criticality of infrastructure ==<br />
'''Infrastructure criticality''' is generally set at varying variables:<br />
*Symbolic criticality vs. systemic criticality (Metzger 2004);<br />
*Dimension-based perspective: the geographic dimension of disruption and breakdown (local to international), the magnitude (low to massive) and the time factor (short term to long term) (IRGC 2007);<br />
<br />
'''EU criteria for criticality''' (EU 2008)<ref>EU: Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the Identification and Designation of European Critical Infrastructures and the Assessment of the Need to Improve their Protection. Official Journal of the European Union L 345/75, 2008. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:EN:PDF [last access: 2010-10-14].</ref> refer to cross-cutting criteria described as:<br />
<br />
*''Casualties criterion'' (potential number of fatalities or injuries);<br />
*''Economic effects criterion'' (economic loss and/or degradation of products or services; potential environmental effects);<br />
*''Public effects criterion'' (impact on public confidence, physical suffering and disruption of daily life; including the loss of essential services).<br />
<br />
Divergence in the assessment of criticality generally results from diverging national situations and (legislative and cultural) preconditions: Are there culturally valuable goods? Are there hazardous chemical and industrial goods? Are there security facilities? In case of positive answers to such questions, these sectors usually are assessed to be critical and risk prone both in definition and in the political perception and discourse.<br />
Objective quantification and determination of criticality are doubtful. Hence, qualitative knowledge of physical [[risk|risks]] and social vulnerabilities is essential to determine indicators and factors, such as [[Social risk perception and communication of risk|risk perception]], individual cognition, political discourses, loss of trust, and public reaction to disastrous events and counter-/mitigating measures.<br />
<br />
== Perception of criticality ==<br />
The systematic analyses of citizens' perceived criticality of infrastructure and necessity to protect it is an essential component for the determination of security demands as a public good, also as related to strategic urban planning. A state of the art review leads to the following indicators for citizens’ subjective needs to provide for protection of critical infrastructure, as well as of their over-perception or under-perception of the criticality of that infrastructure.<ref>Cf. Results from the Project SFI@SFU: Development of an Austrian Centre for Comprehensive Security Research at Sigmund Freud Private University Vienna (http://www.sfi-sfu.eu) in the Austrian National Security Research Programme KIRAS, funded by the Austrian Ministry of Technology, Transport and Innovation (bmvit); Project Deliverable 2.3: ''Integrierte Risikobewertungssystematik (comprehensive risk assessment) und subjektive Schutzbedürfnisbewertung für kritische Infrastruktur'' (not published), p. 98.</ref> The determination of the perception of criticality of infrastructure and related protection requirements is not only an important subjective component, influenced by generic laws of human risk perceptions as well as by cultural features, that needs considering in sector designation and prioritisation of protective measures for built infrastructure. It is also in important factor to consider in urban planning that seeks legitimacy and public acceptance. <br />
<br />
Knowledge of such kind can, for example, help urban planners to design in protective measures that not only reflect objective vulnerability but also citizens’ security cultures. Thus, public support for urban planning that is conscious of security aspects can be enhanced and citizens’ acceptance of resulting built infrastructure enhanced. <br />
<br />
===List of indicators for assessment of subjective protection requirements of critical infrastructure===<br />
[[File:CI_perception.jpg|500px|thumb|center]]<br />
<br />
From this list of indicators, it also follows that subjective protection requirements, similar to [[Perception of (in)security|perception]], highly depend on individual level of information and knowledge. Thus, strategic urban planning should be accompanied by a full-fledged public communication strategy in addressing security aspects. Personal experience and confrontation with critical infrastructure breakdown play an essential role in citizens’ subjective perception of criticality and requirements to protect, as does the individual direct use of the respective critical infrastructure.<br />
<br />
In order to enhance citizens perception of safety in urban places various dimensions must be considered (view [[Checklists_for_dimension_consideration|Practical checklists]]).<br />
<br />
==Impact of critical infrastructure failure on citizens and society<ref>Security Research Project SFI@SFU (http://www.sfi-sfu) results</ref>==<br />
It is generally acknowledged that failure of critical infrastructure, such as malfunctions and accidents in transportation, health service, emergency care or power supply, has an impact on the social components of a system. If an infrastructure-endangering event occurs, domino effects and/or cascading effects are very likely due to interference or outages of the critical infrastructure. Since crises and disasters always take place in (social) contexts, those effects have the potential to bring different sectors of society to standstill, especially because of the multiple vulnerabilities of the social system and its indispensable connections with different critical infrastructure sectors. Beyond negative psycho-social consequences on the affected community, natural disasters or other types of critical infrastructure breakdown affect the society also from the urban planners point of view – for example through physical loss of structures, homes, entire parts of cities etc.<br />
Following an analysis of several case studies that were based on interviews with disaster victims, site investigations and questionnaire surveys<ref>Platz U.: Vulnerabilität von Logistikstrukturen im Lebensmittelhandel. Eine Studie zu den Logistikstrukturen des Lebensmittelhandels, möglichen Gefahrenquellen und den Auswirkungen verschiedener Gefahren bei einem Ereigniseintritt. Landwirtschaftsverlag Münster-Hiltrup.(Serie Band: Schriftenreihe des Bundesministeriums für Verbraucherschutz, Ernährung und Landwirtschaft : Reihe A, Angewandte Wissenschaft; 512 / ISBN-ISSN-ISMN: 3-7843-0512-1), 2006. Retrieved from http://www.ble.de/cln_099/nn_467872/SharedDocs/Downloads/03__Vorsorge/Ernaehrungsvorsorge/Literatur/Vulnerabilitaet.html#Inhalt [last access: 2011-03-31]; Picou J. S., Martin C. G.: Community Impacts of Hurricane Ivan: A Case Study of Orange Beach, Alabama. Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Social Work, University of South Alabama, 2006. Retrieved from http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/research/qr/qr190/qr190.html [last access: 2011-04-12].; Lasley C. B., Simpson D. M., Rockaway T. D., Weigel T.: Understanding Critical Infrastructure Failure: Examining the Experience of Biloxi and Gulfport Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina. Study made by: Center for Hazards Research and Policy Development, University of Louisville, 2007. Retrieved from http://hazardcenter.louisville.edu/images/Research/sgerfinalprojectworkingpaper.pdf [last access: 2011-04-11].; Queste A.: Dissertationsarbeit Vulnerabilität der Kritischen Infrastruktur Wasserversorgung gegenüber Naturkatastrophen. Universität Bielefeld, 2009. Retrieved from http://bieson.ub.uni-bielefeld.de/volltexte/2010/1635/pdf/KRITIS_queste.pdf [last access: 2011-04-11]; Birkmann J., Bach C., Guhl S., Witting M., Welle T., Schmude M.: State of the Art der Forschung zur Verwundbarkeit Kritischer Infrastrukturen am Beispiel Strom/Stromausfall. Schriftreihe Sicherheit Nr. 2 Forschungsforum Öffentliche Sicherheit, Freie Universität Berlin, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.sicherheit-forschung.de/publikationen/schriftenreihe/sr_v_v/sr_2.pdf [last access: 2011-05-12].; Lorenz D. F.: Kritische Infrastrukturen aus der Sicht der Bevölkerung. Schriftreihe Sicherheit Nr. 3 Forschungsforum Öffentliche Sicherheit, Freie Universität Berlin, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.sicherheit-forschung.de/publikationen/schriftenreihe/sr_v_v/sr_3.pdf [last access: 2011-05-04]; Verdon-Kidd D.C., Kiem A.S., Willgoose G., Haines P.: East Coast Lows and the Newcastle/Central Coast Pasha Bulker storm. Report for the National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility, Australia, 2010. Retrieved from http://www.nccarf.edu.au/sites/default/files/FINAL%202-East%20Coast%20Lows(2).pdf [last access: 2011-04-12].</ref>, different types of impact of critical infrastructure failure on citizens and society can be summarized. They also represent aspects to address in forward-looking, resilience-enhancing urban planning. It can be concluded that the complexity of the consequences from critical infrastructure failure increases with increasing citizens’ factual as well as felt dependence on that infrastructure. <br />
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===Types of impact of critical infrastucture failure on citizens and society===<br />
[[File:Grafik_Social_Imp_CI_failure.jpg|700px|thumb|center]]<br />
<br />
== Critical infrastructure protection and urban planning==<br />
[[Urban planning]] and critical infrastructure planning are inseparably linked. Hence, EU Critical Infrastructure Protection policy will inevitably have an impact on future critical infrastructure planning and, thus, urban planning.<br />
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There are several foreseeable future [[legal aspects]] that urban planning should address pre-emptively and that can be expected to have an influence on security issues. Aspects of critical infrastructure protection could be addressed in forward-looking urban planning based on the European Commission’s Staff Working Paper on Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management (European Commission 2010)<ref>European Commission: Commission Staff Working Paper. Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management. SEC(2010) 1626 final. Brussels, 2010. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/civil_protection/civil/pdfdocs/prevention/COMM_PDF_SEC_2010_1626_F_staff_working_document_en.pdf [last access: 2011-06-18].</ref>. <br />
*Accordingly, uniform risk analyses based on standardized criteria to establish a Common Risk Management Framework (CRMF) should be promoted. The [http://www.vitruv-project.eu/consortium.html VITRUV] tools make an important contribution towards this. <br />
*At European level, the aim is to focus efforts and contributions for a European Risk Atlas, serving as a further basis for an adequate coherent [[All-hazard approach|all-hazard]] risk policy due to be established by 2014 (European Commission 2010). These policies and risk assessment and mapping outcomes will expectedly affect future urban planning as well as require legal adaptation of planning requirements. <br />
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With respect to intentional hazards and [[threat|threats]] (above all [[urban terrorism]]) urban planning will be increasingly required to support critical infrastructure protection. "Designing in" and [["designing out" approach|"designing out" approaches]] aim to reduce risk due to crime and terrorism and are important [[Crisis management cycle|mitigation]] instruments in critical infrastructure protection at an early stage of planning.<br />
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Sustainable cities are also vis-à-vis [[Natural threat|natural hazards]] and global environmental change. The [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:288:0027:0034:en:pdf EU Flood Directive 2007/60/EC], entered into force on 26 November 2007, commits member states to undertake actions on the assessment and management of flood risks. Outcomes of these assessments are expected to be integrated in future comprehensive urban and management planning .<br />
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In this context following examples from the [http://www.focusproject.eu/web/focus/home FOCUS] project<ref>FOCUS Project: FOCUS (Foresight Security Scenarios – Mapping Research to a Comprehensive Approach to Exogenous EU Roles): Deliverable 4.2: Literature and small-world study on future nature-related disasters. Retrieved from: http://www.focusproject.eu/web/focus/downloads/-/document_library_display/1QpQ/view/15032/1005?_110_INSTANCE_1QpQ_redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.focusproject.eu%2Fweb%2Ffocus%2Fdownloads%2F-%2Fdocument_library_display%2F1QpQ%2Fview%2F15032 [last access: 2013-06-17]. </ref> respectively from EU guidelines and directives also have relevance for critical infrastructure protection in urban planning from a societal security point of view: <br />
*City planning should take account of increasing frequency and intensity of heat waves by making use of and enhancing natural processes to cool the cities, such as facilitating natural circulations, be it along rivers, from mountains and valleys surrounding cities, etc., introducing more vegetation into the city (roofs, façades, parks, recreational areas, etc.).<br />
*Building standards should be adapted to assure optimal interaction with the sun (e.g. large input in winter, small input in summer e.g. through sun shades positioned outside the building); make use of natural ventilation; use the best possible materials in terms of isolation properties; etc.<br />
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{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Residential&diff=12682Residential2013-07-09T09:21:12Z<p>Florian: </p>
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<div>[[Category:Urban object]]<br />
[[File:RESIDENTIAL.jpg|right|200x200px|link=]]A residential [[urban object]] is a unit which is generally zoned/designated for dwelling purposes and designed to accommodate housing facilities in which people can live.<br />
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== Description ==<br />
Residential areas, which are normally zoned as such by the relevant (city authority or municipality) development plan, are typically classified by providing varying amounts of living accommodation for people, with the amount of units and consequently the number of people living within them depending upon the prescribed density. The amount of land zoned for residential development should be in keeping with the projected population growth figures, as set out in regional strategic development documents (such as Regional Planning Guidelines).<br />
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Residential areas will generally consist of accommodation units of a number of different types: apartment schemes (medium to high density), detached or semi detached houses (low to medium density), or terraced housing (medium to high density). The character of a residential area can be heavily influenced by the mixture of tenures (owner occupier, private rental, social housing) which are available within them. All of these factors will have an influence on the security of a residential area.<br />
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===Residential building types===<br />
Residential development can encompass a wide variety of structures. For the use of this page, we divided this broad spectrum into three archetypes:<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|-<br />
! Residence type !! Description !! Icon<br />
|-<br />
| Housing estates|| Housing estates consist of detached, semi-detached and/or terraced housing, typically with some level of private open space associated with each unit.|| [[Image:Housing Estate.jpg|center|x50px|link=]]<br />
|-<br />
| Housing blocks || A housing block is made up of a rectangular layout consisting of connected residential units, often with a private open square contained within it.|| [[Image:Housing Block.jpg|center|x50px|link=]]<br />
|-<br />
| High rise housing || High rise housing consists of apartment schemes usually in excess of 6 storey's in height, although apartment schemes of lower height are common.|| [[Image:Housing High Rise.jpg|center|x50px|link=]]<br />
|}<br />
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These archetypes will never completely fit any specific situation, but are used to present the typical issues associated with these archetypical situations, to enable the reader to decide to what degree it applies to his or hers specific situation.<br />
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In the text below, any of these three icons will be used whenever a observation is specific to one or more of the above mentioned archetypes.<br />
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== Functions ==<br />
=== Social ===<br />
From the security point of view, the prior social importance of residential areas is to provide a trusted environment for citizens that enhances communal [[resilience]] while reducing [[vulnerability]]. The importance of housing is recognised in the United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, that includes 'the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate ... housing'.<ref>http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/human-rights/human-rights-practical-guidance/guidance-from-the-commission/human-rights-at-home.</ref><br />
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====Resilience-enhancing aspects====<br />
Residential land use is hugely important to a citizen's quality of life, and the standard of housing experienced by citizens will have a significant impact on overall health. Housing provides shelter, a basic human need, and privacy. The quality of housing is influenced by its size, amenities, habitability, and general liveability. The attractiveness of residential areas and the wider urban environment influences the quality of life of citizens. Those aspects are important from the societal [[security]] point of view since they have an impact on [[resilience]], at individual and collective levels, as illustrated by the following examples: <br />
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*Residential areas should provide some aspect with which citizen's may identify (be it employment or a recreational facility, etc) and offer the services/facilities that they seek. Some people, who rent property within areas, may feel less of a sense of ownership or permanency/commitment for that area.<ref>http://www.npr.org/2012/06/07/154504195/generation-rent-slamming-door-of-homeownership.</ref><br />
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*Communities with high levels of 'collective efficacy' – or high levels of cohesion and mutual trust – will be willing to intervene to challenge behaviour in a given setting and stop it from escalating. Communities with low levels of ‘collective efficacy’ (e.g. areas with a high proportion of young offenders as a result of a churning migrant population with shifting moral values, high levels of poverty, and low levels of community cohesion) will be less willing or able to intervene.<ref>Carrabine E., Cox P., Lee M., Plummer, K. and South, N. (2008) Criminology. A Sociological Introduction. 2nd Edition. London et al: Rouldedge, Chapter 8: "Crime, Place and Space"</ref> <br />
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====Vulnerability-reducing aspects====<br />
[[File:Residential_attractiveness.png|thumb|right|300px|What makes an area a good place to live?]]<br />
There are a couple of relations between the built environment of a residential area and its vulnerability from a security point of view, such as the following: <br />
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*The level of safety and security is a very important value in the perceived attractiveness of a residential area (see illustration), as residential areas provide the home base for people and their families. In addition, inadequate housing increases the risk of severe ill health and disability; it can also lead to poor mental health, lower educational attainment, unemployment, and poverty.<br />
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*Another example is that poor residential development (bad housing) can impact on children's future chances. The Shelter housing agency report 'Chance of a Lifetime' documents the powerful influence of poor housing on children's lives and shows how its destabilising impact is felt long into adulthood.<ref>Harker, Lisa (2006) Home Truths. Retrieved from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2006/sep/13/comment.guardiansocietysupplement.</ref> On every aspect of life - mental, physical, emotional, social and economic - living in bad housing can hand children a devastating legacy. Studies show that poor housing can lead to a 25 per cent higher risk of experiencing severe ill-health and disability before they reach middle age. It can have a devastating impact on emotional wellbeing. Research shows that homeless children are three to four times more likely to have mental health problems than other children,<ref>Harker, Lisa (2006) Home Truths. Retrieved from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2006/sep/13/comment.guardiansocietysupplement.</ref>while bad housing can also lead to youth behavioural problems and offences:<br />
{{quote|How does bad housing affect children’s chances to make a positive contribution in life?<br />
* Homeless children are more likely to show signs of behavioural problems such as aggression, hyperactivity, and impulsivity; <br />
* Poor housing conditions and overcrowding may also contribute to the emergence of problem behaviour;<br />
* Behavioural difficulties in childhood, which may be attributable to or exacerbated by bad housing, can manifest themselves in offending behaviour later in life. In the UK, nearly half of male remand young offenders and 42 per cent of female sentenced young offenders have experienced homelessness).<ref>http://england.shelter.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/66364/Lifechancereport.pdf</ref>.}}<br />
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====Hazard-reducing aspects====<br />
*Quality of residency also has criminological impact in that it can contribute to preventing - or creating - hazard. Evidence suggests that nearly half of young offenders have experienced homelessness as a child, and the roots of offending behaviour may well be traceable to problems that emerge when children grow up in such conditions.<ref>Harker, Lisa (2006) Chance of a lifetime. The impact of bad housing on children’s lives. Retrieved from: http://england.shelter.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/39202/Chance_of_a_Lifetime.pdf</ref><br />
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*Research has also shown that a wide range of features of the physical environment at the street block and neighborhood levels have proven relevant to predicting crime rates and crime-related outcomes, such as fear of crime and neighborhood confidence, that among other things relate to the perception of hazard.<ref>Taylor, R.B. and Harrell, A.V. (1996) Physical Environment and Crime: A Final Summary Report Presented to the National Institute of Justice </ref><br />
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In terms of practical methods, [[crime prevention by design]] - such as for example "crime prevention through [[environmental design]]" (CPTED) - is of priority in this field, although it also involves some measures directed at vulnerability reduction rather than reduction of hazard.<br />
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=== Economic ===<br />
Residential areas accommodate the people who operate in and utilise the economic systems of the urban area. Additionally, residential areas both enhance a communities’ ability to attract new business, and in the same time provide citizens with one of its most basic needs (housing). As a whole, residential land use is the most valuable urban spatial structure due to its great aggregate value and [[causes::Economic impact|economic impact]] for the local economy<ref>For example: Residential development creates direct construction activity (primary economic impact), including planning professionals, attorneys, designers, marketing, landscaping, etc.). Indirectly, residential areas create local jobs, income and taxes due to the consumption generated by residential inhabitants.</ref>. Moreover, residential areas foster critical mass which contributes to economic, social and transport (infrastructure) activities. These economic impacts can be estimated with the help of [[Economic tools|economic tools/techniques]].<br />
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The most common types of residential [[Threat|security threats]] (in terms of human intent) are crime related (e.g., domestic burglary, robbery, graffiti, assault, etc.). Crime generates [[Economic effects of crime|costs]] in anticipation of crime (e.g. locks, surveillance, etc.), as a consequence of crime (loss of property) and in response to crime (police investigation, legal system, etc.). [[Economic effects of crime#Secondary economic effects of crime|Indirectly]], crime has (amongst others) an impact on, for example, the local real estate value<ref>This regards not only violent crimes or domestic burglary, but also petty crimes such as graffiti and vandalism.</ref>.<br />
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Security devices such as locks, closed circuit television, surveillance or improved street lightning have an [[Economic impact of security measures|economic impact]] (in terms of costs and benefits) which can be considerable. Another way to enhance security is by design, e.g. the [[Designing out approach|designing out approach]], or as an aspect of [[Sustainable design|sustainable design]], which seeks a balanced consideration of social, economic, cultural and environmental aspects in urban design<ref>Including fundamental issues such as how affordability can be reconciled with a secure/safe place to live, and how an imbalance between affluence and deprivation can be prevented.</ref>. In general, these measures demand larger investments than traditional security measures, but at the same time they are able to avoid future costs due to the long-term prevention of crime. An example of home security measures:<br />
<br />
{{quote|The Association of British Insurers (ABI)<ref>Association of British Insurers (2006). ''Securing the Nation: The Case for Safer Homes''</ref> performed a cost-benefit analysis on target hardening measures for home security. The analysis was based on the estimates of the average household cost of burglary (£3,300), the average cost of Security By Design (SBD) target hardening (£630), burglary rates (average 2.7 - 6.7% range), and socio-economic demographics. The per household net present value benefit of target hardening measures was projected over 20 years, yielding benefits of over £1,170 per household. As a result, the average household benefits are nearly double the average cost of the introduced security measures.}}<br />
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=== Mobility ===<br />
The presence of large numbers of people living within one part of an urban area brings with it a requirement for mobility, in allowing them to move throughout the urban area to take advantage of the various functions on offer within its different parts.<br />
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The transportation demand in a network depends on the functions of the different zones in a network. With demand estimation models, the demand can be estimated as the expected number of trips in a certain time period for a certain modality (e.g. car, [[Modes of transport|public transport]]) between each combination of origin zone and destination zone, depending on the function of the zones. This is also called a [[Transportation system|trip market]].<br />
For a residential zone, in the morning there will be many trips going out (e.g. towards work, school), while in the afternoon there will be large demands going into the zone. This should be taken into account for operating traffic management measures or for predicting future/expected traffic flows.<br />
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Furthermore, in order to prevent crime, the mobility network should be designed such that there are as little spaces as possible that cannot be seen easily by the public. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if criminals can operate, including travelling to and from the location, without fear of being seen; and if all sides of buildings and all parts of spaces are not overlooked by surrounding users or passers-by <ref name="SaferPlaces" /> .<br />
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==== Cul-de-sacs ====<br />
Residential areas can benefit from a design that minimises transit through the area, as crime is positively related to the amount of traffic through an area and residential areas only need good entry and exit points and can function perfectly well as cul-de-sacs. <br />
Homes in cul-de-sacs can be highly secure, but the cul-de-sac should be short and straight (to allow visibility from one end to the other) and should not be joined by networks of footpaths that are irregularly used but likely to foster criminal activity <ref name="SaferPlaces"> Safer Places - the Planning System and Crime Prevention. Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, London</ref>. It should be borne in mind however that while cul-de-sacs can be beneficial from a crime-reduction perspective, many urban planners and designers do not favour their use, as they can create an introverted layout which fails to integrate with the surroundings<ref>English Partnerships and The Housing Corporation (2000) The Urban Design Compendium </ref><ref>Also discussed at: http://uctc.its.berkeley.edu/access/24/Access%2024%20-%2006%20-%20Reconsidering%20the%20Cul-de-sac.pdf</ref>.<br />
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=== Safety ===<br />
Safety in all its forms, is an important function for the perceived quality of these environments. The common presence of children in residential areas further elevate the required safety standards. However well as these environments are designed to provide safety, the safety function can be deteriorated by crime. Examples of crime deteriorating safety are:<br />
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* [[File:electricity_meter.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Vandalised electricity meters, leading to potentially unsafe situations]][[Security issue: Vandalism| Vandalism]]: destruction of safety features (such as traffic signs, fencing around dangerous areas or child-safe playgrounds) can lead to dangerous situations and safety hazards.<br />
* [[Security issue: Burglary| Burglary]] often leads to substantial damages due to the forced entry. Broken windows and doors no longer provide shelter for the cold, wind, rain, which can lead to subsequent safety hazards, such as with electricity and wet surfaces.<br />
* [[Security issue: Antisocial behaviour| Antisocial behaviour]] can for instance endanger people by generating street litter, such as broken bottles or reckless driving<br />
* [[Security issue: Drug offences| Drug offences]] can also lead to dangerous litter in the streets, such as used needles.<br />
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== Security Issues ==<br />
Crimes most relevant to residential areas, are:<br />
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* [[Security issue: Burglary| Burglary]]<br />
* [[Security issue: Vehicle theft| Vehicle theft]]<br />
* [[Security issue: Robbery| Robbery]]<br />
* [[Security issue: Assault| Assault]]<br />
* [[Security issue: Sexual assault| Sexual Assault]]<br />
* [[Security issue: Vandalism| Vandalism]]<br />
* [[Security issue: Graffiti| Graffiti]]<br />
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Of these crimes, burglary is in general regarded as the most relevant to residential areas. Burglary is a security issue that is amongst others affected by the population density. Though generally high population density is associated with high rates of assault and burglary, when corrected for the presence of poverty and lack of vegetation, rates of assaults and burglaries are higher in more sparsely populated neighbourhoods. This means that especially high-density neighbourhoods with little vegetation are prone to these issues<ref>Mary K. Wolfe, Jeremy Mennis;''Does vegetation encourage or suppress urban crime? Evidence from Philadelphia, PA''; in: Landscape and Urban Planning 108 (2012), pp 112– 122</ref>. Many traditional designed high-rise residential environments [[Image:Housing High Rise.jpg|x30px|link=]]were designed with these qualities, leading to relatively high levels of crime and a tendency for early deterioration.<br />
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== Measures ==<br />
* [[Measure: Directing traffic flows|Directing traffic flows]] can be effective both in preventing criminals to become aware of opportunities and reducing the opportunities for approach of a target. Especially housing blocks[[Image:Housing Block.jpg|x30px|link=]] and housing estates[[Image:Housing Estate.jpg|x30px|link=]] can benefit from a careful design of traffic flows, effectively reducing the 'visibility' of an area to criminals. For high-rise housing [[Image:Housing High Rise.jpg|x30px|link=]]this is less effective due the high visibility of the structure.<br />
* [[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]] can greatly increase the effort needed for criminals to enter the object and thereby reduce the attractiveness of a n object<br />
* [[measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]] can be effective against mentioned security issues, but can incur high costs if implemented as dedicated observers, either on location or remote. A more natural form of surveillance is surveillance by the inhabitants (also known as 'natural surveillance'). This can be very effective if the right conditions are met, such as adequate surveillability of the environment (from the own home), social cohesion and a sense of ownership. These factors can all be influenced by the structure of the built environment, but have proven to be most challenging to achieve in high-rise housing [[Image:Housing High Rise.jpg|x30px|link=]].<br />
* [[Measure: Intervention force|Intervention force]] is needed to make detection measures, such as alarms or surveillance effective <br />
* [[Measure: Target removal|Target removal]] such as the removal of coin operated gas and electricity meters in houses or coin operated parking meters<br />
* [[Measure: Facilitating compliance|Facilitating compliance]] can prevent littering by providing ample waste bins, it can prevent unwanted traffic flows by careful design of the mobility in an area<br />
* [[Measure: Ownership|Ownership]] is an important aspect in the prevention of unauthorized entry by creating a clear distinction between public and private space<br />
* [[Measure: Maintenance|Maintenance]] and designing for easy maintenance can be used as the removal of a crime motivator, as deterioration can be an incentive to crime<br />
* [[Measure: Removal of crime motivator|Removal of crime motivators]] ensures the separation of perpetrators , their incentives and opportunities, Such as the prevention of blank, reachable and highly visible walls to prevent graffiti.<br />
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A combination of these measures is used in the practical approach '[http://www.securedbydesign.com/professionals/guides.aspx secured by design'].<br />
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{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Mixed_use&diff=12640Mixed use2013-06-26T10:02:59Z<p>Florian: </p>
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<div>[[Category:Urban object]]<br />
[[File:Mixed Use.jpg|right|200x200px|]]A '''mixed use''' development consists of a building or group of related buildings (e.g. a scheme) which are used for more than one purpose, such as a series of retail units at ground floor level, office units at first floor level and residential apartments on upper levels.<br />
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== Description ==<br />
[[Image:Shard_tower_London.jpeg|thumb|right|300px|Shard tower, London, an example of a mixed-use building featuring offices, a restaurant, a hotel, a tourist attraction, residences and an underground station.]]A mixed use object supports by definition various uses. On one hand, this makes making generic statements about this kind of object very difficult, as various combinations of use have very different characteristics. On the other hand, the mixed structure of this object is the main feature that distinguishes it from the other types of urban objects and this feature has some specific considerations.<br />
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The fact that various functions are combined into one object type, means that these functions interact and this can lead to effects not present in uniform types of urban objects. It will be these effects we will focus on on this page.<br />
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== Function ==<br />
=== Social ===<br />
Mixed land use can enhance the vitality and perceived security of areas by increasing the number of people on the street and in public spaces at different times of the day. Mixed use development also encourages more efficient use of land and can lead to a more equitable city design, allowing for reduced travel and associated costs for residents.<br />
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Mixed use settings particularly demonstrate the high relevance of societal security as a frame of reference for identification of vulnerability and enhancement of resilience - for example, [[Vulnerability#Social.2Fcommunity_vulnerability|social/community vulnerability]] in view of the growing number of threats from global terrorism, natural disasters, or crime. Urban planning practice must therefore incorporate appropriate security measures for vulnerability identification and resilience enhancements of urban objects, including from the societal point of view. Vulnerability assessment of urban objects in particular in mixed-use settings should thus take place based on different sets of indicators, from physical to social, and across several levels of reference, from individual to cultural community. <br />
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It is important to consider that a society is not confined to the semiotics of architectural structure in perceiving and interpreting the vulnerability of its material environment as well as social and economic structure. Since design cannot alter human nature, it cannot be a direct answer to crime and insecurity. However, design can reduce insecurity and increase security by addressing the underlying causes, as well as the types of behaviour that lead to insecurity, such as crime. This behaviour has cultural roots that need to be understood and included in vulnerability assessment.<br />
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Such an assessment can be done based on:<br />
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*[[Vulnerability#Social.2Fcommunity_vulnerability|List of indicators for assessment of subjective protection requirements of critical infrastructure]];<br />
*[[Critical_infrastructure#Types_of_impact_of_critical_infrasture_failure_on_citizens_and_society|Types of impact of critical infrastructure failure on citizens and society as well as needs to protect it]];<br />
*[[Failure_of_critical_services#Societal_aspects|Societal aspects of failure of critical services]].<br />
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Aspects like those listed above show how important it is to involve citizens in related urban-object risk assessment. VITRUV identified a set of practical methods for such [[citizen participation]].<br />
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=== Economic ===<br />
Mixed use development yields economic benefits in terms of the optimum use of infrastructure (less need for vehicle use due to the small distances), increasing social interaction and thus a richer, more vibrant urban life. This type of development, however, involves higher (perceived or actual) risks for developers and investors because it is more difficult to estimate the demand of multiple types of utilities than a single use object<ref name = "MEN"> Ministry for the Environment of New Zealand. ''The Value of Mixed Use'': http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/urban/value-urban-design-summary-jun05/html/page7.html#fig1.</ref>. Like any urban development, mixed use development creates [[Economic impact|economic effects]] for the local and regional economy, and might even enhance the viability of secondary economic activity like local convenient stores<ref name="MEN"></ref>. The economic impact of mixed use development can be estimated with the help of [[Economic tools|economic tools/techniques]].<br />
<br />
With regard to security issues (see paragraph below), mixed use development has some specific issues that are depending on the specific situation. In general, crime generates [[Economic effects of crime|costs]] in anticipation of crime (e.g. locks, access control, surveillance, etc.), as a consequence of crime (loss of property) and in response to crime (police investigation, legal system, etc.). [[Economic effects of crime#Secondary economic effects of crime|Indirectly]], the above mentioned enhanced viability of secondary economic activity can more easily be reversed if one aspect of the mixed use is not functioning as intended (e.g. due to a lack of demand), increasing local crime rates, vandalism, etc<ref>As mentioned above, there is a higher risk of underutilisation of the mixed use development in comparison to single use dwellings, due to a lack of interest in certain elements of the mixed use dwelling (e.g. office space and/or residential units) which could result in partly abandoned dwellings, making an urban object more vulnerable for types of crime that are prone to lack of surveillance and low levels of security (such as burglary and vehicle theft). On top of that, more crowded places are also more vulnerable for crime types like pickpocketing and vandalism. Source: Ministry for the Environment of New Zealand. ''The Value of Mixed Use'': http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/urban/value-urban-design-summary-jun05/html/page7.html#fig1.</ref>. <br />
<br />
Security measures mitigate the negative effects of crime and terrorism, but are not without direct investment costs and more indirect economic effects, [[Economic effects of anti-crime security measures|the economic effects of security measures]]. The ‘[[Designing out approach|designing out]]’ or '[[Sustainable design|sustainable design]]' approach in the earliest stages in the planning process could be in the long run an effective measure from an economic point of view to prevent security threats and to reduce the economic damage. In general, these measures demand larger investments than traditional security measures, but at the same time they are able to avoid future costs due to the long-term prevention of crime.<br />
<br />
=== Mobility ===<br />
<br />
From the mobility perspective, mixed use zones are efficient in the sense that travelling distances between different types of destinations (work, leisure, living) are short. A relatively large part of the trips are made by pedestrians and cyclists (also called [[Traffic safety#Vulnerable road users safety|vulnerable road users]]) and [[Modes of transport#Public transport|public transport]].<br />
<br />
Another important mobility aspect of mixed use area's is parking. Each different type of destination (especially shopping) needs sufficient public parking spaces. This can be offered with street parking, parking lots, or parking garages, either paid or unpaid. Finding a parking space needs extra kilometers driven, 'cruising for parking'. When there are no free parking spaces available, this could lead to urban congestion and irritation of the drivers, which could eventually lead to [[Security issue: Assault|assault]]. Parkings have furthermore a relatively high risk for several other security issues, such as [[Security issue: Vehicle theft|vehicle theft]] and [[Security issue: Sexual assault|sexual assault]].<br />
<br />
=== Safety ===<br />
An important aspect of mixed use development is that safety requirements from one use can extend into areas with other uses. For example, the safety requirements for a transportation [[hub]] include specific requirements that normally do not apply (to the same extent) to [[residential]] areas. However, when developing an object with a mixed use of both transportation hub and residential area, one should be careful to prevent threats associated with one use to affect another use, not designed to deal with the threat, such as terrorism, which is a more likely threat for hubs than for residential areas. Access to closed-off areas by a large and unscreened group of people (such as a residential access at the back of the station) can possibly offer opportunities to terrorists that would not exist without the mixed use. Another example would be an industrial area which also serves as a node for road traffic. Although the industrial design would normally suffice to avoid excessive risks due to industrial incidents, the presence of a busy road (with not only many potential victims, but perhaps also effects for local and perhaps national mobility if closed down) can aggravate the impact to a degree that would require measures that would not be necessary if the area was used either as transport node or industrial area.<br />
<br />
== Security Issues ==<br />
A mixed use development can raise specific security issues. Analogous to the safety issues arising when uses are combined, the presence of for example a use that would be attractive for attack by fanatics with a use that would attract crowds, can lead to a security sensitive situation that far exceeds either situation apart. <br />
<br />
A mixed use area can also benefit from multiple uses, as the weakness from one use can sometimes be relieved be a second use and vice-versa. This principle is for example used in mixed commercial and residential areas, where the shops ensure a sufficient population in the street in the daytime and the residential use ensures a natural surveillance during the night time. While this can potentially reduce the risk of crime types such as burglary, robbery, graffiti, etc., its effectiveness is debated.<br />
<br />
Research<ref>[http://books.google.nl/books?id=NnZ9Hx3w77wC&pg=PA22&lpg=PA22&dq=mixed-use+crime+influence&source=bl&ots=n6sHAfoK5U&sig=KwbsMo7ojdV0-ePatfCo44ascgA&hl=nl&sa=X&ei=8_WIUeOZK4aUOO6bgOAK&ved=0CEcQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=mixed-use%20crime%20influence&f=false Paulsen, Derek J., ''Crime and planning, Building socially sustainable communities, CRC press, 2013, ISBN: 978-1-4398-7166-9'']</ref> has found that:<br />
* Property crimes and robbery victimization are more likely in mixed land-use locations.<br />
* At low levels, increasing diversity of uses increases homicide, assault, robbery, and property crime.<br />
* If density is made high enough, homicide and assault victimization decrease, but robbery victimization increases.<br />
* Territorial theory finds that residents provide better security near their homes than nonresidents.<br />
* Mixed-use developments in urban centre areas are more likely to experience lower crime than more suburban mixed use developments.<br />
* The goals of mixed use —to provide a variety of services, uses, and jobs within close proximity to residential developments— can still be securely achieved if properly designed. The key to maintaining security while promoting mixed uses is to design the uses so that they are walkable hut not so close that they produce anonymity and create surveillance holes.<br />
<br />
For the design of mixed use environments it is important to design for compatible use. For example, placing an embassy next to a day-care centre would expose the daycare centre to (a part of) the threats the embassy would face. A careful design can prevent such unwanted effects realising. Furthermore, one should realise that cities are living and evolving entities and initial designs can change in the course of time. For example, at a dual-use building of an office with internal day-care centre one would not expect excessive security risk for the day-care centre, but if the use of the office later changes to a consulate or prominent multi-national, this situation changes.<br />
<br />
There are no security issue that are specifically associated with mixed use. Rather, one should be weary of amplifying effects of security issues present from one use by another use.<br />
<br />
== Measures ==<br />
There are no measures specifically suited to counteract the effects of mixed use of an area. Basically, the measures valid for each of the uses still apply. The only way to avoid unwanted amplifying effects of security issues by mixed use is to be aware of them and to attune the design and the measures to these effects and minimise (or negate) them.<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Transportation&diff=12639Transportation2013-06-26T10:00:54Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Mobility]]<br />
[[Category:Urban object]]<br />
[[File: Trans vehicles.jpg|right|200px|Transportation|link=]][http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport '''Transportation'''] means moving objects or people from one location to another.<br />
A transportation facility is an [[urban object]] designated to facilitating the movement of people, cattle, animals and [http://en.wikipedia.org.wiki/cargo goods] from one location to another. Transportation is facilitated by [[Transport Infrastructure|transport infrastructure]].<br />
<br />
==Description==<br />
Transportation is divided into private and [[modes of transport|public transport]]. An important distinction in the type of transport is [[modes of transport|mode of transport]]. In an urban context, the most relevant modes of transport will typically operate under the following transportation objects:<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|-<br />
! Transportation network object type !! Description !! Icon<br />
|-<br />
| Road network|| A series of roads connecting the constituents parts of the urban environment and its surrounding hinterland, and urban areas with the wider region and country. The road network consists of a range of different hierarchical standards of road (e.g. single street, dual carriageway, highway/motorway, etc).|| [[Image:Roadnetwork.jpg|center|x50px|Road network|link=Road network]]<br />
|-<br />
| Rail network || The rail network consists of the infrastructure connecting population nodes through a series of rail corridors. The rail network facilitates public transportation services, including train, metro and tram services. || [[Image:Railnetwork.jpg|center|x50px|Rail network|link=Rail network]]<br />
|-<br />
| [[Hub]]s ||A transport hub is a connection point in the wider transport network where the public can change transport modes. Hubs include stations [[Image:Station.jpg|border|x30px|Station|link=Hub#Stations]] for train, metro and tram systems, or sea/air ports [[Image:Port.jpg|border|x30px|Port|link=Hub#Port]] for water or air transport to change modality.|| [[Image:transporthub.jpg|center|x50px|Hubs|link=Hub]]<br />
|}<br />
<br />
Transport is important since it enables trade between peoples, which in turn establishes civilizations.<br />
<br />
Transport plays an important part in economic growth and globalization, but most types cause [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_pollution air pollution] and [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use use large amounts of land]. Good planning of transport is essential to make traffic flow, and restrain [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urban_sprawl urban sprawl].<br />
<br />
However, transportation is generally very vulnerable for security threats. It is an attractive target because of its importance in society and the presence of large amounts of people or [[Crowd|crowds]].<br />
<br />
== Functions ==<br />
<br />
=== Social ===<br />
High quality transport links ensure that communities can access basic services, facilities, and employment opportunities. The connectivity provided by such links promotes social inclusion can reduce social isolation and ultimately enhance quality of life.<br />
<br />
From the social point of view, vulnerability assessment and deriving of resilience requirements for urban planning is a complex process in the case of transportation infrastructure. This is so because common indicators point into different directions based on the following checklists: <br />
*[[Vulnerability#Social.2Fcommunity_vulnerability|List of indicators for assessment of subjective protection requirements of critical infrastructure]];<br />
*[[Critical_infrastructure#Types_of_impact_of_critical_infrasture_failure_on_citizens_and_society|Types of impact of critical infrastructure failure on citizens and society and needs to protect it]];<br />
*[[Failure_of_critical_services#Societal_aspects|Societal aspects of failure of critical services]].<br />
<br />
For example, citizens can perceive direct benefit of transportation infrastructure, which should increase felt risks to urban infrastructure and needs to protect. However, transportation is an infrastructure that allows to considerable extent for perception of own capability to control the infrastructure. This should decrease citizens’ felt risks to that infrastructure and needs to protect, including reduced acceptance levels for security-enhancing measures in urban planning. At the same time, the high degree of exposure to transportation infrastructure should again increases citizens’ felt risks to urban infrastructure and needs to protect, as well as felt individual dependence on transportation infrastructure. <br />
This makes it important to involve citizens in related urban-object risk assessment. VITRUV identified a set of practical methods for such [[citizen participation]].<br />
<br />
=== Economic ===<br />
Transportation is a crucial component of every economy since it enables the transport of resources from one location to the other, enabling people and societies as a whole to produce welfare. Transported resources can range from material objects such as natural resources and manufactured products to labour, knowledge and skills in the form of people.<ref>NPTEL (2007). Chapter 3. Role of Transportation in Society.</ref>. Efficient transport systems provide economic and social benefits such as a better accessibility to markets, employment, knowledge (schools) and investors. These benefits are the result of a reduction in transportation costs and lead to [[Primary economic impact|direct economic impacts]] which can be measured in terms of employment, added value, investment costs, etc. Note, however, that these transportation costs are not just the result of physical infrastructure such as roads and airports, but also of many other different kind of obstacles such as tariffs, language and culture barriers<ref>Brakman, S., H. Garretsen and C. van Marrewijk (2001). An introduction to geographical economics.</ref>. The [[Economic impact|economic impact]] of transportation extends in most cases beyond these direct effects due to the further rounds of economic activity as a result of the transportation of goods, the so-called [[Secondary economic impact|indirect economic effects]]. Transportation, however, also has a social and an environmental impact, which is not in all cases positive. Congestion, traffic accidents, environmental pollution and land consumption are well-known examples of these social or external effects of transportation. <br />
<br />
The economic impact of transportation can be assessed from both a macroeconomic perspective and a micro-economic perspective<ref>Macroeconomics is the branch of economics dealing with an economy as a whole, rather than individual markets and persons. Micro-economics studies the behaviour of individual households, firms and organisations while dealing with scarcity.</ref>with the help of [[Economic tools|economic tools]] such as the [[Social cost-benefit analysis|social cost-benefit analysis]] in case investments in transportation have to be appraised. At the micro-economic level, transportation is linked to the costs of transportation for individual agents, while at a macroeconomic level the importance of transportation for an economy as a whole is assessed<ref>J.P. Rodrique & T. Notteboom (2013). The Geography of Transport Systems. 3rd Edition.</ref>.<br />
The economic impact of transportation is directly linked to the location of an urban object/environment. Locations with low levels of accessibility such as cities surrounded by mountains tend to have higher costs for many goods and services, limiting the welfare of individuals and society. <br />
<br />
In general, security threats will have a negative effect on the mobility of individuals, and in extreme cases on the mobility of a society as whole. As a result, the positive economic impact of an efficient transportation system will be partly reversed (the [[Economic impact of security threats|economic impact of security threats]]). Security measures such as directing traffic flows and access control, can reduce these negative impacts, but can also have a negative impact on the efficiency of transportation networks, also referred to as the [[Economic impact of security measures|economic impact of security measures]].<br />
<br />
=== Mobility ===<br />
[[Mobility]] enables transportation. It is obvious that mobility is very important for the daily life of humans and as such, the continuity of the traffic should be guaranteed. Mobility is fundamental to economic and social activities. In developed and developing nations, a large fraction of people travel daily for work, shopping and social reasons. More information can be found on the [[mobility]] page. <br />
<br />
Transportation can either mean transportation of people or transportation of goods. <br />
For the first, different [[Modes of transport|modes of transport]] are available, such as [[Modes of transport#Road transport|road transport]] ([[Modes of transport#Walking|walking]], [[Modes of transport#Cycling|cycling]], [[Modes of transport#Automobile|car driving]], [[Modes of transport#Bus|buses]]) and [[Modes of transport#Rail transport|rail transport]]. Important for passenger transport is also [[Modes of transport#Public transport|public transport]]. Especially public transport has a high security risk. The past decades have shown the vulnerability of the public transport system for terrorist attacks by several tragic incidents, e.g. the 2004 Madrid train bombings<ref name="ftn1">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004_Madrid_train_bombings</ref>, the 2010 Moscow Metro bombings<ref name="ftn2">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Moscow_Metro_bombings</ref>, and several attacks on the London Underground<ref name="ftn3">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attacks_on_the_London_Underground</ref>.<br />
<br />
The transportation of goods is called [[Modes of transport#Freight transport and logistics|freight transport and logistics]]. It concerns the distribution of goods from the source to their destination, such as warehouses or terminals for further distribution to e.g. shops. This can involve different modes of transport as well. <br />
<br />
Transportation is facilitated by its [[Road network|road network]], [[Rail network|rail network]] and the [[Hub|hubs]].<br />
<br />
=== Safety ===<br />
Specific safety issues in transportation objects concern mainly [[traffic safety]].<br />
<br />
== Security Issues ==<br />
Security issues associated with transportation objects, are related with the fact that it can be an [[attractive object]] for fanatics. This is related with the fact that many transportation objects government assets have public access areas with a high volume of transiting people and with the public attention an attack to a public transportation node will draw. Also, transportation nodes are places with crowds and distracted people, often with valuable luggage. The presence of a high volume of travellers makes graffiti visible to a large audience. This makes these kinds of urban objects vulnerable for the following security issues:<br />
* [[Security issue: Destruction by fanatics| Destruction by fanatics]]<br />
* [[Security issue: Mass killing| Mass killing]]<br />
* [[Security issue: Pickpocketing| Pickpocketing]]<br />
* [[Security issue: Robbery|Robbery]]<br />
* [[Security issue: Grafitti|Graffiti]]<br />
<br />
== Measures ==<br />
The measures for each type of security issue can be found on the respective pages. There are few measures they are specifically suited or unsuited to this kind of urban object, but some general considerations can be mentioned:<br />
<br />
* Transportation objects in general know a very high transitory flow. This makes entry/exit control or even screening of visitors often very difficult or even impossible. Airports, which do feature entrance/exit control, can afford to do so due to the relative long boarding times (hours instead of minutes for a metro or bus), and the relative high travel costs (hundreds of euros instead of a few euros per passenger).<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Utilities&diff=12638Utilities2013-06-26T09:58:46Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Urban object]]<br />
[[File:UtilitiesIcon.jpg|right|200x200px|link=]] Utilities are [[urban object|urban object]]s that form [[critical infrastructure|critical infrastructure]]s, needed for maintaining the essential support for sustaining the standard of living. <br />
<br />
==Description==<br />
Utilities in an urban context are formed by facilities for:<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|-<br />
! Utility type !! Description !! Icon<br />
|-<br />
| Water|| Utilities providing essential drinking water services to the different land uses within the urban environment, including residential, commercial, and industrial sectors. Such utilities and the associated infrastructure are often owned and managed by the state, with day-to-day maintenance coordinated by the local authority or muncipality. || [[Image:Utilities water.jpg|center|x50px|Water utilities|link=]]<br />
|-<br />
| Waste || Utilities to facilitate the treatment of wastewater and sewage from residential, commercial and other premises throughout the urban environment and surrounding hinterland (more rural locations may have individual domestic systems). Such utilities are often highly sensitive to the environment and must be carefully planned and designed.|| [[Image:Utilities waste.jpg|center|x50px|Waste utilities|link=]]<br />
|-<br />
| Energy || Electricity, fuel and gas utilities that generate, transmit and/or distribute to all urban objects. Energy provision is an essential requirement for a functioning society and economy. || [[Image:Utilities energy.jpg|center|x50px|Energy utilities|link=]]<br />
|}<br />
<br />
As can be seen from the table above, within Urban Securipedia, the utilities that are focussed on are water[[Image:Utilities water.jpg|border|x30px|Utilities water|link=]], waste[[Image:Utilities waste.jpg|border|x30px|Utilities waste|link=]] and energy utilities[[Image:Utilities energy.jpg|border|x30px|Utilities energy|link=]], while transportation networks [[Image:Trans vehicles.jpg|border|x30px|Transportation|link=Transportation]] are described under a unique category of [[urban object|urban object]]. Urban Securipedia also has dedicated pages on public health and government services (see: [[Image:PUBLIC SERVICES AND FACILITIESicon.jpg|border|x30px|Public services and facilities|link=Public services and facilities]])<br />
<br />
==Functions==<br />
<br />
===Social===<br />
Failure of utilities-related infrastructure can result in severe social and cultural consequences:<br />
<br />
*[[Critical_infrastructure#Types_of_impact_of_critical_infrastructure_failure_on_citizens_and_society|Types of impact of critical infrastructure failure on citizens and society as well as needs to protect it]]<br />
*[[Failure_of_critical_services#Societal_aspects|Societal aspects of failure of critical services]]<br />
<br />
Urban planning practice must therefore incorporate appropriate security measures for [[vulnerability]] identification and [[resilience]] enhancement, including from the societal point of view. Vulnerability assessment should take place based on different sets of indicators, from physical to social, and across several levels of reference, from individual to cultural community. <br />
<br />
We know for example that citizens' felt risks to urban infrastructure and needs to protect can be influenced by the ownership structure (public vs. private owners; domestic/foreign owners).<ref>Cf. Coppola, D.P.: Introduction to International Disaster Management. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007, pp. 164-166.</ref> This is an aspect of general [[Critical_infrastructure#Types_of_impact_of_critical_infrasture_failure_on_citizens_and_society|types of impact of critical infrastructure failure on citizens and society and needs to protect it]]. Moreover, utilities can also be associated with citizens' perception of individual dependence, which can increase their perception of risks to related infra-structure and needs to protect it.<ref>Cf. Slovic, P./Fischhoff, B./Lichtenstein, S.: Facts and Fears: Societal Perception of Risk. In: Monroe, K.B./Abor, A. (eds.): Advances in Consumer Research, Vol. 8 (1981), pp. 497-502. Retrieved from: http://www.acrwebsite.org/volumes/display.asp?id=5844.</ref> <br />
<br />
Therefore, related risk assessment for urban planning should identify related levels of risk perception at the level of the citizens as the end-users of urban utilities. VITRUV identified a set of practical methods for such [[citizen participation]].<br />
<br />
===Economic===<br />
Since most of the utility services (e.g. water, waste, energy) are essential for the quality of life, they are integral to household, commercial and industrial productivity, and hence the creation of welfare. Utilities create direct economic impact as a result of the production of utility goods, but also have an direct and indirect impact on the urban environment in terms of land use, habitat fragmentation, noise and smell generation, air pollution, a change in the quality of surface water, etc. These effects have also [[Economic impact|economic impacts]].<br />
<br />
Utilities have to deal with several security issues, ranging from theft, vandalism, assaults, and the looming threat of terrorism. Especially large scale criminal and terrorist threats can cause catastrophic [[Economic impact of security threats|economic damage]] since so many individuals and companies depend on it. Most utility infrastructure, however, is many years old, and is not built with today’s security in mind. Hence, if there is one type of urban object that can use serious security measures, it is utilities, and due to the integral role with economic productivity in the urban environment, these security measures have a large [[Secondary economic impact|indirect]] economic impact, the so-called [[Economic impact of security threats|economic impact of security threats]]. In addition, due to the need of space, utilities are in many cases located in the more remote areas of a city, creating specific security issues.<br />
<br />
===Mobility===<br />
Most utilities are located in remote areas. <br />
The peripheral location of many utilities will often dictate their mobility requirements; most visitors will come by car as people may not have the same public transport mode availability of employees working in more central or well served locations, which may generate a significant amount of congestion. Congestion may cause a higher safety and security risk, as explained [[Traffic management#congestion|here]]. <br />
<br />
Some utilities will require [[accessibility]] of [[Modes of transport#heavy duty vehicles|heavy duty vehicles]] and transport of hazardous goods. Transportation of hazardous goods causes particular security risks, since hazardous goods can harm people (by definition) if they are released. Hazardous goods are for example radioactive, flammable, explosive, or toxic. "HazMat teams" are personnel specially trained to handle dangerous goods [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dangerous_goods]. There are several sets of regulations covering aspects of the transport of hazardous substances <ref>http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/staff/policy/healthandsafety/publications/transportofhazardoussubstancesguidance/</ref>.<br />
<br />
===Safety===<br />
Some utilities contribute directly to the safety, welfare and well-being of people. In this case, the object is said to belong to the [[critical infrastructure]]. For all of included utility types water[[Image:Utilities water.jpg|border|x30px|Utilities water|link=]], waste[[Image:Utilities waste.jpg|border|x30px|Utilities waste|link=]] and energy utilities[[Image:Utilities energy.jpg|border|x30px|Utilities energy|link=]] this is true. Disruption of these services can result in unsafe situations, such as drinking contaminated water, unsanitary conditions or no protection from the cold because heater do not work without electricity.<br />
<br />
==Security issues==<br />
Security issues associated with utilities, are amongst others related with the fact that it can be an [[attractive object]] for fanatics. This is due to the potential of critical infrastructure to magnify the effect of an attack. This makes these kinds of urban objects vulnerable for the following security issues:<br />
* [[Security issue: Destruction by fanatics]]<br />
<br />
'''See if the below is surplus of requirments'''<br />
<br />
* Public utilities have long been recognised as being vulnerable to acts of terrorism and sabotage. Security and safety features are thus routinely incorporated in the design of construction and enhancement projects. This can include components such as: perimeter fencing, interior and exterior lighting, channelizing ingress and egress access points, fire suppression equipment, chemical leak detectors, smoke detectors, intrusion alarms, turbidity, chemical dosimeters, real time monitoring of systems and functions, and other process variables. However traditional security mechanisms may no longer be sufficient to protect utilities from the modern threats of today. <br />
* Threats to be considered in the planning processes to protect our utilities/critical infrastructure should include cyber attacks, chemical contamination, biological contamination, physical destruction, and devolution of organizational functions/operational capacity.<ref>‘NATIONAL SECURITY AND HOMELAND SECURITY - PROTECTING UTILITIES’ [Internet] Available at: http://www.firestorm.com/Blog/national-security-and-homeland-security-protecting-utilities.html Accessed 14/3/13</ref><br />
<br />
==Measures==<br />
The measures for each type of security issue can be found on the respective pages. There are few measures they are specifically suited or unsuited to this kind of urban object, but some general considerations can be mentioned:<br />
<br />
As utilities are closed areas, the flows in and out the area can be strictly controlled if needed.<br />
* [[Measure: Ownership| Ownership]] is required for the public to be aware to enter private space and know to act accordingly.<br />
* [[Measure: Access control| Access control]] is closely related to ownership and one of the most rudimentary measures as it ensures the possibility to determine who does and who does not get access to the premise. It is usually enforced by having a dynamic gate (for vehicles, pedestrians, bicyclists, etc.) with a guard at hand or electronically present.<br />
* [[Measure: Screening| Screening]] is a measure that can be employed supporting access control. By screening your visitors, a more rigid access control can be enforced.<br />
* [[Measure: Directing traffic flows| Directing traffic flows]] can be employed to ensure only the expected kind of traffic enters via the entrances. Examples of directing traffic flows for industry locations are fences around the premises, creating separate routes for visitors and delivery, creating separate entrances for trusted visitors, personnel and deliveries or creating low passages to separate passenger cars from trucks.<br />
* [[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]] can greatly increase the effort needed for criminals to enter the object and thereby reduce the attractiveness of an object. Target hardening is especially effective in combination with detection measures, such as alarms or surveillance and intervention force. The object of target hardening is to delay the crime long enough to be detected and intervened upon by a intervention force. A target which - in the perception of the criminal - is hardened to a level that entry is not likely before detection and intervention, is not attractive.<br />
* [[measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]] can be effective against security issues, but can incur high costs if implemented as dedicated observers, either on location or remote. A more natural form of surveillance is surveillance by the inhabitants (also known as 'natural surveillance'), provided that the commercial area is inhabited and the inhabitants have a good surveillability.<br />
* [[Measure: Intervention force|Intervention force]] is needed to make detection measures, such as alarms or surveillance effective. <br />
<br />
For an optimal security policy all aspects of security should be coherently considered in the security strategy. This means that physical/procedural/organisational security measures should be coordinated with cyber/information security and personnel security. If this coordination is not assured, security gaps and overlaps can occur in the security regime, both of which can be detrimental to the level of security. <br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Social_facilities,_open_and_civic_space&diff=12637Social facilities, open and civic space2013-06-26T09:56:41Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[File:AMENITY,_OPEN_AND_CIVIC_SPACE.jpg|right|200x200px|link=]]Social facilities, open and civic space are [[urban object]]s which provide for the recreational requirements of an urban area, its citizens, workers and visitors.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
The following archetypes are used within Urban Securipedia to represent social facilities, open and civic space:<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|-<br />
! Type of social location !! Description !! Icon<br />
|-<br />
| Open and civic space||Within Urban Securipedia, open and civic space includes: the '''public realm'''[[Image:Aminity public realm.jpg|border|x30px|Public realm|link=Open and civic space]] - Defined as public space including streets, pathways, parks, publicly accessible open spaces and any public/civic building and facilities; '''urban squares''' [[Image:Urban square.jpg|border|x30px|Urban squares|link=Open and civic space]] - A planned open public space, usually rectangular in shape with clearly defined borders. These locations usually have significant footfall as public meeting places, concerts, markets or public rallies; and, '''public parks and recreation space'''[[Image:Public Park.jpg|border|x30px|Public Parks and recreation space|link=Open and civic space]] - Recreational space in the urban environment encompasses those areas which are publicly accessible and conducive to citizens refreshing their mind or body through passive or active activity. Recreation space can broadly be grouped as formal (e.g. playing fields, tennis courts, etc), informal (e.g. city parks, linear river walks, incidental open space within residential schemes, etc) and children's playing space (e.g. playgrounds). || [[Image:OPEN_AND_CIVIC_SPACE.jpg|center|x50px|Open and civic space|link=Open and civic space]]<br />
|-<br />
<br />
|-<br />
| Community centres and sports facilities || This type of [[urban object]] includes all facilities where large crowds may be present for social or recreational activities, and arenas or stadia, etc, in which sports activity and competition takes place. || [[Image:Sport facility.jpg|center|x50px|Community centres and sports facilities|link=]]<br />
|-<br />
| Religious or cultural || 'Religious' [[urban object|urban objects]] include religious worship and education spaces, and associated administration spaces. Collectively these facilities hold a sacred atmosphere of religious worship. A typical example would be a church or cathedral. 'Cultural' facilities are classed as any building/structure used for activities promoting the arts, such as a museum or gallery. Within Urban Securipedia, both types are classed as one, given their similarities, not least the fact that they may attract medium sized crowds at specific occasions. || [[Image:Church.jpg|center|x50px|Religious or cultural facilities|link=]]<br />
|-<br />
| Public monuments || These [[urban object|urban objects]] are used to commemorate a person or significant event in the city or national history (and therefore have a certain symbolic value, and are potentially an inherent target for criminals) || [[Image:AmenityMonument.jpg|center|x50px|Public monuments|link=]]<br />
|}<br />
<br />
Social facilities, open and civic space are generally provided for the community of an urban area to fulfil a range of requirements for the residents and citizens of urban areas, primarily in the field of supporting recreation and social functions. Some of the facilities, gathered under the term 'open and civil space' are designed to also fulfil the function of connecting different parts of the urban area which allow people to move freely between them (civic space, the public realm[[Image:Aminity public realm.jpg|border|x30px|Public realm|link=Open and civic space]], and urban squares[[Image:Urban square.jpg|border|x30px|Urban squares|link=Open and civic space]]), and areas for recreational purposes (amenity and open space such as public parkland[[Image:Public Park.jpg|border|x30px|Public Park|link=Open and civic space]]). Other social facilities, like Facilities for religious or cultural requirements[[Image:Church.jpg|border|x30px|Religious and cultural facilities|link=]]), Public monuments [[Image:AmenityMonument.jpg|border|x30px|Public monuments|link=]] and Community centres and sports facilities[[Image:Sport facility.jpg|border|x30px|Community centres and sports facilities|link=]] usually do not support this additional function.<br />
<br />
== Functions ==<br />
<br />
=== Social ===<br />
In the case of social facilities, open and civic space, societal security should be a natural frame of reference for identification of vulnerability and enhancement of resilience. <br />
<br />
Social facilities, open and civic space, when properly designed and maintained can play an important local role in bringing communities together, hardening them against harm. As a meeting place, these spaces can promote social cohesion, shape the cultural identity of an area, and provide a sense of place for local communities. However, bringing many people together in one place can also increase vulnerability. <br />
<br />
In particular for this type of urban objects, urban planning practice must therefore incorporate appropriate security measures for vulnerability identification and resilience enhancements, including from the societal point of view. Vulnerability assessment should thus take place based on different sets of indicators, from physical to social, and across several levels of reference, from individual to cultural community. <br />
<br />
We know, for example, that citizens' felt risks to urban infrastructure and needs to protect can be influenced according to ownership structure (public vs. private owners; domestic/foreign owners).<ref>Cf. Coppola, D.P.: Introduction to International Disaster Management. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007, pp. 164-166.</ref> This is an aspect of general [[Critical_infrastructure#Types_of_impact_of_critical_infrasture_failure_on_citizens_and_society|types of impact of critical infrastructure failure on citizens and society and needs to protect it]]. Another aspect is that social facilities, open and civic space can also be associated with perception of own capability to control the infrastructure, which decreases citizens' felt risks to urban infrastructure and needs to protect.<ref>Cf. Slovic, P./Fischhoff, B./Lichtenstein, S.: Facts and Fears: Societal Perception of Risk. In: Monroe, K.B./Abor, A. (eds.): Advances in Consumer Research, Vol. 8 (1981), pp. 497-502. Retrieved from: http://www.acrwebsite.org/volumes/display.asp?id=5844.</ref> <br />
<br />
Vulnerability assessment and reduction in urban planning should thus involve awareness building, at the same time appreciating citizens' views as those of the end-users of such type of urban objects. VITRUV identified a set of practical methods for [[citizen participation]] that can serve these objectives.<br />
<br />
=== Economic ===<br />
Providing the urban environment with goods and services such as recreation, tourism, cultural inheritage, food, drinking water, and safety against natural threats, social facilities, open and civic space are major contributors to the public well being, and, therefore create a positive [[economic impact]] such as:<br />
* A positive contribution to property value of land and real estate; e.g. to attract business and industry to a region.<br />
* Avoided costs for public authorities due to the environmental services such as waste water disposal, filtering of drinking water, etc.<br />
* Economic spin-off of recreation and tourism.<br />
* Jobs for the management and the upkeep of the open space.<br />
<br />
Moreover, social facilities, open and civic space can be regarded as a public asset that in time will increase in value, in contrast to many other urban developments. The economic impacts can be estimated with the help of [[Economic tools|economic tools/techniques]]. However, some of these benefits are not easy to measure though and one easily double-counts effects.<br />
<br />
Most of the [[Threat|security threats]] are crime related (e.g., vandalism, assault, robbery, etc.). Crime generates [[Economic effects of crime|costs]] in anticipation of crime (e.g. locks, surveillance, etc.), as a consequence of crime (loss of property) and in response to crime (police investigation, legal system, etc.). [[Economic effects of crime#Secondary economic effects of crime|Indirectly]], crime has (amongst others) an impact on, for example, the local real estate value in the area around the open and civic space<ref>There can be a negative effect on real estate value, especially for single family dwellings due to the potential negative externalities that may surround social facilities, open and civic space, for example, criminal activities in the evenings in public parks. Source: Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urban_open_space</ref>. Security measures can reduce these negative impacts, but can also have a negative impact on the urban environment, also referred to as the [[Economic impact of security measures|economic impact of security measures]]. The ‘[[Designing out approach|designing out]]’ or '[[Sustainable design|sustainable design]]' approach in the earliest stages in the planning process could be in the long run an effective measure from an economic point of view to prevent security threats and to reduce the economic damage. In general, these measures demand larger investments than traditional security measures, but at the same time they are able to avoid future costs due to the long-term prevention of crime.<br />
<br />
=== Mobility ===<br />
Good [[Accessibility|access]] (including sufficient parking spaces) encourages use of social facilities. [[Modes of transport#Public transport|public transport]] is often encouraged by facilitating with good public transport options, such as the proximity of bus, metro or train stations.<br />
<br />
The scale of open space should be aligned with the level of attraction and accessibility (e.g. a large regional park should be proximate to a major transport interchange to facilitate use and visitation by large numbers).<br />
<br />
For large facilities such as [[Arenas and Sports Stadia|sports stadia]] that can attract large [[Crowd|crowds]] (travelling by all [[Modes of transport|modes]]), event management[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Event_management] and [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crowd_control crowd control] can be applied.<br />
<br />
=== Safety ===<br />
Most generic safety requirements are also of importance for Social facilities, open and civic space. As social facilities will typically involve gatherings of people, they can sometimes be very busy. The ability for the people to get to safety in time in the event of an incident ([[Evacuation Management]]) can therefore be an important safety aspect.<br />
<br />
Safety in all its forms, is an important function for the perceived quality of these environments. The presence of children in open and civic space further, such as open and civic space[[Image:OPEN_AND_CIVIC_SPACE.jpg|border|x30px|Open and civic space|link=Open and civic space]] elevate the required safety standards. As these facilities would often provide also the function of connecting different parts of the urban area, [[traffic safety]] would also be relevant.<br />
<br />
== Security Issues ==<br />
Security issues facing social facilities, open and civic space vary depending on the nature and function of the space. Social facilities face different threats. Facilities which attract large crowds such as stadia or arenas provide target rich destinations for terrorists, while cultural facilities such as museums or galleries, and religious spaces, can face security issues such as vandalism and theft.<br />
Crimes most relevant to social facilities, open and civic space, are:<br />
<br />
* [[Security issue: Vandalism| Vandalism]] and [[Security issue: Graffiti| Graffiti]]: These security issues are related to the fact that social facilities are highly publicly accessible and highly visible. Especially at places where young people gather, such as open and civic space[[Image:OPEN_AND_CIVIC_SPACE.jpg|border|x30px|Open and civic space|link=Open and civic space]] and in places with competitive situations, such as community centres and sports facilities[[Image:Sport facility.jpg|border|x30px|Community centres and sports facilities|link=]] this issue is most prominent.<br />
* [[Security issue: Pickpocketing| Pickpocketing]] can be a problem in locations where people tend to gather and be packed close together, especially when these places are busy and distractive, such as community centres and sports facilities[[Image:Sport facility.jpg|border|x30px|Community centres and sports facilities|link=]] or some kinds of public monuments [[Image:AmenityMonument.jpg|border|x30px|Public monuments|link=]].<br />
* [[Security issue: Robbery| Robbery]] has a higher rate of occurring in locations like parks, fields and playgrounds[[Image:OPEN_AND_CIVIC_SPACE.jpg|border|x30px|Open and civic space|link=Open and civic space]]<ref>[http://www.popcenter.org/problems/street_robbery/ Monk Khadija M., Heinonen Justin A. and Eck John E., '''Street Robbery''', Problem-Oriented Guides for Police, Guide No. 59, April 2010]</ref>.<br />
* [[Security issue: Assault| Assault]] can be a problem at locations with competitive situations, such as community centres and sports facilities[[Image:Sport facility.jpg|border|x30px|Community centres and sports facilities|link=]], especially when they are busy<ref name="Celebratory riots">U.S. Department of Education’s, ''Report of the Proceedings'', National Conference Addressing Issues Related to Celebratory Riots, November 20–21, 2003</ref>.<br />
* Antisocial behaviour<br />
* [[Security issue: Destruction by riots| Destruction by riots]] can be a problem at locations that know competitive situations, such as community centres and sports facilities[[Image:Sport facility.jpg|border|x30px|Community centres and sports facilities|link=]], especially if also alcohol is used.<br />
* [[Security issue: Mass killing| Mass killing]] is a possibility at any location where large crowds are gathered, especially if the location also adds to the symbolic value of a terrorist act.<br />
<br />
== Measures ==<br />
The measures for each type of security issue can be found on the respective pages. There are few measures that are specifically suited or unsuited to this kind of urban object, but some general considerations can be mentioned:<br />
<br />
* [[Measure: Ownership| Ownership]] is required for the public to be aware of what would and would not be allowed and facilitates them to act accordingly.<br />
* [[Measure: Access control| Access control]] can be used to disallow access to particular (vulnerable) parts of the area or location or at particular times. It can serve to set clear boundaries and establish a sense of ownership.<br />
* [[Measure: Screening| Screening]] would often be inappropriate for social facilities, but can in particular locations be employed supporting access control. By screening visitors, a more rigid access control can be enforced.<br />
* [[Measure: Directing traffic flows| Directing traffic flows]] can be employed to ensure only the expected kind of traffic enters via the entrances. Some examples of directing traffic flows for social facilities, open and civic spaces are: limiting the number of accesses to a playground or park, provide turnstile accesses at museums or monuments or providing clearly defined walkways to and from the locations.<br />
* Intelligence can be used to detect increasing risk by fanatics.<br />
* [[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]] can be used to increase the effort to commit vandalism or graffiti. An other form of target hardening can also be employed to delay the effect of riots to the point when sufficient intervention force can be employed.<br />
* [[measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]] can be effective against vandalism or graffiti or even celebratory riots<ref name ="Celebratory riots"/> when perpetrators can be detected and corrected fast enough.<br />
* [[Measure: Intervention force|Intervention force]] is needed to make detection measures, such as alarms or surveillance effective. <br />
<br />
'''BELOW MAY BE SURPLUS TO REQUIREMENTS:'''<br />
<br />
Crime prevention measures for social facilities, open and civic space will vary depending on the type and function of public space. Generally mechanisms can include opportunity reduction approaches which focus on reducing the situational, physical or environmental opportunities for crime. The main mechanisms employed here can include:<br />
* Planning and design measures (e.g. the promotion of natural surveillance, enhanced public lighting, controlled access and exit points)<br />
* Situational strategies (e.g., graffiti reduction measures)<br />
* Use or threat of coercion to deter offenders (e.g., targeted policing)<ref>White, R (1998) PUBLIC SPACES AND COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION. Available at: http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/conferences/urban/white.pdf </ref><br />
<br />
Large scale public facilities such as sports stadia or arenas which attract large crowds require different security approaches. Various plans should be prepared including an overall security plan based on a risk assessment, a search plan, and other contingency plans such as an evacuation plan. As is required with important cultural spaces (museums, galleries etc.) entrance and exit points should also be controlled with visible security presence. For museums and galleries, the ideal door type is a rotating door which can be locked suddenly. <ref>National Counter Terrorism Security Office (2011) ‘Counter Terrorism Protective Security Advice for Stadia and Arenas’ [Internet] Available at: http://nactso-dev.co.uk/system/cms/files/121/files/original/Stadia___Arenas_2011.pdf Accessed: 14/3/13</ref><br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Public_services_and_facilities&diff=12636Public services and facilities2013-06-26T09:54:35Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Urban object]]<br />
[[File:PUBLIC SERVICES AND FACILITIESicon.jpg|right|200x200px|link=]]'''Public services and facilities''' are [[urban object|urban object]]s designated to fulfil supportive functions related to the health and well-being of the citizens of a modern society or urban area. <br /><br />
<br />
The provision of public services and facilities in the urban environment thus has a significant impact on the quality of<br />
life that residents and others enjoy. Good quality local public services, including education and training opportunities, health care and community facilities, are identified as one of the key elements for a Sustainable Communities Plan connecting with crime reduction and community safety<ref name="saferplaces">Safer Places - The Planning System and Crime Prevention (2004). Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.</ref>.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
Public services and facilities play an essential role in providing support services to create viable,sustainable, healthy and cohesive communities,overcoming social barriers and raising achievement. <br /><br />
They refer to all of the services/facilities which are required by an urban area to provide the necessary and essential functions for its citizens. These include: <br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|-<br />
! Public service/ facility type !! Description !! Icon<br />
|-<br />
| Educational || The land uses and buildings that are used to serve the educational purposes of the community. These facilities very often have a secondary function of providing a location for social and recreational activities of the community.|| [[Image:Education.jpg|center|x50px|Education|link=Educational facilities]]<br />
|-<br />
| Health || This category of urban object includes all facilities where medical treatment of some form is offered. For example, it would include a local GP clinic or a city hospital. It is however not limited to clinical or medical healthcare, but all contexts relating to the diagnosis, treatment and rehabilitation of people with sickness/illness.|| [[Image:Health.jpg|center|x50px|Health|link=Health facilities]]<br />
|-<br />
| Government Assets || Buildings and facilities relating to government departments or entities. This would include, for example administration office associated with a government department or agency, police and fire services stations, etc. For the purposes of Urban Securipedia, government assets do not extend to recreational services or utilities such as water/waste/energy infrastructure or facilities. || [[Image:Government Assets.jpg|center|x50px|Government Assets|link=Government Asset]]<br />
|}<br />
<br />
All of the above perform vital roles within the overall operation of the urban area. The different types of public services and facilities will occur in all contexts of the urban fabric, depending on the role and function of the individual object.<br />
<br />
The icon representing the above urban objects will be shown throughout this page where a description relates specifically to that urban object.<br />
<br />
== Functions ==<br />
<br />
=== Social ===<br />
In the case of public services and facilities, societal security should be a natural frame of reference for identification of vulnerability and enhancement of resilience. In particular for this type of urban objects, urban planning practice must therefore incorporate appropriate security measures for vulnerability identification and resilience enhancements of urban objects, including from the societal point of view. Vulnerability assessment should thus take place based on different sets of indicators, from physical to social, and across several levels of reference, from individual to cultural community. <br />
We know, for example, that citizens felt risks to urban infrastructure and needs to protect can be influenced according to ownership structure (public vs. private owners; domestic/foreign owners)<ref>Cf. Coppola, D.P.: Introduction to International Disaster Management. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007, pp. 164-166</ref>. This is an aspect of general [[Critical_infrastructure#Types_of_impact_of_critical_infrastructure_failure_on_citizens_and_society|types of impact of critical infrastucture failure on citizens and society and needs to protect it]] to consider. Public services and facilities can also be associated with citizens' perception of individual dependence, which can increase their perception of risks to related infrastructure and needs to protect it.<ref>Cf. Slovic, P./Fischhoff, B./Lichtenstein, S.: Facts and Fears: Societal Perception of Risk. In: Monroe, K.B./Abor, A. (eds.): Advances in Consumer Research, Vol. 8 (1981), pp. 497-502. Retrieved from: http://www.acrwebsite.org/volumes/display.asp?id=5844.</ref> <br />
<br />
Therefore, related risk assessment for urban planning should identify related levels of risk perception at the level of the citizens as the end-users of urban public facilities and infrastructure for public services. VITRUV identified a set of practical methods for such [[citizen participation]]. For planning of public services and facilities, methods that are particularly suitable include [[activating opinion survey]] (with a focus on identifying citizens' fears and needs) and [[appreciative planning]] (with a focus on stakeholders and mapping of communities for which the public services and facilities are of particular importance).<br />
<br />
=== Economic ===<br />
The economic function of social infrastructure is to provide for the well-being of individuals, families and communities. Investment in social infrastructure is essential for maintaining quality of life and to develop the skills and resilience essential to strong communities. There is a growing consensus amongst scholars and politicians that social infrastructure is at least as important for the successful development of a modern economy as more physical infrastructure such as roads, utility facilities, and sewer systems. Social infrastructure such as schools, theatres and sport facilities make people want to live in a certain area, which subsequently attracts businesses and other investors that provide for jobs and income ([[Economic impact|economic impact]]). "In short, social infrastructure planning involves minimal resource for high returns"<ref>Smarth Growth (2009). Social Infrastructure Planning Framework for the Western Bay of Plenty Sub-region.</ref>.<br />
<br />
In terms of [[Threat|security threats]], public services and facilities are subject to crime and vandalism. These activities create [[Economic effects of crime|costs]] in anticipation of crime (e.g. locks, surveillance, etc.), as a consequence of crime (loss of/damage to property), and in response to crime (police investigation, legal system, etc.). <br />
<br />
Security measures such as access control, ownership, surveillance, etc., mitigate the negative effects of crime and terrorism, but are not without direct investment costs (both temporary and permanent) and more indirect economic effects, [[Economic effects of anti-crime security measures|the economic effects of security measures]]. The ‘[[Designing out approach|designing out]]’ or '[[Sustainable design|sustainable design]]' approach in the earliest stages in the planning process could be in the long run an effective measure from an economic point of view to prevent security threats and to reduce the economic damage. In general, these measures demand larger investments than traditional security measures, but at the same time they are able to avoid future costs due to the long-term prevention of crime.<br />
<br />
=== Mobility ===<br />
Public services generally require good possibilities for mobility, e.g. public buildings should have a good [[Accessibility | accessibility]].<br />
<br />
However, in order to reduce safety risk of vulnerable public places such as schools, accessibility might also be reduced on purpose in order to make it more difficult for criminals to enter the place. <br />
<br />
In <ref name="saferplaces"/> an example is given of a recently-rebuilt secondary school which is unusual in having the grounds unfenced and accessible to the public. It is on the site of a prefabricated school that had many security and disorder problems. The aim was to create a school that students would be proud of and would be safe without having overly visible security measures. This aim has been successful, thanks to a secure building envelope with a single controlled entrance and a comprehensive CCTV system monitored by security guards on 24-hour duty.<br />
<br />
=== Safety ===<br />
Some public services and facilities contribute directly to the safety, welfare and well-being of people, such as health facilities[[Image:Health.jpg|x30px|link=Health facilities]], fire departments or security forces[[Image:Government Assets.jpg|x30px|link=Government Asset]]. Disruption of these services can result in unsafe situations, as people in emergency situations would not receive required help.<br />
<br />
== Security Issues ==<br />
Crimes most relevant to public services and facilities, are:<br />
<br />
* [[Security issue: Vandalism| Vandalism]] and [[Security issue: Graffiti| Graffiti]]: These security issues are related to the fact that public services often reside in buildings which are publicly accessible, highly visible and which are located in area that add to this visibility. Due to the presence of young people, this issue is most prominent at and around educational facilities[[Image:Education.jpg|x30px|link=Educational facilities]]<ref>[http://www.popcenter.org/problems/graffiti/ Lamm Weisel Deborah, ''Graffiti'', Problem-Oriented Guides for Police, Guide No. 9]</ref>.<br />
* [[Image: Gadewar.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Riots in Copenhagen as result of a demonstration in 2006]][[Security issue: Destruction by riots| Destruction by riots]]: is a threat particularly for Government assets[[Image:Government Assets.jpg|x30px|link=Government Asset]], as riots can origin from peaceful protests and government assets are likely targets for protest demonstrations.<br />
* [[Security issue: Destruction by fanatics| Destruction by fanatics]] can result from the fact that many government assets[[Image:Government Assets.jpg|x30px|link=Government Asset]] have a highly visible and prominent position, which adds to their attractiveness in the eye of terrorists.<br />
* [[Security issue: Assault| Assault]] is a recent phenomena, which expresses itself in violence against rescue workers[[Image:Government Assets.jpg|x30px|link=Government Asset]].<br />
<br />
== Measures ==<br />
The measures for each type of security issue can be found on the respective pages. There are few measures that are specifically suited or unsuited to this kind of urban object, but some general considerations can be mentioned:<br />
<br />
* [[Measure: Ownership| Ownership]] is required for the public to be aware to enter private space and know to act accordingly.<br />
* [[Measure: Access control| Access control]] is closely related to ownership and one of the most rudimentary measures as it ensures the possibility to determine who does and who does not get access to the office. It is usually enforced by having a reception and a form of dynamic barrier, such as a turnstile, a blockable revolving door or a guard on duty.<br />
* [[Measure: Screening| Screening]] is a measure that can be employed supporting access control. By screening visitors, a more rigid access control can be enforced.<br />
* [[Measure: Directing traffic flows| Directing traffic flows]] can be employed to ensure only the expected kind of traffic enters via the entrances. Examples of directing traffic flows for offices are: directing all cars away from the entrance by, for example, locating the parking facilities some distance from the entrance, closing parking garages from entry on foot or creating separate entrances for trusted visitors.<br />
* Intelligence can be used to detect increasing risk by fanatics.<br />
* [[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]] can be used to increase the effort to commit vandalism or graffiti. An other form of target hardening can also be employed to delay the effect of riots to the point when sufficient intervention force can be employed.<br />
* [[measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]] can be effective against vandalism or graffiti when perpetrators can be detected and corrected fast enough.<br />
* [[Measure: Intervention force|Intervention force]] is needed to make detection measures, such as alarms or surveillance effective. <br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Office&diff=12635Office2013-06-26T09:51:09Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Urban object]]<br />
[[File:Employment Office.jpg|right|200x200px|link=]]An office is an [[urban object]] which accommodates employment facilitating the provision of services. It is where business is conducted, be it of a professional, commercial or bureaucratic nature.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
In the context of urban security and safety, it is important to consider offices with regard to the potential number of employees (usage of the building). Different office functions and use will determine the floor area per full-time equivalent (FTE) employee. For example, a general office may allow 12 square metres (sq.m.) per FTE, a call centre may provide 8 sq.m. per FTE, while an IT/data centre might provide 47 sq.m. per FTE (given its specific requirements). In addition, offices where public access/services is facilitated will have a level of visitor footfall.<br />
<br />
Office based employment enterprises can occur in a wide variety of urban contexts, ranging from city centre locations (often in the upper floor of retail or services buildings in a High Street or city centre context) to large business parks in peripheral locations and which feature a range of differing employment activities. Locational factors will influence the range of transport modes available and utilised for access to offices.<br />
<br />
Modern urban areas have a wide variety of office locations available, dependent on the requirements of the individual tenants. Tenant requirements themselves will vary substantially, of as a result of the type of business or the economic sector within which it operates. Large offices with significant workforces will often require extensive floor spaces; the type of office space required to accommodate this type of operation is therefore more suited to more peripheral locations. In comparison, small offices, with less substantial space requirements, can easily be accommodated anywhere within an urban area, from city centre to peripheral locations.<br />
<br />
== Functions ==<br />
=== Social ===<br />
One of the key social functions of office employment is in the provision of employment for citizens. The growth of the economy and societal development relies on maintaining a low unemployment rate and providing opportunities for office (and other) employment. Societal functionality requires goods and services, the latter of which are often provided through office-based activities. The locating of office development and its impact and contribution to the urban area is an important feature in urban planning, where job creation and employment policy are important features.<br />
<br />
Vulnerability assessment for urban infrastructure of the office type from the social point of view should include the following aspects: <br />
<br />
*[[Vulnerability#Social.2Fcommunity_vulnerability|List of indicators for assessment of subjective protection requirements of critical infrastructure]];<br />
*[[Critical_infrastructure#Types_of_impact_of_critical_infrastructure_failure_on_citizens_and_society|Types of impact of critical infrastucture failure on citizens and society as well as needs to protect it]];<br />
*[[Failure_of_critical_services#Societal_aspects|Societal aspects of failure of critical services]].<br />
<br />
For example, we know that perceived direct benefit of an infrastructure (such as of office infrastructure, which benefits the generation of one’s income) increases felt risks to that infrastructure and needs to protect it; this effect will be amplified by the fact that individual dependence, also a relevant aspect of office infrastructure, increases citizens’ felt risks to urban infrastructure and needs to protect.<ref>Cf. Coppola, D.P.: Introduction to International Disaster Management. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007, pp. 164-166; Siedschlag, A./Jerković, A.: Summary of CPSI Country Case Studies: Austria – Bulgaria – France – Germany – Italy – Netherlands – Sweden – United Kingdom. Sigmund Freud Private University Vienna, CEUSS | Centre for European Security Studies, Analytical Standpoint, No. 13, 2010. Retrieved from: http://www.esci.at/eusipo/asp13.pdf; Slovic, P./Fischhoff, B./Lichtenstein, S.: Facts and Fears: Societal Perception of Risk. In: Monroe, K.B./Abor, A. (eds.): Advances in Consumer Research, Vol. 8 (1981), pp. 497-502. Retrieved from: http://www.acrwebsite.org/volumes/display.asp?id=5844.</ref> <br />
<br />
Aspects like those listed above show how important it is to involve future users in risk assessment and planning for office objects. VITRUV identified a set of general practical methods for such [[citizen participation]]. Related to office-type urban structure, a suitable participation method would be the [[Future Workshop]], where urban planners and future office users develop visions and scenarios for physical and social settings for office objects in urban environments that are secure and are also perceived as secure.<br />
<br />
=== Economic ===<br />
Office space primarily accommodates commercial and public activities performed by individuals and groups of people. Together with residential, retail and industrial areas, office space is one of the most valuable urban spatial structures due to its [[Economic impact|economic effects]] for the local, regional and national economy (both in terms of office space development<ref>Office development creates direct construction activity ([[Primary economic impact|primary economic impact]], including planning professionals, commercial real estate agents, attorneys, designers, marketing, landscaping, etc.). The [[Secondary economic impact|secondary impact]] of construction generates business for a variety of business types such as insurance companies, cleaning services, security companies, etc. On the long term, office space creates local jobs, income and taxes generated by the consumption and other spending of office users (e.g. for lunch, office products, office maintenance, etc.).</ref> and the commercial activities that take place in these premises). In sum, office development can be a catalyst for wider economic regeneration. The economic impact of offices can be estimated with the help of [[Economic tools|economic tools/techniques]].<br />
<br />
The location of office space in terms of economic reasoning is for a large part determined by the accessibility of the location per car or public transport, the availability of parking space, image and representativeness, and the availability of adequately skilled labour. The location of office space in more remote parts of the city/urban environment can raise specific security issues (e.g. burglary, vehicle theft, assault, etc.). In general, burglary and vandalism are the most relevant security issues to be considered for office space. These type of crimes generate [[Economic impact of security threats|economic effects]] in terms of anticipation (e.g. security locks, surveillance, etc.), as a consequence (e.g. loss of valuable property), and in response to (police investigation, legal system, etc.) the criminal event. As a secondary impact, crime has (amongst others) an [[Economic effects of crime#Secondary economic impact|economic impact]] on the local real estate value.<br />
<br />
Security measures such as intervention force, target hardening, surveillance, mitigate the negative effects of crime and terrorism, but are not without direct investment costs (both temporary and permanent) and more indirect economic effects, [[Economic effects of anti-crime security measures|the economic effects of security measures]]. The ‘[[Designing out approach|designing out]]’ or '[[Sustainable design|sustainable design]]' approach in the earliest stages in the planning process could be in the long run an effective measure from an economic point of view to prevent security threats and to reduce the economic damage. In general, these measures demand larger investments than traditional security measures, but at the same time they are able to avoid future costs due to the long-term prevention of crime.<br />
<br />
=== Mobility ===<br />
The mobility requirements of offices will depend on the type of service provided and the number of people employed. Offices in central locations will be able to take advantage of public transportation modes, whereas offices in more peripheral locations will be more dependent on private car use.<br />
<br />
For offices with good access to public transportation, there may be a security risk connected to those public transportation modes, such as [[Transport Infrastructure#Bus station|bus]], [[Transport Infrastructure#Metro station|metro]] or [[Transport Infrastructure#Train station|train stations]].<br />
<br />
For offices in peripheral locations, parking lots or garages are required. Parking lots are sensitive for car break-in and sexual assault. To reduce this risk, parking lots should be easily overseen without e.g. dark corners.<br />
<br />
Another security risk is that high office buildings might be a target for terroristic attacks, thinking of the WTC 9-11 attack in 2001 <ref> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_11_attacks</ref>. For such serious attacks, it is important that the building should have good [[Accessibility|accessibility]] for emergency services and that there are clear emergency routes and exits inside the building.<br />
<br />
=== Safety ===<br />
Safety functions associated with offices, include the usual functions such as:<br />
* shelter from the environment (weather)<br />
* prevention and repression of incidents (fires, floods, air quality, etcetera)<br />
* constructional safety (including the dynamic stresses that large crowds can exert)<br />
* facilities to assure a timely retreat to a safe environment for the people present in case of incidents ([[Evacuation Management]]).<br />
<br />
== Security Issues ==<br />
Security issues associated with offices, are related with the fact that it can be an [[attractive object]] for thieves. This is related with the presence of [[valuables]], which would be highly dependent of the use of the office. This makes these kinds of urban objects vulnerable for the following security issues:<br />
* [[Security_issue: Burglary]]<br />
* [[Security issue: Vehicle theft| Vehicle theft]]<ref>Clarke Ronald V., ''Thefts of and From Cars in Parking Facilities'', Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Series, Guide No. 10</ref>: The use of (particularly large, unattended) parking lots can attract vehicle thieves.<br />
* [[Security issue: Pickpocketing| Pickpocketing]] can sometimes be a problem in particularly busy office districts.<br />
* [[Security issue: Destruction by fanatics| Destruction of property by fanatics]] can occur if the offices have a special meaning for a group of fanatics. Examples would be an embassy of a controversial nation, the office of the association of fur traders for animal activists, etcetera.<br />
<br />
Other issues that can be associated with offices, such as fraud and white collar crime are not considered relevant in the context of this Securipedia, as they are out of the urban planner's control.<br />
<br />
== Measures ==<br />
[[Image:LSE-Reception.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Controlling entry and exit of an office building is one of the most basic security measures]]The measures for each type of security issue can be found on the respective pages. There are few measures they are specifically suited or unsuited to this kind of urban object, but some general considerations can be mentioned:<br />
<br />
As offices are closed (non public) areas, the flows in and out the area can be strictly controlled if needed.<br />
* [[Measure: Ownership| Ownership]] is required for the public to be aware to enter private space and know to act accordingly.<br />
* [[Measure: Access control| Access control]] is closely related to ownership and one of the most rudimentary measures as it ensures the possibility to determine who does and who does not get access to the office. It is usually enforced by having a reception and a form of dynamic barrier, such as a turnstile, a blockable revolving door or a guard on duty.<br />
* [[Measure: Screening| Screening]] is a measure that can be employed supporting access control. By screening your visitors, a more rigid access control can be enforced.<br />
* [[Measure: Directing traffic flows| Directing traffic flows]] can be employed to ensure only the expected kind of traffic enters via the entrances. Examples of directing traffic flows for offices are: directing all cars away from the entrance by, for example, locating the parking facilities some distance from the entrance, closing parking garages from entry on foot or creating separate entrances for trusted visitors.<br />
* [[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]] can greatly increase the effort needed for criminals to enter the object and thereby reduce the attractiveness of an object. Target hardening is especially effective in combination with detection measures, such as alarms or surveillance and intervention force. The object of target hardening is to delay the crime long enough to be detected and intervened upon by a intervention force. A target which - in the perception of the criminal - is hardened to a level that entry is not likely before detection and intervention, is not attractive.<br />
* [[measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]] can be effective against security issues, particularly as office districts can be very much 9-5 places – i.e. they are deserted in the evening time. Dedicated observation can incur high costs, both if implemented on location or remote. A more natural form of surveillance is surveillance by the inhabitants (also known as 'natural surveillance') and/or dwellers. A way to achieve this is to stimulate the use of an office district for night-time activities, by providing additional restaurant, shops and a university to extend the ‘street activity’ into the later evening or combine the area with residential use, provided that the inhabitants have a good surveillability.<br />
* [[Measure: Intervention force|Intervention force]] is needed to make detection measures, such as alarms or surveillance effective. <br />
<br />
For an optimal security policy for the organisation in the office, all aspects of security should be coherently considered in the security strategy. This means that physical/procedural/organisational security measures should be coordinated with cyber/information security and personnel security. If this coordination is not assured, security gaps and overlaps can occur in the security regime, both of which can be detrimental to the level of security. <br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Retail_and_commercial_services&diff=12634Retail and commercial services2013-06-26T09:47:50Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Urban object]]<br />
[[File:RETAIL AND COMMERCIAL SERVICESicon.jpg|right|200x200px|Retail and commercial services|link=]]'''Retail and commercial services''' are [[urban object|urban object]]s, designated for the purpose of housing economic activities that fulfil the role of goods and commercial service provision. Examples include shops, restaurants, credit unions, etc.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
Retail and commercial services activities are very important drivers of economic activity within urban areas. Retail services predominantly become clustered within a specific area, offering wide ranging services to consumers, and attracting significant footfall. Retail services which may be offered will range from the sale and supply of consumer goods and products, to the provision of social activities such as bars and restaurants. Retail and services activities will typically occur in one of three primary contexts:<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|-<br />
! Retail type !! Description !! Icon<br />
|-<br />
| High street || Where the main commercial or retail activity occurs in a city or urban area (larger cities may have a high street for each district or quarter) || [[Image:Retail high street.jpg|center|x50px|High street retail|link=]]<br />
|-<br />
| Shopping centres || Consist of a complex of shops, restaurants and other businesses in one or more connected buildings|| [[Image:Shopping centre.jpg|center|x50px|Shopping centre|link=]]<br />
|-<br />
| Out of town retail parks || A group of large warehouses and superstores (often selling bulky and white goods) in edge of centre or outside urban areas, with a large quantum of parking space for customers. || [[Image:out of town Retail.jpg|center|x50px|Out of town retail parks|link=]]<br />
|}<br />
<br />
These contexts within which retail and commercial services activities occur represent three different urban characters. They are representative to facilitate the reader in determining what applies to his/her unique and specific situation.<br />
<br />
In the text below, any of these three icons will be used whenever an observation is specific to one or more of the above mentioned archetypes.<br />
<br />
== Functions ==<br />
=== Social ===<br />
The retail sector plays a major role in attracting people to cities, towns, and villages - thus contributing to the overall economic vitality of those centres and supporting their role as centres of social and business interaction in the community. Retail use facilitates consumer spending that is an important component of a developing economy (see economic function below). This land use is also strongly grounded in social interaction and socio-cultural needs. A key component of a high quality urban environment is the provision of a range of high quality easily accessible retail facilities.<br />
<br />
Retail planning guidance advocate a sequential approach to locate retail development in the city/town centre, and only to allow retail development in edge of centre or out of centre locations, where all other options have been exhausted. The number of retail outlet per 100 households or the quantum of retail floor space per capita is a common indicator of retail performance used by urban planners.<ref>IRELAND: Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (2012) Guidelines for Planning Authorities Retail Planning, p. 30.</ref><br />
<br />
A number of studies demonstrate the social function of shops, such as for the Netherlands:<br />
<br />
{{quote|In the run-up to the opening of the 2600th post office, PostNL carried out research into the social function of local shops. The research...has shown that people are still receiving personal service quite literally around the corner from where they live. For almost a quarter of the respondents social contact was the main reason for continuing to visit the shop around the corner. <br />
Despite the increasing popularity of internet shopping, 98% of Dutch people still find it important that there are shops close to where they live. Almost everyone visits a local shop at least once a week. A quarter of those questioned even visit on a daily basis. The fact that the shop is close by was given as the main reason for the number of visits (56%). <br />
Where daily grocery shopping in particular is concerned, the Dutch still prefer using supermarkets or specialist shops. The atmosphere (22%), as well as being able to view the range of goods (62%) and being able to touch them (55%) were determining factors.<ref>NETHERLANDS: The research into the social and community relevance of local shops was carried out by ISIZ and Stadspeil using a representative sample survey of 1298 respondents with an equal male/female ratio. Retrieved from: http://www.postnl.com/press/586834/The_social_function_of_the_local_shop_in_the_year_2011.aspx.</ref>.}}<br />
<br />
The retail core of urban locations can very often draw/attract large numbers of people along the shopping streets and within the stores and shopping centres. This heavy footfall and large crowds have obvious implications from a safety and security perspective. These implications are often addressed by [[environmental design]]. A common example is the [[designing out]] approach. Since design cannot alter human nature, it cannot be a direct answer to crime and insecurity. However, design can reduce insecurity and increase security by addressing the underlying causes, as well as the types of behaviour that lead to insecurity, such as crime. <br />
<br />
In the case of retail and commercial-type urban objects,<ref>For the following examples, cf. Coppola, D.P.: Introduction to International Disaster Management. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007, pp. 164-166; Siedschlag, A./Jerković, A.: Summary of CPSI Country Case Studies: Austria – Bulgaria – France – Germany – Italy – Netherlands – Sweden – United Kingdom. Sigmund Freud Private University Vienna, CEUSS | Centre for European Security Studies, Analytical Standpoint, No. 13, 2010. Retrieved from: http://www.esci.at/eusipo/asp13.pdf; Slovic, P./Fischhoff, B./Lichtenstein, S.: Facts and Fears: Societal Perception of Risk. In: Monroe, K.B./Abor, A. (eds.): Advances in Consumer Research, Vol. 8 (1981), pp. 497-502. Retrieved from: http://www.acrwebsite.org/volumes/display.asp?id=5844.</ref> we can expect that the perceived direct benefit of such an [[Vulnerability#Social.2Fcommunity_vulnerability|infrastructure]] increase citizens’ felt risks to that infrastructure and needs to protect, including security-enhancing measures. Since we know that citizens’ [[Critical_infrastructure#Types_of_impact_of_critical_infrasture_failure_on_citizens_and_society|felt risks to urban infrastructure and needs to protect]] can be influenced by its ownership structure (public vs. private owners; domestic/foreign owners), we can also expect that retail-type resilience enhancing of urban infrastructure has high social relevance. <br />
<br />
Those aspects show how important it is to involve citizens in related urban-object risk assessment. VITRUV identified a set of practical methods for such [[citizen participation]].<br />
<br />
=== Economic ===<br />
The retail and services industry is one of the largest private-sectors in terms of jobs and GDP, but the [[Economic impact|economic impact]] of the retail industry extends beyond the industry itself. First of all, retail and services require inputs from various other sectors such as real estate, finance, marketing, transportation, wholesale trade for its operations (the [[Secondary economic impact|secondary economic impact]]). Additionally, employees and owners will generate economic spin-off as consumers of goods and services (the [[Induced effects|induced economic effects]]). These economic impacts can be estimated with the help of [[Economic tools|economic tools/techniques]].<br />
<br />
In terms of the location of retail space, the urban planner needs to ensure retail use is located in the appropriate location and having regard to population catchment and adjoining uses. From an economic perspective, urban planners think along the lines of locating retail to be conducive to urban sustainability, encourage investment and growth, and reaching population targets for the city (good retail is a good draw towards successful and competitive mixed-use urban commercial centres). A sequential approach is promoted: city centre, edge of centre, out of town retail space. Spillover damage by out of town locations, monopolistic dominance of too-large centres relative to their catchment, floor space caps to control retail development, etc. are all important considerations for the urban planner.<br />
<br />
Retailers have to deal with a wide array of issues and problems in terms of [[Economic impact of security threats|security threats and their economic impact]]. In economic terms, shoplifting is widely considered to be one of the most serious of these threats. Moreover, retailers spent billions on loss prevention, and these costs are steadily increasing worldwide. On top of that, there is also the chance for terrorist events, e.g. in shopping centres.<br />
<br />
Preventive measures such as surveillance, physical security, etc. reduce the costs of retail crime, but demand significant [[Economic effects of anti-crime security measures|investments]]. Apart from the more traditional security measures, the ‘[[Designing out approach|designing out]]’ or '[[Sustainable design|sustainable design]]' approach in the earliest stages in the planning process can be in the long run an effective measure from an economic point of view to prevent security threats and reduce the economic damage<ref>In general, these measures demand larger investments than traditional security measures, but at the same time they are able to avoid future costs due to the long-term prevention of crime.</ref>.<br />
<br />
''Case example: Assessing security measures protecting shopping centres from terrorist events''<br />
{{quote| In order to improve the safety of shopping centres against terrorist threats, the American [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR401.sum.pdf RAND group]<ref>RAND Homeland Security (2006). [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR401.sum.pdf Reducing Terrorism Risk at Shopping Centers. An Analysis of Potential Security Options]. A Rand Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment Program. </ref> assessed almost 40 different security options in terms of their (cost-) effectiveness. The cost of these selected security measures were estimated in terms of annual cost in terms of labour ($10 per hour), equipment costs, consultancy costs, maintenance costs, lost rental income, etc. The risk effectiveness was determined with the help of value estimates based on multiple factors and the notion that 'deterrence effectiveness' is of much more relevance than for instance 'mitigation effectiveness' because you want to prevent a terrorist attack to happen or find some other target, instead of limiting the amount of casualties. One of the most striking results of the model is that the relatively inexpensive security measures such as suspicious packing reporting, access control, bollards at entrances, and clearly labelled exits, contribute most to the risk reduction. In addition, the RAND researchers conclude that some more visible security measures like scanning bags and coats during opening hours, detector portals, and vehicle inspection, are expected to have some negative secondary effects (e.g. time delays at the entrance) that may cause visitors to shop somewhere else. The researchers conclude that decisions about when and how to implement security measures will depend on the local situation and perceptions by local experts. The RAND-model can be a useful guidance about prioritising security measures.}}<br />
<br />
=== Mobility ===<br />
An important transportation issue concerning retail is retail logistics. Retail logistics includes the transportation of goods to the points of retail sales as well as to storage locations. Several security issues arise in retail logistics: more and more, especially urban deliveries, are made during the off-peak hours (including the early and late night). During these periods the driver is vulnerable for theft and vandalism activities. Next, for retail premises this requires unattended deliveries (because the deliveries are outside opening hours). As a result, the premises cannot inspect the deliveries (on condition and other amount) and the driver should be able to open (part) of the premise to deliver the goods. <br />
<br />
Next, it also covers additional activities for door delivery of goods to the customers, i.e. home deliveries. One of the main issues in home deliveries of parcels, which are increasing due to the increase of e-commerce, is the relatively high number of unsuccessful deliveries due to the fact that addressees are not home at the time of delivery. Therefore, many parcels are delivered to neighbors, which in itself is a security issue for the addressee. <br />
<br />
Finally, many of the retail locations are located at areas where vulnerable road users actually use the same infrastructure as delivering trucks. This results in relatively high risks for the safety of vulnerable road users.<br />
<br />
=== Safety ===<br />
Most generic safety requirements are also of importance for retail and commercial services. As commercial venues can sometimes be very busy, the ability for the people to get to safety in time in the event of an incident ([[Evacuation Management]]) can be an important safety aspect.<br />
<br />
== Security Issues ==<br />
Commercial areas are more prone to certain types of crime than other urban objects.<br />
* Commercial burglary: Even though there are considerably fewer retail burglaries than residential burglaries, the risk of retail burglary per number of premises is very high. For example, in 2012, 12 percent of wholesale and retail establishments were burgled<ref>http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/crime-research/crime-business-prem-2012/crime-against-businesses</ref>, compared with just 2 percent of residences<ref>http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_296191.pdf</ref>. As for this form of crime the measures in a context of urban planning are very limited, it is not included as a security issue for the urban planner.<br />
* Shoplifting is a serious concern for shops. A british survey found that stores lose as much to burglars as they do to shoplifters.<ref name="clarke">Clarke Ronald V., ''Burglary of Retail Establishments'', Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Series, Guide No. 15</ref> As this problem is highly unrelated to the shape of the built environment, it is not included as a security issue for the urban planner.<br />
* [[Security issue: Vandalism| Vandalism]]<ref name="hors146">Mirrlees-Black Curiona and Ross Alec, ''Crime against retail and manufacturing premises: findings from the 1994 Commercial Victimisation Survey'', Home Office Research Study 146, copyright 1995, ISBN 1 85893 554 7</ref><br />
* [[Security issue: Graffiti| Graffiti]]: The use of metal roller-shutters have proven effective against burglary, but can have a negative effect on the street scene, and are susceptible to graffiti<ref>Home Office, ''Safer Places. The planning system and crime prevention'', 2004</ref>.[[File:Garage door graffiti-vandalism.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Roller-shutter with graffiti]]<br />
* [[Security issue: Vehicle theft| Vehicle theft]]<ref name=hors146></ref><ref>Clarke Ronald V., ''Thefts of and From Cars in Parking Facilities'', Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Series, Guide No. 10</ref>: The use of (particularly large, unattended) parking lots can attract vehicle thieves.<br />
* [[Security issue: Ram raid| Ram raid]]<ref>Jacques Christopher, ''Ram raiding: the history, incidence and scope for prevention'', Crime at work: studies in security and crime prevention</ref><br />
* [[Security issue: Robbery| Robbery]]<ref>Scott Michael S., Robbery at Automated Teller Machines, Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Series, Guide No. 8</ref>: The common presence of ATM machines in commercial areas can attract robbers who rob people who just withdrew money, or they can force people to withdraw money and then rob them of it.<br />
* [[Security issue: Pickpocketing| Pickpocketing]] can be a problem in commercial areas, especially when they are busy and distractive.<br />
<br />
== Measures ==<br />
* [[Measure: Directing traffic flows|Directing traffic flows]] can be effective against ram-raid. Particularly the use of vehicle security barriers, such as [[Bollard]]s and the use of indirect routes<ref>CPNI, ''Integrated Security. A Public Realm Design Guide for Hostile Vehicle Mitigation'', Version 1, 2011, pp 21</ref> [http://www.cpni.gov.uk/documents/publications/2011/2011001-integrated_security_v1.0.pdf?epslanguage=en-gb (link)] reduce the accessibility of the store for ramming it with vehicles.<br />
* [[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]] can greatly increase the effort needed for criminals to enter the object and thereby reduce the attractiveness of an object. The use of rollershutters can reduce the risk of burglary. It will also increase the risk of graffiti.<br />
* [[measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]] can be effective against security issues, but can incur high costs if implemented as dedicated observers, either on location or remote. A more natural form of surveillance is surveillance by the inhabitants (also known as 'natural surveillance'), provided that the commercial area is inhabited and the inhabitants have a good surveillability.<br />
* [[Measure: Intervention force|Intervention force]] is needed to make detection measures, such as alarms or surveillance effective. <br />
* [[Measure: Target removal|Target removal]] can be effective with each of above-mentioned security issues.<br />
**Commercial burglary can be reduced by providing means of easily removing the [[valuables]] from the store at night.<br />
** Vandalism and graffiti can be reduced by avoiding features that could attract these forms of crime from the area, such as blank and reachable walls or easily accessible and damaged street furniture or bus shelters. <br />
* [[Measure: Facilitating compliance|Facilitating compliance]] can prevent littering by providing ample waste bins, which can act as a crime motivator for vandalism, graffiti and other crimes.<br />
* [[Measure: Ownership|Ownership]] is an important aspect in the prevention of unauthorized entry by creating a clear distinction between public and private space. By providing a clear distinction between public and private property, unwanted entry is prevented which reduces the number of opportunities for crime.<br />
* [[Measure: Maintenance|Maintenance]] and designing for easy maintenance can be used as the removal of a crime motivator, as deterioration can be an incentive to various forms of crime.<br />
* [[Measure: Removal of crime motivator|Removal of crime motivators]] ensures the separation of perpetrators , their incentives and opportunities, Such as the prevention of blank, reachable and highly visible walls to prevent graffiti.<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Retail_and_commercial_services&diff=12633Retail and commercial services2013-06-26T09:44:55Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Urban object]]<br />
[[File:RETAIL AND COMMERCIAL SERVICESicon.jpg|right|200x200px|Retail and commercial services|link=]]'''Retail and commercial services''' are [[urban object|urban object]]s, designated for the purpose of housing economic activities that fulfil the role of goods and commercial service provision. Examples include shops, restaurants, credit unions, etc.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
Retail and commercial services activities are very important drivers of economic activity within urban areas. Retail services predominantly become clustered within a specific area, offering wide ranging services to consumers, and attracting significant footfall. Retail services which may be offered will range from the sale and supply of consumer goods and products, to the provision of social activities such as bars and restaurants. Retail and services activities will typically occur in one of three primary contexts:<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|-<br />
! Retail type !! Description !! Icon<br />
|-<br />
| High street || Where the main commercial or retail activity occurs in a city or urban area (larger cities may have a high street for each district or quarter) || [[Image:Retail high street.jpg|center|x50px|High street retail|link=]]<br />
|-<br />
| Shopping centres || Consist of a complex of shops, restaurants and other businesses in one or more connected buildings|| [[Image:Shopping centre.jpg|center|x50px|Shopping centre|link=]]<br />
|-<br />
| Out of town retail parks || A group of large warehouses and superstores (often selling bulky and white goods) in edge of centre or outside urban areas, with a large quantum of parking space for customers. || [[Image:out of town Retail.jpg|center|x50px|Out of town retail parks|link=]]<br />
|}<br />
<br />
These contexts within which retail and commercial services activities occur represent three different urban characters. They are representative to facilitate the reader in determining what applies to his/her unique and specific situation.<br />
<br />
In the text below, any of these three icons will be used whenever an observation is specific to one or more of the above mentioned archetypes.<br />
<br />
== Functions ==<br />
=== Social ===<br />
The retail sector plays a major role in attracting people to cities, towns, and villages - thus contributing to the overall economic vitality of those centres and supporting their role as centres of social and business interaction in the community. Retail use facilitates consumer spending that is an important component of a developing economy (see economic function below). This land use is also strongly grounded in social interaction and socio-cultural needs. A key component of a high quality urban environment is the provision of a range of high quality easily accessible retail facilities.<br />
<br />
Retail planning guidance advocate a sequential approach to locate retail development in the city/town centre, and only to allow retail development in edge of centre or out of centre locations, where all other options have been exhausted. The number of retail outlet per 100 households or the quantum of retail floor space per capita is a common indicator of retail performance used by urban planners.<ref>IRELAND: Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (2012) Guidelines for Planning Authorities Retail Planning, p. 30.</ref><br />
<br />
A number of studies demonstrate the social function of shops, such as for the Netherlands:<br />
<br />
{{quote|In the run-up to the opening of the 2600th post office, PostNL carried out research into the social function of local shops. The research...has shown that people are still receiving personal service quite literally around the corner from where they live. For almost a quarter of the respondents social contact was the main reason for continuing to visit the shop around the corner. <br />
Despite the increasing popularity of internet shopping, 98% of Dutch people still find it important that there are shops close to where they live. Almost everyone visits a local shop at least once a week. A quarter of those questioned even visit on a daily basis. The fact that the shop is close by was given as the main reason for the number of visits (56%). <br />
Where daily grocery shopping in particular is concerned, the Dutch still prefer using supermarkets or specialist shops. The atmosphere (22%), as well as being able to view the range of goods (62%) and being able to touch them (55%) were determining factors.<ref>NETHERLANDS: The research into the social and community relevance of local shops was carried out by ISIZ and Stadspeil using a representative sample survey of 1298 respondents with an equal male/female ratio. Retrieved from: http://www.postnl.com/press/586834/The_social_function_of_the_local_shop_in_the_year_2011.aspx.</ref>.}}<br />
<br />
The retail core of urban locations can very often draw/attract large numbers of people along the shopping streets and within the stores and shopping centres. This heavy footfall and large crowds have obvious implications from a safety and security perspective. These implications are often addressed by [[environmental design]]. A common example is the [[designing out]] approach. Since design cannot alter human nature, it cannot be a direct answer to crime and insecurity. However, design can reduce insecurity and increase security by addressing the underlying causes, as well as the types of behaviour that lead to insecurity, such as crime. <br />
<br />
For example,<ref>For the following examples, cf. Coppola, D.P.: Introduction to International Disaster Management. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007, pp. 164-166; Siedschlag, A./Jerković, A.: Summary of CPSI Country Case Studies: Austria – Bulgaria – France – Germany – Italy – Netherlands – Sweden – United Kingdom. Sigmund Freud Private University Vienna, CEUSS | Centre for European Security Studies, Analytical Standpoint, No. 13, 2010. Retrieved from: http://www.esci.at/eusipo/asp13.pdf; Slovic, P./Fischhoff, B./Lichtenstein, S.: Facts and Fears: Societal Perception of Risk. In: Monroe, K.B./Abor, A. (eds.): Advances in Consumer Research, Vol. 8 (1981), pp. 497-502. Retrieved from: http://www.acrwebsite.org/volumes/display.asp?id=5844.</ref> In the case of retail and commercial-type urban objects, we can expect that the perceived direct benefit of such an [[Vulnerability#Social.2Fcommunity_vulnerability|infrastructure]] increase citizens’ felt risks to that infrastructure and needs to protect, including security-enhancing measures. Since we know that citizens’ [[Critical_infrastructure#Types_of_impact_of_critical_infrasture_failure_on_citizens_and_society|felt risks to urban infrastructure and needs to protect]] can be influenced by its ownership structure (public vs. private owners; domestic/foreign owners), we can also expect that retail-type resilience enhancing of urban infrastructure has high social relevance. <br />
<br />
Those aspects show how important it is to involve citizens in related urban-object risk assessment. VITRUV identified a set of practical methods for such [[citizen participation]].<br />
<br />
=== Economic ===<br />
The retail and services industry is one of the largest private-sectors in terms of jobs and GDP, but the [[Economic impact|economic impact]] of the retail industry extends beyond the industry itself. First of all, retail and services require inputs from various other sectors such as real estate, finance, marketing, transportation, wholesale trade for its operations (the [[Secondary economic impact|secondary economic impact]]). Additionally, employees and owners will generate economic spin-off as consumers of goods and services (the [[Induced effects|induced economic effects]]). These economic impacts can be estimated with the help of [[Economic tools|economic tools/techniques]].<br />
<br />
In terms of the location of retail space, the urban planner needs to ensure retail use is located in the appropriate location and having regard to population catchment and adjoining uses. From an economic perspective, urban planners think along the lines of locating retail to be conducive to urban sustainability, encourage investment and growth, and reaching population targets for the city (good retail is a good draw towards successful and competitive mixed-use urban commercial centres). A sequential approach is promoted: city centre, edge of centre, out of town retail space. Spillover damage by out of town locations, monopolistic dominance of too-large centres relative to their catchment, floor space caps to control retail development, etc. are all important considerations for the urban planner.<br />
<br />
Retailers have to deal with a wide array of issues and problems in terms of [[Economic impact of security threats|security threats and their economic impact]]. In economic terms, shoplifting is widely considered to be one of the most serious of these threats. Moreover, retailers spent billions on loss prevention, and these costs are steadily increasing worldwide. On top of that, there is also the chance for terrorist events, e.g. in shopping centres.<br />
<br />
Preventive measures such as surveillance, physical security, etc. reduce the costs of retail crime, but demand significant [[Economic effects of anti-crime security measures|investments]]. Apart from the more traditional security measures, the ‘[[Designing out approach|designing out]]’ or '[[Sustainable design|sustainable design]]' approach in the earliest stages in the planning process can be in the long run an effective measure from an economic point of view to prevent security threats and reduce the economic damage<ref>In general, these measures demand larger investments than traditional security measures, but at the same time they are able to avoid future costs due to the long-term prevention of crime.</ref>.<br />
<br />
''Case example: Assessing security measures protecting shopping centres from terrorist events''<br />
{{quote| In order to improve the safety of shopping centres against terrorist threats, the American [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR401.sum.pdf RAND group]<ref>RAND Homeland Security (2006). [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR401.sum.pdf Reducing Terrorism Risk at Shopping Centers. An Analysis of Potential Security Options]. A Rand Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment Program. </ref> assessed almost 40 different security options in terms of their (cost-) effectiveness. The cost of these selected security measures were estimated in terms of annual cost in terms of labour ($10 per hour), equipment costs, consultancy costs, maintenance costs, lost rental income, etc. The risk effectiveness was determined with the help of value estimates based on multiple factors and the notion that 'deterrence effectiveness' is of much more relevance than for instance 'mitigation effectiveness' because you want to prevent a terrorist attack to happen or find some other target, instead of limiting the amount of casualties. One of the most striking results of the model is that the relatively inexpensive security measures such as suspicious packing reporting, access control, bollards at entrances, and clearly labelled exits, contribute most to the risk reduction. In addition, the RAND researchers conclude that some more visible security measures like scanning bags and coats during opening hours, detector portals, and vehicle inspection, are expected to have some negative secondary effects (e.g. time delays at the entrance) that may cause visitors to shop somewhere else. The researchers conclude that decisions about when and how to implement security measures will depend on the local situation and perceptions by local experts. The RAND-model can be a useful guidance about prioritising security measures.}}<br />
<br />
=== Mobility ===<br />
An important transportation issue concerning retail is retail logistics. Retail logistics includes the transportation of goods to the points of retail sales as well as to storage locations. Several security issues arise in retail logistics: more and more, especially urban deliveries, are made during the off-peak hours (including the early and late night). During these periods the driver is vulnerable for theft and vandalism activities. Next, for retail premises this requires unattended deliveries (because the deliveries are outside opening hours). As a result, the premises cannot inspect the deliveries (on condition and other amount) and the driver should be able to open (part) of the premise to deliver the goods. <br />
<br />
Next, it also covers additional activities for door delivery of goods to the customers, i.e. home deliveries. One of the main issues in home deliveries of parcels, which are increasing due to the increase of e-commerce, is the relatively high number of unsuccessful deliveries due to the fact that addressees are not home at the time of delivery. Therefore, many parcels are delivered to neighbors, which in itself is a security issue for the addressee. <br />
<br />
Finally, many of the retail locations are located at areas where vulnerable road users actually use the same infrastructure as delivering trucks. This results in relatively high risks for the safety of vulnerable road users.<br />
<br />
=== Safety ===<br />
Most generic safety requirements are also of importance for retail and commercial services. As commercial venues can sometimes be very busy, the ability for the people to get to safety in time in the event of an incident ([[Evacuation Management]]) can be an important safety aspect.<br />
<br />
== Security Issues ==<br />
Commercial areas are more prone to certain types of crime than other urban objects.<br />
* Commercial burglary: Even though there are considerably fewer retail burglaries than residential burglaries, the risk of retail burglary per number of premises is very high. For example, in 2012, 12 percent of wholesale and retail establishments were burgled<ref>http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/crime-research/crime-business-prem-2012/crime-against-businesses</ref>, compared with just 2 percent of residences<ref>http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_296191.pdf</ref>. As for this form of crime the measures in a context of urban planning are very limited, it is not included as a security issue for the urban planner.<br />
* Shoplifting is a serious concern for shops. A british survey found that stores lose as much to burglars as they do to shoplifters.<ref name="clarke">Clarke Ronald V., ''Burglary of Retail Establishments'', Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Series, Guide No. 15</ref> As this problem is highly unrelated to the shape of the built environment, it is not included as a security issue for the urban planner.<br />
* [[Security issue: Vandalism| Vandalism]]<ref name="hors146">Mirrlees-Black Curiona and Ross Alec, ''Crime against retail and manufacturing premises: findings from the 1994 Commercial Victimisation Survey'', Home Office Research Study 146, copyright 1995, ISBN 1 85893 554 7</ref><br />
* [[Security issue: Graffiti| Graffiti]]: The use of metal roller-shutters have proven effective against burglary, but can have a negative effect on the street scene, and are susceptible to graffiti<ref>Home Office, ''Safer Places. The planning system and crime prevention'', 2004</ref>.[[File:Garage door graffiti-vandalism.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Roller-shutter with graffiti]]<br />
* [[Security issue: Vehicle theft| Vehicle theft]]<ref name=hors146></ref><ref>Clarke Ronald V., ''Thefts of and From Cars in Parking Facilities'', Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Series, Guide No. 10</ref>: The use of (particularly large, unattended) parking lots can attract vehicle thieves.<br />
* [[Security issue: Ram raid| Ram raid]]<ref>Jacques Christopher, ''Ram raiding: the history, incidence and scope for prevention'', Crime at work: studies in security and crime prevention</ref><br />
* [[Security issue: Robbery| Robbery]]<ref>Scott Michael S., Robbery at Automated Teller Machines, Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Series, Guide No. 8</ref>: The common presence of ATM machines in commercial areas can attract robbers who rob people who just withdrew money, or they can force people to withdraw money and then rob them of it.<br />
* [[Security issue: Pickpocketing| Pickpocketing]] can be a problem in commercial areas, especially when they are busy and distractive.<br />
<br />
== Measures ==<br />
* [[Measure: Directing traffic flows|Directing traffic flows]] can be effective against ram-raid. Particularly the use of vehicle security barriers, such as [[Bollard]]s and the use of indirect routes<ref>CPNI, ''Integrated Security. A Public Realm Design Guide for Hostile Vehicle Mitigation'', Version 1, 2011, pp 21</ref> [http://www.cpni.gov.uk/documents/publications/2011/2011001-integrated_security_v1.0.pdf?epslanguage=en-gb (link)] reduce the accessibility of the store for ramming it with vehicles.<br />
* [[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]] can greatly increase the effort needed for criminals to enter the object and thereby reduce the attractiveness of an object. The use of rollershutters can reduce the risk of burglary. It will also increase the risk of graffiti.<br />
* [[measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]] can be effective against security issues, but can incur high costs if implemented as dedicated observers, either on location or remote. A more natural form of surveillance is surveillance by the inhabitants (also known as 'natural surveillance'), provided that the commercial area is inhabited and the inhabitants have a good surveillability.<br />
* [[Measure: Intervention force|Intervention force]] is needed to make detection measures, such as alarms or surveillance effective. <br />
* [[Measure: Target removal|Target removal]] can be effective with each of above-mentioned security issues.<br />
**Commercial burglary can be reduced by providing means of easily removing the [[valuables]] from the store at night.<br />
** Vandalism and graffiti can be reduced by avoiding features that could attract these forms of crime from the area, such as blank and reachable walls or easily accessible and damaged street furniture or bus shelters. <br />
* [[Measure: Facilitating compliance|Facilitating compliance]] can prevent littering by providing ample waste bins, which can act as a crime motivator for vandalism, graffiti and other crimes.<br />
* [[Measure: Ownership|Ownership]] is an important aspect in the prevention of unauthorized entry by creating a clear distinction between public and private space. By providing a clear distinction between public and private property, unwanted entry is prevented which reduces the number of opportunities for crime.<br />
* [[Measure: Maintenance|Maintenance]] and designing for easy maintenance can be used as the removal of a crime motivator, as deterioration can be an incentive to various forms of crime.<br />
* [[Measure: Removal of crime motivator|Removal of crime motivators]] ensures the separation of perpetrators , their incentives and opportunities, Such as the prevention of blank, reachable and highly visible walls to prevent graffiti.<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Industry&diff=12632Industry2013-06-26T09:35:32Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Urban object]]<br />
[[File:IndustryIcon.jpg|right|200x200px|Industry|link=]]An '''industrial unit''' is an [[urban object]] that accommodates employment and economic activity in the processing of raw materials and in manufacturing, for the creation of goods. <br />
== Description ==<br />
Industry, an economic activity that consists of manufacturing goods and the processing of raw materials, can be broadly considered to encompass the following three archetypes:<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|-<br />
! Industry type !! Description !! Icon<br />
|-<br />
| Heavy Industry || Land and premises associated with heavy industrial activities, such as manufacturing or processing. Heavy industry is usually planned and developed away from the urban area where there is a high residential component. || [[Image:heavy_industry.png|center|x50px|Heavy Industry|link=]]<br />
|-<br />
| Light Industry || Industrial activities that are more labour intensive and less capital intensive than the above. The output is typically an end-product, of smaller consumer goods. Light industry is typically cleaner and less impacting on the physical and natural environment, and there is less restiction on its establishment close to residential areas in the urban environment.||[[Image:Industrial.jpg|center|x50px|Light Industry|link=]]<br />
|-<br />
| Warehousing ||Usually large buildings for the commercial storage of both raw materials and manufactured goods prior to distribution to retailers, etc. || [[Image:Employment Warehousing.jpg|center|x50px|Warehousing|link=]]<br />
|}<br />
<br />
Industrial employment [[Image:Industrial.jpg|border|x30px|Industrial|link=]]activities are most frequently located away from town and city centres (often in so-called industrial estates or business/commercial parks), in accordance with the zoning provisions of the relevant development plan. The character of such areas is generally single use, with little or no retail activities or residential land uses occurring within them (apart from those necessary to serve employees). This often means that they are largely unoccupied outside of normal working hours, which can raise security issues. The large footprint of the buildings required to house many industrial activities can also mean that there are significant areas that do not feature any form of passive surveillance. Warehousing [[Image:Employment Warehousing.jpg|border|x30px|Employment Warehousing|link=Warehousing]] and storage facilities would share many of the same characteristics of industrial employment activities, given that they are usually large buildings for the commercial storage of both raw materials and manufactured goods prior to distribution to retailers, etc.<br />
<br />
In the text below, any of the icons in the above table will be used whenever an observation is specific to heavy industry, light industry or warehousing urban objects.<br />
<br />
== Functions ==<br />
<br />
=== Social ===<br />
Industry is an important component of society and overall development progress. Not only is it a source of employment, but it is also important for the provision of raw materials. Many developing societies have a higher dependence on industrial activities, while more developed societies may have a broader economic base.<br />
<br />
Vulnerability assessment for industry infrastructure of the office type from the social point of view should include the following aspects: <br />
<br />
*[[Vulnerability#Social.2Fcommunity_vulnerability|List of indicators for assessment of subjective protection requirements of critical infrastructure]];<br />
*[[Critical_infrastructure#Types_of_impact_of_critical_infrasture_failure_on_citizens_and_society|Types of impact of critical infrastucture failure on citizens and society as well as needs to protect it]];<br />
*[[Failure_of_critical_services#Societal_aspects|Societal aspects of failure of critical services]].<br />
<br />
We know, for example, we know that perceived direct benefit of an infrastructure (such as of industry infrastructure that benefits the generation of a lot of citizens' income because they are employed in the industry sector) increases felt risks to that infrastructure and needs to protect it. This effect will be amplified by the fact that individual dependence, also a relevant aspect of office infrastructure, increases citizens' felt risks to infrastructure and needs to protect it. <br />
<br />
Another example is that industry infrastructure is important for supply of daily goods. We know that perceived direct benefit of an infrastructure also increases its acceptance and increased citizens' felt risks to urban infrastructure and needs to protect; felt dependence in infrastructure increases citizens' felt risks to urban infrastructure and needs to protect. <ref>Cf. Coppola, D.P.: Introduction to International Disaster Management. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007, pp. 164-166; Siedschlag, A./Jerković, A.: Summary of CPSI Country Case Studies: Austria – Bulgaria – France – Germany – Italy – Netherlands – Sweden – United Kingdom. Sigmund Freud Private University Vienna, CEUSS | Centre for European Security Studies, Analytical Standpoint, No. 13, 2010. Retrieved from: http://www.esci.at/eusipo/asp13.pdf; Slovic, P./Fischhoff, B./Lichtenstein, S.: Facts and Fears: Societal Perception of Risk. In: Monroe, K.B./Abor, A. (eds.): Advances in Consumer Research, Vol. 8 (1981), pp. 497-502. Retrieved from: http://www.acrwebsite.org/volumes/display.asp?id=5844.</ref> Societal consequences of supply chain disruptions caused by failure of industry-type urban objects can also be severe and call for vulnerability assessment beyond urban safety aspects. <br />
<br />
These examples show how important it is to involve citizens in risk assessment. In the case of industry infrastructure, this should involve users as well as nearby residents since depending on the type of industry (such as chemical), citizens could perceive it as a risk by itself, and urban planning would need to be responsive also to such a perception. VITRUV identified a set of practical methods for such [[citizen participation]]. Suitable methods to perform related assessments for industry infrastructure in particular include [[local open dialogue]] as a method to determine how citizens will be affected by spatial planning for industry usage, including addressing of citizens' perception of related risks and insecurity.<br />
<br />
=== Economic ===<br />
Industry areas accommodate economic activity that consists of manufacturing goods and the processing of raw materials (i.e. industrial activities). Today, industry plays a major role in most Western societies, and is an important source of economic activities, generating [[Economic impact|economic impact]] both as a facilitator of economic activities, and as an urban development project<ref>Industrial area development creates direct construction activity ([[Primary economic impact|primary economic impact]], including planning professionals, commercial real estate agents, attorneys, designers, marketing, landscaping, etc.). The [[Secondary economic impact|secondary impact]] of construction generates business for a variety of business types such as insurance companies, cleaning services, park management providers, etc. On the long term, industrial employment creates local jobs, income and taxes generated by the consumption and other spending of industrial terrain users (e.g. local consumption by employees, the generation of spin-offs, clustering of related industries such as suppliers, etc.).</ref>. <br />
<br />
Industrial objects are subject to both fanatics (terrorists or other types of fanatics) and unlawful intrusion (burglary). These events cause [[Economic impact of security threats|economic effects]] in terms of anticipation (e.g. security locks, surveillance, etc.), as a consequence of crime/terrorism (e.g. loss of valuable property), and in response to crime/terrorism (police investigation, legal system, war on terrorism, etc.). Crime and terrorism also generate [[Secondary economic impact|secondary economic effect]] on other parts of the local/regional economy.<br />
<br />
Apart from the more traditional security measures such as policing, alarm systems, surveillance and regulatory bodies, the ‘[[Designing out approach|designing out]]’ or '[[Sustainable design|sustainable design]]' approach in the earliest stages in the planning process, can be in the long run an effective measure from an economic point of view to prevent security threats and reduce the economic damage<ref>In general, these measures demand larger investments than traditional security measures, but at the same time they are able to avoid future costs due to the long-term prevention of crime.</ref>.<br />
<br />
=== Mobility ===<br />
Industrial areas are usually located at peripheral locations at the outer edge of cities or near ports and other transportation [[Hub|hubs]]. <br />
<br />
The peripheral location of many industrial facilities will often dictate their mobility requirements; they will frequently generate a significant amount of [[Traffic management#congestion|congestion]] as people may not have the same public transport mode availability of employees working in more central or well served locations, and the traffic demand to and from industrial zones is largest during peak hours. Congestion may cause a higher safety and security risk, as explained [[Traffic management#congestion|here]].<br />
<br />
A special form of transport connected to industry is transport of hazardous or dangerous goods. Hazardous goods can be transported via all [[Modes of transport|modalities]] (road, rail, water) or via special infrastructure such as pipelines. Transportation of hazardous goods causes particular security risks, since hazardous goods can harm people (by definition) if they are released. Hazardous goods are for example radioactive, flammable, explosive, or toxic. "HazMat teams" are personnel specially trained to handle dangerous goods <ref>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dangerous_goods</ref>. There are several sets of regulations covering aspects of the transport of hazardous substances <ref>http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/staff/policy/healthandsafety/publications/transportofhazardoussubstancesguidance/</ref>.<br />
<br />
=== Safety ===<br />
Specific safety issues of industrial venues arise when:<br />
* The object can be potentially harmful to humans (such as chemical plants, oil/gas refineries and storages, nuclear plants, etcetera). The regular transport and storage of large quantities of hazardous goods adds to this threat, as it increases the probability and impact of and incident, respectively.<br />
* The object is situated next to incompatible land used (for example a high risk industrial complex close to a stadium, which could increase the impact of an accident manifold).<br />
* The object holding hazardous materials is situated in a location with an increased risk of natural hazards (storm, flooding, earthquake, etc.) or suffers a lax safety regime.<br />
* The object provides an essential service to the well-being of humans and belongs to the [[critical infrastructure]]. In this case, the sole fact of its failure can bring harm to the people by the interruption of essential services (such as power, water or telecom services).<br />
<br />
== Security Issues ==<br />
Security issues associated with industrial objects, are amongst others related with the fact that it can be an [[attractive object]] for fanatics. This is due to the potential of some industrial objects to magnify the effect of an attack. This happens when an object has one of the above mentioned safety issues associated with it. Also, industrial objects often store goods that might be perceived as [[valuables]]. This makes these kinds of urban objects vulnerable for the following security issues:<br />
* [[Security issue: Burglary]]<br />
* [[Security issue: Destruction by fanatics]]<br />
* [[Security issue: Mass killing]] (indirectly, by destruction of an industrial object that will become a hazard for its surroundings)<br />
<br />
== Measures ==<br />
The measures for each type of security issue can be found on the respective pages. There are few measures they are specifically suited or unsuited to this kind of urban object, but some general considerations can be mentioned:<br />
<br />
As offices are closed (non public) areas, the flows in and out the area can be strictly controlled if needed.<br />
* [[Measure: Ownership| Ownership]] is required for the public to be aware to enter private space and know to act accordingly.<br />
* [[Measure: Access control| Access control]] is closely related to ownership and one of the most rudimentary measures as it ensures the possibility to determine who does and who does not get access to the premise. It is usually enforced by having a dynamic gate (for vehicles, pedestrians, bicyclists, etc.) with a guard at hand or electronically present.<br />
* [[Measure: Screening| Screening]] is a measure that can be employed supporting access control. By screening your visitors, a more rigid access control can be enforced.<br />
* [[Measure: Directing traffic flows| Directing traffic flows]] can be employed to ensure only the expected kind of traffic enters via the entrances. Examples of directing traffic flows for industry locations are fences around the premises, creating separate routes for visitors and delivery, creating separate entrances for trusted visitors and personnel or creating low passages to separate passenger cars from trucks.<br />
* [[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]] can greatly increase the effort needed for criminals to enter the object and thereby reduce the attractiveness of an object. Target hardening is especially effective in combination with detection measures, such as alarms or surveillance and intervention force. The object of target hardening is to delay the crime long enough to be detected and intervened upon by a intervention force. A target which - in the perception of the criminal - is hardened to a level that entry is not likely before detection and intervention, is not attractive.<br />
* [[measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]] can be effective against security issues, but can incur high costs if implemented as dedicated observers, either on location or remote. A more natural form of surveillance is surveillance by the inhabitants (also known as 'natural surveillance'), provided that the commercial area is inhabited and the inhabitants have a good surveillability.<br />
* [[Measure: Intervention force|Intervention force]] is needed to make detection measures, such as alarms or surveillance effective. <br />
<br />
For an optimal security policy all aspects of security should be coherently considered in the security strategy. This means that physical/procedural/organisational security measures should be coordinated with cyber/information security and personnel security. If this coordination is not assured, security gaps and overlaps can occur in the security regime, both of which can be detrimental to the level of security. <br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Residential&diff=12631Residential2013-06-26T09:29:32Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Urban object]]<br />
[[File:RESIDENTIAL.jpg|right|200x200px|link=]]A residential [[urban object]] is a unit which is generally zoned/designated for dwelling purposes and designed to accommodate housing facilities in which people can live.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
Residential areas, which are normally zoned as such by the relevant (city authority or municipality) development plan, are typically classified by providing varying amounts of living accommodation for people, with the amount of units and consequently the number of people living within them depending upon the prescribed density. The amount of land zoned for residential development should be in keeping with the projected population growth figures, as set out in regional strategic development documents (such as Regional Planning Guidelines).<br />
<br />
Residential areas will generally consist of accommodation units of a number of different types: apartment schemes (medium to high density), detached or semi detached houses (low to medium density), or terraced housing (medium to high density). The character of a residential area can be heavily influenced by the mixture of tenures (owner occupier, private rental, social housing) which are available within them. All of these factors will have an influence on the security of a residential area.<br />
<br />
===Residential building types===<br />
Residential development can encompass a wide variety of structures. For the use of this page, we divided this broad spectrum into three archetypes:<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|-<br />
! Residence type !! Description !! Icon<br />
|-<br />
| Housing estates|| Housing estates consist of detached, semi-detached and/or terraced housing, typically with some level of private open space associated with each unit.|| [[Image:Housing Estate.jpg|center|x50px|link=]]<br />
|-<br />
| Housing blocks || A housing block is made up of a rectangular layout consisting of connected residential units, often with a private open square contained within it.|| [[Image:Housing Block.jpg|center|x50px|link=]]<br />
|-<br />
| High rise housing || High rise housing consists of apartment schemes usually in excess of 6 storey's in height, although apartment schemes of lower height are common.|| [[Image:Housing High Rise.jpg|center|x50px|link=]]<br />
|}<br />
<br />
These archetypes will never completely fit any specific situation, but are used to present the typical issues associated with these archetypical situations, to enable the reader to decide to what degree it applies to his or hers specific situation.<br />
<br />
In the text below, any of these three icons will be used whenever a observation is specific to one or more of the above mentioned archetypes.<br />
<br />
== Functions ==<br />
=== Social ===<br />
From the security point of view, the prior social importance of residential areas is to provide a trusted environment for citizens that enhances communal [[resilience]] while reducing [[vulnerability]]. The importance of housing is recognised in the United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, that includes 'the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate ... housing'.<ref>http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/human-rights/human-rights-practical-guidance/guidance-from-the-commission/human-rights-at-home.</ref><br />
<br />
====Resilience-enhancing aspects====<br />
Residential land use is hugely important to a citizen's quality of life, and the standard of housing experienced by citizens will have a significant impact on overall health. Housing provides shelter, a basic human need, and privacy. The quality of housing is influenced by its size, amenities, habitability, and general liveability. The attractiveness of residential areas and the wider urban environment influences the quality of life of citizens. Those aspects are important from the societal [[security]] point of view since they have an impact on [[resilience]], at individual and collective levels, as illustrated by the following examples: <br />
<br />
*Residential areas should provide some aspect with which citizen's may identify (be it employment or a recreational facility, etc) and offer the services/facilities that they seek. Some people, who rent property within areas, may feel less of a sense of ownership or permanency/commitment for that area.<ref>http://www.npr.org/2012/06/07/154504195/generation-rent-slamming-door-of-homeownership.</ref><br />
<br />
*Communities with high levels of 'collective efficacy' – or high levels of cohesion and mutual trust – will be willing to intervene to challenge behaviour in a given setting and stop it from escalating. Communities with low levels of ‘collective efficacy’ (e.g. areas with a high proportion of young offenders as a result of a churning migrant population with shifting moral values, high levels of poverty, and low levels of community cohesion) will be less willing or able to intervene.<ref>Carrabine E., Cox P., Lee M., Plummer, K. and South, N. (2008) Criminology. A Sociological Introduction. 2nd Edition. London et al: Rouldedge, Chapter 8: "Crime, Place and Space"</ref> <br />
<br />
====Vulnerability-reducing aspects====<br />
[[File:Residential_attractiveness.png|thumb|right|300px|What makes an area a good place to live?]]<br />
There are a couple of relations between the built environment of a residential area and its vulnerability from a security point of view, such as the following: <br />
<br />
*The level of safety and security is a very important value in the perceived attractiveness of a residential area (see illustration), as residential areas provide the home base for people and their families. In addition, inadequate housing increases the risk of severe ill health and disability; it can also lead to poor mental health, lower educational attainment, unemployment, and poverty.<br />
<br />
*Another example is that poor residential development (bad housing) can impact on children's future chances. The Shelter housing agency report 'Chance of a Lifetime' documents the powerful influence of poor housing on children's lives and shows how its destabilising impact is felt long into adulthood.<ref>Harker, Lisa (2006) Home Truths: http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2006/sep/13/comment.guardiansocietysupplement.</ref> On every aspect of life - mental, physical, emotional, social and economic - living in bad housing can hand children a devastating legacy. Studies show that poor housing can lead to a 25 per cent higher risk of experiencing severe ill-health and disability before they reach middle age. It can have a devastating impact on emotional wellbeing. Research shows that homeless children are three to four times more likely to have mental health problems than other children,<ref>Harker, Lisa (2006) Home Truths: http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2006/sep/13/comment.guardiansocietysupplement.</ref>while bad housing can also lead to youth behavioural problems and offences:<br />
{{quote|How does bad housing affect children’s chances to make a positive contribution in life?<br />
* Homeless children are more likely to show signs of behavioural problems such as aggression, hyperactivity, and impulsivity; <br />
* Poor housing conditions and overcrowding may also contribute to the emergence of problem behaviour;<br />
* Behavioural difficulties in childhood, which may be attributable to or exacerbated by bad housing, can manifest themselves in offending behaviour later in life. In the UK, nearly half of male remand young offenders and 42 per cent of female sentenced young offenders have experienced homelessness).<ref>http://england.shelter.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/66364/Lifechancereport.pdf</ref>.}}<br />
<br />
====Hazard-reducing aspects====<br />
*Quality of residency also has criminological impact in that it can contribute to preventing - or creating - hazard. Evidence suggests that nearly half of young offenders have experienced homelessness as a child, and the roots of offending behaviour may well be traceable to problems that emerge when children grow up in such conditions.<ref>Harker, Lisa (2006) Chance of a lifetime: The impact of bad housing on children’s lives. Available from: http://england.shelter.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/39202/Chance_of_a_Lifetime.pdf</ref><br />
<br />
*Research has also shown that a wide range of features of the physical environment at the street block and neighborhood levels have proven relevant to predicting crime rates and crime-related outcomes, such as fear of crime and neighborhood confidence, that among other things relate to the perception of hazard.<ref>Taylor, R.B. and Harrell, A.V. (1996) Physical Environment and Crime: A Final Summary Report Presented to the National Institute of Justice </ref><br />
<br />
In terms of practical methods, [[crime prevention by design]] - such as for example "crime prevention through [[environmental design]]" (CPTED) - is of priority in this field, although it also involves some measures directed at vulnerability reduction rather than reduction of hazard.<br />
<br />
=== Economic ===<br />
Residential areas accommodate the people who operate in and utilise the economic systems of the urban area. Additionally, residential areas both enhance a communities’ ability to attract new business, and in the same time provide citizens with one of its most basic needs (housing). As a whole, residential land use is the most valuable urban spatial structure due to its great aggregate value and [[causes::Economic impact|economic impact]] for the local economy<ref>For example: Residential development creates direct construction activity (primary economic impact), including planning professionals, attorneys, designers, marketing, landscaping, etc.). Indirectly, residential areas create local jobs, income and taxes due to the consumption generated by residential inhabitants.</ref>. Moreover, residential areas foster critical mass which contributes to economic, social and transport (infrastructure) activities. These economic impacts can be estimated with the help of [[Economic tools|economic tools/techniques]].<br />
<br />
The most common types of residential [[Threat|security threats]] (in terms of human intent) are crime related (e.g., domestic burglary, robbery, graffiti, assault, etc.). Crime generates [[Economic effects of crime|costs]] in anticipation of crime (e.g. locks, surveillance, etc.), as a consequence of crime (loss of property) and in response to crime (police investigation, legal system, etc.). [[Economic effects of crime#Secondary economic effects of crime|Indirectly]], crime has (amongst others) an impact on, for example, the local real estate value<ref>This regards not only violent crimes or domestic burglary, but also petty crimes such as graffiti and vandalism.</ref>.<br />
<br />
Security devices such as locks, closed circuit television, surveillance or improved street lightning have an [[Economic impact of security measures|economic impact]] (in terms of costs and benefits) which can be considerable. Another way to enhance security is by design, e.g. the [[Designing out approach|designing out approach]], or as an aspect of [[Sustainable design|sustainable design]], which seeks a balanced consideration of social, economic, cultural and environmental aspects in urban design<ref>Including fundamental issues such as how affordability can be reconciled with a secure/safe place to live, and how an imbalance between affluence and deprivation can be prevented.</ref>. In general, these measures demand larger investments than traditional security measures, but at the same time they are able to avoid future costs due to the long-term prevention of crime. An example of home security measures:<br />
<br />
{{quote|The Association of British Insurers (ABI)<ref>Association of British Insurers (2006). ''Securing the Nation: The Case for Safer Homes''</ref> performed a cost-benefit analysis on target hardening measures for home security. The analysis was based on the estimates of the average household cost of burglary (£3,300), the average cost of Security By Design (SBD) target hardening (£630), burglary rates (average 2.7 - 6.7% range), and socio-economic demographics. The per household net present value benefit of target hardening measures was projected over 20 years, yielding benefits of over £1,170 per household. As a result, the average household benefits are nearly double the average cost of the introduced security measures.}}<br />
<br />
=== Mobility ===<br />
The presence of large numbers of people living within one part of an urban area brings with it a requirement for mobility, in allowing them to move throughout the urban area to take advantage of the various functions on offer within its different parts.<br />
<br />
The transportation demand in a network depends on the functions of the different zones in a network. With demand estimation models, the demand can be estimated as the expected number of trips in a certain time period for a certain modality (e.g. car, [[Modes of transport|public transport]]) between each combination of origin zone and destination zone, depending on the function of the zones. This is also called a [[Transportation system|trip market]].<br />
For a residential zone, in the morning there will be many trips going out (e.g. towards work, school), while in the afternoon there will be large demands going into the zone. This should be taken into account for operating traffic management measures or for predicting future/expected traffic flows.<br />
<br />
Furthermore, in order to prevent crime, the mobility network should be designed such that there are as little spaces as possible that cannot be seen easily by the public. Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if criminals can operate, including travelling to and from the location, without fear of being seen; and if all sides of buildings and all parts of spaces are not overlooked by surrounding users or passers-by <ref name="SaferPlaces" /> .<br />
<br />
==== Cul-de-sacs ====<br />
Residential areas can benefit from a design that minimises transit through the area, as crime is positively related to the amount of traffic through an area and residential areas only need good entry and exit points and can function perfectly well as cul-de-sacs. <br />
Homes in cul-de-sacs can be highly secure, but the cul-de-sac should be short and straight (to allow visibility from one end to the other) and should not be joined by networks of footpaths that are irregularly used but likely to foster criminal activity <ref name="SaferPlaces"> Safer Places - the Planning System and Crime Prevention. Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, London</ref>. It should be borne in mind however that while cul-de-sacs can be beneficial from a crime-reduction perspective, many urban planners and designers do not favour their use, as they can create an introverted layout which fails to integrate with the surroundings<ref>English Partnerships and The Housing Corporation (2000) The Urban Design Compendium </ref><ref>Also discussed at: http://uctc.its.berkeley.edu/access/24/Access%2024%20-%2006%20-%20Reconsidering%20the%20Cul-de-sac.pdf</ref>.<br />
<br />
=== Safety ===<br />
Safety in all its forms, is an important function for the perceived quality of these environments. The common presence of children in residential areas further elevate the required safety standards. However well as these environments are designed to provide safety, the safety function can be deteriorated by crime. Examples of crime deteriorating safety are:<br />
<br />
* [[File:electricity_meter.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Vandalised electricity meters, leading to potentially unsafe situations]][[Security issue: Vandalism| Vandalism]]: destruction of safety features (such as traffic signs, fencing around dangerous areas or child-safe playgrounds) can lead to dangerous situations and safety hazards.<br />
* [[Security issue: Burglary| Burglary]] often leads to substantial damages due to the forced entry. Broken windows and doors no longer provide shelter for the cold, wind, rain, which can lead to subsequent safety hazards, such as with electricity and wet surfaces.<br />
* [[Security issue: Antisocial behaviour| Antisocial behaviour]] can for instance endanger people by generating street litter, such as broken bottles or reckless driving<br />
* [[Security issue: Drug offences| Drug offences]] can also lead to dangerous litter in the streets, such as used needles.<br />
<br />
== Security Issues ==<br />
Crimes most relevant to residential areas, are:<br />
<br />
* [[Security issue: Burglary| Burglary]]<br />
* [[Security issue: Vehicle theft| Vehicle theft]]<br />
* [[Security issue: Robbery| Robbery]]<br />
* [[Security issue: Assault| Assault]]<br />
* [[Security issue: Sexual assault| Sexual Assault]]<br />
* [[Security issue: Vandalism| Vandalism]]<br />
* [[Security issue: Graffiti| Graffiti]]<br />
<br />
Of these crimes, burglary is in general regarded as the most relevant to residential areas. Burglary is a security issue that is amongst others affected by the population density. Though generally high population density is associated with high rates of assault and burglary, when corrected for the presence of poverty and lack of vegetation, rates of assaults and burglaries are higher in more sparsely populated neighbourhoods. This means that especially high-density neighbourhoods with little vegetation are prone to these issues<ref>Mary K. Wolfe, Jeremy Mennis;''Does vegetation encourage or suppress urban crime? Evidence from Philadelphia, PA''; in: Landscape and Urban Planning 108 (2012), pp 112– 122</ref>. Many traditional designed high-rise residential environments [[Image:Housing High Rise.jpg|x30px|link=]]were designed with these qualities, leading to relatively high levels of crime and a tendency for early deterioration.<br />
<br />
== Measures ==<br />
* [[Measure: Directing traffic flows|Directing traffic flows]] can be effective both in preventing criminals to become aware of opportunities and reducing the opportunities for approach of a target. Especially housing blocks[[Image:Housing Block.jpg|x30px|link=]] and housing estates[[Image:Housing Estate.jpg|x30px|link=]] can benefit from a careful design of traffic flows, effectively reducing the 'visibility' of an area to criminals. For high-rise housing [[Image:Housing High Rise.jpg|x30px|link=]]this is less effective due the high visibility of the structure.<br />
* [[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]] can greatly increase the effort needed for criminals to enter the object and thereby reduce the attractiveness of a n object<br />
* [[measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]] can be effective against mentioned security issues, but can incur high costs if implemented as dedicated observers, either on location or remote. A more natural form of surveillance is surveillance by the inhabitants (also known as 'natural surveillance'). This can be very effective if the right conditions are met, such as adequate surveillability of the environment (from the own home), social cohesion and a sense of ownership. These factors can all be influenced by the structure of the built environment, but have proven to be most challenging to achieve in high-rise housing [[Image:Housing High Rise.jpg|x30px|link=]].<br />
* [[Measure: Intervention force|Intervention force]] is needed to make detection measures, such as alarms or surveillance effective <br />
* [[Measure: Target removal|Target removal]] such as the removal of coin operated gas and electricity meters in houses or coin operated parking meters<br />
* [[Measure: Facilitating compliance|Facilitating compliance]] can prevent littering by providing ample waste bins, it can prevent unwanted traffic flows by careful design of the mobility in an area<br />
* [[Measure: Ownership|Ownership]] is an important aspect in the prevention of unauthorized entry by creating a clear distinction between public and private space<br />
* [[Measure: Maintenance|Maintenance]] and designing for easy maintenance can be used as the removal of a crime motivator, as deterioration can be an incentive to crime<br />
* [[Measure: Removal of crime motivator|Removal of crime motivators]] ensures the separation of perpetrators , their incentives and opportunities, Such as the prevention of blank, reachable and highly visible walls to prevent graffiti.<br />
<br />
A combination of these measures is used in the practical approach '[http://www.securedbydesign.com/professionals/guides.aspx secured by design'].<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Security_issue:_Mass_killing&diff=12630Security issue: Mass killing2013-06-26T09:13:12Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Threat]][[Category:Safety]]<br />
[[File:Russell_square_ambulances.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Ambulances on the street after the 2005 London Bombings]]'''Mass killing''' is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of [[human intent|willful action]] by [[fanatic]]s: terrorists or criminal activists.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
We see that the target of fanatics can be persons, objects, or both. This category of security issues focusses on the threat directed towards people. When directed at objects, it falls under the category of [[security issue: Destruction by fanatics|destruction by fanatics]].<br />
<br />
The motives for mass killing by fanatics can mostly be found in the amount of attention it yields. This motive gives a very good clue of who and what locations might be potential targets for fanatics: not only should an attack yield a fair amount of attention, it should also be the kind of attention aiding the fanatics' cause. Depending on the fanatics faction, this can entail a wide variety of reactions; for some factions, negative attention is not unwanted. We see this in the [[Wikipedia:World Trade Center#Destruction|11 September 2001 attack]] on the New York Trade Center. Although this generated almost uniformly negative responses in the western world, this was received with joy by the responsible faction (al-Qaeda).<br />
<br />
The [[The economics of terrorist behaviour|roots of terrorism]] can also be found in certain poor or unfavourable conditions such as relative economic deprivation (manifested in poverty, income inequality, etc.), socio-economic change (fostered by the process of for example modernisation) and economic and political integration<ref>Schneider, F., T. Brück, and Karaisl, M. (2008). A survey of the Economics of Security. Economics of Security Working Paper 1.</ref>. ([[The economics of crime|The roots of) crime]] is closely related to poverty, social exclusion, wage and income inequality, cultural and family background, level of education and other economic and social factors<ref>Buananno, P. (2003). The Socioeconomic Determinantes of Crime. A Review of the Literature. Working Paper Series, No.63. University of Milan.</ref>.<br />
<br />
== Contributing circumstances ==<br />
Known circumstances to influence the likelihood or effect of mass killing are presented in the table below:<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|-<br />
! width=150 | Contributing Circumstance !!width=150| Influence !! Description <br />
|-<br />
| Presence of crowds or busy places. || Increases attractiveness || As the object of mass killing is to kill or injure as many people as possible, places where many people gather form an attractive target. The predictability of crowds adds to the attractiveness.<br />
|-<br />
| Presence of prominent objects and/or ideological associations. || Increases attractiveness || For an attack to have the desired effect (in the eyes of terrorists), it needs to attract wide attention and be associated with their 'cause'. Prominent objects will assure attention, objects which can be associated to their ideological beliefs will assure the 'right' message will be carried. One should realise that what constitutes a prominent or ideologically attractive object should be assessed from the viewpoint of the fanatic and these can either be very specific or general.<br />
|-<br />
| Presence of safety threats that could be misused. || Increases attractiveness || Sometimes, an object is used as a force multiplier for an attack directed at people. This can be used on [[urban object]]s if:<br />
* the object can be potentially harmful to humans (such as chemical plants, oil/gas refineries and storages, nuclear plants, etcetera)<br />
* the object provides an essential service to the well-being of humans and belongs to the critical infrastructure. In this case, its failure can bring harm to the people.<br />
<br />
The presence of such an object in the vicinity of large groups of people can raise the attractiveness and attainability for an attack by fanatics and therefore increase the risk.<br />
|-<br />
| Lack of surveillance and attention. || Decreases risk of detection. || A low level of surveillance or attention, decreases the risk of detection (particularly in the preparation phase of an attack) for a perpetrator and thereby increases the attractiveness.<br />
|-<br />
| Long reaction times or inadequate action of intervention force. || Decreases likelihood of apprehension || Untimely or inappropriate reactions to violence lead to a perception of little control, which will increase perceived risk for the public and decrease perceived risk for the perpetrators.<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Impacts ==<br />
===Social impact===<br />
* Psychological trauma<br />
* Reduced perception of safety<br />
<br />
===Economic impact===<br />
The effects of mass killing in terms of economic consequences are complex. Terrorist events and violent crime not only lead to material and immaterial costs for those who have become victimised, but also forces local and national authorities to spend billions on the prevention of terrorism and the detection, prosecution and punishment of terrorists (the [[Economic effects of terrorism#Primary economic impact of terrorism|primary economic impact of terrorism]]). <br />
<br />
The material costs (e.g. loss of productivity) and immaterial costs (e.g. suffering, pain, sorrow, and loss of enjoyment of life) of mass killing events are generally expressed in terms of the value per statistical life (VSL). "The value per statistical life represents an individual’s willingness to exchange income or wealth for small changes in the likelihood of survival, rather than purchasing other goods or services"<ref>Source: Robinson, L.A. et al. (2010). Valuing the Risk of Death from Terrorist Attacks. ''Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management''. Vol.7, Issue 1, Article 14.</ref>. The VSL ranges from € 1.4 million to € 2.1 million (2009 prices) in the EU<ref> Jost, G., Allsop, R., Steriu, M. & Popolizio, M. (2011). 2010 Road safety target outcome: 100,000 fewer deaths since 2001. 5th Road Safety PIN Report. European Transport Safety Council ETSC, Brussels.</ref>. However, according to ''Robinson et al''. (2010)<ref name="RobinsonEA"> Robinson, L.A. et al. (2010). Valuing the Risk of Death from Terrorist Attacks. ''Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management''. Vol.7, Issue 1, Article 14.</ref> “terrorism-related risks may be perceived as more dreaded and ambiguous, and less controllable and voluntary, than the workplace risks underlying many VSL estimates”. “These factors may increase the VSL appropriate for terrorism risks, possibly doubling the value”<ref name="RobinsonEA"/>.<br />
<br />
In addition to the primary economic impacts, terrorism and violent crime cause the disruption of economic entities, which have not been direct targets of the attack (the [[Economic effects of terrorism#Secondary economic impact of terrorism|secondary economic impacts of terrorism]])<ref name="ftn27"> Source: Schneider, F., T. Brück and D. Meierrieks (2009). ''The Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey''.</ref>. Security measures can prevent destruction by fanatics, but not without [[Economic effects of anti-terrorism security measures|costs]]. Access control or screening, for example, is costly and there is always the risk of [[The economics of terrorist behaviour#Dynamic interaction between terrorism and counter-terrorism|terrorist displacement]]<ref>The relocation of crime/terrorism from one place, time, target, offence, or tactic to another as a result of some crime prevention initiative</ref>. With the help of [[Economic tools|economic tools]] such as [[Social cost-benefit analysis|social cost-benefit analysis]] it is possible to overview the costs and future benefits of security measures in order to decide which types of measures are best suited for a specific urban planning situation.<br />
<br />
===Mobility impact===<br />
Mobility effects of mass killing can be seperated into the direct effect of the mass killing and the effects of preventive measures (airport checks, etc.).<br />
<br />
Since a mass killing has a very rare frequency of occuring, the direct effect is of less important than the effects of preventive measures.<br />
An example of a direct mobility effect is when the mass killing involves the mobility system, such as with [[Mobility#Description|train or metro bombings]]. The mass killing then paralyzes the normal functioning of the mobility system.<br />
<br />
Preventive mobility measures for mass killing deal with controlling who enters a certain area or building, by controlling the [[Accessibility|accessibility]] and [[Access and egress|access and egress]], the entry or exit to an urban object. <br />
Also suspicious driver/travelling behaviour can be detected from camera or police surveillance, for example to detect a suspicious person on a public space who could cause mass killing (e.g. by suicide).<br />
<br />
One of the mobility effect of airport checks is that travel times (from home to into the airplane) are increased. Also since the time of the security check (due to different lengths of the waiting queue) are normally unknown before starting the trip, the travel time reliability with heavy airport checks is less. Both effects (longer travel time and lower travel time reliability) mean that the departure time for the trip should be earlier. This leads to higher (economic) costs, since time represents a certain value (Value of Time [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Value_of_time]).<br />
<br />
===Safety impact===<br />
A successful mass killing attack can do massive physical and/or bodily damage. The collateral damages from an attack can sometime be so great that they weaken structures and unsafe situation arise, but compared to the direct effects of a successful attack, these risks are usually minor.<br />
<br />
== Measures ==<br />
*[[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]] can be done by making it harder to take weapons of mass destruction to a vulnerable location, e.g. by separating traffic flows so car bombs cannot come close to masses of people, or by separating locations where such weapons might possibly come from masses of people by hardened obstacles, reducing the effect of the weapon. For support on construction methods and materials that mitigate explosion effects and structural collapse one can use the [[Plan level tools]] and [[Detail level tools]].<br />
*[[Measure: Access control|Access control]], combined with [[Measure: Directing traffic flows|directing traffic flows]] can be used to assure all traffic entering and exiting a location passes at certain, predestined points. This allows for all traffic to be monitored (Surveillance) or even screened (see below).<br />
*[[Measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]] can help to detect suspicious activities, like left luggage or groups of people monitoring the situation (in a preparation phase of the attack).<br />
*[[Measure: Intervention force|Intervention force]]s can be used to act when suspicious activities have been detected. These intervention forces range from normal guards, who can investigate the seriousness of reports made by the public to bomb squads.<br />
*[[Measure: Screening|Screening]] can be used to test a flow of traffic for suspicious signs. This can include metal detectors, trained personnel looking for people carrying suspicious luggage, random body searches, etcetera. The gravity of the measures taken should always be in balance with the threat and the nature of the location.<br />
*[[Measure: Target removal|Target removal]] can be done by designing an area to be free of concentrations of people or by reducing the predictability of concentrations of people.<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Security_issue:_Pickpocketing&diff=12629Security issue: Pickpocketing2013-06-26T09:09:02Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Threat]][[Category:Safety]]<br />
[[image:pickpocketing.jpg|thumb|right|300x300px|Lifting a wallet from a handbag without being noticed, a classic example of pickpocketing]]'''Pickpocketing''' is a form of [[theft]] that involves the stealing of [[valuables]] from a the person of a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. <br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
Pickpocketing is an issue that is especially present in large cities, where crowds of people are omnipresent and distractions are plentiful. Although Barcelona and Rome were recently singled out as being particularly dangerous pickpocketing havens.<ref>[http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1215982/Barcelona-pickpocket-capital-world.html "Barcelona, pickpocket capital of the world "], ''The Daily Mail'', September 25, 2009</ref><ref>[http://journals.worldnomads.com/safetyhub/story/69750/Italy/Italy-1-for-Pickpockets "Italy - #1 for Pickpockets"], WorldNomads.com, October 20, 2011</ref><ref>[http://multivu.prnewswire.com/mnr/tripadvisor/37974/ "TRIPADVISOR POINTS OUT TOP 10 PLACES WORLDWIDE TO BEWARE PICKPOCKETS"], TripAdvisor, September 10, 2009</ref>, pickpockets may be found in any crowded place around the world.<br />
<br />
== Contributing circumstances ==<br />
Known circumstances to influence the likelihood or effect of pickpocketing, are presented in the table below:<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|-<br />
! width=150 | Contributing Circumstance !!width=150| Influence !! Description <br />
|-<br />
| Lack of surveillance. || Decreases risk of detection. || A low level of surveillance, particularly round-the-clock surveillance, decreases the perceived risk of detection for a perpetrator and thereby increases the attractiveness.<br />
|-<br />
| Long reaction times or inadequate action of intervention force. || Decreases likelihood of apprehension || Untimely or inappropriate reactions to violence lead to a perception of little control, which will increase perceived risk for the public and decrease perceived risk for the perpetrators.<br />
|-<br />
| High levels of pickpocketing in the environment. || Increases likelihood of targeting. || Pickpocketers will travel to attractive locations, but typically not too far.<ref>reference not found</ref> The existence of successful pickpockets in the wider area (a radius of about 5 km), is an indication to assume the threat might also apply to the location at hand.<br />
|-<br />
| High levels of unemployment || Increases likelihood of targeting || High levels of unemployment are associated with higher levels of property crime<ref>Weatherburn Don, Riots, ''Policing and Social Disadvantage: Learning from the Riots in Macquarie Fields and Redfern'', Current Issues in Criminal Justice Volume 18 Number 1, July 2006</ref>.<br />
|-<br />
| Presence of crowds or busy places || Increases number of targets, decreases risk of apprehension || Pocket-picking is most common in places where large groups of people gather. Transportation facilities, such as bus terminals and rail-road stations, are favourite hunting grounds for pickpockets, but a department store, public arena, or city street also can supply enough potential victims.<ref name="young">Young, David, ''Pickpockets, Their Victims, and the Transit Police'', FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin Volume:72 Issue:12 Dated:December 2003,P.p 1-5</ref><br />
|-<br />
| Presence of excitement or distractions|| Decreases risk of being detected || The most significant factor in the victim profile possibly may be psychological. A crowded terminal creates a distracting environment. People are packed together in cramped waiting areas listening for public announcements, watching a departure, carrying packages, or talking on a cellular telephone. The station's environment creates a sensory overload. Further, the victims, conditioned by the rush hour atmosphere of the station, are accustomed to the close physical proximity of other people.<ref name="young"></ref><br />
|-<br />
| Use of drugs or alcohol || Decreases risk of being detected || The use of drugs or alcohol decreases the vigilance of potential victims and therefore increases the chances of a pickpocket to successfully commit his or her crime. <br />
|-<br />
| Presence of tourists || Decreases risk of being detected || Tourists are often very recognizable and typically distracted by their surroundings. As they often also mass-visit the same locations, these locations become very busy and an ideal hunting ground for pickpockets. Because tourists often are obvious by their dress, carry items easily disposed of once stolen, and are temporary visitors (and thus unable to put much pressure on police to act against criminals, or unlikely to appear as a prosecution witness), tourist zones allow pickpockets, swindlers, thieves, gang members, and robbers to commit crimes they might not otherwise attempt or be able to accomplish.<ref>Glensor Ronald W., and Peak Kenneth J., ''Crimes Against Tourists'', Problem-Oriented Guides for Police, Guide No. 26. August 2004</ref><br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Impacts ==<br />
===Social impact===<br />
* Perception of unsafety;<br />
* Urban environments with a high rate of pickpocketing will be seen as less attractive places for the public to frequent or visit;<br />
* Public transport nodes and services, together with areas where there are large crowds (such as busy shopping streets or market squares), can become less comfortable places to be when you are aware there is a high rate of pickpocketing;<br />
* Different groupings of society are often targeted more than others (e.g. tourists) due to a lack of familiarity with the context of the area, and owing to a likelihood of their attention being distracted (e.g. taking photographs).<br />
<br />
=== Economic impact===<br />
Property crimes such as pickpocketing lead to considerable costs in both a direct ([[Economic effects of crime#Primary economic impact of crime|primary]]) and a indirect ([[Economic effects of crime#Secondary economic impact of crime|secondary]]) way<ref>Primary economic impact (or direct effects) are generally defined as the initial, immediate economic output generated by a specific cause (in this case a criminal offence). Secondary economic impact (or indirect effects) are generated each time a subsequent transaction is made, for example, the impact of crime on the real estate value in the neighbourhood.</ref>. Direct costs of pickpocketing come in the form of:<br />
* Preventive costs for individuals in anticipation of pickpocketing (e.g. prevention, insurance fees);<br />
* Material and immaterial costs to victims as a consequence of pickpocketing (e.g. value of property stolen repairs, mental harm); and<br />
* Responsive costs by public authorities to pickpocketing (e.g. the costs of detection and prevention, prosecution, support trial, etc.). <br />
<br />
In addition, pickpocketing on a large scale could lead to [[Economic effects of crime#Secondary economic impact of crime|secondary economic impact]], but these effects are relatively minor compared to more serious types of crime. Nevertheless, a growing amount of local authorities vying (competing) for tourism and investment on an (inter)national level, are increasingly focused on the prevention and prosecution of petty crimes like pickpocketing (in order to stimulate tourism or at least to prevent a decline due to a bad reputation). Like with most types of crime, the success of these authorities is above all a matter of perceived success, rather than actual success.<br />
<br />
Like street robbers, pickpockets are difficult to deter. They have a lot of crime opportunities and pickpocketing does not require much planning or skill (although some are really skilled technically spoken). On top of that, pickpockets will adapt quickly to preventive security measures in accordance with the [[The economics of crime|economics of criminal behaviour]]. Pickpockets will, for example, use accomplices to distract the potential victim, or use disguises to avoid cameras.<br />
<br />
===Mobility impact===<br />
There is a high rate of pickpocketing at several mobility related locations, such as public transport nodes and services (especially [[Transport Infrastructure#Train station|train]] and [[Transport Infrastructure#Metro station|metro stations]]), together with areas where there are large [[Crowd|crowds]] (such as busy [[Shopping centre|shopping centres]] or shopping streets or market squares). The risk is increased when there are large crowds, tourists, and hiding and fleeing options for pickpocketers. For example, a pickpocketer in a metro station can flee with (another) metro easily after the robbery.<br />
<br />
In order to reduce the risk, one can use [[Measure: Surveillance|surveillance]] by mounting camera's inside stations and create awareness of the travellers, for example with warning posters and warning broadcasting inside trains. Also guards can be deployed inside stations and trains.<br />
<br />
Also crowd management measures may be used to reduce risk of pickpocketing, e.g. by better [[Directing flows of people|directing flows of people]], flows can be structured and the density of crowds can be reduced.<br />
<br />
===Safety impact===<br />
Pickpocketing has very little impact on the safety of people.<br />
<br />
== Measures ==<br />
Potential measures that can mitigate the likelihood or impact of pickpocketing include:<br />
<br />
* [[measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]] can be somewhat effective to detect pickpocketing and if overt, to deter potential criminals by raising the perceived risk of apprehension. It can incur high costs if implemented as dedicated observers, either on location or remote. A more natural form of surveillance is surveillance by the inhabitants (also known as 'natural surveillance'), usually by warning for pickpockets. Be aware that putting out warning signs can also have detrimental effects <ref>Clarke Ronald V., Situational Crime Prevention. Successful Case Studies. Second Edition,1997</ref>, as is illustrated by Ekblom<ref>Ekblom, P, ''Talking to Offenders: Practical Lessons from Local Crime Prevention.'', In: O. Nel-lo (ed.). Urban Crime: Statistical Approaches and Analyses, International seminar held under the auspices of Ajuntament de Barcelona Forum des Collectives Territoriales Europeenes pour la Securité Urbaine. Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Metropolitans de Barcelona.</ref> who cites the example of pickpockets on the London Underground who stationed themselves near signs warning of theft to see which pockets were checked by passengers on reading the signs.<br />
* [[Measure: Intervention force|Intervention force]] should be swift and effective in order to make detection measures, such as alarms or surveillance, effective and convey the notion that pickpocketing will not be left unpunished.<br />
* [[Measure: Directing traffic flows|Directing traffic flows]] can be effective in preventing crowding. The effectiveness of this measure is illustrated by a case study which shows that thefts from shopping bags at markets in Birmingham, England, were substantially reduced by reducing congestion around the stalls, which increased the difficulty of pickpocketing and other "stealth" thefts.<ref>Poyner, B. & Webb, B., ''Successful Crime Prevention: case studies'', London: The Tavistock Institute of Human Relations, (1987)</ref><br />
* [[Measure: Target removal|Target removal]] is not always feasible, but by for example suppressing tourists to visit a particular location, pickpocketing at that location can be effectively reduced. Another example of how to remove targets is to minimize distraction for visitors, by for example placing clear signposts or designing the area to minimize congestion.<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Security_issue:_Assault&diff=12628Security issue: Assault2013-06-26T09:06:52Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Threat]]<br />
[[Image:Street fight.jpg|thumb|right|300px|A street fight]]'''Assault''', in the use of this Securipedia, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence, which is covered under [[Security issue: Sexual assault|Sexual assault]].<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
The specific meaning of assault varies between countries, but refers to an act that causes another to fear or experience immediate and personal violence, or in the more limited sense, to fear or experience a threat of violence caused by an immediate show of force. In legal terms, assault is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear violence, and is often distinguished from battery, which involves physical contact. For the use in this Securipedia, the broader definition of assault is used, meaning that battery will be included in the use of the term assault. [[Security issue: Sexual assault|Sexual assault]] is considered separately.<br />
<br />
Assault accounts for a relevant part of the total of recorded crime, e.g. for about 20% in the UK <ref>http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/crime-research/hosb1011/hosb1011?view=Binary, page 28</ref> as well as in the US <ref>http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus06.pdf, table 1</ref>.<br />
<br />
== Contributing circumstances ==<br />
Known circumstances to influence the likelihood or effect of assault, are presented in the table below:<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|-<br />
! width=150 | Contributing Circumstance !!width=150| Influence !! Description <br />
|-<br />
| Use of alcohol and/or drugs. || Increases level of aggression. || About one-third of the recorded assault cases are related to the use of alcohol or drugs<ref>http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus06.pdf, table 32</ref>. The excessive use of alcohol and consequently the access to alcohol in bars, cafés, dance clubs and other places of entertainment, but also liquor dealers or discount stores selling alcohol in places where alcohol is consumed in the street are therefore important contributing circumstances for assault as security issue. Be aware that the type of establishment, as well as the way they are clustered can be of great influence on the extent that assault may result. A practical guide to assessing this can be found on the website of the Centre for Problem-Orientated Policing <ref>http://www.popcenter.org/problems/assaultsinbars/</ref>.<br />
|-<br />
| Concentration of alcohol serving establishments || Increases probability of intoxication || Research has shown that if bars are concentrated or close together this increases the amount of violence, typically at closing times. The reason is twofold: an increased availability of liquor it brings together various and distinct groups of people<ref>Spicer Valerie, Reid Andrew A., Ginther Jordan, Seifi Hasti, Dabbaghian Vahid, ''Bars on blocks: A cellular automata model of crime and liquor licensed establishment density'', Computers, Environment and Urban Systems 36 (2012) 412–422</ref>.<br />
|-<br />
| Large crowds. || Increases likelihood of conflict. || Rival fan groupings at a sports game or concert goers are typical examples. In July 2012, an outdoor concert at Dublin's (Ireland) Phoenix Park resulted in a litany of incidents including assaults, public order offences, and drugs seizures. The concert was attended by c. 45,000 people, and a subsequent report by the police force (An Garda Siochana) found that the park was not a suitable venue for 'outdoor electric music concerts'<ref>http://www.breakingnews.ie/ireland/man-on-disability-benefit-charged-with-phoenix-park-gig-assault-569201.html</ref>. <br />
|-<br />
| Activities that arouse excitement or competitive situations || Increases aggressive behaviour || The high emotions that arise during competition (e.g. in bars—whether patrons are watching sporting events on television or competing themselves in pool, darts, or other typical bar games) can turn to anger and frustration<ref>[http://www.popcenter.org/problems/assaultsinbars/ Scott Michael S. and Dedel Kelly, Assaults in and Around Bars. 2nd Edition, Problem-Oriented Guides for Police, Guide No. 1, August 2006]</ref>.<br />
|-<br />
| Abandoned/secluded areas and low traffic volumes (cars and/or pedestrians). || Decreases likelihood of detection. || A decreased perceived risk of detection decreases the perceived need for restraint of unwanted behaviour.<br />
|-<br />
| Increased levels of physical assault in the vicinity || Increases the likelihood of offenders || The presence of people who have shown violent behaviour in the vicinity increases the chance of them visiting the area.<br />
|-<br />
| Low level of social monitoring. || Decreases level of social correction. || A decreased perceived risk of detection and correction decreases the perceived need for restraint of unwanted behaviour.<br />
|-<br />
| Low level of physical monitoring (e.g. cameras). || Decreases likelihood of detection. || This reduces the possibilities of intervening and increases the likelihood of the conflict escalating. Low levels of physical monitoring contributes to less enforcement of the law, which undermines other efforts to prevent assault and other crimes occurring. <br />
|-<br />
| Long reaction times or inadequate action of intervention force. || Decreases likelihood of apprehension || Untimely or inappropriate reactions to violence lead to a perception of little control, which will increase perceived risk for the public and decrease perceived risk for the perpetrators. Also, reducing the impact of an assault (by timely intervention) will also be impossoble and lead to greater effects of incidents.<br />
|-<br />
| Presence of vulnerable groups. || Increases the likelihood of conflict. || This may include communities made up of groups with different ethnic or racial backgrounds, or areas where there is a high distribution of elderly people, etc. In gender equality studies, research into the vulnerability of women in urban spaces is often conducted. Often, women, through fear, feel it necessary to consider where they are going (from point A to B through the urban environment), at what time, with whom they will travel, and even what they will wear.<br />
|-<br />
| Incompatible zonings. || Increases of the likelihood of conflict. || Incompatible zonings, and activities therein, can increase the likelihood of vulnerable groups and potential offenders meeting. The composition and compatibility of adjoining land uses should be sufficiently considered by urban planners.<br />
|- <br />
| Low levels of social capital. || Likelihood of offences || A low level of [[Wikipedia:social capital|social capital]] within the community (trust, friendliness, civic involvement, etc) often reflects in elevated street levels of crime, including assault<ref>Eibner, C. and Evan, W. (2001) Relative Deprivation, Poor Health Habits and Mortality. Available at: http://wws-roxen.princeton.edu/chwpapers/papers/eibner_evans.pdf</ref>. <br />
|- <br />
| Affluence and deprivation / unemployment. || Increases the likelihood of conflict. || Together with alcohol consumption, poverty (which correlates with high levels of unemployment) is one of the few [[The economics of crime#Socio-economic causes of crime|socio-economic causes]] that increases the risk of vulnerable groups such as women, children, adolescents and homosexuals<ref>See ''e.g.'': Straus, M.A, and R.J. Gelles (2009); Zavaschi, M.Z. ''et al.'' (2002) http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?pid=S1020-49892002001100006&script=sci_arttext&tlng=es; Huebner, D.M. ''et al.'' (2003) http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/full/10.2105/AJPH.94.7.1200</ref> becoming victims of physical violence.<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Impacts ==<br />
=== Social impacts ===<br />
From the social point of view, assaults can have various impacts, including generalised fear of crime and over-amplified feeling of insecurity, as well as loss of trust in institutions. There are several approaches to assess and address these impacts in urban planning that is responsive to citizens' security needs. It is particularly important to properly consider the [[gender perspective]] and the [[ecological perspective]]. The latter addresses the need to find a balance between [["designing out" approach|designing out]] crime by infrastructure and providing reason for more assaults by building infrastructure that can be perceived by some social groups as unjustly exclusionary.<br />
<br />
An important effect of regular assaults taking place in an urban environment is that it can lead to a [[Perception of (in)security and risks|perception of insecurity and risks]]. The actual (objective) level of [[risk]] can decrease quality of life and overall wellbeing within the urban community.<br />
<br />
There are [[Checklists_for_dimension_consideration|checklists]] available from research that help address social aspects of security issues such as assault. A recommendable method to involve citizens in urban planning that "designs in" those social aspects is the [[safety audit]], which focuses on local and context-specific solutions to address security issues.<br />
<br />
Other helpful texts on the social impact of assault can be found on the pages of [[cultural criminology]], [[environmental design]] and [[sociospatial perspective]].<br />
<br />
=== Economic impact ===<br />
The [[Economic effects of crime#primary costs of crime|direct costs]] of an assault is for a major part (±70%) attributable to the monetary value of inflicted harm to the victim (most of all in terms of mental harm, but also physical harm). Moreover, assaults cause responsive costs by the public authorities who are responsible for the prosecution, trial and enforcement of the offender(s).<ref>In general, there are three types of costs of crime: Preventive costs in anticipation of assaults (e.g. private security measures); Material and immaterial costs as a consequence of assaults (e.g. physical damage, repairs, medical costs, [[Victimization|mental harm]]); and responsive costs to assaults (e.g. the costs of detection and prevention, prosecution, support trial, etc.)</ref> There are no real prevention costs from a macro-economic point of view in terms of insurance fees, but there are some intangible costs such as prevention measures taken by individuals, who, for example, after a night out take a taxi home in stead of walking home by themselves.<ref>These costs are very hard to quantify since they also serve other goals. Driving home by taxi, for instance, is not just safer but also more comfortable than by foot or bike.</ref>. A study by SEO (2007)<ref>SEO (2007). De kosten van criminaliteit].</ref> illustrates that the direct impact of an assault is relatively high compared to the average costs of e.g. vandalism, but far less than e.g. sexual offences and murder (which occur far less frequently though). Violent crimes like assaults, however, also have a negative long-term impact on the mental health of the victim, causing higher health costs and loss of productivity.<br />
<br />
In addition, assaults do not just create costs for the victim and public authorities, but can also have a negative impact on the whole area or local community, the so-called [[Economic effects of crime#Secondary economic impact of crime|secondary economic impact of crime]]. Crime prone areas with a long-standing reputation for suffering from much crime are subjects of high mobility of residents, vandalism, empty lots and buildings, businesses with extreme security measures, etc. In addition, one could consider the opportunity costs of police and other public services (like health care services for victim support), and the long term health costs and decrease in income of victims and their due to the traumatising impact of assaults.<br />
<br />
=== Mobility impacts ===<br />
The mobility impacts depend on the size of the assault. In most cases, if it concerns only a few people, the mobility impact on the traffic flows or [[Transportation system|transportation system]] will be negligible. <br />
<br />
Where the assault would lead to an obstruction of the road, traffic flows will be deteriorated, depending on the obstruction and the degree of [[Robustness|robustness]] of the road network. For example, [http://www.thejournal.ie/crash-nassau-street-dawson-street-dublin-705968-Dec2012/ an assault in Dublin, Ireland in December 2012] resulted in one of the city centre's busiest traffic routes being diverted for an extended period while an police investigation was undertaken.<br />
<br />
Where the assault would lead to an obstruction of a location of interest, people flows towards this location will be deteriorated. Depending on the type of location (e.g. a household or a commercial business) this obstruction will have an [[Economic impact|economic impact]].<br />
<br />
When people are injured or in danger, emergency services will be called to assist. These include the police, ambulances or fire brigades. The emergency services need to know the best route to the incident location, taking into account possible obstructions. [[Incident management]] assists in reducing the duration and impact of incidents.<br />
<br />
=== Safety impacts ===<br />
The safety impact of assault is minor; although the mental or physical damage of the victim can be substantial, the act of assault usually does not influence the level of safety (risk due to non-intentional causes).<br />
<br />
== Measures ==<br />
Assault, be it domestic violence or some other form of assault, often occurs as a result of personal situation and conflict between persons with different views, or where alcohol or drugs have heightened emotions/aggression. From an urban planning perspective, a useful and practical aid in decision-making and policy formulation is enhanced interaction between the law enforcement agency and the planning sector. For example, by acquiring the spatial datasets of incidents of reported assault, it may be possible for planners to create a 'hotspots' map of area within the urban environment where a higher proportion of assaults have occurred over time. From this, urban planners could consider what measures could address this problem, and could direct resources where available.<br />
<br />
Potential measures that can mitigate the likelihood or impact of assault, are:<br />
* [[Measure: Directing traffic flows|Directing traffic flows]] can be effective in separating potential offenders from vulnerable groups and/or locations less controlled or controllable. Property offenders will commit crimes within their routine activity spaces. In the aggregate, this means that property crimes are most likely to occur on street segments which are highly accessible within the road network, have higher levels of traffic (or people) flows, and include attractive locations such as apartments, bars, high schools or motels<ref>Daniel J. K. Beavon Correctional Service of Canada P. L. Brantingham and P. J. THE INFLUENCE OF STREET NETWORKS ON THE PATTERNING OF PROPERTY OFFENSES. Brantingham School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University</ref>.<br />
* [[Measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]] can be effective on a specific offence (in preventing it or reducing its consequences), but can also be effective in reducing repeat offences if detection is swiftly followed-up by an appropriate intervention. A highly visible form of surveillance can also raise the perceived risk and act as an inhibitor. In a Stockholm-based study, surveillance cameras were installed in the subway stations at different points in time. Difference-in-difference analysis revealed that the introduction of the cameras helped to reduce crime by approximately 20% in busy stations<ref>Priks, M (2010) The Effect of Surveillance Cameras on Crime: Evidence from the Stockholm Subway. Stockholm: Department of Economics, Stockholm University, 106 91</ref>.<br />
* [[Measure: Intervention force|Intervention force]] is required to intervene and make surveillance effective. <br />
* [[Measure: Target removal|Target removal]] can be achieved by removing circumstances that make people vulnerable, or designing out for vulnerable groups. The ethical aspect of doing so should be always be considered. Secluded areas make people more vulnerable to assault and should be avoided in the design of an area. By designing the road network such that traffic flows are spread over the whole area, secluded areas can be prevented. Traffic simulation models (e.g. [[Urban Strategy]], Dynasmart) can help with this by estimating traffic flows for alternative road designs.<br />
* [[Measure: Controlling disinhibitors|Controlling disinhibitors]] such as alcohol can directly decrease the problem. A careful design with compatible land uses and activities is important.<br />
* Creating awareness / stimulating conscience can act as an inhibitor, especially if adopted by the general public.<br />
* [[Measure: Screening|Screening]] where possible and ethical, can act as an effective way to exclude known offenders.<br />
* [[Measure: Access control|Access control]] should be employed in combination with screening to prevent unauthorised access.<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Security_issue:_Ram_raid&diff=12627Security issue: Ram raid2013-06-26T09:05:13Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Threat]]<br />
[[Image:ramraid.jpg|thumb|right|240px|Results of a ram raid]]'''Ram raid''' is a particular technique for [[Security issue: Burglary|burglars]] to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits, windows, or walls.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
This act has occurred since at least the mid 1930s. The term came into widespread use after a series of such raids in Belfast in 1979 that was covered in news reports and in countries such as Australia that inspired a series of similar crimes.<br />
<br />
<ref>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z5uvkfoghUo</ref>Notably, large trucks are used to break into technology companies and steal high-value equipment for resale on the [[wikipedia:black market|black market]].<br />
<br />
Out of town retail parks and industrial parks are often targets due to their largely deserted nature after day time business hours, together with the relatively high-value products often on sale (e.g. electronics). <br />
<br />
In recent years, ram raiding with excavators/diggers to target ATM machines, has risen significantly<ref>for example in July 2012 (UK example): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-suffolk-19026835</ref>.<br />
<br />
== Contributing circumstances ==<br />
Known circumstances to influence the likelihood or effect of ram raid are presented in the table below:<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|-<br />
! width=150 | Contributing Circumstance !!width=150| Influence !! Description <br />
|-<br />
| Lack of surveillance. || Decreases risk of detection. || A low level of surveillance, particularly round-the-clock surveillance, decreases the perceived risk of detection for a perpetrator and thereby increases the attractiveness.<br />
|-<br />
| High levels of ram-raid in the vicinity. || Increases likelihood of targeting. || The distance to known places where offenders live matters. As Ram raid is is mostly an act that is committed spontaneously, without much planning <ref name="christopher">Jacques Christopher, ''Ram raiding: the history, incidence and scope for prevention'', Crime at work: studies in security and crime prevention</ref>, the crime has a highly situational character. These kinds of crimes are usually committed closer to the criminal's home than pre-meditated crimes<ref>Beauregarda Eric T, Proulxb Jean, D., Rossmoc Kim A., ''Spatial patterns of sex offenders: Theoretical, empirical, and practical issues'', Aggression and Violent Behavior 10 (2005) 579–603</ref>. This means that if the crime is situated nearby, the criminals are most likely situated nearby also and the likelihood of them selecting the new location for working area increases.<br />
|-<br />
| High levels of unemployment || Increases likelihood of targeting || High levels of unemployment are associated with higher levels of burglary<ref>Kepple NJ, Freisthler B., ''Exploring the ecological association between crime and medical marijuana dispensaries.'',J Stud Alcohol Drugs. 2012 Jul;73(4):523-30</ref>. As burglary by ram raid and other means of entering are not distinguished, this is assumed to be valid for ram raid too.<br />
|-<br />
| Location in suburban area or satellite town or near access route to city || Perceived more vulnerable || Ram-raiders often travel out of the security-conscious city areas to the softer targets of the suburbs. Police sources and retailers’ data show that the satellite towns around many cities suffer a high proportion of attacks (the main roads which lead to these districts are common sites for the location of out-of-town superstores, and provide a further attraction to the ram raiders).<ref name="christopher"></ref><br />
|-<br />
| Presence of ATMs or (attractive) shops || High attractiveness || Almost any type of premises is a potential target for ram raiding, but ATMs and shops that contain electronical equipment, sports clothing, fashion clothing, jewellery, or cigarettes (usually supermarkets or cash and carry warehouses) are particularly popular targets <ref name="christopher"></ref><br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Impacts ==<br />
===Social impact===<br />
* Compounds the black economy by facilitating stolen goods to be sold illegally. This has an impact on revenue achieved by national governments, and could impact on social service/welfare provision.<br />
<br />
===Economic impact===<br />
The [[Economic effects of crime|economic impact]] of a ram raid is comparable to the economic impact of a [[Robbery|robbery]] or a normal [[Raid|raid]]. Apart from the lost revenues, merchandise, the [[Primary economic impact|direct]] costs of ram raids are primarily the result of physical and emotional harm inflicted to employees and employers. But the very nature of a ram raid also implies high repair cost, including the cost of clearing up and the need for temporary security measures (guards). Moreover, potential victims will try to prevent a ram raid, investing time and money in preventative security measures like physical barriers and security equipment. In addition, the public authorities will respond to violent crime like ram raids with detection and prevention, prosecution, trial and detention, etc. The economic impact of ram raids can be measured with the help of [[Economic tools|economic tools]].<br />
<br />
Violent crime like ram raids cause economic damage to the economy as a whole (the [[Secondary economic impact|secondary economic impact]]). A high frequency of raids, robberies and ram raids can, for example, have a negative influence on local business, property value, tourism, and quality of life (social capital).<br />
<br />
[[Measures|Security measures]] mitigate the economic costs of security threats, but also demand investment in time and money such as security costs (cameras, guards) or the increase in distribution costs as a result of a limited accessibility. On top of that, certain security measures like closed roller shutters (that do not create a welcome environment) can reduce the quality of the area and have a negative effect on business. These so-called indirect [[Economic effects of anti-crime security measures#Indirect (secondary) costs of security|economic impact of security measures]] are explained in more detail elsewhere in Securipedia.<br />
<br />
===Mobility impact===<br />
A location or building has a higher risk for ram raid when it is easily accessible by large vehicles (trucks, vans). In order to prevent ram raids, locations which are more likely to suffer from ram raids (banks etc.) can be protected against ram raid by making it less accessible to (large) vehicles, for example by placing [[bollard]]s. <br />
<br />
However, that would have an impact of the mobility and [[accessibility]] in general of that area. For example, one could lower the accessibility of a street for large trucks by putting a barrier on a certain height which allows person cars but not larger trucks or buses, or by making the street narrower. That would also have an impact on the accessibility of e.g. normal public transport (buses) or delivery of goods to shops with trucks. This can be an undesirable side effect of such measures on mobility. With [[bollard]]s, this effect can be reduced by using movable bollards which can be folded flat to permit certain vehicles to drive over them.<br />
<br />
===Safety impact===<br />
As ram raid is actually a form of burglary, not robbery, the act is usually performed when the shop is unattended, thus ruling out accidental injuries to the personnel. The damage to the shop is usually extensive, which has direct consequences for the extent the shop is able to perform its safety functions, such as <br />
* shelter from the environment (weather)<br />
* prevention and repression of incidents (fires, floods, air quality, etcetera)<br />
* constructional safety<br />
* facilities to assure a timely retreat to a safe environment for the people present in case of incidents ([[Evacuation Management]]).<br />
<br />
== Measures ==<br />
Potential measures that can mitigate the likelihood or impact of breaking and entering include:<br />
<br />
* [[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]] can greatly increase the effort needed for criminals to enter the object and thereby reduce the attractiveness of an object. [[Bollard|Bollards]] and roller shutters can greatly increase the effort and time needed for a ram raider to enter the premises, thereby increasing the risk of detection and reduce the attractiveness for and likelihood of burglary.<br />
* [[measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]] can be effective to detect crime and if overt, to deter potential criminals by raising the perceived risk of apprehension. It can incur high costs if implemented as dedicated observers, either on location or remote. A more natural form of surveillance is surveillance by the inhabitants (also known as 'natural surveillance'), which can also be effective, provided that the commercial area is inhabited and the inhabitants have a good surveillability.<br />
* [[Measure: Intervention force|Intervention force]] is needed to make detection measures, such as alarms or surveillance, effective.<br />
* [[Measure: Directing traffic flows|Directing traffic flows]] [[Image:Bollard ramkraakbeveiliging.jpg|thumb|right|240px|A [[bollard]] (and two big flower boxes which can also function as vehicle stoppers) in front of a shop to deter ram raiders.]]can be effective in preventing traffic to be able to get into a ramming position. A CPNI guide [http://www.cpni.gov.uk/documents/publications/2011/2011001-integrated_security_v1.0.pdf?epslanguage=en-gb] gives, from page 18 and further, some practical advice how design of traffic flows can reduce the risk of ramming.<br />
* [[Measure: Target removal|Target removal]] can reduced ram raiding by for example providing means of easily removing the [[valuables]] from the store at night.<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Security_issue:_Burglary&diff=12626Security issue: Burglary2013-06-26T09:04:17Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Threat]]<br />
[[File:Burglary.jpg|thumb|right|x300px|Gaining access by forcing a window]]'''Burglary''' is the [[crime]] of illicitly entering a building or other property with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
Burglary involves a criminal (most commonly: [[thief]]) to enter a building, or part thereof, that is not freely accessible, without permission. All kinds of methods of gaining access are possible, although gaining access by ramming a vehicle through a wall or entrance is covered in the security issue [[Security issue: Ram raid| Ram raid]].<br />
<br />
== Contributing circumstances ==<br />
Known circumstances to influence the likelihood or effect of burglary, are presented in the table below:<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|-<br />
! width=150 | Contributing Circumstance !!width=150| Influence !! Description <br />
|-<br />
| Lack of surveillance. || Decreases risk of detection. || A low level of surveillance, particularly round-the-clock surveillance, decreases the perceived risk of detection for a perpetrator and thereby increases the attractiveness.<br />
|-<br />
| High levels of burglary in the vicinity. || Increases likelihood of targeting. || The distance to known places where offenders live matters. On average, burglars travel 2,6 km to commit their crimes<ref>Rhodes, W. M., & Conly, C. (1981). ''Crime and mobility: An empirical study.'' In P. J. Brantingham, & P. L. Brantingham (Eds.), Environmental Criminology (pp. 167–188). Beverly Hills7 Sage.</ref> and the odds of a neighbourhood’s being chosen increases by a factor of 1.67 for every kilometre closer to the burglar’s home it is located<ref name="bernasco">Bernasco Wim and Nieuwbeerta Paul, ''How do residential burglars select target areas? A new approach to the analysis of Criminal Location Choice'', Brit. J. Criminol. (2005) 44, 296-315</ref>.<br />
|-<br />
| High levels of unemployment || Increases likelihood of targeting || High levels of unemployment are associated with higher levels of burglary<ref>Kepple NJ, Freisthler B., ''Exploring the ecological association between crime and medical marijuana dispensaries.'',J Stud Alcohol Drugs. 2012 Jul;73(4):523-30</ref>.<br />
|-<br />
| Low levels of ownership || Decreases the inhibitions for committing the crime || Uncertainty of ownership can reduce responsibility and increase the likelihood of crime and anti-social behaviour going unchallenged<ref>Home Office, ''Safer Places. The planning system and crime prevention'', 2004</ref>.<br />
|-<br />
| High expected levels of drug- or alcohol abuse || Reduces inhibitions for crime || The presence of regular abusers of alcohol or drugs has a strong correlation with the occurrence of burglary, often thought to be caused by the need for financing an addiction. Studies show that about 40% of all burglary is committed under the influence of alcohol<ref>Greenfeld, Lawrence A, ''Alcohol and crime, an analysis of national data on the prevalence of alcohol involvement in crime'', U,.S. Department of Justice, Office of justice Programs, April 5-7 1998, Washington D.C.</ref>. <br />
|-<br />
| Long reaction times or inadequate action of intervention force. || Decreases likelihood of apprehension || Untimely or inappropriate reactions to violence lead to a perception of little control, which will increase perceived risk for the public and decrease perceived risk for the perpetrators. Also, reducing the impact of an assault (by timely intervention) will also be impossible and lead to greater effects of incidents.<br />
|-<br />
| High percentage of single family detached homes || Increases the perceived reward and vulnerability || Single family detached houses are often attractive targets–with greater rewards – and more difficult to secure because they have multiple access points <ref name="lamm">Lamm Weisel Deborah, ''Burglary of Single-Family Houses'', Problem-Oriented Guides for Police, Guide No. 18</ref>.<br />
|-<br />
| Concentration of residential units || Increases attractiveness || Burglars are attracted to areas where potential targets are plenty and concentrated. The greater the number of residences in a neighbourhood, the more likely it is that the neighbourhood will be selected for burglary<ref name="bernasco"/>.<br />
|-<br />
| Large residential areas || Increases attractiveness of area || The number of residential units in a neighbourhood influences the chance of this neighbourhood to be chosen by burglars. When the number of residential units in a neighbourhood increases by 1000, the odds of being chosen rises by a factor of 1.35.<ref name="bernasco">Bernasco Wim and Nieuwbeerta Paul, ''How do residential burglars select target areas? A new approach to the analysis of Criminal Location Choice'', Brit. J. Criminol. (2005) 44, 296-315</ref><br />
|- <br />
| Increased ethnic heterogeneity || unknown || Ethnic heterogeneity is associated with higher levels of burglary. A study<ref name="bernasco"></ref> showed that an increase of 10% in heterogeneity in a neighbourhood makes it a factor 1.15 more likely to be chosen by burglars.<br />
|- <br />
| High amounts of traffic || Increases the visibility of targets || Houses near major thoroughfares are more likely to catch the attention of burglars passing by. Moreover, it is more difficult to distinguish residents and visitors from strangers in heavily travelled areas.<ref name="lamm"></ref><br />
|-<br />
| Multiple accesses and exits to neighbourhood || Decreases the risk of apprehension || Multiple access ways, particularly when limited in surveillance, provide good access and exit opportunities for criminals. Alleys, for example, provide both access and escape for burglars, and limit visibility to neighbours. In addition, large side yards facilitate access to the backs of houses.<ref name="lamm"></ref> Mobility considerations in this context must be balanced with wider urban planning principles which advocate permeability, accessibility and connectivity<ref>Murphy, N. (2013) 'The New City' lecture. Cambridge University Department of Architecture. Available at: http://www.beyondgreen.co.uk/library/2013/02/18/a-new-movement-in-planning/. Accessed on 12 March 2013</ref>. <br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Impacts ==<br />
=== Social impacts ===<br />
Burglary can have impact on citizens' general [[perception of (in)security]] and increase their general [[Risk#Perception_of_risk|perception of risk]]. This can then change the perception of the meaning of built urban space ("[[Sociospatial perspective|sociospatial perspective]]"), thus creating public demands on urban planning. <br />
<br />
There are [[Checklists_for_dimension_consideration|checklists]] available from research that help address social aspects of security issues, such as breaking and entering. A recommendable method to involve citizens in urban planning that "designs in" those social aspects is the [[experimental participation method]].<br />
<br />
=== Economic impact ===<br />
Property crimes such as burglary lead to considerable costs in both a direct ([[Economic effects of crime#Primary economic impact of crime|primary]]) and an indirect ([[Economic effects of crime#Secondary economic impact of crime|secondary]]) way<ref>Primary economic impact (or direct effects) are generally defined as the initial, immediate economic output generated by a specific cause (in this case a criminal offence). Secondary economic impact (or indirect effects) are generated each time a subsequent transaction is made, for example, the impact of crime on the real estate value in the neighbourhood.</ref>. The direct [[Economic impact of security threats|economic impact]] of burglary in a dwelling crimes are for about 10% the result of preventive measures (security and insurance), and for 55% the result of physical damage and mental harm. The remaining part are costs in response to crime (detection and prevention, enforcement, trial, support)<ref>Home Office, Research, Development and Statistics Directorate (2005). The economic and social costs of crime against individuals and households 2003/04.</ref>. Burglary is a high-volume crime. In England and Wales, burglary in a dwelling makes up for about 7% of the estimated volume of offences against individuals and households<ref>This excludes crimes against commercial and public victims (source: Ibid).</ref>. The average total cost per burglary are estimated to be about £3,250 (in 2003 prices)<ref>Ibid</ref>. This is relevant knowledge for urban planners, since the cost of security measures can be earned back with a reduction of the frequency of burglaries in dwellings, the [[Economic impact of security measures|economic impact of security measures]]. In addition, the social costs of burglaries are relatively modest compared to violent crime such as homicide, robbery and sexual assault.<br />
<br />
Burglaries do not just create direct costs, but also have a lasting social and economic impact on the entire area ([[Economic effects of crime#Secondary economic impact of crime#Secondary economic impact of crime|secondary economic impact of crime]]). Obvious examples of these secondary economic effects are reduced house prices and costs of void properties. In general, crime prone areas with a long-standing reputation for suffering from much crime are frequent subjects of high mobility of residents, vandalism, empty lots and buildings, businesses with extreme security measures, etc. The perception of security is a relevant issue in case of frequent burglaries, since signs of broken windows, makeshift security measures around dwellings, blaring alarms and continuous police surveillance do not help to make people feel safe, even though the actual frequency of criminal events has declined. In addition, one could consider the opportunity costs of police and other public services (like health care services for victim support). In sum, property crimes such as burglary act like a tax on the entire economy. It discourages investments by private residents, businesses and public authorities.<br />
<br />
Security measures will mitigate the costs of burglaries, but burglars will adapt quickly to preventive security measures in accordance with the [[The economics of crime|economics of criminal behaviour]]. Although there is no real scientific consensus with respect to the causal relationship between the [[The economics of crime#Socio-economic causes of crime|socio-economic background]] and property crime like burglary, Australian research illustrates that long term unemployment amongst young male adolescents has a substantial effect on property crime rates<ref>See, ''e.g.'': Chapman, B., D Weatherburn, C.A. Kapuscinski, M. Chilvers and S. Roussel (2002). ''Unemployment duration, schooling and property crime''. CEPR Working paper</ref>. Enthorf and Spengler(2002)<ref>Entorf, H., H. Spengler (2002). Crime in Europe; Causes and Consequences. Springer-Verlag Berlin</ref>, however, find that planning-intense offences like breaking and entering, robbery and violence, respond relatively slow to changes in the socio-economic conditions compared to other types of crime like drug and alcohol abuse and violent crime<ref>According to the authors, this may reflect that in a first response to unfortunate social and economic developments some of the affected might become attracted to alcohol and drug abuse, which in a later phase has to be financed with criminal activities by committing property crimes like breaking and entering.</ref>. With the help of [[Economic tools|economic tools]] such as [[Social cost-benefit analysis|social cost-benefit analysis]] it is possible to overview the costs and future benefits of security measures in order to decide which types of measures are best suited for a specific urban planning situation.<br />
<br />
=== Mobility impacts ===<br />
Mobility can be considered as the [[Accessibility|accessibility]] of an area or building. The rate or means of entry or exit to an urban object is also called [[Access and egress|access and egress]]. A building perimeter is the area surrounding any building or event venue that will require controlled access. The building perimeter may be as near as the entrance gate(s) or curb surrounding a building or as far away as several blocks. <br />
* Recognize your weaknesses - where in your building or perimeter unwanted influences can gain access. <br />
* Identify Individual Access Needs: Determine who may need access to the building. <br />
<br />
These should be identified before putting your transportation system in place as they have a direct impact on how your system will be managed and designed<ref>http://www.theconventionstore.com/secure-transportation-systems.shtml</ref>.<br />
<br />
Normally, breaking and entering does not have mobility impacts on larger traffic scale, though mobility is a necessary condition for the person(s) breaking and entering in order to reach and get away from the location of issue. The possibilities to reach a certain location, e.g. by [[Modes of transport#Public transport|public transport]], or different road alternatives (over land or water), determine the [[Accessibility|accessibility]] of the location. The risk of burglary can be reduced by [[Measure: Directing traffic flows|directing traffic flows]] in such a way that it is more difficult for burglars to reach their target. As indicated above, multiple accesses and exits to a neighbourhood will increase the risk of burglary because it provides good access and exit opportunities for criminals. Also high amounts of traffic are negative since it increases the visibility of targets. That said, such considerations must be balanced with the underlying urban planning principles which advocate permeability, accessibility and connectivity for pedestrian, bicycle and other vehicular movement from point A to point B. This is particularly the case for large residential areas, where there are limited local services and facilities.<br />
<br />
The damage done from the breaking could have impact on the mobility within the building; a broken access door can greatly hinder access for the regular visitors.<br />
<br />
A secondary impact could be that if the police would chase the suspect, the traffic would be disrupted, since the normal traffic needs to give way to the police car. Also the suspect could disrupt the traffic when fleeing.<br />
<br />
=== Safety impacts ===<br />
A burglary can result in loss of safety for the inhabitants, as a result of the breaking incurred.<br />
* The breaking of windows, doors, and other barriers between the inside and outside of the building means a loss of shelter from the elements for the inhabitants.<br />
* The breaking of safety structures such as fire-retardant doors, sprinklers, etcetera can mean a decreased protection against fire.<br />
* When the burglar encounters an inhabitant when burgling, this can result in physical injuries, mental trauma and sometimes even death.<br />
<br />
== Measures ==<br />
Potential measures that can mitigate the likelihood or impact of burglary include:<br />
<br />
* [[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]] can greatly increase the effort needed for criminals to enter the object and thereby reduce the attractiveness of an object. The use of alarms, resilient builders hardware, rollershutters or anti-climbing measures can increase the time needed to enter, thereby increase the risk of detection and reduce the attractiveness for and likelihood of burglary.<br />
* [[measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]] can be effective to detect crime and if overt, to deter potential criminals by raising the perceived risk of apprehension. It can incur high costs if implemented as dedicated observers, either on location or remote. A more natural form of surveillance is surveillance by the inhabitants (also known as 'natural surveillance'), which can also be effective, provided that the commercial area is inhabited and the inhabitants have a good surveillability.<br />
* [[Measure: Intervention force|Intervention force]] is needed to make detection measures, such as alarms or surveillance, effective.<br />
* [[Measure: Directing traffic flows|Directing traffic flows]] can be effective in preventing unneccesary traffic in a neighbourhoud, reducing the visibility of potential targets to criminals. Study shows that targets are most likely to be chosen in likely travel directions of potential offenders<ref name="bernasco"></ref>.<br />
* [[Measure: Target removal|Target removal]] By removing particularly vulnerable objects, burglary can in some case be effectively reduced. An example is a package of measures to prevent repeat victimization of houses on a public housing estate in Britain, including the removal of gas and electric coin meters which were frequent targets for theft, which reduced burglaries on the estate from 526 in the year before intervention to 132 three years later<ref>Clarke Ronald V., ''Situational Crime Prevention. Successful Case Studies''. Second Edition,1997</ref>.<br />
* [[Measure: Ownership|Ownership]] is an important aspect in the prevention of unauthorized entry by creating a clear distinction between public and private space. By providing a clear distinction between public and private property, unwanted entry is more easily detected and requires a greater mental effort which reduces the number of opportunities for crime.<br />
* [[Measure: Maintenance|Maintenance]] and designing for easy maintenance can be used as the removal of a crime motivator, as deterioration can be an incentive to various forms of crime.<br />
* [[Measure: Removing means| Removing means]] can contribute to a more secure environment by making sure any materials that might be helpful for burglars are kept out of reach. An urban planner can contribute by ensuring secure storage places for climbable garbage containers, ladders, tools, etcetera and making sure external electricity outlets can be switched off from the inside, as these can be used by burglars to power their burglary tools.<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Security_issue:_Robbery&diff=12625Security issue: Robbery2013-06-26T09:01:44Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Threat]][[Category:Safety]]<br />
'''Robbery''' is the [[crime]] of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used here exclusively for acts committed to individual persons. For the forceful theft from commercial venues, see [[security issue: Raid|raid]].<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
[[Image:SnatchThieves003.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Snatch theft, depicted here as done from a motor vehicle]]In the context of urban planning, robbery is most relevant if performed in the public space. This form of robbery, called 'street robbery' has the following five characteristics<ref name=streetrobbery>[http://www.popcenter.org/problems/street_robbery/ Monk Khadija M., Heinonen Justin A. and Eck John E., ''Street Robbery'', Problem-Oriented Guides for Police, Guide No. 59, April 2010]</ref>:<br />
* the offender targets a victim; <br />
* the victim is a stranger to the offender;<br />
* the offender attempts or completes a theft of cash or property;<br />
* the offender uses force or the threat of force against the victim; and<br />
* the offence occurs in a public or semi-public place, such as on a street, in an alley, in a parking garage, in a public park, on or near public transportation, or in a shared apartment hallway.<br />
<br />
Mark that a robbery need not involve the use of a weapon or injuries of the victim.<br />
<br />
Several subtypes of street robbery exist that vary in frequency depending on local circumstances. Among the better known are:<br />
* purse-snatching (referred to as "snatch theft")<br />
* robbery at automated teller machines;<br />
* robbery of drunken bar patrons; robbery of students (e.g., middle- and high-school students and college students); <br />
* robbery of passengers near public transportation systems; and<br />
* robbery of migrant labourers.<br />
<br />
== Contributing circumstances ==<br />
Known circumstances to influence the likelihood or effect of robbery are presented in the table below:<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|-<br />
! width=150 | Contributing Circumstance !!width=150| Influence !! Description <br />
|-<br />
| Attractive locations for robbery || Increases success rate of robbery || Some locations are by nature particularly suited for robbery, by the fact that they are relatively deserted, lack surveillance, have potential victims and offer many easy exits to flee the crime scene. Examples of such locations include parking lots and garages, parks, fields, playgrounds, and areas near public transportation<ref name="streetrobbery"/> and ATMs<ref name="tellermachines">>[http://www.popcenter.org/problems/robbery_atms/ M. Scott (2001). Robbery at Automated Teller Machines. Guide No.8. Center for Problem-Oriented Policing.]</ref>.<br />
|-<br />
| Lack of surveillance. || Decreases risk of detection. || A low level of surveillance, particularly round-the-clock surveillance, decreases the perceived risk of detection for a perpetrator and thereby increases the attractiveness.<br />
|-<br />
| Long reaction times or inadequate action of intervention force. || Decreases likelihood of apprehension || Untimely or inappropriate reactions to violence lead to a perception of little control, which will increase perceived risk for the public and decrease perceived risk for the perpetrators.<br />
|-<br />
| High levels of robbery in the vicinity. || Increases likelihood of targeting. || The distance to known places where offenders live matters. On average, robbers travel 2,1 km to commit their crimes<ref>Beauregarda Eric T, Proulxb Jean, D., Rossmoc Kim A., ''Spatial patterns of sex offenders: Theoretical, empirical, and practical issues'', Aggression and Violent Behavior 10 (2005) 579–603</ref>, and the chance of a neighbourhood to be chosen reduces with every km distance from the offender's home.<br />
|-<br />
| High levels of unemployment || Increases likelihood of targetting || High levels of unemployment are correlated with higher levels of property crime <ref>Kepple NJ, Freisthler B., ''Exploring the ecological association between crime and medical marijuana dispensaries.'',J Stud Alcohol Drugs. 2012 Jul;73(4):523-30</ref>.<br />
|-<br />
| High expected levels of drug- or alcohol abuse || Reduces inhibitions for crime || The presence of regular abusers of alcohol or drugs has a strong correlation with the occurrence of robbery, often thought to be caused by the need for financing an addiction. Studies show that about 35% of all robbery is committed under the influence of alcohol<ref>Greenfeld, Lawrence A, ''Alcohol and crime, an analysis of national data on the prevalence of alcohol involvement in crime'', U,.S. Department of Justice, Office of justice Programs, April 5-7 1998, Washington D.C.</ref>.<br />
|-<br />
| Presence of excitement or distractions || Increases vulnerability of victims || A legitimate distraction enables the robber to gain contact with the victim without causing alarm. Street robbers could perceive people who are distracted (e.g., using a cell phone, drunk, and/or unfamiliar with their surroundings) as easier to approach and overpower. Distracting circumstances such as road works, which require a detour in unfamiliar surroundings, special events or holidays can also provide the distractions that aid robbers<ref name="streetrobbery"/>. Tourists are particularly vulnerable for these circumstances.<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Impacts ==<br />
===Social impact===<br />
* Psychological distress, including fear, anger and depression<ref>http://irv.sagepub.com/content/14/2/175</ref><br />
* Social effects<br />
* Physical harm<br />
* (Personal) financial loss<br />
* Decrease in perceived security<br />
* Increased personal vulnerability<br />
<br />
===Economic impact===<br />
Robberies lead to socio-economic [[Economic effects of crime|costs]] that reach beyond the financial value of the property stolen. The [[Primary economic impact|direct]] costs of robberies can be for about 65% attributed to the result of the physical and emotional impact on direct victims, health costs, value of property stolen, and lost productivity (the costs as a consequence of crime)<ref name="soccost">Home Office, Research, Development and Statistics Directorate (2005). The economic and social costs of crime against individuals and households 2003/04.</ref>. The rest can be attributed to costs in response to crime by public authorities (criminal justice system)<ref name="soccost"/>. Robberies occur less frequent than for example burglaries or acts of vandalism, but the average cost per event (± £7,500) is twice the amount compared to an average burglary)<ref name="soccost"/>. This is mostly the result of higher physical and emotional damage, loss of output and costs for the criminal justice system.<br />
<br />
Robberies can also have a lasting [[Secondary economic impact|indirect]] impact on society, the [[Economic effects of crime#Secondary economic impact of crime|secondary economic impact of crime]]. On a more local and regional level, frequent robberies can have a negative impact on local business, social life, tourism and housing prices. Empirical research by the Federal Reserve Bank of Ney York, for example, quantified the relationship between a reduction in crime such as robberies and homicides and the change in the prices of nearby residential real estate, concluding that intensive policing had a substantial positive effect on the property values and the inequality among residential prices<ref>Frischtak, C. and B.R. Mandel (2012). Crime, House Prices, and Inequality: The Effect of UPPs in Rio. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Staff Report no.542. http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr542.pdf</ref>.<br />
<br />
Robbers, especially street robbers "are notoriously difficult to deter"<ref name="tellermachines"/>."They require relatively small amounts of cash to justify their risk, they have a lot of crime opportunities, they want cash immediately, and street robbery does not require much skill or planning"<ref> Wright and Decker (1997)in: [http://www.popcenter.org/problems/robbery_atms/ M. Scott (2001). Robbery at Automated Teller Machines. Guide No.8. Center for Problem-Oriented Policing.]</ref>. On top of that, robbers will adapt quickly to preventive security measures in accordance with the [[The economics of crime|economics of criminal behaviour]]. Taxi robbers, for example, sometimes use a female accomplice to order a taxi.<br />
<br />
===Mobility impact===<br />
Robbery usually takes place at public spaces (street robbery). As for [[pickpocketing]], the risk is higher in crowded places and at [[Transport Infrastructure#Train station|train]] and [[Transport Infrastructure#Metro station|metro stations]]. One can use surveillance with camera's at high risk locations.<br />
<br />
The perpetrator will usually use some form of transport to flee. For example, he might use a scooter or car which was put standby near the robbery location. In order to be able to flee quickly, he will prefer a location with good [[Accessibility|accessibility]] and no [[Traffic management#Congestion|congestion]].<br />
<br />
The risk of robbery can be reduced by urban planning when the streetmap and public transportation options will not allow for easy fleeing, for example with [[Residential#Mobility|cul-de-sacs]] and limitation of alternative routes to the same destination. However, this is contradictory with the general mobility objective to increase [[Accessibility|accessibility]] and traffic flow in an area.<br />
<br />
The police can chase [[Category:Ethical]] someone who convicted robbery by car or even by helicopter. A helicopter has a better overview of the streetmap and of the person fleeing and can see and go everywhere and give instructions to the police in the car on the ground.<br />
<br />
===Safety impact===<br />
Offenders attack approximately half of robbery victims and about 20 percent of these victims require medical attention<ref name="streetrobbery"/>.<br />
<br />
== Measures ==<br />
Many strategies are used to reduce the risk of street robbery. Of these, most are actions that are taken just before or after specific incidents. These are therefore not suited to be integrated in to the planning of urban environment, as this generally precedes incidents by a long time. Measures that have proven to be effective against street robbery<ref name="streetrobbery"/> and can be taken (or at least influenced) by the urban planner include:<br />
<br />
*[[Measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]]. This can be effective to prevent crime if it is highly visible.<br />
* Improving the [[Measure: Intervention force|intervention force]] by Installing emergency call stations.<br />
*[[Measure: Target removal|Target removal]], either by [[Measure: Directing traffic flows|directing traffic flows]], like providing safe transportation for visitors of entertainment facilities or providing safe alternative routes during construction or special festivities or removing hiding spots, increasing lighting at high-risk sites and increasing pedestrian density near risky places. Also planting vegetation can reduce risk of robbery<ref>Wolfe Mary K., Mennis Jeremy, ''Does vegetation encourage or suppress urban crime?'' Evidence from Philadelphia, PA, Landscape and Urban Planning 108 (2012) 112– 122</ref>.<br />
*[[Measure: Controlling disinhibitors|Controlling disinhibitors]] by reducing intoxication and facilities distributing alcohol in high-risk areas.<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Deflection&diff=12624Measure type: Deflection2013-06-26T08:58:31Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>'''Deflection''' is the [[measure]] of reducing risk by creating circumstances that direct criminals to less critical objects or redirects the motivational causes into non-criminal means of expression.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
[[Image:Urinal Fly.JPG|thumb|right|300px|A fly drawn in a urinal, a deflection measure to prevent visitors from aiming at other 'targets']]This is the channelling of potentially criminal or aggressive behaviour in more pro-social directions by means of architectural, equipment, and related alterations.<br />
<br />
== Examples ==<br />
* Provision of graffiti boards and mural programs where graffiti artist may legally express themselves<br />
* Interesting wallpaper, daily newspaper, chalkboard on bathroom wall<br />
* Providing activity centres, sport halls or skateboard terrains for potentially loitering youth<br />
* Separating incompatible public by designing some areas to appeal to only one group and other areas to the other group<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
Security issues where this measure can be effective and influenced by the urban planner, are:<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Burglary</span>{{#info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || <span style="color:silver">Physical assault</span>{{#info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || <span style="color:silver">Destruction by riots</span>{{#info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || <span style="color:silver">Mass killing</span>{{#info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Ram-raiding</span>{{#info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| <span style="color:silver">Sexual assault</span>{{#info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || <span style="color:silver">Destruction of property by fanatics</span>{{#info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Pickpocketing</span>{{#info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || [[Security issue: Vandalism| Vandalism]]{{#info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Robbery</span>{{#info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || [[Security issue: Graffiti| Graffiti]]{{#info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Raid</span>{{#info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || <span style="color:silver">Antisocial Behaviour</span>{{#info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Vehicle theft</span>{{#info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
As this measure does not actually reduce crime, but rather directs the crime to less critical targets, the measure is best suited for crimes that are (more or less) acceptable in specific places, such as vandalism or graffiti. For more serious crimes that would be unacceptable in any circumstance, this measure is not applicable.<br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
The use of deflection methods, which encourage responsible use of urban spaces by providing a suitable outlet for activities which would otherwise take place in an anti-social manner, is becoming an important tool for urban planners. Urban planners have, in this way, been able to facilitate the protection of urban spaces which would otherwise be the target of such criminal or anti-social activities. From a planning perspective, it is important to ensure that facilities which are designed to accommodate deflection are seen as a more attractive option than those that would otherwise be used, resulting in criminal or anti-social behaviour.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
Before redirecting crime to another target one should be well aware of the possible consequences for that new target and its surroundings. For example, opening a skateboard park to get rid of loitering youth can cause inconvenience at the skateboard park due to the noise of rolling skateboards, an increase of vandalism in the surroundings or harassments in the bus to and from the skateboard park.<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
Deflection may result in displacing risk and hazard from one urban area to another. The measure should be assessed in the broader context of the public interest. While the public interest is a question of continuous debate, both in its general principles and case-by-case applications, it requires a conscientiously held view of the policies and actions that best serve the entire community. An important [[Social aspects|social aspect]] is the responsiveness of the measure of deflection to citizens' felt security needs. Measures will only be responsive if they are based on identification of citizens’ self-perceptions of vulnerability and resilience as well as their relation to/interaction with resilience-enhancing measures centred on built infrastructure. <br />
<br />
Deflecting risk is no substitute for continuously confronting citizens with risks, how to assess risks, and how to prepare for realisation of risks.<ref> Dennis S. Mileti/John H. Sorensen: Communication of Emergency Public Warnings. A Social Science Perspective and State-of-the-Art Assessment. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, 1990.</ref><br />
<br />
Practical addressing of social aspects and aspects of [[security culture]] as they relate to the measure of deflection can best be accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure of deflection should include tests of usability in relevant social contexts. A suitable method is for example [[appreciative planning]] that helps work out shared and consensual perspectives on security aspects in the urban planning. <br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Deflection mitigates the chance of a security threat, but at the same time demands some kind of investment in time, capital and effort by private agents, companies/developers and the public authorities, exacting [[Economic impact|economic costs]]. Together these benefits and costs are referred to as [[Economic impact of security measures|economic impact of security measures]]. The costs of deflection contains the relatively straightforward [[Primary economic impact|direct expenditures]] on capital equipment and operational costs (both temporary and permanent) such as investments and investments in activity centres, sport halls or graffiti boards. In addition, deflection measures generate various types of [[Secondary economic impact|secondary effects]] due to its effect on society (e.g. less fear and crime is good for local business and consumer confidence).<br />
<br />
Whether the costs are making sense from an economic point of view, depends on many factors, and can be answered by two distinct sets of questions (see also the [[Economic tools#Economic assessment step by step|'''flow chart''']] of an economic assessment):<br />
# Are the envisioned measures cost effective from a socio-economic point of view, or are there better alternatives?<br />
# Which specific agents (individuals, companies, sectors, authorities) are affected by the envisioned measures, and to which extend? How do the envisioned measures alter the behaviour of these agents, and of course the [[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|behaviour of criminals/terrorists]]? <br />
<br />
[[Economic tools]] can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security (of course in collaboration with insights from criminology, sociology, etc.). In terms of benefit-cost ratio, deflection can be considered as a type of security measure which in a relatively subtle way increases security, in contrast to measures such as security guards, big concrete walls and barb wire that may be pervasive, but can also arouse feelings of fear and anxiety<ref>Coaffee, J., P. O’Hare, and M. Hawkesworth. ''The Visibility of (In)security: The Aesthetics of Planning Urban Defences Against Terrorism''. Security Dialogue 2009 40:489.</ref>. Hence, deflection is an example of the [[designing out approach]], or as an aspect of [[Sustainable design|sustainable design]], which seeks a balanced consideration of social, economic, cultural and environmental aspects in urban design. In general, these measures demand larger investments than traditional security measures, but at the same time they are able to avoid future costs due to the long-term prevention of crime.<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
The road network can be designed in such a way that areas where visiting people or vehicles are not wanted will attract less traffic, for example by making the roads to these areas less attractive (lower speed limit, speed bumps etc.). Or, the other way around, by providing good and easily accessible roads between the origin/destination pairs that have to accommodate a lot of traffic. Also ''green waves'' (successive intersections where the green times are tuned such that drivers will experience successive green traffic lights on their route) can be established on these roads, while larger red times on intersections can be used to make other routes less attractive.<br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Deflection may involve risk of departure from normal liberal democratic standards (such as protection of liberties, separation of powers, and endorsement of checks and balances). Deflection may also come with [[Ethics aspects|ethics]] issues of distributive justice, such as risks of reifying uneven distribution of security in society. Architectural alterations to support deflection can contribute to selective delivery of security, making some groups of citizens more secure, and other groups of citizens more vulnerable. This may be, for example, the case in a situation where deflection in some area displaces crime to another community. This illustrates the need to provide norms and standards beyond frameworks for built infrastructure<br />
<br />
In general, pinpointing specific ethics aspects in resilience-enhancing measures needs to consider, among other things, citizen security cultures and citizens' personal concerns. There are no ethics considerations that can be planned or implemented without prior identification and addressing of citizens' perceptions. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
Major [[Legal aspects|legal aspects]] of deflection include balancing measures of deflection that may be seen as compulsory to some extent, with freedom to act and other fundamental rights. <br />
<br />
VITRUV offers a [[Legal_aspects#Summary_table_of_legal_aspects_in_urban_planning|summary checklist]] and a [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_legal_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods]] to assess legal aspects in resilience-enhancing urban planning.<br />
{{references}}<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Maintenance&diff=12623Measure type: Maintenance2013-06-26T08:54:43Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Measure]]'''Maintenance''' is the [[measure]] of discouraging crime by designing places with management and maintenance in mind.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
Research has shown that a lack of maintenance can act as a disinhibitor for certain crimes. A lack of maintenance over the environment can be seen as "a signal that there is little or no surveillance over an area, that there is little or no social authority exerting control over an area, and that consequently deviant behaviour may be tolerated"<ref>Wolfe Mary K., Mennis Jeremy, ''Does vegetation encourage or suppress urban crime? Evidence from Philadelphia, PA'', Landscape and Urban Planning 108 (2012) 112– 122</ref>.<br />
<br />
Whereas the maintenance itself is usually not a concern of the urban planner, the design for easy maintenance (including repair) is.<br />
<br />
== Examples ==<br />
* Coated walls for easy removal of graffiti<br />
* Modular street furniture that can quickly be replaced or repaired if damaged<br />
* Street designed for mechanized cleaning, i.e. wide enough and without inaccessible nooks and crannies<br />
* Greenery chosen for easy maintenance<br />
* Design of the public space to support maintenance, such as providing easy access for maintenance (e.g. support for cleaning of windows on higher floors), preventing wind corners where debris might gather, designing traffic flows to prevent litter in inaccessible places.<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
Security issues where this measure can be effective and influenced by the urban planner, are:<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Burglary| Burglary]]{{#info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || <span style="color:silver">Physical assault</span>{{#info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || <span style="color:silver">Destruction by riots</span>{{#info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || <span style="color:silver">Mass killing</span>{{#info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Ram-raiding</span>{{#info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| <span style="color:silver">Sexual assault</span>{{#info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || <span style="color:silver">Destruction of property by fanatics</span>{{#info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Pickpocketing</span>{{#info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || [[Security issue: Vandalism| Vandalism]]{{#info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Robbery</span>{{#info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || [[Security issue: Graffiti| Graffiti]]{{#info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Raid</span>{{#info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || <span style="color:silver">Antisocial Behaviour</span>{{#info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Vehicle theft</span>{{#info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
Designing for easy maintenance can be most effectively implemented in cooperation with the persons or organisations responsible for this maintenance.<br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
The maintainability of urban spaces should be an important element in the decision making process for developments which pass through the urban planning system. This system can be used to ensure that appropriate measures are in place which will guarantee sufficient upkeep is both possible and takes place, in order to prevent areas of dilapidation or neglect, and to present an image of a well cared for and therefore well surveilled location.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
One should be careful to provide easy access for maintenance indiscriminately, as this might result in criminals (burglars, vandals) misusing this to facilitate their crimes. <br />
<br />
A lack of maintenance can lead to unsafe situations (such as sharp edges being exposed) and an increase in vulnerability (such as mouldered door posts which are easy to break).[[Image:Vandalised picnic table - geograph.org.uk - 782295.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Vandalised picnic table, showing sharp edges and unsafe for use]] By designing for easy maintenance, these risks can be minimized, as repairs can be executed quickly. <br />
<br />
By assuring a well-maintained public space, the risk of bad maintenance working as an incentive to other crimes can be avoided.<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
The main [[Social aspects|social]] consideration behind the measure of maintenance is the "broken windows" paradigm<ref>G Kelling, C Coles: Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities. New York: Free Press, 1996.</ref> that comes from community policing. It is based on the experience that when a broken window in a building is left unrepaired, soon all the windows in that building are broken. The generalised lesson is that minor crime causes fear and creates a perception of disorder and insecurity. Reversely, close maintenance can prevent those perceptions from rising. <br />
<br />
However, maintenance alone does not change [[security culture]]s or the overall setting of urban environments. It should therefore be considered that over-maintenance could have negative impact on societal resilience. For example, research has shown that visible strong protective built infrastructure makes people to underestimate real risks and also makes them reluctant to adopt protective measures at individual and social levels, thus potentially undermining societal resilience. <ref> Dennis S. Mileti/John H. Sorensen: Communication of Emergency Public Warnings. A Social Science Perspective and State-of-the-Art Assessment. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, 1990.</ref> <br />
<br />
Practical addressing of social aspects and aspects of [[security culture]] as they relate to the measure of maintenance can best be accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure should include usability tests in relevant social contexts. This can be supported by citizen participation methods such as the [[safety audit]] or [[appreciative planning]] that, among other things. focus on collecting and integrating perspectives in multicultural environments.<br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Urban objects generate annual expenditures such as building services, utilities, repairs and maintenance. On the benefit side, maintenance extends the economic life of assets, has a positive environmental impact, improves social aspects like employee well-being, and mitigates crime and vandalism (also referred to as positive [[External effects|externalities]]). In addition, asset maintenance creates [[secondary economic impact]] due to the re-spending of maintenance fees by maintenance workers, contractors, etc.<br />
<br />
Whether extra focus on maintenance in order to increase security makes sense from an economic point of view, depends on many factors and is case dependent (see also the [[Economic tools#Economic assessment step by step|'''flow chart''']] of an economic assessment). One should first of all compare the potential cost-benefits with other alternatives. Secondly, one has to take in account which parties are affected by the increase in maintenance, who is paying for it and last but not least, how the envisioned measures adjust the [[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|behaviour of criminals/terrorists]].<br />
<br />
[[Economic tools]] such as the [[social cost-benefit analysis]] (first question) and [[Economic Impact Study|economic impact study]] (second question) can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security (of course in collaboration with insights from criminology, sociology, etc.).<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
Maintenance of mobility structures mainly concerns road maintenance.<br />
Like all structures, roads deteriorate over time. Deterioration is primarily due to accumulated damage from vehicles, however environmental effects such as frost heaves, thermal cracking and oxidation often contribute <ref>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Road#Maintenance</ref>.<br />
<br />
Pavements are designed for an expected service life or design life. In some parts of the United Kingdom the standard design life is 40 years for new bitumen and concrete pavement. Maintenance is considered in the whole life cost of the road with service at 10, 20 and 30 year milestones.[33] Roads can be and are designed for a variety of lives (8-, 15-, 30-, and 60-year designs). <br />
<br />
Virtually all roads require some form of maintenance before they come to the end of their service life. Pro-active agencies use pavement management techniques to continually monitor road conditions and schedule preventive maintenance treatments as needed to prolong the lifespan of their roads. Technically advanced agencies monitor the road network surface condition with sophisticated equipment such as laser/inertial Profilometers. These measurements include road curvature, cross slope, asperity, roughness, rutting and texture. This data is fed into a pavement management system, which recommends the best maintenance or construction treatment to correct the damage that has occurred.<br />
<br />
Maintenance treatments for asphalt concrete generally include thin asphalt overlays, crack sealing, surface rejuvenating, fog sealing, micro-milling and surface treatments. Thin surfacing preserves, protects and improves the functional condition of the road while reducing the need for routing maintenance, leading to extended service life without increasing structural capacity. <ref>^ "Thin Surfacing - Effective Way of Improving Road Safety within Scarce Road Maintenance Budget" (PDF). Paper for presentation at the 2005 Annual Conference of the Transportation Association of Canada in Calgary, Alberta. Transportation Association of Canada. 2005. Archived from the original on 2008-04-07. Retrieved 2007-05-14.</ref><br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Design for easy maintenance may incur [[Ethics aspects|ethics]] issues of distributive justice, such as risks of reifying uneven distribution of security in society. Creating built urban infrastructure that facilitates maintenance can contribute to selective delivery of security, making some groups of citizens more secure, and other groups of citizens more vulnerable. This may be, for example, the case in a situation, where increase in maintenance in some area displaces crime to another community. <br />
<br />
In general, pinpointing specific ethics aspects in resilience-enhancing measures needs to consider, among other things, citizen security cultures and citizens' personal concerns. There are no ethics considerations that can be planned or implemented without prior identification and addressing of citizens' perceptions. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
Main [[Legal aspects|legal]] aspects to consider related to the measure of maintenance include city and building codes, as well as general health and safety requirements. <br />
<br />
VITRUV offers a [[Legal_aspects#Summary_table_of_legal_aspects_in_urban_planning|summary checklist]] and a [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_legal_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods]] to assess legal aspects in resilience-enhancing urban planning.<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Ownership&diff=12622Measure type: Ownership2013-06-26T08:50:50Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>'''Ownership''' is the [[measure]] of reducing risk by establishing an environment where there is a clear separation between public and private space.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
Research<ref>Goldstein, Arnold P., ''Controlling Vandalism: The Person-Environment Duet'', School oriented interventions, pp 290-321</ref> has shown that a lack of ownership can act as a disinhibitor for certain crimes, as "Uncertainty of ownership can reduce responsibility and increase the likelihood of crime and anti-social behaviour going unchallenged". Ownership is described as "Places that promote a sense of ownership, respect, territorial responsibility and community".<br />
<br />
The level of ownership is expressed in a clear distinction between public, semi-private/communal and private space:<br />
# Will it be clear to users — including potential offenders and capable guardians — which space is public, communal, semi-private and private?<br />
# Are the boundaries between public, communal and private space signified in the most appropriate manner, be it a physical barrier or a psychological barrier such as changes in paving, surface texture/colour, landscaping and signage?<br />
# Will the place have an identity of its own?<br />
# Are all those who should feel ownership involved in defining the place’s identity?<br />
# Are barriers of a high quality of design in their detailing and appropriate to their local context?<br />
<br />
== Examples ==<br />
[[Image:Wood fence.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Wood fence, indicating a clear distinction between public and private space. The open structure does not restrict surveillance,]]<br />
* Providing a clear demarcation between public and private territory by fences, paving, surface texture/colour, landscaping, planting and/or signage.<br />
* Increasing the felt level of responsibility for the environment by involving residents and users. This can be achieved in a number of ways, such as town centre management partnerships, tenant management organisations, community development trusts, regeneration programmes and management trusts<ref>Home Office, ''Safer Places. The planning system and crime prevention'', 2004</ref>.<br />
* Involving the community in the design of (parts of) communal spaces.<br />
* Increasing a sense of communality by using distinct and common design features, like colours or architecture.<br />
* Hiring of unemployed youths as subway vandalism inspectors.<br />
* "[http://www.acorp.uk.com/Station%20Adoption%20main.html Adopt-a-station]" antivandalism programs.<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
Security issues where this measure can be effective and influenced by the urban planner, are:<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Burglary| Burglary]]{{#info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || <span style="color:silver">Physical assault</span>{{#info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || <span style="color:silver">Destruction by riots</span>{{#info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || <span style="color:silver">Mass killing</span>{{#info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Ram-raiding</span>{{#info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| <span style="color:silver">Sexual assault</span>{{#info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || <span style="color:silver">Destruction of property by fanatics</span>{{#info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Pickpocketing</span>{{#info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || [[Security issue: Vandalism| Vandalism]]{{#info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Robbery</span>{{#info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || [[Security issue: Graffiti| Graffiti]]{{#info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Raid| Raid]]{{#info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || <span style="color:silver">Antisocial Behaviour</span>{{#info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Vehicle theft</span>{{#info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
The form of measures that are most suited to provide ownership depend on the location and use of the object. High fences and landscape that actively impede access are most appropriate in places that are vulnerable to crime, such as the back of dwellings. Lower barriers, hedges and bushes are also highly useful to signify the public/private divide.<br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
Urban planning has an important role to play in facilitating the delineation of spaces and allowing the clear illustration of ownership, while also preserving the functionality, surveillance and (in some examples) permeability which is required of it. By making the concept of ownership clearly visible, the likelihood of criminal or anti-social behaviour can be reduced. In this way, it will be possible to ensure that such spaces retain a positive role within the overall urban fabric.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
Wherever an increased sense of ownership leads to an increase in social cohesion, this may lead to an increased social concern to one another. This concern can lead to a decrease in security issues (by for example the public not accepting aggression to an fellow resident), or in safety issues (like people providing first aid to an injured fellow resident after an accident).<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
Each city and community is distinct, with specific population characteristics, physical spaces, government structures, values, and history. Each will thus have its particular security problems and public security cultures that co-determine whether urban design will be accepted by citizens and used appropriately. Ownership is a way to address this. At the same time, decentralisation and privatisation decrease opportunities for coherent collective action and often reinforce the uneven distribution of power over resources.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, the main [[Social aspects|social]] consideration behind the measure of ownership is that an individual and social sense of 'belonging to' and 'holding a share of', supported by favourable and attractive design of built infrastructure, increases citizens' preparedness, capability to respond resilience to crime, terrorism and disaster. Since vulnerability changes with the type of hazard,<ref>S. Schneiderbauer, D. Ehrlich: Social Levels and Hazard (In)dependence in Determining Vulnerability, in J. Birkmann (ed.): Measuring Vulnerability to Natural Hazards: Towards Disaster Resilient Societies, pp. 78-102 (p. 81).</ref> the measure of ownership is not a 'one size fits all' approach. <br />
<br />
The measures of ownership need careful assesment and planning in order to be responsive to citizens' felt security needs. It will only be responsive if based on identification of citizens’ self-perceptions of vulnerability and resilience. Moreover, ownership-supporting built infrastructure may have negative impact on societal resilience: Research has shown, for example, that prominent protective built infrastructure (such as walls and fences) can make people to underestimate real risks and also makes them reluctant to adopt protective measures at individual and social levels, thus potentially undermining societal resilience.<ref> Dennis S. Mileti/John H. Sorensen: Communication of Emergency Public Warnings. A Social Science Perspective and State-of-the-Art Assessment. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, 1990.</ref> Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that resilience-enhancing measures are no substitute for continuously confronting citizens with risks, how to assess risks, and how to prepare for realisation of risks.<ref> Dennis S. Mileti/John H. Sorensen: Communication of Emergency Public Warnings. A Social Science Perspective and State-of-the-Art Assessment. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, 1990.</ref> This means that the measure of ownership requires a [[comprehensive approach]]. <br />
<br />
Practical addressing of the social aspects and aspects of [[security culture]] in planning and implementaion of the measure of ownership can best be accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure of ownership should include tests of usability social contexts. Suitable related methods that at the same time can promote citizens' sense of ownership, for example include [[appreciative planning]] or [[local open dialogue]].<br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Privatising public space for security purposes does not necessarily imply that the involved actors also actually 'own' the specific urban object/environment in legal and financial terms. Increasing the involvement of residents and users with the help of regeneration programmes or "adoption"-programmes, for example, does not make these people the legal owner of the specific urban objects, but does increase the involvement of the members of a community. <br />
<br />
The costs of 'ownership' measures contain the relatively straightforward [[Primary economic impact|direct expenditures]] on capital equipment and operational costs (both temporary and permanent) such as investment in design features or hiring unemployed youths. <br />
In addition, ownership generate various types of [[Secondary economic impact|secondary effects]] related to the perceived security in an area (less crime is good for business). Whether the costs are making sense from an economic point of view, depends on many factors, and can be answered by two distinct sets of questions (see also the [[Economic tools#Economic assessment step by step|'''flow chart''']] of an economic assessment):<br />
# Are the envisioned 'ownership' measures cost effective from a socio-economic point of view, or are there better alternatives?<br />
# Which specific agents (individuals, companies, sectors, authorities) are affected by the surveillance measures, and to which extend? How do the envisioned measures alter the behaviour of these agents, and, of course, the [[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|behaviour of criminals/terrorists]]?<br />
<br />
''Case example: Cost-effective security programmes for schools''<br />
{{quote|The Department of Education and Training in Western Australia initiated in 1999 a successful security risk management programme helping school principals to evaluate existing security measures and determine cost-effective levels of security to meet the risks faced by their schools <ref>[http://www.oecd.org/education/country-studies/centreforeffectivelearningenvironmentscele/38162484.pdf OECD (2007). ''School Security Assessment Programme in Australia.''PEB Exchange 2007/3 ISSN 1609-7548]</ref>. Part of this assessment was the draft of a treatment plan for which the principal provided a description of the school plan, including costs of individual security measures and the applied locations. The programme was very successful in reducing the number of offences (13 - 40%) and cost of crime (30 - 70%)<ref>This excepts the result of one particular school which dealt with an isolated crime occurrence of stolen computers during the programme evaluation.</ref> against relatively small investment costs between AUD 27,000 and AUD 49,000. One of the suggested security measures was ownership/territorial reinforcement in which not only staff and students are involved, but also the community through the School Watch Programme. Other measures were target hardening, surveillance, landscape management and lighting.}}<br />
<br />
[[Economic tools]] can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security (of course in collaboration with insights from criminology, sociology, etc.).<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
Mobility infrastructure is usually public, though private roads may exist, which is usually indicated with signs which prohibit entering for public users. Also companies often own a private parking area which is only accessible to employees and visitors of the company. This is usually regulated with a barrier with intercom at the entrance.<br />
<br />
Furthermore there can be made a distinction between public and private means of transport. The difference is usually clear (e.g. public buses and private cars), though in some cases it could be unclear if a taxi is an 'offical' public taxi or some private vehicle pretending to be a taxi. Especially in less developed countries (such as Indonesia), transport is offered by all sorts of vehicles ((mini)buses, taxis, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cycle_rickshaw rickshaw/becak], scooters) and many not regulated by offical public transport companies. It may be unclear if a bus is an 'official' bus and prices are not regulated. This will create a less safe environment for using public transport. Often touts will offer transport for very high prices to tourists, drive unsafe and/or use unsafe vehicles. This can be approved by making clear which are the 'official' bus- or taxi companies, e.g. using a uniform colour and published schedule and prices, using fixed bus stop locations, or asking the taxi driver for a taxi permit or taxi with regulated taximeter.<br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Ownership-enhancing measures may incur [[Ethics aspects|ethics]] issues of distributive justice, such as risks of reifying uneven distribution of security in society. Creating sense of ownership may in the final analysis contribute to selective delivery of security, making some groups of citizens more secure, and other groups of citizens more vulnerable. This may be the case in a situation where increase in ownership in one community displaces crime to another community. It may furthermore the case that enhancement of ownership will be – unintendedly – at the expense of other groups of citizens, for example reducing their rights to movement, etc. <br />
<br />
In general, pinpointing specific ethics aspects in resilience-enhancing measures needs to consider, among other things, citizen security cultures and citizens' personal concerns. There are no ethics considerations that can be planned or implemented without prior identification and addressing of citizens' perceptions. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
Ownership is a legal measure to recognize the power and obligations of public authorities, especially municipalities, to control the urban development process by formulating land and land use policies in which individual interests of land and other property owners can coexist with other social, cultural, and environmental interests espoused by other socio-economic groups and inhabitants of cities as a whole. <br />
<br />
Prior [[Legal aspects|legal]] considerations related to ownership include property rights and building codes, as well as the possible involvement of environmental regulations and legislation for stability of housing. <br />
<br />
VITRUV offers a [[Legal_aspects#Summary_table_of_legal_aspects_in_urban_planning|summary checklist]] and a [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_legal_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods]] to assess legal aspects in resilience-enhancing urban planning.<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Facilitating_compliance&diff=12621Measure type: Facilitating compliance2013-06-26T08:45:09Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>'''Facilitating compliance''' is the [[measure]] of reducing risk by decreasing crime by making it easier for the public to behave according to the local rules.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
The idea behind facilitating compliance is to reduce circumstances that might be used as excuse for committing crimes. For example, not having public waste bins might be used as an excuse for littering, long lines as excuse to get in without paying or a dilapidated appearance as an excuse for vandalism.<br />
<br />
== Examples ==<br />
* Providing ample waste bins<br />
* Providing 'graffiti boards' where messages can legally be painted<br />
* Providing public urinals<br />
* Using [[Measure: Directing traffic flows| directing traffic flows]] to ease right and discourage wrong behaviour, like one-way turnstiles to discourage using an exit for entry or clear signs indicating the preferred route around a closed or one-way road.<br />
* Providing taxi stops in bar district to prevent driving under influence<br />
* Rehabilitation programs for addicts<br />
* Ensuring a adequate level of [[Measure: Maintenance| maintenance]]<br />
* Making clear rules are monitored and acted upon[[Image:Welsh bilingual cycling sign 2.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Sign in Wales indicating a prohibition to bicycle and at the same time that these rules are monitored and acted upon.]]<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
Security issues where this measure can be effective and influenced by the urban planner, are:<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Burglary</span>{{#info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || <span style="color:silver">Physical assault</span>{{#info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || <span style="color:silver">Destruction by riots</span>{{#info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || <span style="color:silver">Mass killing</span>{{#info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Ram-raiding</span>{{#info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| <span style="color:silver">Sexual assault</span>{{#info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || <span style="color:silver">Destruction of property by fanatics</span>{{#info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Pickpocketing</span>{{#info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || <span style="color:silver">Vandalism</span>{{#info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Robbery</span>{{#info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || <span style="color:silver">Graffiti</span>{{#info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Raid| Raid]]{{#info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || <span style="color:silver">Antisocial Behaviour</span>{{#info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Vehicle theft</span>{{#info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
When taken right, measures to facilitate compliance can be quite natural and subtle to the public and be seen as an extra service rather than as a restriction. One should realize the limitation of this measure though, as it primarily targets the 'opportunity crimes' and it will therefore be better suited to low-level crimes like antisocial behaviour, graffiti and vandalism and less suited to the higher-level crimes. <br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
Through efficient and effective urban planning, instances of poor quality urban spaces or dilapidated environmental conditions can be minimised. Good quality, well designed and functional urban spaces, which have a well defined role within the overall urban fabric are less likely to feature high levels of crime or anti-social behaviour or other issues which can bring with them risks to the general public who utilise such spaces.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
Facilitating compliance can both be used to serve security and safety goals; warning people for dangerous situations and informing them about a requirement to use hard hats in a construction area is an example of the latter. As the measure of facilitating compliance does not impose new rules, but only provides incentives and support to voluntarily uphold existing rules, this measure has no side effects.<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
An important [[Social aspects|social aspect]] of facilitating compliance is the responsiveness of this measure to citizens' felt security needs. The measure will only be responsive if it is based on identification of citizens’ self-perceptions of vulnerability and resilience, and their relation to/interaction with resilience-enhancing measures centred on built infrastructure. In general, it is not easy to address citizens by built infrastructure in order – for example – to influence their behaviour in using that infrastructure. The reason for this is that – among other things due to [[culture aspects]] – citizens ‘read’ built urban environment in different ways: One central tenet in [[environmental psychology]] is that meaning intentionally embodied in built environment is not always decoded by citizens according to that intention. <br />
<br />
Practical addressing of social aspects and aspects of [[security culture]] as they apply to facilitating compliance can best be accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure of facilitating compliance should include tests of usability in relevant social contexts. Suitable methods to assess the appropriateness of the measure of facilitating compliance from the citizen point of view, and that can also help supporting implementation of the measue, include [[planning for real]]. This helps assess risks and how to address it, giving emphasis on cultural contexts. At the same time, the method aims at creating conducive contexts for security-enhancing cooperation among neighbours, experts and local interest groups.<br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Facilitating compliance (see the case example below) mitigates the chance of a security threat. There are however costs involved with the improvement of urban security, also referred to as the "Costs of Mitigation"<ref>Source: Rose, A & S. Chatterjee (2011). Benefits and Costs of Counter-Terrorism Security Measures in Urban Areas. Research sponsor: Department of Homeland Security: 6-7.</ref>, <br />
Together these benefits and costs are referred to as [[Economic impact of security measures|economic impact of security measures]]. The costs of facilitating compliance contains the relatively straightforward [[Primary economic impact|direct expenditures]] on capital equipment and operational costs (both temporary and permanent) such as investments in public urinals, rehabilitation programmes for addicts, waste bins, etc. In addition, facilitating compliance measures generate various types of [[Secondary economic impact|secondary effects]] related to the perception of security in an area that translates itself in economic outcome (e.g. more consumer confidence, an impulse for local business and trade, etc.).<br />
<br />
Whether the costs are making sense from an economic point of view, depends on many factors, and can be answered by two distinct sets of questions (see also the [[Economic tools#Economic assessment step by step|'''flow chart''']] of an economic assessment):<br />
# Are the envisioned measures cost effective from a socio-economic point of view, or are there better alternatives?<br />
# Which specific agents (individuals, companies, sectors, authorities) are affected by the envisioned measures, and to which extend? How do the envisioned measures alter the behaviour of these agents, and, of course, the [[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|behaviour of criminals/terrorists]]? <br />
<br />
''Case example: Fake security systems''<br />
{{quote|With the help of fake security systems (camera's, signs, dog warnings, etc.) one can create the impression of a monitored secure asset without the high investment and maintenance costs of the real version. This kind of security is all about perceived security.}}<br />
<br />
[[Economic tools]] can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security (of course in collaboration with insights from criminology, sociology, etc.).<br />
<br />
In terms of benefit-cost ratio, facilitating compliance can be considered as a type of security measure which in a relatively subtle way increases security, in contrast to measures such as security guards, big concrete walls and barb wire that may be pervasive, but can also arouse feelings of fear and anxiety<ref>Coaffee, J., P. O’Hare, and M. Hawkesworth. ''The Visibility of (In)security: The Aesthetics of Planning Urban Defences Against Terrorism''. Security Dialogue 2009 40:489.</ref>. Hence, facilitating compliance is an example of the [[designing out approach]], or as an aspect of [[Sustainable design|sustainable design]], which seeks a balanced consideration of social, economic, cultural and environmental aspects in urban design. In general, these kind of measures demand larger initial investments than traditional security measures, but at the same time they are able to avoid future costs due to the long-term prevention of crime.<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
There are several possibilites to facilitate compliance of traffic. As written above, this can be done using measures for [[measure: Directing traffic flows|directing traffic flows]] to ease right and discourage wrong behaviour, like one-way turnstiles to discourage using an exit for entry or clear signs indicating the preferred route around a closed or one-way road. <br />
<br />
One of the principles of the Dutch approach ''Sustainable Safety'' is predictability, which is a means of facilitating compliance as well. As explained in <ref name="duurzaamveilig">http://bicycledutch.wordpress.com/2012/01/02/sustainable-safety/</ref>, road design should be so consistent that road users instantly understand what they can expect and what is expected of them on a certain type of street or road. The road design itself gives information about the type of road/street. If the street is paved with bricks, there are parked cars and the street is shared with cyclists and gives access to homes, the road user will instantly know and feel this is a 30km/h (19mph) local access street. However, if the road has two carriageways separated by a median, there is no parking and cyclists have their own cycle paths, it is clear to the road user that this is a through road.<br />
<br />
Another principal of the Sustainable Safety approach is ''Forgivingness''; Humans make errors and willingly or unwillingly break rules. This is a given that cannot be changed. So roads and streets should be designed in such a way that this natural human behavior does not lead to crashes and injuries. An example is a shoulder with a semi-hard pavement. A road user coming off the main road will not crash immediately; the semi-hard shoulder will give this road user the ability to get back to the main carriageway. The equivalent for cyclists is a curb with a different angle; 45 degrees in stead of 90 degrees. Hitting this curb with your front wheel will not immediately result in a fall. Forgivingness towards other road users is enhanced when road design leads to a predictable behavior of road users. A result of this principle is that motorized traffic sometimes gives priority to cyclists even if they don’t have it. Because it is so clear where the cyclists want or need to go the motorist anticipates their behavior and gives the cyclist more room than he or she is legally obliged to, often to the surprise of especially foreign cyclists <ref name="duurzaamveilig"/>.<br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Facilitating compliance first requires the selection of those areas and types of risk where compliance is sought to be facilitated. This involves [[Ethics aspects|ethics]] issues because limited resources will probably not allow addressing all relevant urban areas. This may lead to the creation of different levels of security in society. <br />
<br />
Therefore, investigating human and societal needs regarding target hardening should be a priority. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
Major [[Legal aspects|legal aspects]] include balancing of facilitation of compliance that may be seen as compulsory to some extent, with freedom to act and other fundamental rights. <br />
<br />
VITRUV offers a [[Legal_aspects#Summary_table_of_legal_aspects_in_urban_planning|summary checklist]] and a [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_legal_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods]] to assess legal aspects in resilience-enhancing urban planning.<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Controlling_disinhibitors&diff=12620Measure type: Controlling disinhibitors2013-06-26T08:42:36Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>'''Controlling disinhibitors''' is the [[measure]] of reducing risk by removing or regulating disinhibiting substances or circumstances.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
Disinhibitors can be defined as substances or circumstances that decrease the inhibitions of an offender to commit crimes. Studies<ref>Greenfield, Lawrence A, ''Alcohol and crime, and analysis of national data on the pravalence of alcohol involvement in crime'', prepared for the Assistant Attorney General's National symposium on alcohol abuse and crim, April5-7, 1998, Washington D.C.</ref> have shown that drugs, but above all alcohol are conductive to some forms of crime<ref>About 1 in 3 convicted offender had been drinking alcohol at the time of their crime.</ref>, particularly violent crimes.<br />
<br />
It should be noted that not only behaviour-altering substances can influence natural inhibitions, but for instance untidy environments or environments in disrepair can stimulate vandalism and other crimes.[[Image:One of York's less scenic spots - geograph.org.uk - 1130246.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Cluttered, untidy and unstructured spots attract crime]]<br />
<br />
Also, environmental conditions, like overly high temperatures in crowds or gatherings, can affect the public's mood and decrease inhibitions to aggressive behaviour.<br />
<br />
== Examples ==<br />
* School restroom thermostats kept at 62°F<br />
* Repainting of playground equipment in bright colours<br />
* Beautification programs (e.g., landscaping, painting, maintenance)<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
Security issues where this measure can be effective and influenced by the urban planner, are:<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Burglary</span>{{#info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || [[Security issue: Assault|Physical assault]]{{#info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || [[Security issue: Destruction by riots|Destruction by riots]]{{#info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || <span style="color:silver">Mass killing</span>{{#info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Ram-raiding</span>{{#info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| [[Security issue: Sexual assault|Sexual assault]]{{#info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || <span style="color:silver">Destruction of property by fanatics</span>{{#info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Pickpocketing</span>{{#info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || <span style="color:silver">Vandalism</span>{{#info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Robbery|Robbery]]{{#info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || <span style="color:silver">Graffiti</span>{{#info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Raid</span>{{#info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || <span style="color:silver">Antisocial Behaviour</span>{{#info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Vehicle theft</span>{{#info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
In controlling disinhibitors one should be aware that at least part of the people will actively seek circumstances that will diminish their inhibitions. Any measure taken to control disinhibitors should be planned to include alternative sources of disinhibitors: early closing hours for the bars will not suffice if people can bring their own alcohol to alternative locations and 'party on'.<br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
Poorly planned urban spaces can have an instrumental role in the disinhibition of anti-social or criminal behaviour. In this situation, urban planning must be used to limit the incidences of poor quality urban spaces through the encouragement of good quality urban areas which can function as an inhibitor to criminal or anti-social activities.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
Disinhibitors will not only affect the behaviour of people regarding criminal behaviour, but rather their behaviour in general. This means that controlling disinhibitors will generally not only affect security, but also safety: when people are more in control of their actions, accidents as a result of reckless driving or driving under influence will decrease as well as injuries as a result of rowdy behaviour or loss of balance due to intoxication.<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
Controlling disinhibitors is an example of the [[designing out approach]], or as an aspect of [[Sustainable design|sustainable design]], which seeks a balanced consideration of social, economic, cultural and environmental aspects in urban design. An important [[Social aspects|social aspect]] is the responsiveness of the measure of controlling disinhibitors to citizens' felt security needs. The measure will only be responsive if based on identification of citizens' self-perceptions of vulnerability and resilience, and felt security gaps. <br />
<br />
Practical addressing of social aspects and aspects of [[security culture]] in security-related urban planning can best be accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure of controlling disinhibitors should include usability tests in relevant social contexts. A practical method to support social considerations in planning for controlling of disinhibitors is, for example, the [[safety audit]] that focuses on local and context-specific solutions to address security issues.<br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Controlling disinhibitors (see example below) deters and mitigates security threats. There are, however, costs involved with the improvement of urban security, also referred to as the "Costs of Mitigation"<ref>Source: Rose, A & S. Chatterjee (2011). ''Benefits and Costs of Counter-Terrorism Security Measures in Urban Areas''. Research sponsor: Department of Homeland Security: 6-7.</ref>, <br />
Together these benefits and costs are referred to as [[Economic impact of security measures|economic impact of security measures]]. The costs of controlling disinhibitors contains the relatively straightforward [[Primary economic impact|direct expenditures]] on capital equipment and operational costs (both temporary and permanent), and in addition generate various types of [[Secondary economic impact|secondary effects]]. Whether the costs are making sense from an economic point of view, depends on many factors, and can be answered by two distinct sets of questions (see also the [[Economic tools#Economic assessment step by step|'''flow chart''']] of an economic assessment):<br />
# Are the envisioned measures cost effective from a socio-economic point of view, or are there better alternatives?<br />
# Which specific agents (individuals, companies, sectors, authorities) are affected by the envisioned measures, and to which extend? How do the envisioned measures alter the behaviour of these agents, and, of course, the [[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|behaviour of criminals/terrorists]]? <br />
<br />
''Case example: A statistical analysis of bar closing hours:''<br />
{{quote|A Scandinavian study on the impact of small changes in bar closing hours on violence concluded that "each additional 1-hour extension to the opening times of premises is associated with a 16% increase in violent crime"<ref>Rossow, I., T Noström (2011). ''The impact of small changes in bar closing hours on violence. The Norwegian experience from 18 cities''. Society for the Study of Addiction.</ref>. Combined with the cost of an average violent event, one could relatively easily determine the socio-economic benefits of a decrease in opening hours as a measure to control disinhibitors. In order to determine the cost-effectiveness, though, one should for example include the decrease in revenues by commercial venues due to the limited opening hours, the lost of customers for taxi drivers, and so on.}}<br />
<br />
[[Economic tools]] can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security (of course in collaboration with insights from criminology, sociology, etc.). In terms of benefit-cost ratio, controlling disinhibitors can be considered as a type of security measure which in a relatively subtle way increases security, in contrast to measures such as security guards, big concrete walls and barb wire that may be pervasive, but can also arouse feelings of fear and anxiety<ref>Coaffee, J., P. O’Hare, and M. Hawkesworth (2009). ''The Visibility of (In)security: The Aesthetics of Planning Urban Defences Against Terrorism''. Security Dialogue 2009 40:489.</ref>. Since controlling disinhibitors belongs to the [[designing out approach]], and is an aspect of [[Sustainable design|sustainable design]], it is a compelx measure that in general demands larger initial investments than traditional security measures, but at the same time they are able to avoid future costs due to the long-term prevention of crime.<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
Controlling disinhibitors can have a positive effect on driving behaviour and therefore on traffic. For example, if alcohol use can be reduced, [[Traffic safety|traffic safety]] will be increased. Also creating a pleasant environment can improve the mood of drivers and their driver behaviour. This can for example create a smoother traffic flow with less accidents and congestion. Also, aggression in traffic is less likely to occur in a pleasant environment. <br />
A pleasant environment for traffic also means that the road layout should be understandable and easily driveable. An example of the opposite, a road lay-out which is not pleasant and might increase aggressiveness among drivers, is a narrow road with many narrowing sections where the right-of-way is not regulated. Drivers might get irritated at the narrowing sections when they don't get right-of-way, or try to enforce right of way.<br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Since not all disinhibitors have a criminal quality in themselves, removing disinhibitors may in some cases involve a risk of departure from normal liberal democratic standards (such as protection of liberties). <br />
<br />
In general, pinpointing specific [[Ethics aspects|ethics aspects]] related to removing disinhibitors needs to consider, among other things, citizen security cultures and citizens' personal concerns. There are no ethics considerations that can be planned or implemented without prior identification and addressing of citizens' perceptions. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
A prior [[Legal aspects|legal]] consideration related to removing disinhibitors is the tight to deny substances to people and how this may interfere, for example, with the fundamental right of freedom of action. <br />
<br />
VITRUV offers a [[Legal_aspects#Summary_table_of_legal_aspects_in_urban_planning|summary checklist]] and a [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_legal_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods]] to assess legal aspects in resilience-enhancing urban planning.<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure:_Removal_of_crime_motivator&diff=12619Measure: Removal of crime motivator2013-06-26T08:39:36Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>'''Removal of a crime motivator''' is the [[measure]] of reducing risk by removing the benefits of a crime.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
A crime motivator is an important reason of the offender to commit his or her crime. For a burglar, for instance this would be financial gain, a graffiti artist would like his work to be visible to the intended audience, a vandal likes a spectacular way of failing (like shattered glass) of or damage to the object and a terrorist would like his act to be widely advertised.<br />
<br />
The measure of removal of the crime motivator is directed at denying the offer the 'rewards' of his or her crime. For example, by removing the opportunity to sell stolen goods, the motivation for burglary can be removed.<br />
<br />
== Examples ==<br />
* Making goods unsellable by marking them[[Image:Codiertes Rad.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Bicycle marked against theft]]<br />
* Constructing street furniture and street art out of invaluable materials, so stealing and selling the metal does not pay<br />
* Constructing vandalism-prone objects from materials that fail in non-spectacular fashions<br />
* Designing street furniture for rapid repair (for example by modular design)<br />
* Designing walls designed for rapid removal of graffiti (by for instance coating them)<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
Security issues where this measure can be effective and influenced by the urban planner, are:<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Burglary</span>{{#info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || <span style="color:silver">Physical assault</span>{{#info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || [[Security issue: Destruction by riots|Destruction by riots]]{{#info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || <span style="color:silver">Mass killing</span>{{#info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Ram-raiding</span>{{#info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| <span style="color:silver">Sexual assault</span>{{#info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || <span style="color:silver">Destruction of property by fanatics</span>{{#info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Pickpocketing</span>{{#info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || <span style="color:silver">Vandalism</span>{{#info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Robbery</span>{{#info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || <span style="color:silver">Graffiti</span>{{#info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Raid</span>{{#info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || <span style="color:silver">Antisocial Behaviour</span>{{#info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Vehicle theft</span>{{#info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
There are no specific environmental conditions required to make removal of crime motivators effective, but a good removal of crime motivators measure does require a good understanding what motivates a perpetrator and some creativity to remove this aspect from the environment without impairing the function of the object (too much). <br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
Urban planning can play an important role in the removal of crime motivators through the creation of places which feature high levels of passive surveillance, and limiting or removing spaces which are not overlooked or observed. This reduces or removes the opportunity for criminals to commit crimes within such locations, making them safer and more secure. The use of passive surveillance is more desirable than active surveillance methods, as not only are such places more cost effective to secure, but areas which feature a high proportion of active surveillance measures can become counterproductive in some instances by making such places oppressive in character.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
As long as safety functions of the concerned objects and materials are sufficiently considered, removal of crime motivators has no effects on safety and security.<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
The removal of crime motivator is a perfect case example of the [[designing out approach]], or as an aspect of [[Sustainable design|sustainable design]], which seeks a balanced consideration of [[Social aspects|social,]] economic, [[Culture aspects|cultural]] and environmental aspects in urban design. As such being a complex measure - although seeming an easy, "technical" solution -, it will only be effective and accepted by the public if it takes the existing [[security culture]] into account. This can best be accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. <br />
<br />
Ideally, planning for the measure of removal of crime motivator should include usability test in relevant social contexts. An example of a specific practical method to accomplish this is the [[safety audit]], which focuses on local and context-specific solutions to address security issues. It should be considered that the measure of removing a crime motivator can probably not always be implemented just based on measures directed a built infrastructure. Social aspects should be closely taken into account. For example, cultural norms that define masculinity can act as enablers (motivators) for violence by marginalised young men who feel themselves excluded from normal paths of enacting gender-specific norms of virility.<br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Removal of crime motivator (see the case example below) deters and prevents crime, but at the same time demands investments, exacting [[Economic impact|economic costs]]. Together these benefits and costs are referred to as [[Economic impact of security measures|economic impact of security measures]]. The costs of measures like the removal of crime motivators contain the relatively straightforward [[Primary economic impact|direct expenditures]] on capital equipment and operational costs such as investments in coatings for wall (against graffiti) or the construction of vandalism-prone objects. In addition, the removal of crime motivator generates various types of [[Secondary economic impact|secondary effects]] as the result of subsequent rounds of expenditure ('re-expenditures') of business companies, households and public authorities outside the security market. Whether the costs are making sense from an economic point of view, depends on many factors, and can be answered by two distinct sets of questions (see also the [[Economic tools#Economic assessment step by step|'''flow chart''']] of an economic assessment):<br />
# Are the envisioned measures cost effective from a socio-economic point of view, or are there better alternatives?<br />
# Which specific agents (individuals, companies, sectors, authorities) are affected by the envisioned measures, and to which extend? How do the envisioned measures change/alter the behaviour of these agents, and, of course, the [[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|behaviour of criminals/terrorists]]? <br />
<br />
''Cost-effectiveness of removal of crime motivators aimed at criminal juveniles:''<br />
{{quote|"Many social and economic policies designed for other purposes may also reduce the incidence of serious crimes. Programs to encourage young people to remain in school, for example, have proved to be one of the most cost-effective crime-reduction strategies"(Greenwood, 2004)<ref>Greenwood, P. (2004). Cost-Effective Violence Prevention Through Targeted Family Interventions. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1036: 201-214. In: Shapiro, J. and K.A. Hassett (2012). ''The Economic Benefits of Reducing Violent Crime. A Case Study of 8 American Cities'': 5</ref>. Another study by the Australian Institute of Criminology (1998)<ref>Weatherburn, D. & B. Lind (1998). ''Poverty, Parenting, Peers and Crime-Prone Neighbourhoods''. Australian Institute of Criminology. Trends & Issues in crime and criminal justice. No.85</ref> finds that economic and social disadvantages have a disruptive effect on parenting skills (in terms of neglect and abuse), causing juveniles to participate in criminal activities, especially in crime prone areas. Hence, the study conclude that long-term measures against juvenile crime aimed at improving parenting skills (e.g. by reducing the level of economic stress (poverty) or the introduction of family and child support programs) will contribute significantly to the reduction of juvenile crime, even though these benefits will not be realised as fast as in comparison to, for example, policing, which is mostly aimed at reducing the frequency of offences (and not so much the supply of motivated offenders).}}<br />
<br />
[[Economic tools]] can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security (of course in collaboration with insights from criminology, sociology, etc.). In terms of benefit-cost ratio, removal of crime motivator can be considered as a type of security measure which in a relatively subtle way increases security, in contrast to measures such as security guards, big concrete walls and barb wire that may be pervasive, but can also arouse feelings of fear and anxiety<ref>Coaffee, J., P. O’Hare, and M. Hawkesworth. ''The Visibility of (In)security: The Aesthetics of Planning Urban Defences Against Terrorism''. Security Dialogue 2009 40:489.</ref>. Since the removal of crime motivator is a measure that belongs to the [[designing out approach]], or to [[Sustainable design|sustainable design]], it is complex and demands larger investments than traditional security measures, but at the same time they are able to avoid future costs due to the long-term prevention of crime.<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
Mobility is normally not affected by removal of crime motivators, since it will not affect the road infrastructure or the traffic demand. Also, traffic or traffic infrastructure is usually not a crime motivator in itself.<br />
There could be a (negligable) effect of attracting less traffic to places which used to be attractive for crime offenders, after the crime motivator was removed.<br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Since not all crime motivators have a criminal quality in themselves, removing motivators may in some cases involve a risk of departure from normal liberal democratic standards (such as protection of liberties). <br />
<br />
Pinpointing specific [[Ethics aspects|ethics aspects]] in related to removal of crime motivators needs to consider, among other things, citizen security cultures and citizens' personal concerns. There are no ethics considerations that can be planned or implemented without prior identification and addressing of citizens' perceptions. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
Detailed [[Legal aspects|legal]] coverage of the measure of removal of crime motivator is needed at the level of detail implications, for example splitting groups of people in order to reduce motivation for riots. <br />
<br />
VITRUV offers a [[Legal_aspects#Summary_table_of_legal_aspects_in_urban_planning|summary checklist]] and a [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_legal_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods]] to assess legal aspects in resilience-enhancing urban planning.<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Target_removal&diff=12618Measure type: Target removal2013-06-26T08:36:32Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>Target removal is the [[measure]] of reducing risk by either removing the perceived attractive aspects from an [[attractive object]], or removing the object as a whole.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
If appropriately employed, target removal is one of most effective approaches to crime prevention<ref>[http://www.popcenter.org/library/crimeprevention/volume_01/01poyner.pdf Poyner, Barry, ''what works in crime prevention: an overview of evaluations'', crime prevention studies, 1993]</ref>, as it removes the object or subject suited to commit the crime to.<br />
<br />
== Examples ==<br />
* Removal of money-carrying devices such as pay phones from high-loitering areas[[Image:Pay-phone-TPE97.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Replacement of money pay phones by phones accepting only electronic payments can effectively reduce theft.]]<br />
* Omission of ground-level windows against vandalism<br />
* Concealing or placing out of reach of vulnerable parts<br />
* Using inlaid signs instead of mounted signs against vandalism<br />
* Removal of vandalism-prone street furniture, plants or fixtures or replacing them with less attractive targets<br />
* Removing people vulnerable for robbery and/or assault from high-risk locations by providing alternative routes or means of transport.<br />
* Removing masses as attractive target for fanatics by [[designing out]] crowds and busy places<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
Security issues where this measure can be effective and influenced by the urban planner, are:<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Burglary|Burglary]]{{#info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || [[Security issue: Assault|Physical assault]]{{#info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || <span style="color:silver">Destruction by riots</span>{{#info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || [[Security issue: Mass killing|Mass killing]]{{#info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Ram raid|Ram-raiding]]{{#info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| [[Security issue: Sexual assault|Sexual assault]]{{#info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || <span style="color:silver">Destruction of property by fanatics</span>{{#info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Pickpocketing|Pickpocketing]]{{#info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || [[Security issue: Vandalism|Vandalism]]{{#info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Robbery|Robbery]]{{#info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || [[Security issue: Grafitti|Graffiti]]{{#info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Raid</span>{{#info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || [[Security issue: Antisocial behaviour|Antisocial Behaviour]]{{#info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Vehicle theft|Vehicle theft]]{{#info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
There are no specific environmental conditions required to make target removal effective, but a good target removal measure does require a good understanding what makes a situation attractive for a perpetrator and some creativity to remove the attractiveness of a target without impairing the function of the object (too much).<br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
Urban planning must consider how groups which are particularly vulnerable to criminal acts (women, the elderly etc.) can be removed from high risk locations. This can mean removing any need for such groups to visit these places. For example bus stops should not be located in isolated areas where potential for entrapment is high. In addition, public facilities such as restrooms, benches and luggage lockers should not be placed in locations of poor visibility where people have the opportunity to loiter.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
Some targets might serve a role in providing safety, such as fire extinguishers that are regularly vandalised. Removing these should be done only after considering their effect on safety.<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
Target removal is an example of the [[designing out approach]], or an aspect of [[Sustainable design|sustainable design]], which seeks a balanced consideration of [[Social aspects|social,]] economic, [[Culture aspects|cultural,]] and environmental aspects in urban design. For related measures to be effective and accepted by the public, the need to be responsive to the prevailing [[security culture]]. This can best be accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure of target removal should include usability tests in relevant social contexts. The [[safety audit]] is one of the practical measures that could be used. <br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Target removal deters security threats and mitigates its effects. At the same time, however, security measures demand an investment in time, capital and effort by private agents, companies/developers and the public authorities, exacting [[Economic impact|economic costs]]. Together these benefits and costs are referred to as [[Economic impact of security measures|economic impact of security measures]]. The costs of target removal contains the relatively straightforward [[Primary economic impact|direct expenditures]] on capital equipment and operational costs such as investments in mounted signs against vandalism or omission of ground-level windows. In addition, target removal measures generate various types of [[Secondary economic impact|secondary effects]] as a result of subsequent rounds of expenditure ('re-expenditures') of business companies, households and public authorities outside the security market.<br />
<br />
Whether the act of target removal as a security measures makes sense from an economic point of view, depends on many factors and is case dependent (see the [[Economic tools#Economic assessment step by step|'''flow chart''']] of an economic assessment). One should first of all compare the potential cost-benefits with other alternatives such as target hardening. Secondly, one has to take into account which parties are affected by the act of removing means, who is paying for it, whose activities are affected by it, and so on. And last but not least, how the envisioned measure alters the [[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|behaviour of criminals/terrorists]].<br />
<br />
[[Economic tools]] can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security (of course in collaboration with insights from criminology, sociology, etc.). In terms of benefit-cost ratio, target removal can be considered as a type of security measure which in a relatively subtle way increases security, in contrast to measures such as security guards, big concrete walls and barb wire that may be pervasive, but can also arouse feelings of fear and anxiety<ref>Coaffee, J., P. O’Hare, and M. Hawkesworth. ''The Visibility of (In)security: The Aesthetics of Planning Urban Defences Against Terrorism''. Security Dialogue 2009 40:489.</ref>. Since target removal belongs to the the [[designing out approach]], and is as aspect of [[Sustainable design|sustainable design]], it seeks a balanced consideration of a variety of aspects in urban design. In general, this demands larger investments than traditional security measures, but at the same time they are able to avoid future costs due to the long-term prevention of crime.<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
As described above, an example of target removal is removing people vulnerable for robbery and/or assault from high-risk locations by providing alternative routes or means of transport. For example, providing more means of public transport or new routes guiding around poor or dangerous areas.<br />
<br />
Another example, removing masses as attractive target for fanatics by designing out crowds and busy places, can be achieved by providing more open spaces and squares while avoiding areas/corners that cannot be overseen, or by making more areas of a city attractive by creating for example alternative shopping areas and places to go out in other parts of the city, including appropriate road and public transport means.<br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Removing targets can also mean to remove opportunities for agency, such impacting citizens’ freedom to act. Increase in security may be echoed by increase in restrictions. This needs to be assessed on a case by case basis that considers, among other things, citizen security cultures and citizens' personal concerns. There are no [[Ethics aspects|ethics]] considerations that can be planned or implemented without prior identification and addressing of citizens' perceptions. <br />
<br />
To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
[[Legal aspects|Legal]] considerations concerning target removal include the right to remove the target, as defined - or not defined - by applicable property law. <br />
<br />
VITRUV offers a [[Legal_aspects#Summary_table_of_legal_aspects_in_urban_planning|summary checklist]] and a [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_legal_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods]] to assess legal aspects in resilience-enhancing urban planning. <br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Screening&diff=12617Measure type: Screening2013-06-26T08:32:06Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>'''Screening''' is the [[measure]] of reducing risk by testing all traffic entering and/or exiting a certain area or object on criteria to determine their right to do so.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
[[Image:Receptionists.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Requiring registration at the receptionist desk before access is granted can be an effective form of screening]]Instead of seeking to exclude potential perpetrators (as in access control), this set of tactics seeks to increase the likelihood of detecting persons who are not in conformity with entry requirements (entry screening) or exit requirements (such as detecting the attempted removal of objects that should not be removed from protected areas).<br />
<br />
== Examples ==<br />
Screening measures can take a wide range of form, depending on the access/exit criteria they intend to test:<br />
* Closed-circuit TV (screening for for example hidden objects)<br />
* Body searches (testing for hidden objects)<br />
* Metal detectors (testing for metal objects)<br />
* Vibration detectors or motion detectors (testing for entry at forbidden times or locations)<br />
* Library book tags (testing for theft)<br />
* Requirement show identification<br />
* Electronic badges for trusted personnel[[Image:USMC-080625-M-4682L-006.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Electronic identity badges can provide a quick and automated means of screening]]<br />
* [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vignette_(road_tax) Vignette on the car window] (testing for paid road tax)<br />
* Camera control (with license plate recognition), e.g. for parking garages or for [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congestion_pricing congestion charging] such as in London[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_congestion_charge]<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
Security issues where this measure can be effective and influenced by the urban planner, are:<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Burglary</span>{{#info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || [[Security issue: Assault|Physical assault]]{{#info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || [[Security issue: Destruction by riots|Destruction by riots]]{{#info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || [[Security issue: Mass killing|Mass killing]]{{#info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Ram-raiding</span>{{#info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| [[Security issue: Sexual assault|Sexual assault]]{{#info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || [[Security issue: Destruction by fanatics|Destruction of property by fanatics]]{{#info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Pickpocketing</span>{{#info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || <span style="color:silver">Vandalism</span>{{#info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Robbery</span>{{#info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || <span style="color:silver">Graffiti</span>{{#info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Raid</span>{{#info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || [[Security issue: Antisocial behaviour|Antisocial Behaviour]]{{#info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Vehicle theft</span>{{#info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
For screening to work in general, a detection method needs to exist that is able to, and effective in, testing the access or exit criteria. The test needs to be designed in conformity to the mobility requirements of the access or exit, that is: it should allow the required flows.<br />
<br />
For screening to be deployed in an urban environment, the measure has to be in concordance with the environment it is deployed in. Some types of screening would disrupt traffic flows to an extent that would cause problems: an identity check in a metro station would, because of the high flows of traffic, be very problematic. A body search would normally not be allowed on account of it being very invasive to the privacy of a person, but in certain circumstances - especially when specific indications exist a person might form a significant threat - it might be allowed.<br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
While many forms of screening are not suitable for use in public space due to the potential disruption and time delays it could cause, other forms of natural screening can be promoted through urban design techniques. For example, a clear demarcation of public and private space, through the use of different boundary or surface treatments or the use of fencing, should provide for strong territorial definition. When clear ownership of space is evident, it makes it easier for residents to ‘screen’ for people who do not have legitimate reason to be there.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
Intensive forms of screening can raise the prominence of an object, which can raise the attractiveness of the object for fanatics.<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
From the [[Social aspects|social]] point of view, screening as a measure to increase resilience should consider that security mainly refers to the people and society, and that technical solutions are not effective without the acceptance and participation of the public. This acceptance is, among other things, rooted in [[security culture]]s.<br />
<br />
Practical addressing of social aspects and aspects of [[security culture]] in planning for measures (such as screening) can best be accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure of screening should include tests of usability of respective resilience-enhanced built infrastructure in relevant social contexts. An example of a practical method to use is the [[Safety_audit|safety audit]], which focuses on context-specific solutions.<br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Screening measures (see the case example below) intend to deter crime and terrorism, mitigating the negative [[Economic impact of security threats| socio-economic impact of crime]] and terrorism. There are, however, costs involved with the improvement of urban security, also referred to as the "Costs of Mitigation"<ref>Source: Rose, A & S. Chatterjee (2011). Benefits and Costs of Counter-Terrorism Security Measures in Urban Areas. Research sponsor: Department of Homeland Security: 6-7.</ref>. These costs contain first of all [[Primary economic impact|direct investments]] in equipment, training and operational costs by private agents, companies/developers and the public authorities, exacting [[Economic impact|economic cost/impact]]. Secondly, the mitigation effort generates various types of [[Secondary economic impact|secondary effects]] for example in terms of delays, inconveniences, and changes in the business environment.<br />
[[File:CISF Security Check Point.jpg|thumb|CISF Security Check Point]]<br />
Whether these primary and secondary costs are making sense from an economic point of view depends on many factors, and can be answered by two distinct sets of questions (see also the [[Economic tools#Economic assessment step by step|'''flow chart''']] of an economic assessment):<br />
# Are the envisioned security measures cost effective from a socio-economic point of view, or are there better alternatives?<br />
# Which specific agents (individuals, companies, sectors, authorities) are affected by the security measures and to which extend? How do the envisioned measures alter the behaviour of these agents, and, of course, the [[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|behaviour of criminals/terrorists]]? <br />
<br />
''Case example: A cost-benefit analysis of screening at checkpoints:''<br />
{{quote| In economic terms, checkpoints help to apprehend persons in violation of laws and confiscate contraband (such as smuggling goods). The benefits of checkpoints can be quantified in terms of the number of apprehensions per patrol agent. Some detailed studies suggest that checkpoints have a positive benefit-cost ratio. Take for example a study on the community sobriety checkpoint program estimated benefits from the National Highway Traffic safety Administration (NHTSA). This report states that for every $1 spent on sobriety checkpoint program the community saves more than $6, including $1.30 of insurer costs(Miller et al., 1998).<ref>Miller, T., M. Galbraith, and B Lawrence. (1998). Costs and Benefits of a Community Sobriety Checkpoint Program. Journal of Studies on Alcohol and Drugs, 59(4), 462-468. In: Rose, A. & S. Chatterjee (2011). Benefits and Costs of Counter-Terrorism Security Measures in Urban Areas. Research sponsor: Department of Homeland Security, p.10</ref>. Nevertheless, screening of persons also generates indirect costs that are generally hard to measure. Think of effects such as delays (for both private persons as commercial transportation companies), inconvenience for travelers, and the quality of life for local residents. On top of that, checkpoints may possibly also raise concerns about the overall safety of the region, influencing economic activities such as tourism and local business customer ship.}}<br />
<br />
[[Economic tools]] such as the [[social cost-benefit analysis]] (first question) and [[Economic Impact Study|economic impact study]] (second question) can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security (of course in collaboration with insights from criminology, sociology, etc.).<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
Mobility considerations for screening are that the screening should be performed quickly as not to disrupt the traffic flow.<br />
As given above, examples of screening in a mobility environment are a vignette on the car window (road tax), camera control (with license plate recognition), barriers (e.g. to control a private parking or area), toll booths or security/entrance checks at airports.<br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
[[Ethics aspects]] of screening depend on the differences in the security and rights traditions of different countries. Prevention management, and mitigation strategies may be seen to involve restriction of fundamental rights (e.g. movement; privacy). As a general guideline, the screening measure should aim to test for ''only'' the access/exit criteria and avoid gathering any other information. This principal ensures a minimal breach to the personal privacy.<br />
<br />
In general, pinpointing specific ethics aspects in resilience-enhancing measures needs to consider, among other things, citizen security cultures and citizens' personal concerns. There are no ethics considerations that can be planned or implemented without prior identification and addressing of citizens' perceptions. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
Main [[Legal aspects|legal]] considerations as they relate to screening include data protection; identification of people and how this could infringe personal rights; legal permission or restriction (such as anti-discrimination) to apply criteria; legal aspects of mass data storage; data protection; and legal admissibility of forcing people to identify themselves. <br />
<br />
VITRUV offers a [[Legal_aspects#Summary_table_of_legal_aspects_in_urban_planning|summary checklist]] and a [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_legal_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods]] to assess legal aspects in resilience-enhancing urban planning. <br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florianhttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Surveillance&diff=12616Measure type: Surveillance2013-06-26T08:24:29Z<p>Florian: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Economic]]<br />
[[Category:Ethics]]<br />
[[Category:Measure]]<br />
[[Category:Mobility]]<br />
[[Category:Social]]<br />
'''Surveillance''' is the [[measure]] of monitoring the behaviour, activities, or other changing information, usually of people for the purpose of influencing, managing, directing, or protecting.<ref>[[wikipedia:Surveillance]]</ref><br />
<br />
[[Traffic management#Traffic monitoring|Monitoring of traffic]] is a related activity which can be used for general [[Traffic management|traffic management]] or [[Traffic management#Incident management|incident management]].<br />
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== Description ==<br />
Surveillance is the first step in the reaction chain '''detection'''-'''perception'''-'''interpretation'''-'''formulating action'''-'''acting'''. The essence of surveillance lies in the detection of the actual situation. This can be done in various ways:<br />
* by dedicated observers on location<br />
* remotely by dedicated observers<br />
* by the public<br />
<br />
==Examples==<br />
===By dedicated observers on location===<br />
[[File:UDPolice1.jpg|thumb|right|Police officer on surveillance]]Observation of the situation by dedicated observers on location can be done either by observers that are incognito, or observers that are clearly distinguishable. Both strategies have their advantages:<br />
* observation by observers that are incognito can reveal the situation in its natural behaviour, undisturbed by the fact that it is observed. This can reveal behaviour (and its causes) that otherwise remain undetected.<br />
* observation by observers that are clearly distinguishable can convey the presence of authority and exert a mitigating effect on the behaviour of the observed.<br />
<br />
===Remotely by dedicated observers===<br />
[[File:Surveillance_cameras.jpg|thumb|right|Security cameras in the street]]Monitoring with the help of cameras (CCTV) has become a common method throughout all Europe to combat crime and terrorism. In the UK more than 4 million cameras have been installed (The Associated Press, 2007).<br />
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===By the public===<br />
[[File:Amber_Alert_SMS.jpg|thumb|right|Example of an Amber Alert SMS]]This concerns involving (a select part of) the public in the detection of crime. This can both be facilitated by electronic means and more traditional means. Examples of both approaches can be found in:<br />
* The USA 'Eagle Eyes' initiative of the Air Force office of Special Investigation<ref>http://www.osi.andrews.af.mil/eagleeyes/index.asp</ref><br />
* 'Veilige wijk' The Hague<ref>link to be added</ref><br />
* Amber alert<ref>[[wikipedia: AMBER Alert]]</ref><br />
* Gulfport Alternative Policing strategy<ref>http://www.ci.gulfport.ms.us/police/gaps.html</ref><br />
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== Effectiveness ==<br />
The effectiveness of surveillance against crime is rooted in three effects:<br />
* its contribution to the reaction chain<br />
* the mitigating effect of clearly visible observation/observants<br />
* the contribution it can have to the prosecution of crime (gathering evidence and leads)<br />
<br />
Security issues where this measure can be effective and influenced by the urban planner, are:<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
!colspan="4"|Security issues<br />
|-<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Burglary|Burglary]]{{#info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || [[Security issue: Assault|Physical assault]]{{#info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || [[Security issue: Destruction by riots| Destruction by riots]]{{#info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || [[Security issue: Mass killing| Mass killing]]{{#info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Ram raid|Ram-raiding]]{{#info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| [[Security issue: Sexual assault|Sexual assault]]{{#info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || [[Security issue: Destruction by fanatics| Destruction of property by fanatics]]{{#info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Pickpocketing|Pickpocketing]]{{#info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || [[Security issue: Vandalism|Vandalism]]{{#info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Robbery|Robbery]]{{#info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || [[Security issue: Grafitti|Graffiti]]{{#info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Raid|Raid]]{{#info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || [[Security issue: Antisocial behaviour|Antisocial Behaviour]]{{#info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Vehicle theft|Vehicle theft]]{{#info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
* In order for surveillance to have the intended effects, it is essential that the reaction chain is unbroken. As often the links in the reaction chain are managed by different people or organisations, the communication in this chain is of vital essence.<br />
<br />
For surveillance to be effective, an observer needs to be able to oversee an area. In an urban context, the extent to which an area can be overseen by an observer is highly dependent on<br />
* the available positions for the observer<br />
* the field of vision, which is directly related to the geometry of the space<br />
* the lighting conditions<br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
Urban Planning can promote the natural surveillance of public space through providing for a diverse mix of land uses. A diverse mix of land uses ensures that there will be activity on the street for the most part of the day, which in turn increases the continuous presence of people on streets all the time. Areas with poor mix of land use or single use areas become deserted during certain hours of the day, creating a suitable environment for the criminal activities.<br />
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=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
Situational crime prevention measures such as camera surveillance are subject of [[Economic effects of anti-crime security measures#Crime displacement|displacement effect]]s. A UK-study (2009)<ref>Waples, S., M. Gill, and P. Fisher (2009). ''Does CCTV displace crime?'' Sage Publications.</ref> empirically tested this thesis in the UK on 13 CCTV projects and concludes that spatial displacement of crime due to camera surveillance does occur, but not in a frequent and uniform way across space and types of offences<ref>Violence against persons, for example, increased dramatically, which (according to the authors) "could be explained by the increase in reporting due to the cameras or due to the national upward trend in recorded violent crime."</ref><br />
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Highly visible forms of surveillance can raise the prominence of an object, which can raise the attractiveness of the object for fanatics.<br />
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=== Social considerations ===<br />
[[Social aspects|Social]] side effects of surveillance can be:<br />
* Increased perception of unsafety by the public (some research suggests observation of increased public security measures such as video surveillance of public places reduces citizens social fear of crime but increases their personal fear of crime (e.g. [[Security_issue:_breaking_and_entering|breaking and entering]] of their homes)<ref>CPSI project, http://www.cpsi-fp7.eu.</ref><br />
* Increased perception of safety by the public<br />
* Decreased perception of privacy by the public<br />
* [[Risk#Objective_and_subjective_risk|Overconfidence]] <br />
* [[Reflective fear]]: For example, critics argue that information technology-based solutions to security problems (including the use of video surveillance) are not suited to confront threats but only to reassure the public that something is being done. This facilitates the rise of a security culture of moral panic as illustrated by the London bombings in 2005.<ref>Alexander Siedschlag: The Concept of Security in the EU, in: Maximilian Edelbacher et al. (eds.): Global Security and the Financial Crisis. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press (Taylor & Francis Group), pp. 51-64 (p. 59).</ref><br />
<br />
In general, technology-based measures such as surveillance should consider that security mainly refers to the people and society, and that technical solutions are not effective without the acceptance and participation of the public. This acceptance is, among other things, rooted in [[security culture]]s.<br />
<br />
Practical addressing of social aspects and aspects of [[security culture]] in security-related urban planning can be best accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure of access control should include usability tests in relevant social contexts. [[planning for real]] and [[local open dialogue]] are examples of practical methods to use.<br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Surveillance measures (see case examples below) intend to increase the level of security, detecting security issues and mitigating the negative (economic) effects of security threats. Security measures, however, also require investment in capital, time and money exacting [[Economic impact|economic cost/impact]]. The costs of surveillance measures contain the relatively straightforward [[Primary economic impact|direct expenditures]] such as investments in police officers, cameras in the street, public awareness programmes, etc. In addition, surveillance measures generate various types of [[Secondary economic impact|secondary effects]]. These indirect economic effects are the result of subsequent rounds of expenditure ('re-expenditures') of business companies, households and public authorities outside the security market. <br />
<br />
Whether the costs are making sense from an economic point of view, depends on many factors, and can be answered by two distinct sets of questions (see also the [[Economic tools#Economic assessment step by step|'''flow chart''']] of an economic assessment):<br />
# Are the envisioned surveillance measures cost effective from a socio-economic point of view, or are there better alternatives?<br />
# Which specific agents (individuals, companies, sectors, authorities) are affected by the surveillance measures, and to which extend? How do the envisioned measures alter the behaviour of these agents, and, of course, the [[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|behaviour of criminals/terrorists]]? <br />
<br />
''Case example: dedicated surveillance on location''<br />
{{quote|Stewart and Mueller (2008)<ref>Stewart, M.G., J. Mueller (2008). ''A risk and cost-benefit assessment of United States aviation security measures''. Springer Science.</ref> performed a cost-benefit analysis of the Federal Air Marshal Service and hardening cockpit doors as security measures against terrorist events like 9/11. They conclude that even if the Federal Air Marshal Service prevents one 9/11 replication each decade, the $900 million annual spending on Air Marshal Service fails a [[Social cost-benefit analysis|cost-benefit analysis]] at an annual estimated cost of $180 million per life saved (compared to a [[Social cost-benefit analysis#Value of a statistical life (VASL)|societal willingness to pay]] to save a life of $1 - $10 million per saved life). On the other hand, Stewart and Mueller <ref>Ibid.</ref> conclude that with $40 million per year, [[Measure: Target hardening|target hardening]] of cockpit doors is one of the most cost-effective security measures with an annual cost of $800,000 per life saved.}}<br />
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''Case example: remote surveillance by dedicated observer''<br />
{{quote|The current debate about CCTV (camera surveillance) with regards to its cost-effectiveness is pointing out the following topics:<br />
* Empirical research finds that the overall crime rates drop in the areas with CCTV, but not in all cases and situations<ref> See, ''e.g.'':Priks, M. (2010).''The Effect of Surveillance Cameras on Crime: Evidence from the Stockholm Subway''. Cameron, A., E. Kolodinski, H. May, N. Williams (2008). ''Measuring the Effects of Video Surveillance on Crime in Los Angeles''. CRB-8-007. USC School of Policy, Planning and Development.</ref>. Furthermore, crimes committed in the heat of the moment, such as assaults are in general not affected by the presence of cameras.<br />
* Total costs of CCTV far exceed that of the camera hardware alone<ref> See ''e.g.'':http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/08/08-007.pdf and http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/dec/22/cctv-surveillance-police-cost</ref>.<br />
* To be effective, surveillance systems should be fully integrated into law enforcement practices.}}<br />
<br />
[[Economic tools]] can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security (of course in collaboration with insights from criminology, sociology, etc.).<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
In the mobility field, surveillance is often applied for enforcement of speed limits or other traffic rules such as only parking at the allowed spaces.<br />
<br />
For speed limit enforcement, surveillance is usually applied with a radar system to measure the speed and a camera with flasher to detect the car driver by its license plate. Also trajectory control is applied, where all drivers are detected at both ends of a trajectory, after which their average speed is calculated and checked against the speed limit.<br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Surveillance is an instance of [http://www.focusproject.eu/web/focus/wiki/-/wiki/ESG/Securitization#section-Securitisation-SecuritisationAndSurveillance securitisation], for example the advocation of big and potentially intrusive measures in the name of security, where the concept of security becomes quite broad.<ref> Cf. Salter, M. B. (2010). Surveillance. In J. P. Burgess (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies. London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group.</ref> Surveillance can involve a variety of [[Ethics aspects|ethics]] issues, such as: [[Culture aspects|cultural differences]] in citizens' perception of security technologies and their acceptability as well as need to provide norms and standards beyond frameworks for built infrastructure (such as respect for privacy and fundamental rights). <br />
<br />
Pinpointing specific ethics aspects in resilience-enhancing measures such as surveillance needs to consider, among other things, citizen security cultures and citizens' personal concerns. There are no ethics considerations that can be planned or implemented without prior identification and addressing of citizens' perceptions. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
Main [[Legal aspects|legal]] considerations relate to the impact of surveillance-related measures on privacy, collection and use of personal data, and human rights. <br />
<br />
VITRUV offers a [[Legal_aspects#Summary_table_of_legal_aspects_in_urban_planning|summary checklist]] and a [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_legal_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods]] to assess legal aspects in resilience-enhancing urban planning. <br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Florian