https://securipedia.eu/api.php?action=feedcontributions&user=Dolinda&feedformat=atomSecuripedia - User contributions [en]2024-03-29T14:38:14ZUser contributionsMediaWiki 1.34.0https://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Soft_targets&diff=14373Soft targets2020-11-23T14:30:43Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
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<div>The definition of soft target within the EU [[PRoTECT research project|PRoTECT]] project was: a (public) site that is insufficiently protected against a [[Terrorism|terrorist attack]] and when attacked by a terrorist organization, will help terrorists obtain their goals. Within this project specific [[Public space|public spaces]] that can be defines as soft targets were assessed for their [[Vulnerability assessment of the EU PRoTECT project|vulnerabilities]] against terrorist attacks and mitigating solutions were researched. <br />
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[[Public space|Public spaces]] that are vulnerable to terrorism (or other crime) can be considered as “soft targets”. This means that crowded public places including the metro, shopping centres, sports stadiums, bars, restaurants, clubs and commercial sidewalks, are easily accessible to the public and an easy target for terrorists to do great harm. These areas are targets because attacking them can aid terrorist organizations to obtain their goals such as enforcing their will on governments. These areas are called ‘soft’, because they are not hardened against such terrorist attacks. A crowded public space, for instance a shopping centre, may be hardened against threats like vandalism and petty crime, but not necessarily for a terrorist attack. <br />
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<br /></div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measures&diff=14372Measures2020-11-23T14:28:57Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
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<div><br />
[[File:ae.png|25px|right|This is a page providing background in a specific field of expertise]]'''Measures''' are provisions made or actions taken to protect an object or subject from risk.<br />
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Measure types can be classified by their temporal application: structural or event-driven measures. Structural measures are more geared towards permanent solutions, such as infrastructural improvements, in order to reduce the risk of criminal acts taking place in the areas where these measures are applied. Event-driven measures have a more temporal nature and can be implemented in order to ensure extra risk reduction and mitigation for (large scale) events. These are intended for more high impact crimes such as (terrorist) attacks.<br />
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==Structural measure types to protect an object or subject from risk==<br />
Structural measures are permanent solutions that mediate the risk of a [[Crime|criminal]] act. These measures can be further classified by their point of application in the process of a criminal act. From the perspective of a criminal, all measures reduce the perceived attractiveness of a target. Identified points of application are:<br />
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*Increasing perceived effort<br />
*Increasing perceived risk<br />
*Decreasing anticipated reward<br />
*Controlling contributing circumstances<br />
*Other<br />
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All measure types can be classified in one of these categories. The table below displays for each of the measure types in Securipedia, which point of application it works on. <br />
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By clicking the {{#tip-info:Example of a explanatory text}} a brief description of the measure is provided.<br />
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{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
! style="background:#f0f0f0;" |'''Increasing perceived effort'''<br />
! style="background:#f0f0f0;" |'''Increasing perceived risk'''<br />
! style="background:#f0f0f0;" |'''Decreasing anticipated reward'''<br />
! style="background:#f0f0f0;" |'''Contributing circumstances'''<br />
! style="background:#f0f0f0;" |'''Other'''<br />
|-<br />
|[[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]]{{#tip-info:Target hardening is the measure of strengthening the security by increasing the required effort to commit crimes to or at an object}}||[[Measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]]{{#tip-info:Surveillance is the measure of monitoring the behaviour, activities, or other changing information, usually of people for the purpose of influencing, managing, directing, or protecting.}}||[[Measure: Target removal|Target removal]]{{#tip-info:Target removal is the reduction of risk by removing the perceived attracting aspects from an [[attractive object]]}}||[[Measure: Controlling disinhibitors|Controlling disinhibitors]]{{#tip-info:Controlling disinhibitors is the reduction of risk by removing or regulating disinhibiting substances or circumstances}}||[[Measure: Deflection|Deflection]]{{#tip-info:Deflecting crime is the reduction of risk by creating circumstances that direct criminals to less critical objects}}<br />
|-<br />
|[[Measure: Access control|Access control]]{{#tip-info:Access control is the reduction of risk by regulating and controlling the flows of traffic into and out of an area or object}}||[[Measure: Intervention force|Intervention force]]{{#tip-info:A intervention force is the measure of having adequate resources (first responders) to react to emergencies in order to minimize impact and restore a normal situation as soon as possible.}}||[[Measure: Removal of crime motivator|Removal of crime motivator]]{{#tip-info:Removal of a crime motivator is the reduction of risk by removing the benefits of a crime}}||[[Measure: Facilitating compliance|Facilitating compliance]]{{#tip-info:Facilitating compliance is the measure of reducing risk by decreasing crime by making it easier for the public to behave according to the local rules.}}||Creating awareness / stimulating conscience{{#tip-info:Creating awareness is the measure of increasing the mental reserves of people to committing crimes}}<br />
|-<br />
|[[Measure: Directing traffic flows|Directing traffic flows]]{{#tip-info:Directing traffic flows is the measure of reducing the opportunities for a criminal to approach a suitable target by physically separating the flows of traffic}}||[[Measure: Screening|Screening]]{{#tip-info:Screening is the measure of reducing risk by identifying all traffic entering and/or exiting a certain area or object}}|| ||Rule setting{{#tip-info:Rule-setting is the measure of erecting legal or regulatory restrictions of a temporal and/or local nature in order to reduce risk}}||<br />
|-<br />
|[[Measure: Removing means|Removing means]]{{#tip-info:Removing means is the reduction of risk by ensuring the tools or other means conductive to crime are not available}}||Increase punishment{{#tip-info:Increasing punishment is the reduction of risk by the increase of the negative consequences of crime when caught}}|| ||[[Measure: Ownership|Ownership]]{{#tip-info:Ownership is the reduction of crime by establishing an environment where there is a clear separation between public and private space}}||<br />
|-<br />
| || || ||[[Measure: Maintenance|Maintenance]]{{#tip-info:Maintenance is the measure of discouraging crime by designing places with management and maintenance in mind}}||<br />
|}<br />
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==Event-driven measure types==<br />
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Event driven-measures are temporal solutions that can mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as an attack) at an event in a designated area. These measures, in turn, can be broken down into various technology categories that could assist in the mitigation of [[Security Vulnerability|vulnerabilities]]: <br />
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The '''five technology categories''' in event-driven measures are:<br />
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#''[[Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)|ICT]]'' that could be used for communicating, storing, analysing and protecting information. Examples are: WiFi, IoT, Encryption, VPN, et cetera;<br />
#''[[Measure type: Sensors|Sensors]]'' that could be used for detection, identification, localisation or tracking. Examples are: cameras, facial recognition, acoustic sniper localisation, et cetera;<br />
#''[[Measure type: Actuators|Actuators]]'' that could be used for warning, intercepting or eliminating. Examples are: sirens, anti-drone drones, HPM vehicle stopping, et cetera;<br />
#''[[Measure type: Physical measures|Physical measures]]'' that could be used for controlling access, impeding an attack or protective materials. Examples are: tourniquets, portable rising steps, bomb blast window film, et cetera;<br />
#''[[Measure type: Methods|Methods]]'' that could be used for procedures, best practices or standards to implement solutions. An example is the ISO 31000 Risk Management<br />
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In this application, the term technology should be interpreted in the broadest sense of the word. It includes both hard technologies and soft technologies. Hard technologies are tangible devices or components (e.g. computers and software). Soft technologies include the human areas of decision making, strategy development, training, and concept formation (e.g. methodologies or procedures).<br />
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Each technology is (part of) a security measure, providing some basic security function as a response to a (potential) threat. As used in the EU VAT, there are ten different technology uses that range from before, during and after an attack. The technology uses are:<br />
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#''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
#''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
#''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
#''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
#''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
#''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
#''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
#''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
#''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
#''Other.''<br />
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The following examples illustrate the potential needs for these event-driven, technological solutions by indicating their support towards mediating risk and mitigating vulnerabilities:<br />
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*Enhancing the surveillance of an area to for instance count crowds, monitor allocation of citizens or identify occurrences of objects or behaviors. By enhancing this surveillance, a municipality and the other local actors can identify anomalies or assess the impact at certain moments in time before an attack or respond faster to incidents and aid citizens.<br />
*Enhancing the cooperation between different actors (between own forces as well as completely different actors). In the cases of terrorist attacks, actors do not stand alone and need to cooperate in order to prevent, responds and recover from terrorist attacks. By enhancing the cooperation in could create more effective deployment of forces, better communication between them and faster (real time) sharing of information like images or videos to get ahead of the threat.<br />
*Enhancing alerting and evacuating of citizens during an attack by putting in place early warning systems and effective evacuation pathways. Potential innovative technology solutions could enhance the warning systems and evacuation pathways for specific public spaces.<br />
*Enhancing the existing knowledge and train forces specifically for protecting public spaces against terrorism, as anti-terrorism expertise is often missing at local government. There is a need of knowing were and how this knowledge can be obtained as well as how to train personal in the future.<br /><br />
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<br /></div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Vulnerability_assessment_of_the_EU_PRoTECT_project&diff=14371Vulnerability assessment of the EU PRoTECT project2020-11-23T14:26:36Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
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<div>Within the EU PRoTECT project municipalities have performed vulnerability assessments on specific public spaces in their region that can be considered soft targets for [[Terrorism|terrorist attacks]]. For this purpose, the EU Vulnerability Assessment Tool developed by DG Home was used and a specific manual for municipalities and local law enforcement agencies was developed. This EU VAT is an example of how to identify and analyze vulnerabilities that can be used to focus on determining what kind of measures are needed to mitigate these vulnerabilities. <br />
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==The EU Vulnerability Assessment Tool manual==<br />
DG HOME has developed the EU Vulnerability Assessment Tool (VAT) (2019) with the main objective of providing practical support to Member States to enhance the protection of public spaces by facilitating on-site vulnerability assessments. Within the PRoTECT project, a manual for this EU VAT was developed to specifically aid municipalities and their stakeholders in identifying vulnerabilities of their public spaces of interest (soft targets) in order to strengthen their protection against terrorism.<br />
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The EU VAT Manual describes (1) who should perform such an assessment and why, (2) the steps that are needed before using the tool, (3) what different steps are involved in the assessment and how to record te results of the assessment, and (4) what can be done with the results and what next steps can be taken. <br />
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==Security management and assessing vulnerabilities==<br />
It is important to mention that the vulnerability assessment was organized by a managing body, in the case of the PRoTECT project the five municipalities[VG(v1] . It is essential to involve relevant stakeholders such as the local law enforcement agency. The managing has the lead in developing a security plan for the PSOI. Generally, developing a security plan is an ongoing process – threats and other circumstances change, requiring the security plan to be continually adapted as well. In the case of protecting a PSOI against terrorist attacks, it is assumed that even though a certain activity at the PSOI may be unique, there are some common aspects related to the PSOI: the method of planning, managing the activity and other security related aspects.<br />
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Developing and maintaining a security plan is a cyclic process, generally involving the following steps:<br />
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1. Security audit/inspection (policy, constraints, site and activity characteristics, threats, security measures, vulnerabilities, risks, etc.);<br />
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2. Decision making (budgets, priorities, schedules, risk acceptance, go/no-go by the management body, etc.);<br />
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3. Security plan (development/adjustment, and ratification by the management body);<br />
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4. Implementation and (periodic) verification of security measures (in accordance with the security plan).<br />
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The aspect of risk assessment involves three consecutive processes<ref>Systematic techniques for risk assessment are described in the IEC 31010:2009 standard.</ref>: <br />
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1. Risk identification (identifying threats and threat scenarios)<br />
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2. Risk analysis (determining consequences, probabilities, risk levels and vulnerabilities)<br />
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3. Risk evaluation (determining priorities, risk treatment actions, risk acceptance)<br />
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The vulnerabilities of a PSOI and the possible risks of an attack can be identified by examining the PSOI (geographical layout, accessibility for vehicles, natural or emplaced security measures, etc) and devising viable attack scenarios. Scenarios should at least mention the threat type (e.g. shooter), the aim of the attack, with what means and how the terrorist carries out the attack. Conceiving scenarios can be an activity carried out by a team of experts from all the relevant stakeholders that is put together by the managing body. This means that to be able to carry out the assessment, different experts need to be present and gathered to go through all steps. In the risk analysis process, the consequences (i.e. impact, severity) and probability (i.e. likelihood, chance) of each attack scenario are determined by the team of experts, considering all factors of influence.<br />
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==Before using the tool: getting started==<br />
Before using the EU VAT, it is important to determine a managing body. The managing body is an individual, organization or group of organizations that takes up the responsibility to identify and work on counter terrorism regarding PSOIs. This can be a law enforcement agency, a municipality or possibly also the owner of the public space. The management will most likely involve various stakeholders in decisions concerning site security, such as local government, emergency services, retailers, etc. In the case of the PRoTECT project, the managing bodies are the municipalities involved that will identify their vulnerabilities against various terrorist attacks and identify their soft targets. This managing body needs to take the following actions:<br />
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1. Create clear understanding of the organization of the PSOI (who is involved (stakeholders) and their roles and responsibilities, geographical boundaries of the site, the plans for the events and risk evaluation criteria) and gather all relevant information.<br />
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2. Create a team of experts that will perform the vulnerability assessment together (include stakeholders that have detailed knowledge of the PSOI, security policies and expertise on counter-terrorism).<br />
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3. Create and decide on a work method with the team of experts, on how to perform the vulnerability assessment. In the case of PRoTECT this was done by workshop sessions with all relevant stakeholders.<br />
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==Assessing the Public Space of Interest: 5 steps==<br />
It is recommended to kick-off by displaying a topographical map to the team, detailing the boundaries of the main site and surrounding sites, and describing the general function of each surrounding site in relation to the activity on the main site. When possible, organize a visit to the PSOI.<br />
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===Step 1: Characteristics of the site===<br />
Write the necessary details like the main site's name, if there are specific activities happening (like a festival, market or something else) and when this activity occurs. The dates and times are important to be aware if an activity is occurring regularly or is incidental. Second, write down the details of the site, the name and address, in which phase of the EU VAT the site fits and what the expected crowd density is. It is possible that the crowd density differs on specific times, please add this if relevant. Finally, it is useful to fill in the team members and the date of assessment.<br />
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===Step 2: Existing security measures===<br />
Gather together with the team of experts, the existing security measures you are aware of regarding the specific site. This can be a natural measure, for instance a wall that can create a blockage or to hide behind, or emplaced measures, for instance surveillance police teams or road blocks. Within the PRoTECT project the measures were categorized by the use of technology solutions.<br />
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===Step 3: Scenario per threat type===<br />
Use each other’s creativity and expertise to assess scenario’s according to ten potential '''''terrorist threat types''''' mentioned by the EU VAT. The ten potential threat types used are:<br />
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#''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
#''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
#''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
#''Improvised Explosive Device (IED)'' - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
#''Person-Born Improvised Explosive Device'' (PBIED) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
#''Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Improvised Explosive Device (UAVIED)'' - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
#''Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devise (VBIED)'' - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
#''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
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===Step 4: Consequence and probability===<br />
For each scenario, one should assess with the team of experts what the consequence and probability are for each scenario. For each site (area) of the PSOI and considering existing measures, each scenario should be followed trough to identify the lack of measures that could create a vulnerability if either or both consequence and probability are high.<br />
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===Step 5: Analysis and results===<br />
Finally, when all consequences and probabilities have been determined for a site, check for any inconsistencies or dependencies among the scenarios, consequences and probabilities, and make adjustments where necessary. Possibly repeat this activity once all record templates for all sites have been completed. Determine level of risk for each scenario, for instance by using a risk matrix (risk low, medium and high) and record this.<br />
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==What’s next==<br />
Once an overall insight into the vulnerabilities of the PSOI is available, follow-up actions can be taken. The security experts’ team can suggest mitigation options for some or all of the attack scenarios to the management body. Also, using the results from using the EU VAT, the managing body can evaluate the risks, deciding which risks to mitigate and how (in part based on the options provided by the security team) and which risks to accept. Furthermore, informing and involving the stakeholders. Finally, '''''gathering information''''' on [[Measures|solutions]] and getting the measures implemented to mitigate '''''vulnerabilities'''''.<br />
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==Footnotes and references==<br />
<references /></div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Security_threat:_actors&diff=14370Security threat: actors2020-11-23T14:19:17Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
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<div>{intro groups Vivian nog aanvullen}<br />
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A criminal, a term that has not been used in literature within the past decade, also known as a perpetrator, is an individual that conducts criminal behavior and thus deviating him or herself from society. Members of a society often see criminals as “the other”. They do not see themselves as part of the same group. Durkheim described the phenomenon of ‘moral superiority’ as a feeling of moral outrage towards the criminal ‘other’. These feelings functions as a positive social function, improving a sense of community among members of society.<ref>Durkheim, E. (1893). De la division du travail sovial. – s.l.;s.n.</ref><br />
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Crime can be conducted in groups or by individuals. Crimes that are committed by individuals often have different motivations and modus operandi than crimes that are committed by groups or members of a group. Individual crimes often have an emotional, compulsive or mental illness component or a mixture of components, whereas crimes committed by groups are often solely financially or ideologically motivated.<br />
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==Individuals==<br />
There is no single definition that can describe a criminal actor. Individual actors can differ in age, motivation, type of act and life course. Researchers did find consensus on risk factors that can influence the decision to commit a crime. Age, life events, social status and personality traits are significant predictors of crime. The Age-Crime Curve shows that most offenders are between 15 and 25 years old.<ref>Dijk, van. J. et al. (2009). ''Actuele Criminologie''. Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers.</ref><ref>Laub and Sampson (2003), Shared Beginnings, Divergent Lives, Fig 5.21, p. 86.</ref> <br />
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===Adolescence limited offender===<br />
Many criminological research on the life course of offenders, shows that there is a peak in age between 15 and 25. The interpretation of the age-crime curve varies among criminologists and researchers. Moffitt’s Dual Taxonomy of the Life Course Persister versus the Adolescence Limited Persister is the most used and supported theory on individual criminal careers. Taxonomy is the study of dividing individuals into similar groups. In her Dual Taxonomy theory, Moffitt distinguishes individuals who engage in antisocial an criminal behavior during their adolescence and individuals that pursue a criminal career throughout the rest of their life (the so called life course persisters).<ref>Moffitt, T.E. (1993). “Adolescence-Limited and Life Course Persistent Antisocial Behaviour: A Developmental Taxonomy”, ''Psychological Review'', pp. 100:674-701.</ref> While the teenage brain is developing, inhibitions, impulsive behavior and sensation seeking traits can still be turned around. Experiencing interventions (youth programs) or certain life events (falling in love, getting into college) can stop this group from developing a criminal career. <br />
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===Life course persisters===<br />
Biological and psychological risk factors such as low intelligence, high impulsivity, low self control can be indicators of the development of a criminal way of life. The Life Course Persister is regarded as the individuals that have not experienced the previously mentioned Life Events or interventions or have not benefited from their desisting influence. Examples of Life Course Persisters are drug criminals, addicts that remain to steal to afford their drugs, or violent, homicidal or sexual offenders, that have not received therapy or interventions before their brains fully developed. <br />
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===Life course persisters===<br />
The FBI conducted research on murderers in the 1970s in the United States. Around that time, lots of young people were hitchhiking and due to social trends (drugs, festivals), many young people travelled freely around the country. In that time, the amount of homicides also increased, because these trends made it a lot easier for killers to pick up their victims. The chances of getting caught were very low, because the young victims were relatively anonymous and often far away from home. The FBI came up with a term, describing killers that killed two or more victims; serial killers. Not to be confused with a mass or spree killer, which they distinguished in the same taxonomy. A serial killer has a cooling down period in between kills. For a serial killer, the act itself is almost a compulsion. He needs time to prepare to make it perfect and to maximize the sensation of killing. A spree killer also commits multiple homicides, but within a very short period (max. 30 days), with a different motive. A mass killer carries out one single acts, in which he or she tries to kill as much victims as possible, often out of anger or with a political motive, such as lone wolves or school shooters.<br />
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===Lone wolves===<br />
Lone wolves do not operate within a group or in the role of a steady member of a large '''''[[Terrorism|terrorist]]''''' cell or of an organisation. The inspiration of a lone actor terrorist, also frequently described as ‘lone actor terrorists’, frequently comes from publications of like-minded individuals through online and offline contact. The explosive amount of violence, that is often used by lone actor terrorists, frequently overshadows their ideology and becomes the ideology itself. A significant difference between jihadist and right-wing lone actors lies in their psychopathology.<br />
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==Groups==<br />
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===Organised===<br />
Until the 1990s, organised crime was known as crime carried out by groups with a pyramidal structure containing a strict hierarchy, such as maffia organisations in Italy or the United States of America. In 1983 RICO, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act was introduced, cleaning out criminal “enterprises”. This led to a shift from pyramid structures within criminal organisations to ‘nodal networks’ and ‘cells’.<br />
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===Nodal networks===<br />
In between the roaring twenties and 1990s most organised criminal networks were mostly formed from families with a hierarchical structure, after the 1990s social embeddedness became more important. Criminal networks dispersed and formed smaller groups that were connected by ‘facilitators’ and ‘nodes’. Facilitators provide services for several smaller groups, such as bookkeeping (laundering money). Nodes are connecting individuals that can bring together different groups, such as an individual with a large (criminal) social network that can introduce key players. Often these nodal networks are drug related crime and/or white collar crime. Investigating these smaller, nodal networks posed a challenge for law enforcement due to the fact that they are less visible than large enterprises or syndicates. Therefore, law enforcement agencies focus on identifying facilitators to roll up entire networks. <br />
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===Cells===<br />
The term ‘cell’ comes from epidemiology, a discipline that forms many similarities to criminology. In history, when a pandemic emerged, the treatment of the pandemic often flowed over to the treatment of crime (during the plague, lepracy and smallpox)<ref>Schuilenburg, Marc. (2015). The Securitization of Society. Crime, Risk, and Social Order (Introduction by David Garland)</ref>. A criminal ‘cell’ can lead back to a common origin, like a disease or virus can be traced back through contacts with an original source<ref>Finnegan J.C., Masys A.J. (2020) An Epidemiological Framework for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorist Networks. In: Fox B., Reid J., Masys A. (eds) Science Informed Policing. Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications. Springer, Cham. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41287-6_2</nowiki></ref>. <br />
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A '''''[[Terrorism|terrorist]]''''' cell is often a small group, that is either self-financing and organised, without being directed by larger organisations, but following their ideologies. For cells, there is no need to maintain an infrastructure and operational costs remain relatively low. Mainly when their modus operandi remains simple, costs stay low, for instance in the example of a terrorist cell carrying out an attack with a rented van or with three attackers with knives and/or firearms<ref>Europol (2020). ''European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. <nowiki>https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/european_union_terrorism_situation_and_trend_report_te-sat_2020_0.pdf</nowiki>''. Accessed 10 11 2020''.''</ref>. <br />
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===Peer groups (impulse)===<br />
Groups are not always organised. Mainly within situations of collective violence, such as riots, group violence can erupt with or without a direct motive or cause. A group can either be formed as a reaction on a certain event or provocation (i.e. soccer match, bar fights) or without a clear cause. Researchers have found that non-reactive group violence is often conducted by young men, that are looking for reasons to commit violent acts, also known as the “Young Male Syndrome”. Young males in this case have the tendency to take risks and think of short term advantages, seeking sensation, acting on impulses, instead of thinking about the long term effects of their actions. <br />
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Here you can find the other security threats related pages:<br />
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*Security threats: [[Security threat: acts|acts]]<br />
*Security threats: [[Security threat: mitigations|mitigations]]<br /><br />
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==Footnotes and references==<br />
<references /></div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Security_threat:_acts&diff=14369Security threat: acts2020-11-23T14:15:57Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
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<div>Over the years, crime has been defined in many ways. There is no single definition of crime or of a criminal act per se. Acts that were punishable by law 80 years ago, are not considered to be a crime anymore today. Or when one country speaks of a criminal act, another country defines that same act as non deviant and normal (being a member of the LGBTQ community for instance). Therefore, within the criminological discourse and literature and on this website, the term criminalization of acts is often used. The types of acts that have been described, have been criminalized by several laws.<ref>DiCristina, B. (2016). Criminology and the “Essence” of Crime: The views of Garofalo, Durkheim and Bonger. ''International Criminal Justice Review, 26(4)'', Pp. 297-315.</ref> Crimes can be divided into financial crimes, organized crimes and high impact crimes.<br />
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==Types==<br />
Different types of [[Crime|crimes]] can be distinguished. <br />
<br />
===Financial crime===<br />
Financial crime comes in many forms and is often defined as the ‘misleading or unlawful usage of an object of value (i.e. theft) or a valuable aspect that can be linked to a business activity (i.e. cybercrime, money laundering, skimming, financing terrorism, pyramid schemes)’.<ref>Politie Academie (zj.). Financieel-economische criminaliteit: we kunnen niet zonder. ''Tijdschrift voor de Politie'', (74), pp. 20-21.</ref> The two main categories of actors of financial crime are blue collar criminals and white collar criminals. In 1905 Bonger<ref>Bonger, W. A. (1905). Criminalité et conditions économiques. University of Michigan Library</ref> described a difference between “street crime” and “economic crime”. Street crime being financial crimes that were committed by individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds, such as [[theft]], [[robbery]], [[Pickpocketing|pick-pocketing]] and [[vehicle theft]]. In the present day, cybercrimes such as phishing or skimming also add to these types of financial crimes. Edwin Sutherland<ref>Sutherland, E. H. (1940). White-collar criminality. American Sociological Review, 5(1), 1–12.</ref>, building forth on the distinction between “street” and “economic crime”, introduced the term “white collar crime” in 1940. The term “White collar criminal”, refers to perpetrators in managing positions that are often trusted by the companies they work for as opposed to the “blue collar criminal”, that wears an overall. White collar crimes’ estimated direct costs are approximately 385 times higher than those of blue collar crimes.<ref>Friedrichs, D.O. (2010). ''Studying White Collar Crime and Assessing its Costs'' in: Trusted Criminals: White collar crime in contemporary society. ''Pp. 43-59,'' Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.</ref> The total projected yearly costs of all total financial crime compliance programs for prevention in Europe are estimated at $136.5 billion<ref>LexisNexis (2020). ''True Cost of Financial Crime Compliance Study''. Pp. 8-9.</ref>. <br />
<br />
===Organized crime===<br />
Within criminological literature on organized crime, a recurring discussion has taken place on whether organized crime should be defined in terms of group characteristics or based on the nature of criminal activities groups carry out.<ref>Kleemans, E.R. & de Poot, C.J. (2008). ''Criminal Careers in Organized Crime and Social Opportunity Structure''. European Journal of Criminology, 5(1), pp. 60-98</ref> In the Organized Crime Monitor, the term organized crime differs from criminal activities such as terrorism, corporate crime, group crime and other types of crime by the characteristics of the groups involved. Groups are considered to be organized when their focus primarily lies in “obtaining illegal profits; systematically commit crimes with serious damage to society; and are reasonably capable of shielding their criminal activities from the authorities”. Examples are [[Drug offences|drug crime]], white collar crime, [[burglary]] or cybercrime.<br />
<br />
===High Impact crime===<br />
High Impact Crimes are criminal acts that are considered to have a large impact on the victim, their environment and/or on society. High Impact Crimes often cause both material (financial) and immaterial (psychological or indirect) damage. Examples of High Impact Crimes that have a large impact on society are terrorism, crimes that are considered to be extremely deviant and vile, such as serial homicide and child molestation networks. Examples are [[terrorism]] ([[Security issue: Mass killing|mass killings]]), homicide (such as crime passionèl, financially motivated homicide and drug homicide), sexual crimes (such as rape, child molestations and [[sexual assault]]) or violent crimes (such as domestic, hate crime and [[assault]]).<br />
<br />
====Terrorism====<br />
'''''[[Terrorism]]''''' is often defined as “The premeditated use or threat of use of extra-normal violence or brutality by subnational groups to obtain a political, religious or ideological objective through intimidation of a huge audience, usually not directly involved with the policy making that the terrorists seek to influence”<ref>Phillips, P.J. (2016). ''The Economics of Terrorism''. Routledge: New York.</ref>. Terroristic acts are often carried out by radicalized individuals (lone actor terrorists) or terrorist cells (groups and/or networks). The EU Directive 2017/541 on combating terrorism<ref>Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, <nowiki>https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017L0541</nowiki></ref>, which all EU Member States were obliged to transpose in their national legislation by 8 September 2018, specifies that “terrorist offences are certain intentional acts which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organization when committed with the aim of: <br />
<br />
● seriously intimidating a population; <br />
<br />
● unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act; <br />
<br />
● or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.<br />
<br />
<br /><br />
==Motives==<br />
There are different motives for crime. One can at least distinguish four types of [[Security issues|motives]]: financial gain, boredom or compulsive behavior, impulse and ideological or political motives.<br />
<br />
===Ideological or political motives===<br />
Ideological of political motivation to act is based on individuals or groups that want to impose their political or cultural beliefs and ideals on others. In doing so, sometimes this results in crimes bases on these ideological or political beliefs. Crimes stemming from ideological or political motives are, for example, [[terrorism]], [[Mass killing|mass killings]], genocide, VIP abduction or assassination.<br />
<br />
====Terrorism====<br />
There can be four different [[Terrorism|'''''terrorism motives''''']] that can be distinguished: ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism, jihadist terrorism, right-wing terrorism and left-wing and anarchist terrorism. <br />
<br />
<br />
Here you can find the other security threats related pages:<br />
<br />
*Security threats: [[Security threat: actors|actors]]<br />
*Security threats: [[Security threat: mitigations|mitigations]]<br />
<br />
==Footnotes and references==<br />
<references /></div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Security_threat:_acts&diff=14368Security threat: acts2020-11-23T14:14:47Z<p>Dolinda: /* Financial crime */</p>
<hr />
<div>Over the years, crime has been defined in many ways. There is no single definition of crime or of a criminal act per se. Acts that were punishable by law 80 years ago, are not considered to be a crime anymore today. Or when one country speaks of a criminal act, another country defines that same act as non deviant and normal (being a member of the LGBTQ community for instance). Therefore, within the criminological discourse and literature and on this website, the term criminalization of acts is often used. The types of acts that have been described, have been criminalized by several laws.<ref>DiCristina, B. (2016). Criminology and the “Essence” of Crime: The views of Garofalo, Durkheim and Bonger. ''International Criminal Justice Review, 26(4)'', Pp. 297-315.</ref> Crimes can be divided into financial crimes, organized crimes and high impact crimes.<br />
<br />
==Types==<br />
Different types of [[Crime|crimes]] can be distinguished. <br />
<br />
===Financial crime===<br />
Financial crime comes in many forms and is often defined as the ‘misleading or unlawful usage of an object of value (i.e. theft) or a valuable aspect that can be linked to a business activity (i.e. cybercrime, money laundering, skimming, financing terrorism, pyramid schemes)’.<ref>Politie Academie (zj.). Financieel-economische criminaliteit: we kunnen niet zonder. ''Tijdschrift voor de Politie'', (74), pp. 20-21.</ref> The two main categories of actors of financial crime are blue collar criminals and white collar criminals. In 1905 Bonger<ref>Bonger, W. A. (1905). Criminalité et conditions économiques. University of Michigan Library</ref> described a difference between “street crime” and “economic crime”. Street crime being financial crimes that were committed by individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds, such as [[theft]], [[robbery]], [[Pickpocketing|pick-pocketing]] and [[vehicle theft]]. In the present day, cybercrimes such as phishing or skimming also add to these types of financial crimes. Edwin Sutherland<ref>Sutherland, E. H. (1940). White-collar criminality. American Sociological Review, 5(1), 1–12.</ref>, building forth on the distinction between “street” and “economic crime”, introduced the term “white collar crime” in 1940. The term “White collar criminal”, refers to perpetrators in managing positions that are often trusted by the companies they work for as opposed to the “blue collar criminal”, that wears an overall. White collar crimes’ estimated direct costs are approximately 385 times higher than those of blue collar crimes.<ref>Friedrichs, D.O. (2010). ''Studying White Collar Crime and Assessing its Costs'' in: Trusted Criminals: White collar crime in contemporary society. ''Pp. 43-59,'' Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.</ref> The total projected yearly costs of all total financial crime compliance programs for prevention in Europe are estimated at $136.5 billion<ref>LexisNexis (2020). ''True Cost of Financial Crime Compliance Study''. Pp. 8-9.</ref>. <br />
<br />
===Organized crime===<br />
Within criminological literature on organized crime, a recurring discussion has taken place on whether organized crime should be defined in terms of group characteristics or based on the nature of criminal activities groups carry out.<ref>Kleemans, E.R. & de Poot, C.J. (2008). ''Criminal Careers in Organized Crime and Social Opportunity Structure''. European Journal of Criminology, 5(1), pp. 60-98</ref> In the Organized Crime Monitor, the term organized crime differs from criminal activities such as terrorism, corporate crime, group crime and other types of crime by the characteristics of the groups involved. Groups are considered to be organized when their focus primarily lies in “obtaining illegal profits; systematically commit crimes with serious damage to society; and are reasonably capable of shielding their criminal activities from the authorities”. Examples are [[Drug offences|drug crime]], white collar crime, [[burglary]] or cybercrime.<br />
<br />
===High Impact crime===<br />
High Impact Crimes are criminal acts that are considered to have a large impact on the victim, their environment and/or on society. High Impact Crimes often cause both material (financial) and immaterial (psychological or indirect) damage. Examples of High Impact Crimes that have a large impact on society are terrorism, crimes that are considered to be extremely deviant and vile, such as serial homicide and child molestation networks. Examples are [[terrorism]] ([[Security issue: Mass killing|mass killings]]), homicide (such as crime passionel, financially motivated homicide and drug homicide), sexual crimes (such as rape, child molestations and [[sexual assault]]) or violent crimes (such as domestic, hate crime and [[assault]]).<br />
<br />
====Terrorism====<br />
'''''[[Terrorism]]''''' is often defined as “The premeditated use or threat of use of extra-normal violence or brutality by subnational groups to obtain a political, religious or ideological objective through intimidation of a huge audience, usually not directly involved with the policy making that the terrorists seek to influence”<ref>Phillips, P.J. (2016). ''The Economics of Terrorism''. Routledge: New York.</ref>. Terroristic acts are often carried out by radicalized individuals (lone actor terrorists) or terrorist cells (groups and/or networks). The EU Directive 2017/541 on combating terrorism<ref>Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, <nowiki>https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017L0541</nowiki></ref>, which all EU Member States were obliged to transpose in their national legislation by 8 September 2018, specifies that “terrorist offences are certain intentional acts which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organization when committed with the aim of: <br />
<br />
● seriously intimidating a population; <br />
<br />
● unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act; <br />
<br />
● or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.<br />
<br />
<br /><br />
==Motives==<br />
There are different motives for crime. One can at least distinguish four types of [[Security issues|motives]]: financial gain, boredom or compulsive behavior, impulse and ideological or political motives.<br />
<br />
===Ideological or political motives===<br />
Ideological of political motivation to act is based on individuals or groups that want to impose their political or cultural beliefs and ideals on others. In doing so, sometimes this results in crimes bases on these ideological or political beliefs. Crimes stemming from ideological or political motives are, for example, [[terrorism]], [[Mass killing|mass killings]], genocide, VIP abduction or assassination.<br />
<br />
====Terrorism====<br />
There can be four different [[Terrorism|'''''terrorism motives''''']] that can be distinguished: ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism, jihadist terrorism, right-wing terrorism and left-wing and anarchist terrorism. <br />
<br />
<br />
Here you can find the other security threats related pages:<br />
<br />
*Security threats: [[Security threat: actors|actors]]<br />
*Security threats: [[Security threat: mitigations|mitigations]]<br />
<br />
==Footnotes and references==<br />
<references /></div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Security&diff=14365Security2020-11-20T10:48:58Z<p>Dolinda: /* Security for the event planner and Law Enforcement Agency */</p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Threat]]<br />
[[File:ae.png|25px|right|This is a page providing background in a specific field of expertise]]<br />
<br />
<br />
'''Security''' is the degree or act of protection of persons or objects against [[risk]] stemming from the threat type [[human intent]].<br />
<br />
==Security in the urban environment==<br />
Security concerns harm done by persons by wilful action. As these actions are generally prohibited by law, these actions constitute [[crime|crimes]]. Security threats can therefore be classified by crime type. The gravity of the crimes can range from fairly minor, such as pickpocketing, to very serious, such as terrorism. An exhaustive listing of all crime types distinguished in the various countries of Europe would not be useful, as this would encompass local regulations and crimes not relevant in an urban context. For this purpose, a categorisation of [[Security issues|criminal acts]] was developed. <br />
<br />
The following security related topics are covered in Urban Securipedia: <br />
<br />
*[[Security threats|Threats]]<br />
*[[Security Vulnerability|Vulnerabilities]]<br />
*[[Measures]]<br />
<br />
At present, these topics are only covered where relevant for VITRUV and PRoTECT.<br />
<br />
Urban Securipedia provides knowledge and tooling primarily intended for use by three types of stakeholders: <br />
<br />
*the urban planner, involved in the development and security of the urban environment<br />
*the event planner, involved in the organization and security of events in public space (against [[terrorism]])<br />
*the Law Enforcement Agency, involved in securing urban environments (locally) with other stakeholder against crimes (specifically terrorism)<br />
<br />
The information contained within Urban Securipedia is however useful for many other types of stakeholders with security challenges or researchers in this field.<br />
<br />
===Security for the urban planner===<br />
As the built environment can influence social behaviour, including criminal behaviour, the urban design can influence the (absolute and perceived) level of safety and security of the future residents. Three elements that are conductive for crimes to take place<ref name="plus" /> are:<br />
<br />
*a motivated offender<br />
*a suitable goal or victim and<br />
*suitable opportunity (such as an absence of witnesses).<br />
<br />
The urban environment and consequently, urban planning, can influence the likelihood of each of these elements being present. For example, the presence of offenders and potential victims (and particularly the meeting of the two) can be potentially influenced by a careful design of traffic flows and opportunities can be minimized by optimizing surveilability and minimizing deserted areas.<br />
<br />
Of course, to effectively address crime by urban design, one needs to know the effect urban design can have on crime and underlying causes and what urban design instruments can be used to influence these effects. Urban Securipedia aims to support the urban planner in exactly this; it provides both instruments that can be incorporated in the urban planning and design process and insight in the effects the urban environment will have (both with or without implementation of these instruments) on crime. The effects of these instruments on criminals are predictable by sake of the actions of criminals being -to a large degree- rational and predictable:<br />
<br />
*Offenders are very rational about maximising their opportunities. They weigh up the amount of effort they would need to make to commit a criminal act compared with the profits they would make from the crime. The immediate situation is the sum of the information from the environment which a motivated offender collects in order to make his/her decision before committing a crime<ref name="plus">[http://www.plus-eu.com/downloads/Final-Report_english-german.pdf Plus consortium, ''Final report'', Landeskriminalamt Niedersachsen, Zentralstelle Prävention, June 2012]</ref>.<br />
*Crime, and particularly violent crime, is the consequence of social conflicts that can escalate where there are corresponding external situational conditions: for example, long waiting time in conditions such as heat, noise, provocations, crowds in small spaces, etc., lead in the end to stress situations which then cause conflicts<ref>Wortley, Richard; ''Situational Precipitators of Crime'', In: Wortley Richard / Mazerolle Lorraine (Hrsg.), Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis. Willan. Collumpton and Portland, 2008.</ref>.<br />
<br />
From the political and public administration point of view, security is often conceived of as a public good. This means in particular that <br />
<br />
#it rests on commonly acquired values. Those values can be material (capital, infrastructure, utilities, etc.) or immaterial ([[Security culture|security culture]], sense of community, etc.)<br />
#it is commonly produced. This includes public-private partnerships as well as [[Citizen participation|citizen participation]] and ownership (see [[Civic culture|civic culture]]);<br />
#nobody should be a priori exempt from its consumption.<br />
<br />
It is therefore important to reconcile the idea of security with that of [[Community safety|community]].<ref>I. Loader/N. Walker: Civilizing Security. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2007. </ref> This can be done, for example, by including the concept of [[Security culture|security culture]] into concepts for urban planning. <br />
<br />
Critics have reprimanded any "clubbing of private security", which in their view contributes to the deconstruction of security as a public good, to the benefit of a short-sighted approach of mere physical risk reduction.<ref>T. Hope: Crime victimisation and inequality in risk society. In: R. Matthews/J. Pitts: Crime, Disorder and Community Safety. A New Agenda? London/New York: Routledge, 2001, p. 216.</ref> This includes scepticism of approaches to urban planning such as the [["designing out" approach]], as well as any production of security by use of exclusionary practices.<ref>G. Hughes: The Politics of Crime and Community. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007.</ref><br />
<br />
===Security for the event planner and Law Enforcement Agency===<br />
For decades, terrorism has been a reality in many European countries and a continuous threat to a great number of European cities. It seriously threatens the safety, the values of democratic states and the rights and liberties of citizens. Acts of terrorism bring about long-term negative effects for cities and high social costs. Not only from a financial, but also from a psychological point of view in the sense of an increased feeling of insecurity among locals and visitors<ref>Efus. (2005). Secucities: Cities against Terrorism-Training Local Representatives in Facing Terrorism. Last visited on 19-02-2019 : <nowiki>https://issuu.com/efus/docs/cities_against_terrorism</nowiki> </ref>. <br />
<br />
As stated by the European Commission in the Action Plan to support the protection of public spaces, ''“local and regional authorities are also important stakeholders in the protection of public space”''. In light of this, local authorities responsible for the safety and security of their citizens must be aware of the vulnerabilities of their public spaces in order to be able to adopt appropriate measures to prevent and mitigate terrorist attacks and their consequences<ref>European Commission. (2017). Action Plan to support the protection of public spaces. Last visited on 19-02-2019: <nowiki>https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/20171018_action_plan_to_improve_the_protection_of_public_spaces_en.pdf</nowiki>.</ref>. <br />
<br />
An important stakeholder that concerns itself with the security of public areas is the event planner, who must take into account the possible risks and vulnerabilities when organising an event at a public venue. A second important category of stakeholders are the Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) who are involved with public security in the urban environment in general (and in case of terrorist threats, most notably at potential [[soft targets]]) and who play an important role in the safeguarding of the public before, during and after an event. LEAs entail organisations such as the local, state or special police. <br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Security&diff=14310Security2020-11-13T13:58:48Z<p>Dolinda: /* Security in the urban environment */</p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Threat]]<br />
[[File:ae.png|25px|right|This is a page providing background in a specific field of expertise]]{Graeme - work in progress --> er staat nog aan het einde work in progress. Wat is hier nog nodig?}<br />
<br />
'''Security''' is the degree or act of protection of persons or objects against [[risk]] stemming from the threat type [[human intent]].<br />
<br />
==Security in the urban environment==<br />
Security concerns harm done by persons by wilful action. As these actions are generally prohibited by law, these actions constitute [[crime|crimes]]. Security threats can therefore be classified by crime type. The gravity of the crimes can range from fairly minor, such as pickpocketing, to very serious, such as terrorism. An exhaustive listing of all crime types distinguished in the various countries of Europe would not be useful, as this would encompass local regulations and crimes not relevant in an urban context. For this purpose, a categorisation of [[Security issues|criminal acts]] was developed. <br />
<br />
The following security related topics are covered in Urban Securipedia: <br />
<br />
*[[Security threats|Threats]]<br />
*[[Security Vulnerability|Vulnerabilities]]<br />
*[[Measures]]<br />
<br />
At present, these topics are only covered where relevant for VITRUV and PRoTECT.<br />
<br />
Urban Securipedia provides knowledge and tooling primarily intended for use by two types of stakeholders: <br />
<br />
*the urban planner, involved in the development and security of the urban environment<br />
*the event planner, involved in the organisation and security of events in public space (against terrorism)<br />
<br />
The information contained within Urban Securipedia is however useful for many other types of stakeholders with security challenges.<br />
<br />
===Security for the urban planner===<br />
As the built environment can influence social behaviour, including criminal behaviour, the urban design can influence the (absolute and perceived) level of safety and security of the future residents. Three elements that are conductive for crimes to take place<ref name="plus" /> are:<br />
<br />
*a motivated offender<br />
*a suitable goal or victim and<br />
*suitable opportunity (such as an absence of witnesses).<br />
<br />
The urban environment and consequently, urban planning, can influence the likelihood of each of these elements being present. For example, the presence of offenders and potential victims (and particularly the meeting of the two) can be potentially influenced by a careful design of traffic flows and opportunities can be minimized by optimizing surveilability and minimizing deserted areas.<br />
<br />
Of course, to effectively address crime by urban design, one needs to know the effect urban design can have on crime and underlying causes and what urban design instruments can be used to influence these effects. Urban Securipedia aims to support the urban planner in exactly this; it provides both instruments that can be incorporated in the urban planning and design process and insight in the effects the urban environment will have (both with or without implementation of these instruments) on crime. The effects of these instruments on criminals are predictable by sake of the actions of criminals being -to a large degree- rational and predictable:<br />
<br />
*Offenders are very rational about maximising their opportunities. They weigh up the amount of effort they would need to make to commit a criminal act compared with the profits they would make from the crime. The immediate situation is the sum of the information from the environment which a motivated offender collects in order to make his/her decision before committing a crime<ref name="plus">[http://www.plus-eu.com/downloads/Final-Report_english-german.pdf Plus consortium, ''Final report'', Landeskriminalamt Niedersachsen, Zentralstelle Prävention, June 2012]</ref>.<br />
*Crime, and particularly violent crime, is the consequence of social conflicts that can escalate where there are corresponding external situational conditions: for example, long waiting time in conditions such as heat, noise, provocations, crowds in small spaces, etc., lead in the end to stress situations which then cause conflicts<ref>Wortley, Richard; ''Situational Precipitators of Crime'', In: Wortley Richard / Mazerolle Lorraine (Hrsg.), Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis. Willan. Collumpton and Portland, 2008.</ref>.<br />
<br />
From the political and public administration point of view, security is often conceived of as a public good. This means in particular that <br />
<br />
#it rests on commonly acquired values. Those values can be material (capital, infrastructure, utilities, etc.) or immaterial ([[Security culture|security culture]], sense of community, etc.)<br />
#it is commonly produced. This includes public-private partnerships as well as [[Citizen participation|citizen participation]] and ownership (see [[Civic culture|civic culture]]);<br />
#nobody should be a priori exempt from its consumption.<br />
<br />
It is therefore important to reconcile the idea of security with that of [[Community safety|community]].<ref>I. Loader/N. Walker: Civilizing Security. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2007. </ref> This can be done, for example, by including the concept of [[Security culture|security culture]] into concepts for urban planning. <br />
<br />
Critics have reprimanded any "clubbing of private security", which in their view contributes to the deconstruction of security as a public good, to the benefit of a short-sighted approach of mere physical risk reduction.<ref>T. Hope: Crime victimisation and inequality in risk society. In: R. Matthews/J. Pitts: Crime, Disorder and Community Safety. A New Agenda? London/New York: Routledge, 2001, p. 216.</ref> This includes scepticism of approaches to urban planning such as the [["designing out" approach]], as well as any production of security by use of exclusionary practices.<ref>G. Hughes: The Politics of Crime and Community. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007.</ref><br />
<br />
===Security for the event planner===<br />
For decades, terrorism has been a reality in many European countries and a continuous threat to a great number of European cities. It seriously threatens the safety, the values of democratic states and the rights and liberties of citizens. Acts of terrorism bring about long-term negative effects for cities and high social costs. Not only from a financial, but also from a psychological point of view in the sense of an increased feeling of insecurity among locals and visitors (Efus, 2005)<ref>Efus. (2005). Secucities: Cities against Terrorism-Training Local Representatives in Facing Terrorism. Last visited on 19-02-2019 : <nowiki>https://issuu.com/efus/docs/cities_against_terrorism</nowiki> </ref>. <br />
<br />
As stated by the European Commission in the Action Plan to support the protection of public spaces, ''“local and regional authorities are also important stakeholders in the protection of public space”''. In light of this, local authorities responsible for the safety and security of their citizens must be aware of the vulnerabilities of their public spaces in order to be able to adopt appropriate measures to prevent and mitigate terrorist attacks and their consequences (European Commission, 2017)<ref>European Commission. (2017). Action Plan to support the protection of public spaces. Last visited on 19-02-2019: <nowiki>https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/20171018_action_plan_to_improve_the_protection_of_public_spaces_en.pdf</nowiki>.</ref>. <br />
<br />
{to be continued...} <br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Safety_Vulnerability&diff=14286Safety Vulnerability2020-11-13T12:37:18Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Threat]]<br />
[[Category:Social]]<br />
Vulnerability is a circumstance that given the realization of a threat could expedite harm to people or damage to objects. If the threat involves human intent, the vulnerability is a weakness that can be exploited by the perpetrator (for example weakly guarded entrances to an object).<br />
<br />
In this context, vulnerabilities are related to [[safety]]-related threats as opposed to the [[Security Vulnerability|security vulnerabilities]]'''.''' Since these safety vulnerabilities entail the risk of harm from sources that also reach beyond human intent, it can be seen as a concept that is more suitable for the use by urban planners whereas the security vulnerability is a concept more suitable for the use by security organisations (such as LEAs) or event planners. <br />
<br />
==Social/community vulnerability==<br />
Improving general resilience levels also requires tackling and understanding vulnerability. While vulnerability in general is the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards, it should in particular “''involve a predictive quality: it is supposedly a way of conceptualizing what may happen to an identifiable population under conditions of particular risk and hazards.''” (Cannon et al. 2003: 4). “''Social vulnerability is the complex set of characteristics that include a person’s: initial well-being (health, morale, etc.); self-protection (asset pattern, income, qualifications, etc.); social protection (hazard preparedness by society, building codes, shelters, etc.); social and political networks and institutions (social capital, institutional environment, etc.).''” (Cannon et al. 2003: 5)<ref>Cannon, T. et al. (2003): Social Vulnerability, Sustainable Livelihoods and Disasters. Report to DFID. Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Department (CHAD) and Sustainable Livelihoods Office London.</ref><br />
<br />
==Identification of vulnerabilities==<br />
By identifying potential '''vulnerabilities''', urban planning can directly contribute to the strengthening of community resilience. From the social and cultural point of view, identification of vulnerability should be based on a comprehensive concept. At the same time, safety conscious urban planning should be aware that citizens always assess risks, threats and uncertainties on a subjective and individual basis. To a certain extent, gaps between felt and factual safety are normal phenomena; more important, therefore, than a mere gap analysis is an analysis of the distribution of gaps between felt and factual security across society.<br />
<br />
==Vulnerability and risk perception==<br />
Risk research, independent of the subject matter in question, sees citizens’ assessment of risks and threats considerably dependent on knowledge of precedents, frequency and extent of risk experience as well as perceived immediate effects on themselves (Proske 2004).<ref>Proske, D. (2004): Katalog Risiken. Risiken und ihre Darstellung. 1. Auflage. Eigenverlag: Dresden. Online: <nowiki>http://www.qucosa.de/fileadmin/data/qucosa/documents/71/1218786958574-1736.pdf</nowiki>. (last access: 07.11.2011).</ref><br />
<br />
Felt security has also been found to depend on personal control/efficacy beliefs: People usually accept considerably higher risk if they feel themselves in a position to decide about it; they are less prone to accept unconditional collective risk, e.g. as communicated by public authorities. At the same time, psychological analyses have found the effect of “overconfidence” (optimistic self-overestimation) (e.g. Oskamp 1965).<ref>Oskamp, S. (1965): Overconfidence in Case-study Judgements. In: The Journal of Consulting Psychology (American Psychological Association), Vol. 2, 261-265. Reprinted in Kahneman D./ Slovic, P./Tversky, A. (1982): Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press, 287-293.</ref> This effect describes a systematic cognitive error in assessing risks (namely assessing them too low) that are amenable to people’s own influence, such as car driving, mountaineering but also walking alone in the dark, a typical (street) crime-related public opinion poll indicator of felt security.<br />
<br />
In risky contexts that are not amenable to intentional human influence, the risk tends to be ignored, as risk ignorance in earthquake-prone areas has shown from ancient Pompeii in the Roman Empire to Los Angeles and San Francisco. In the case of natural risks, or risks that citizens perceive as out of their ability to change, we can expect citizens to discount or even discharge risk by compensating social contexts, leading to a gap between felt and factual security (Parfit 1998).<ref>Parfit, M. (1998): Living with Natural Hazards. In: National Geographic, Vol. 194, 1: 2-39. National Geographic Society.</ref>{{references}}</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Safety_Vulnerability&diff=14285Safety Vulnerability2020-11-13T12:35:03Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Threat]]<br />
[[Category:Social]]<br />
'''Vulnerability''' is a circumstance that given the realization of a threat could expedite harm to people or damage to objects. If the threat involves human intent, the vulnerability is a weakness that can be exploited by the perpetrator (for example weakly guarded entrances to an object).<br />
<br />
In this context, vulnerabilities are related to '''safety'''-related threats as opposed to the '''security vulnerabilities.''' Since these safety vulnerabilities entail the risk of harm from sources that also reach beyond human intent, it can be seen as a concept that is more suitable for the use by urban planners whereas the security vulnerability is a concept more suitable for the use by security organisations (such as LEAs) or event planners. <br />
<br />
==Social/community vulnerability==<br />
Improving general resilience levels also requires tackling and understanding vulnerability. While '''vulnerability''' in general is the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards, it should in particular “''involve a predictive quality: it is supposedly a way of conceptualizing what may happen to an identifiable population under conditions of particular risk and hazards.''” (Cannon et al. 2003: 4). “''Social vulnerability is the complex set of characteristics that include a person’s: initial well-being (health, morale, etc.); self-protection (asset pattern, income, qualifications, etc.); social protection (hazard preparedness by society, building codes, shelters, etc.); social and political networks and institutions (social capital, institutional environment, etc.).''” (Cannon et al. 2003: 5)<ref>Cannon, T. et al. (2003): Social Vulnerability, Sustainable Livelihoods and Disasters. Report to DFID. Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance Department (CHAD) and Sustainable Livelihoods Office London.</ref><br />
<br />
==Identification of vulnerabilities==<br />
By identifying potential '''vulnerabilities''', urban planning can directly contribute to the strengthening of community resilience. From the social and cultural point of view, identification of vulnerability should be based on a comprehensive concept. At the same time, safety conscious urban planning should be aware that citizens always assess risks, threats and uncertainties on a subjective and individual basis. To a certain extent, gaps between felt and factual safety are normal phenomena; more important, therefore, than a mere gap analysis is an analysis of the distribution of gaps between felt and factual security across society.<br />
<br />
==Vulnerability and risk perception==<br />
Risk research, independent of the subject matter in question, sees citizens’ assessment of risks and threats considerably dependent on knowledge of precedents, frequency and extent of risk experience as well as perceived immediate effects on themselves (Proske 2004).<ref>Proske, D. (2004): Katalog Risiken. Risiken und ihre Darstellung. 1. Auflage. Eigenverlag: Dresden. Online: <nowiki>http://www.qucosa.de/fileadmin/data/qucosa/documents/71/1218786958574-1736.pdf</nowiki>. (last access: 07.11.2011).</ref><br />
<br />
Felt security has also been found to depend on personal control/efficacy beliefs: People usually accept considerably higher risk if they feel themselves in a position to decide about it; they are less prone to accept unconditional collective risk, e.g. as communicated by public authorities. At the same time, psychological analyses have found the effect of “overconfidence” (optimistic self-overestimation) (e.g. Oskamp 1965).<ref>Oskamp, S. (1965): Overconfidence in Case-study Judgements. In: The Journal of Consulting Psychology (American Psychological Association), Vol. 2, 261-265. Reprinted in Kahneman D./ Slovic, P./Tversky, A. (1982): Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press, 287-293.</ref> This effect describes a systematic cognitive error in assessing risks (namely assessing them too low) that are amenable to people’s own influence, such as car driving, mountaineering but also walking alone in the dark, a typical (street) crime-related public opinion poll indicator of felt security.<br />
<br />
In risky contexts that are not amenable to intentional human influence, the risk tends to be ignored, as risk ignorance in earthquake-prone areas has shown from ancient Pompeii in the Roman Empire to Los Angeles and San Francisco. In the case of natural risks, or risks that citizens perceive as out of their ability to change, we can expect citizens to discount or even discharge risk by compensating social contexts, leading to a gap between felt and factual security (Parfit 1998).<ref>Parfit, M. (1998): Living with Natural Hazards. In: National Geographic, Vol. 194, 1: 2-39. National Geographic Society.</ref>{{references}}</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Security_Vulnerability&diff=14284Security Vulnerability2020-11-13T12:32:33Z<p>Dolinda: Created page with "Vulnerability is a circumstance that given the realization of a threat could expedite harm to people or damage to objects. If the threat involves human intent, the vulnerabili..."</p>
<hr />
<div>Vulnerability is a circumstance that given the realization of a threat could expedite harm to people or damage to objects. If the threat involves human intent, the vulnerability is a weakness that can be exploited by the perpetrator (for example weakly guarded entrances to an object). <br />
<br />
In the context of [[security]], this means that the absence of measures increases the risk of harm or damages. For example, certain [[Public space|public spaces of interest]] can be considered [[soft targets]]. This means that crowded public places including the metro, shopping centres, sports stadiums, bars, restaurants, clubs and commercial sidewalks, are easily accessible to the public and an easy target for [[Terrorism|terrorists]] to do great harm. These spaces inherently carry a risk of potentially far-reaching harm, or put in other words, are potentially vulnerable.<br />
<br />
Given the focus on human intent, the concept of security vulnerability can be seen more suitable for use by security organisations (such as LEAs) or event planners whereas [[Safety Vulnerability|safety vulnerability]], on the other hand, is a concept more suitable for the use by urban planners. <br />
<br />
The following figure shows examples of missing measures that increase the security vulnerability of a location. These examples are derived from the [[PRoTECT research project|EU PRoTECT project]]'''.''' <br />
[[File:Examples of Vulnerabilities.png|none|thumb|534x534px|Examples of Vulnerabilities]]<br />
<br /><br />
<br />
== Threat types ==<br />
Threats can be categorised in a number of [[Security threats|threat]] types. Vulnerabilities and their mitigation are generally associated with one or more threat types. The following threat types have been used in EU projects:<br />
<br />
# ''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
# ''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
# ''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
# ''IED'' (explosives) - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
# ''PBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
# ''UAVIED'' (explosives) - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
# ''VBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
# ''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
# ''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
# ''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
<br />
== Identification of vulnerabilities ==<br />
In the EU PRoTECT project a method was used to [[Vulnerability assessment of the EU PRoTECT project|identify and assess vulnerabilities.]] <br />
<br />
== Examples of vulnerabilities and possible solutions ==<br />
In ProTECT research, a number of vulnerabilities due to absence of [[measures]] were identified and in the context of the research, a number of possible (preferred) solutions were put forward. The following table contains a number of these pairs of vulnerabilities with possible solutions. Please note that these are examples as found in the specific context of the PRoTECT research. <br />
<br />
'''''Vulnerabilities and possible solutions'''''<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|Vulnerabilities<br />
|Possible Solutions<br />
|-<br />
|Lack of physical barriers (lack of physical security measures; square to close to main street; not delimited square perimeter) <br />
<br /><br />
|Physical barriers proposed solutions: 1. Metallic fences 2. Bollards 3. Panic room <br />
<br /><br />
|-<br />
|Lack of best practices (insufficient communication systems) <br />
<br /><br />
|Best practices proposed solution: 1. Community awareness training 2. Victim support approaches after attack 3. OSINT technologies (threat detection tools) 4. Risk assessment tools and techniques 5. Simulation, training, and gaming tools 6. Solutions for terrorist crisis management 7. Fast transfer information practices 8. Organisation based on GIS systems <br />
<br /><br />
|-<br />
|Lack of technical solutions (insufficient alert systems; access control checks; lack of surveillance systems) <br />
<br /><br />
|Technological proposed solution: 1. CCTV to record people and vehicles 2. Anomaly detection systems 3. Fire detectors 4. Automatic Sprinklers 5. Millimetre wave scanner 6. System optimum travel information (PSOI) 7. Audio analytics systems 8. Signal jamming devices for drones 9. WiFi and communication systems <br />
<br /><br />
|-<br />
|Architectural vulnerabilities (crowded places, no 'places to hide'; narrow streets; bus station overcrowded and close to venues) <br />
<br /><br />
|Architectural proposed solution: 1. Environmentally integrated solutions 2. Light exit pathways 3. Motion sensor lights 4. Architectural modification and improvements <br />
<br /><br />
|}<br />
<br /></div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=File:Examples_of_Vulnerabilities.png&diff=14283File:Examples of Vulnerabilities.png2020-11-13T12:26:38Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>Examples of vulnerabilities due to a lack of measures as found in the research of the EU PRoTECT project.</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Safety_Vulnerability&diff=14281Safety Vulnerability2020-11-13T12:24:14Z<p>Dolinda: Dolinda moved page Vulnerability to Safety Vulnerability: Division Safety and Security Vulnerability</p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Threat]]<br />
[[Category:Social]]<br />
'''Vulnerability''' is a circumstance that given the realization of a threat could expedite harm to people or damage to objects. If the threat involves human intent, the vulnerability is a weakness that can be exploited by the perpetrator (for example weakly guarded entrances to an object).<br />
<br />
In this context, vulnerabilities are related to '''safety'''-related threats as opposed to the '''security vulnerabilities.''' Since these safety vulnerabilities entail the risk of harm from sources that also reach beyond human intent, it can be seen as a concept that is more suitable for the use by urban planners whereas the security vulnerability is a concept more suitable for the use by security organisations (such as LEAs) or event planners. <br />
<br />
== Social/community vulnerability ==<br />
Improving general resilience levels also requires tackling and understanding vulnerability. While '''vulnerability''' in general is the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards, it should in particular “''involve a predictive quality: it is supposedly a way of conceptualizing what may happen to an identifiable population under conditions of particular risk and hazards.''” (Cannon et al. 2003: 4). “''Social vulnerability is the complex set of characteristics that include a person’s: initial well-being (health, morale, etc.); self-protection (asset pattern, income, qualifications, etc.); social protection (hazard preparedness by society, building codes, shelters, etc.); social and political networks and institutions (social capital, institutional environment, etc.).''” (Cannon et al. 2003: 5)<br />
<br />
== Identification of vulnerabilities ==<br />
By identifying potential '''vulnerabilities''', urban planning can directly contribute to the strengthening of community resilience. From the social and cultural point of view, identification of vulnerability should be based on a comprehensive concept. At the same time, safety [MD(1] conscious urban planning should be aware that citizens always assess risks, threats and uncertainties on a subjective and individual basis. To a certain extent, gaps between felt and factual safety are normal phenomena; more important, therefore, than a mere gap analysis is an analysis of the distribution of gaps between felt and factual security across society.<br />
<br />
== Vulnerability and risk perception ==<br />
Risk research, independent of the subject matter in question, sees citizens’ assessment of risks and threats considerably dependent on knowledge of precedents, frequency and extent of risk experience as well as perceived immediate effects on themselves (Proske 2004).<br />
<br />
Felt security has also been found to depend on personal control/efficacy beliefs: People usually accept considerably higher risk if they feel themselves in a position to decide about it; they are less prone to accept unconditional collective risk, e.g. as communicated by public authorities. At the same time, psychological analyses have found the effect of “overconfidence” (optimistic self-overestimation) (e.g. Oskamp 1965). This effect describes a systematic cognitive error in assessing risks (namely assessing them too low) that are amenable to people’s own influence, such as car driving, mountaineering but also walking alone in the dark, a typical (street) crime-related public opinion poll indicator of felt security.<br />
<br />
In risky contexts that are not amenable to intentional human influence, the risk tends to be ignored, as risk ignorance in earthquake-prone areas has shown from ancient Pompeii in the Roman Empire to Los Angeles and San Francisco. In the case of natural risks, or risks that citizens perceive as out of their ability to change, we can expect citizens to discount or even discharge risk by compensating social contexts, leading to a gap between felt and factual security (Parfit 1998).{{references}}</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Vulnerability&diff=14282Vulnerability2020-11-13T12:24:14Z<p>Dolinda: Dolinda moved page Vulnerability to Safety Vulnerability: Division Safety and Security Vulnerability</p>
<hr />
<div>#REDIRECT [[Safety Vulnerability]]</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Safety_Vulnerability&diff=14280Safety Vulnerability2020-11-13T12:23:26Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Threat]]<br />
[[Category:Social]]<br />
'''Vulnerability''' is a circumstance that given the realization of a threat could expedite harm to people or damage to objects. If the threat involves human intent, the vulnerability is a weakness that can be exploited by the perpetrator (for example weakly guarded entrances to an object).<br />
<br />
In this context, vulnerabilities are related to '''safety'''-related threats as opposed to the '''security vulnerabilities.''' Since these safety vulnerabilities entail the risk of harm from sources that also reach beyond human intent, it can be seen as a concept that is more suitable for the use by urban planners whereas the security vulnerability is a concept more suitable for the use by security organisations (such as LEAs) or event planners. <br />
<br />
== Social/community vulnerability ==<br />
Improving general resilience levels also requires tackling and understanding vulnerability. While '''vulnerability''' in general is the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards, it should in particular “''involve a predictive quality: it is supposedly a way of conceptualizing what may happen to an identifiable population under conditions of particular risk and hazards.''” (Cannon et al. 2003: 4). “''Social vulnerability is the complex set of characteristics that include a person’s: initial well-being (health, morale, etc.); self-protection (asset pattern, income, qualifications, etc.); social protection (hazard preparedness by society, building codes, shelters, etc.); social and political networks and institutions (social capital, institutional environment, etc.).''” (Cannon et al. 2003: 5)<br />
<br />
== Identification of vulnerabilities ==<br />
By identifying potential '''vulnerabilities''', urban planning can directly contribute to the strengthening of community resilience. From the social and cultural point of view, identification of vulnerability should be based on a comprehensive concept. At the same time, safety [MD(1] conscious urban planning should be aware that citizens always assess risks, threats and uncertainties on a subjective and individual basis. To a certain extent, gaps between felt and factual safety are normal phenomena; more important, therefore, than a mere gap analysis is an analysis of the distribution of gaps between felt and factual security across society.<br />
<br />
== Vulnerability and risk perception ==<br />
Risk research, independent of the subject matter in question, sees citizens’ assessment of risks and threats considerably dependent on knowledge of precedents, frequency and extent of risk experience as well as perceived immediate effects on themselves (Proske 2004).<br />
<br />
Felt security has also been found to depend on personal control/efficacy beliefs: People usually accept considerably higher risk if they feel themselves in a position to decide about it; they are less prone to accept unconditional collective risk, e.g. as communicated by public authorities. At the same time, psychological analyses have found the effect of “overconfidence” (optimistic self-overestimation) (e.g. Oskamp 1965). This effect describes a systematic cognitive error in assessing risks (namely assessing them too low) that are amenable to people’s own influence, such as car driving, mountaineering but also walking alone in the dark, a typical (street) crime-related public opinion poll indicator of felt security.<br />
<br />
In risky contexts that are not amenable to intentional human influence, the risk tends to be ignored, as risk ignorance in earthquake-prone areas has shown from ancient Pompeii in the Roman Empire to Los Angeles and San Francisco. In the case of natural risks, or risks that citizens perceive as out of their ability to change, we can expect citizens to discount or even discharge risk by compensating social contexts, leading to a gap between felt and factual security (Parfit 1998).{{references}}</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Methods&diff=14254Measure type: Methods2020-11-09T14:19:57Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>''Methods'' could be used for procedures, best practices or standards to implement solutions.<br />
<br />
The following chart includes various Methods that can be implemented as event driven-measures to mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as a terrorist attack) at an event in a designated area. These are examples derived from the [[PRoTECT research project|PRoTECT]] project.<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|'''''Tech description'''''<br />
|'''Threat type'''<br />
|'''Threat phase'''<br />
|'''Tech use'''<br />
|'''Tech criteria'''<br />
|-<br />
|Increase resilience LEOs (for example, training, monitoring)<br />
|all<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
|Other (or all)<br />
|Readiness<br />
|-<br />
|Trainings to enhance LEO capabilities (for example, flexibility, communication skills)<br />
|all<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
|Other (or all)<br />
|Performance (measured increase in capabilities)<br />
|-<br />
|Enhance multiparty decision making (for example, reducing bias, improving collaboration)<br />
|all<br />
|all<br />
|Other (or all)<br />
|Readiness / Compliancy<br />
|-<br />
|Planning and Response to an Active Shooter:<br />
<br />
An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide<br />
<br />
November 2015<br />
|Fire arms<br />
|Execution<br />
|SURVEIL, RESPOND, PROTECT, DETECT<br />
|Readiness / Compliancy<br />
|-<br />
|Security and Resiliency Guide: Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Concepts (including for events and sports venues)<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED (explosives)<br />
|Pre-attack preparations, Execution<br />
|SURVEIL, RESPOND, PROTECT, DETECT<br />
|Readiness / Compliancy<br />
|}<br />
<br />
In the first column, under ''''Tech description'''<nowiki/>', '''technological solutions''' are listed.<br />
<br />
<br />
The next column indicates which '<nowiki/>'''Threat types'''' can be mitigated with these technological solutions:<br />
<br />
#''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
#''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
#''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
#''IED'' (explosives) - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
#''PBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
#''UAVIED'' (explosives) - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
#''VBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
#''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
<br />
<br />
The '<nowiki/>'''Threat phase'''' column states in which phase of the attack the technological solution has the most effect:<br />
<br />
#''Initial Target Identification'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Operational Planning'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Pre-Attack Preparation'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Execution'' (during the attack);<br />
#''Post-Attack/Escape'' (after the attack).<br />
<br />
<br />
Finally, the '<nowiki/>'''Tech use'''' column states the appertaining security function of the technological solution:<br />
<br />
#''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
#''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
#''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
#''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
#''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
#''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
#''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
#''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
#''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
#''Other.''<br />
<br />
<br />
Other [[Measures|measure types]] are: <br />
<br />
*[[Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)|ICT]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Sensors|Sensors]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Actuators|Actuators]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Physical measures|Physical measures]]</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Methods&diff=14253Measure type: Methods2020-11-09T14:18:55Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>''Methods'' could be used for procedures, best practices or standards to implement solutions.<br />
<br />
The following chart includes various Methods that can be implemented as event driven-measures to mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as a terrorist attack) at an event in a designated area. These are examples derived from the [[PRoTECT research project|PRoTECT]] project.<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|'''''Tech description'''''<br />
|'''Threat type'''<br />
|'''Threat phase'''<br />
|'''Tech use'''<br />
|'''Tech criteria'''<br />
|'''Products/suppliers'''<br />
|-<br />
|Increase resilience LEOs (for example, training, monitoring)<br />
|all<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
|Other (or all)<br />
|Readiness<br />
|Training and monitoring by TNO for Police and MinDef<br />
|-<br />
|Trainings to enhance LEO capabilities (for example, flexibility, communication skills)<br />
|all<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
|Other (or all)<br />
|Performance (measured increase in capabilities)<br />
|Trainings by TNO for Police and MinDef<br />
|-<br />
|Enhance multiparty decision making (for example, reducing bias, improving collaboration)<br />
|all<br />
|all<br />
|Other (or all)<br />
|Readiness / Compliancy<br />
|Multidisciplinair Interactie Raamwerk by TNO for Flood Control 2015 (<nowiki>http://digitalpages.tno.nl/mirror/page/1</nowiki>)<br />
|-<br />
|Planning and Response to an Active Shooter:<br />
<br />
An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide<br />
<br />
November 2015<br />
|Fire arms<br />
|Execution<br />
|SURVEIL, RESPOND, PROTECT, DETECT<br />
|Readiness / Compliancy<br />
|DHS website<br />
|-<br />
|Security and Resiliency Guide: Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Concepts (including for events and sports venues)<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED (explosives)<br />
|Pre-attack preparations, Execution<br />
|SURVEIL, RESPOND, PROTECT, DETECT<br />
|Readiness / Compliancy<br />
|DHS website (<nowiki>https://www.dhs.gov/publication/security-and-resiliency-guide-and-annexes</nowiki>)<br />
|}<br />
<br />
In the first column, under ''''Tech description'''<nowiki/>', '''technological solutions''' are listed.<br />
<br />
<br /><br />
<br />
The next column indicates which '<nowiki/>'''Threat types'''' can be mitigated with these technological solutions:<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
#''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
#''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
#''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
#''IED'' (explosives) - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
#''PBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
#''UAVIED'' (explosives) - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
#''VBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
#''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
<br />
<br />
The '<nowiki/>'''Threat phase'''' column states in which phase of the attack the technological solution has the most effect:<br />
<br />
#''Initial Target Identification'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Operational Planning'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Pre-Attack Preparation'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Execution'' (during the attack);<br />
#''Post-Attack/Escape'' (after the attack).<br />
<br />
<br />
Finally, the '<nowiki/>'''Tech use'''' column states the appertaining security function of the technological solution:<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
#''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
#''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
#''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
#''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
#''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
#''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
#''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
#''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
#''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
#''Other.'' <br />
<br />
Other [[Measures|measure types]] are: <br />
<br />
*[[Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)|ICT]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Sensors|Sensors]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Actuators|Actuators]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Physical measures|Physical measures]]</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Information_and_Communications_Technology_(ICT)&diff=14252Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)2020-11-09T14:17:14Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>ICT measures could be used for: communicating, storing, analysing and protecting information. <br />
<br />
The following chart includes various ICT solutions that can be implemented as event driven-measures to mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as a terrorist attack) at an event in a designated area. These are examples derived from the [[PRoTECT research project|PRoTECT]] project. <br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|'''Tech description'''<br />
|'''Threat type'''<br />
|'''Threat phase'''<br />
|'''Tech use'''<br />
|'''Tech criteria'''<br />
|-<br />
|Detection of deviant behaviour online (by combining data science (how to extract and model online behaviour) and social science (which behaviours to address)<br />
|all<br />
|Initial target identification<br />
<br /><br />
|Surveil<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|-<br />
|Vulnerability assessment of individuals before the fact (for example, Multi-Agency Vulnerability Assessment Support Tool (MAVAST))<br />
|all<br />
|Initial target identification<br />
|Surveil<br />
|Performance (accuracy, at face value as data are largely absent)<br />
|-<br />
|GIS system for geographical information<br />
|all<br />
|Execution / post-attack/escape<br />
|Surveil / respond / protect / detect / improvise<br />
|Performance<br />
|-<br />
|Video analytics<br />
|all<br />
|Initial target identification / execution / post-attack/escape<br />
|<br />
|Performance<br />
|} <br />
<br />
In the first column, under ''''Tech description'''<nowiki/>', '''technological solutions''' are listed.<br />
<br />
<br />
The next column indicates which '<nowiki/>'''Threat''' <nowiki/>'''types'''' can be mitigated with these technological solutions:<br />
<br />
#''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
#''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
#''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
#''IED'' (explosives) - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
#''PBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
#''UAVIED'' (explosives) - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
#''VBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
#''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
<br />
<br />
The '<nowiki/>'''Threat phase'''' column states in which phase of the attack the technological solution has the most effect:<br />
<br />
#''Initial Target Identification'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Operational Planning'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Pre-Attack Preparation'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Execution'' (during the attack);<br />
#''Post-Attack/Escape'' (after the attack).<br />
<br />
<br />
Finally, the '<nowiki/>'''Tech use'''' column states the appertaining security function of the technological solution:<br />
<br />
#''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
#''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
#''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
#''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
#''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
#''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
#''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
#''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
#''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
#''Other.''<br />
<br />
<br />
Other [[Measures|measure types]] are: <br />
<br />
*[[Measure type: Sensors|Sensors]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Actuators|Actuators]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Physical measures|Physical measures]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Methods|Methods]]</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Physical_measures&diff=14251Measure type: Physical measures2020-11-09T14:17:01Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>''Physical measures'' could be used for controlling access, impeding an attack or protective materials. <br />
<br />
The following chart includes various Physical solutions that can be implemented as event driven-measures to mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as a terrorist attack) at an event in a designated area. These are examples derived from the [[PRoTECT research project|PRoTECT]] project. <br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|'''Tech description'''<br />
|'''Threat type'''<br />
|'''Threat phase'''<br />
|'''Tech use'''<br />
|'''Tech criteria'''<br />
|-<br />
|Influence attacker physically (for example, intimidate, Less Lethal Weapons (sound, vision))<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Respond / restrict<br />
<br /><br />
|Readiness / Performance<br />
|-<br />
|Physical barriers that are flexible or permanent<br />
|Vehicle attack<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
|Protect<br />
|Readiness / performance<br />
|-<br />
|Urban layout with bollards, planters, et cetera<br />
|Vehicle, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
<br /><br />
|Protect<br />
<br /><br />
|Other: impact, architectural looks<br />
|-<br />
|Reduce the loading on a building by using landscape design<br />
<br /><br />
|VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
<br /><br />
|Protect<br />
<br /><br />
|Cost and other: effectiveness<br />
|-<br />
|Design of roads to prevent the impact of vehicles with a high speed<br />
|Vehicle, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution / Post-Attack/Escape<br />
|Protect<br />
<br /><br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Prevent crowded places with environment design<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
<br /><br />
|Protect<br />
<br /><br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Temporary measures – vehicle barriers, checkpoint, road block<br />
|Vehicle, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical, cost and other: impact on normal operations<br />
|-<br />
|Permanent measures – security gate, (blast resistant) fencing, bollards….<br />
|Vehicle, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical, cost and other: impact on normal operations<br />
|-<br />
|Façade design (include the window and door anchors)<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Explosion resistant glazing<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Bullet proof glazing<br />
|Fire arms attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Prevent progressive collapse<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Prevent roof objects like lightning, panels to fall on the people<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Provide a safe place for shelter<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Products to mitigate or reduce the explosion effects like blast container (place them around the threat) to isolate the threat<br />
<br /><br />
|IED, PBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Other: (It might be effective to protect the surrounding, but also has side effects. E.g. additional risk for EOD)<br />
|-<br />
|Personal protection (vest, helmet, gear) to the first responders and security personnel<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object attack<br />
|Pre-attack preparations / Execution<br />
|Respond<br />
|Physical / cost / performance<br />
|-<br />
|Bomb suit (Explosive ordnance) of the first responders and security personnel<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution / Post-Attack/Escape<br />
|Respond<br />
|Physical / performance<br />
|}<br />
<br />
In the first column, under ''''Tech description'''<nowiki/>', '''technological solutions''' are listed.<br />
<br />
The next column indicates which '<nowiki/>'''Threat types'''' can be mitigated with these technological solutions:<br />
<br />
#''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
#''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
#''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
#''IED'' (explosives) - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
#''PBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
#''UAVIED'' (explosives) - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
#''VBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
#''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
<br />
<br />
The '<nowiki/>'''Threat phase'''' column states in which phase of the attack the technological solution has the most effect:<br />
<br />
#''Initial Target Identification'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Operational Planning'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Pre-Attack Preparation'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Execution'' (during the attack);<br />
#''Post-Attack/Escape'' (after the attack).<br />
<br />
<br />
Finally, the '<nowiki/>'''Tech use'''' column states the appertaining security function of the technological solution:<br />
<br />
#''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
#''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
#''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
#''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
#''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
#''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
#''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
#''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
#''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
#''Other.''<br />
<br />
<br />
Other [[Measures|measure types]] are: <br />
<br />
*[[Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)|ICT]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Sensors|Sensors]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Actuators|Actuators]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Methods|Methods]]</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Actuators&diff=14250Measure type: Actuators2020-11-09T14:16:42Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>''Actuators'' could be used for warning, intercepting or eliminating. <br />
<br />
The following chart includes various Actuator solutions that can be implemented as event driven-measures to mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as a terrorist attack) at an event in a designated area. These are examples derived from the [[PRoTECT research project|PRoTECT]] project.<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|'''Tech description'''<br />
|'''Threat type'''<br />
|'''Threat phase'''<br />
|'''Tech use'''<br />
|'''Tech criteria'''<br />
|-<br />
|Influence attacker in communication (for example, negotiation strategies, security questioning, communication skills)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Respond<br />
|Performance<br />
<br /><br />
|-<br />
|Deception of attacker (for example, distract (i.e., slow down) by unexpected noises or physical barriers)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Respond<br />
|Readiness / Performance<br />
|-<br />
|Loudspeakers<br />
|all<br />
|Execution / post-attack/escape<br />
|Alert<br />
|Physical<br />
|-<br />
|Lights on pathways (maybe in combination with sensor)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution / post-attack/escape<br />
|Respond<br />
|Physical / readiness / performance<br />
|-<br />
|Crowd control (for example, influence techniques or use of social media)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Alert / protect / restrict<br />
|Readiness / Performance<br />
|-<br />
|Non lethal weapons (acoustic, electroshock, et cetera)<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
<br /><br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Weapons to stop the terrorist during the attempted attack<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, vehicle, PBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
<br /><br />
|Cost / compliancy<br />
|-<br />
|Intervention to stop the terrorist during the attempted attack<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
<br /><br />
|Other: effectiveness<br />
|-<br />
|Use of animals as actuator (for example, influencing behaviour in an overt manner (for example intimidation) and a covert manner)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Surveil / respond / detect / restrict<br />
<br /><br />
|Readiness / Performance<br />
|}<br />
<br />
In the first column, under ''''Tech description'''<nowiki/>', '''technological solutions''' are listed.<br />
<br />
The next column indicates which '<nowiki/>'''Threat types'''' can be mitigated with these technological solutions:<br />
<br />
#''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
#''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
#''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
#''IED'' (explosives) - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
#''PBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
#''UAVIED'' (explosives) - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
#''VBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
#''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
<br />
<br />
The '<nowiki/>'''Threat phase'''' column states in which phase of the attack the technological solution has the most effect:<br />
<br />
#''Initial Target Identification'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Operational Planning'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Pre-Attack Preparation'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Execution'' (during the attack);<br />
#''Post-Attack/Escape'' (after the attack).<br />
<br />
<br />
Finally, the '<nowiki/>'''Tech use'''' column states the appertaining security function of the technological solution:<br />
<br />
#''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
#''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
#''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
#''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
#''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
#''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
#''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
#''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
#''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
#''Other.''<br />
<br />
<br />
Other [[Measures|measure types]] are: <br />
<br />
*[[Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)|ICT]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Sensors|Sensors]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Physical measures|Physical measures]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Methods|Methods]]<br />
<br />
<br /></div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Sensors&diff=14249Measure type: Sensors2020-11-09T14:16:08Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>''Sensors'' could be used for detection, identification, localisation or tracking.<br />
<br />
The following chart includes various Sensor solutions that can be implemented as event driven-measures to mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as a terrorist attack) at an event in a designated area. These are examples derived from the [[PRoTECT research project|PRoTECT]] project.<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|'''Tech description'''<br />
|'''Threat type'''<br />
|'''Threat phase'''<br />
|'''Tech use'''<br />
|'''Tech criteria'''<br />
|-<br />
|Weapon detector (DEXTER)<br />
|Fire arms attack<br />
|Pre-attack<br />
|Surveil / detect / protect<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|-<br />
|Explosive detector (DEXTER)<br />
|PBIED<br />
|Pre-attack<br />
|Surveil / detect / protect<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|-<br />
|Automatic vehicle behaviour and threat detection (SASSSISLAN)<br />
|Vehicle Attack<br />
|Pre-attack<br />
|Surveil / protect<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|-<br />
|Automatic person behaviour and threat detection (SASSSISLAN)<br />
|Sharp object attack / PBIED<br />
|Pre-attack<br />
|Surveil / protect<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|-<br />
|Automatic aggression detection<br />
|Sharp object attack<br />
|Pre-attack / execution<br />
|Surveil / protect<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|-<br />
|Person re-identification to avoid next attack (DEXTER)<br />
|PBIED<br />
|Post-attack / Pre-attack (next)<br />
|Surveil / detect / protect<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|-<br />
|Automatic crowd behaviour and threat detection (SASSSISLAN)<br />
|Sharp object attack<br />
|Pre-attack / execution<br />
|Surveil / protect<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|-<br />
|mmw-portals (≈30-300 GHz)<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|anomaly detection, slow (person by person)<br />
|-<br />
|mmw walk-through (≈30-300 GHz)<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|anomaly detection (several 100 persons/h)<br />
|-<br />
|radar/microwave (≈3-30 GHz)<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|anomaly detection<br />
<br />
large distance<br />
|-<br />
|THz/IR cameras<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|anomaly detection<br />
<br />
difficult image interpretation<br />
|-<br />
|X-ray backscatter persons<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|forbidden for use in public in Europe – ionising radiation<br />
|-<br />
|X-ray transmission persons<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|forbidden for use in public in Europe – ionising radiation<br />
|-<br />
|X-ray transmission belt systems<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, IED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|checkpoint necessary, slow (bag by bag), ATR possible for explosives, guns and knives<br />
|-<br />
|X-ray backscatter for cars<br />
|Fire arms & VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|covert: needs close proximity to car (drive by), image difficult to interpret, Mobile Portal solution possible, checkpoint situation, driver has to leave the car<br />
|-<br />
|Explosive vapour Detection – High Volume Sampling (HVS)<br />
|IED, PBIED & VBIED attack (potentially chemical attack)<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|not all explosives can be detected, detection rate depends on circumstances (eg temperature), needs time (1-30 minutes), sampling device is portable, detection device is large and expensive, detector usually mass spectrometer based technology<br />
|-<br />
|Explosive vapour Detection – Direct Sampling<br />
|IED, PBIED & VBIED attack (potentially chemical attack)<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|Less sensitive than HVS, lower DR, handheld, limited use, many technology sub categories<br />
|-<br />
|Explosive Trace Particle detection – contact<br />
|IED, PBIED & VBIED attack (potentially chemical attack)<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|contact with object necessary (swab), very sensitive equipment mostly Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) based, but also other technologies success depends on skill operator<br />
|-<br />
|Explosive Trace Particle detection – non-contact<br />
|IED, PBIED & VBIED attack (potentially chemical attack)<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|Mostly Raman-effect based technology, use of laser, eye-safety is an issue when use in public. Proximity measurements (<2 cm) are mature, longer distance (up to several meters) less mature, also bulk detection possible up to 40 m for some explosives (low TRL), line of sight necessary<br />
|-<br />
|Walk Through Metal Detection<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object & vehicle attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|checkpoint necessary, only works if threat contains metal<br />
|-<br />
|Hand held Metal Detector<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object & vehicle attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|depends on skill operator, only works if threat contains metal<br />
|-<br />
|Explosive Detection Dogs<br />
|IED, PBIED & VBIED attack (potentially chemical attack)<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|versatile use, performance varies from dog to dog and in time, expensive<br />
|-<br />
|Pat down<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|often used as alarm resolution, invasive, time consuming, depends on skill of the screener and cooperation of the subject<br />
|-<br />
|Visual inspection of bags, cars, etc.<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|often used as alarm resolution, invasive, time consuming, depends on skill of the screener and cooperation of the subject<br />
|-<br />
|Detection of deviant behaviour offline (for example, security questioning, distinguishing psychiatric patient from terrorist (Rapid Observation of Psychological Disorders (ROPD) tool))<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Surveil<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|-<br />
|Use of animals as sensor (for example, emotions, stress level, use of substances, presence of explosives, and establishing identity)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Surveil / respond / detect / restrict <br />
<br /><br />
|Readiness / Performance<br />
|-<br />
|Risk assessment of individuals on the spot (i.e., stress assessment)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Respond / detect <br />
<br /><br />
|Performance (accuracy)<br />
|-<br />
|Vulnerability assessment of individuals before the fact (for example, Multi-Agency Vulnerability Assessment Support Tool (MAVAST))<br />
|all<br />
|Initial target identification<br />
|Surveil<br />
|Performance (accuracy, at face value as data are largely absent)<br />
|-<br />
|Automatic sprinkler system<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED & VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Respond / protect / overcome<br />
|Performance<br />
|-<br />
|Drones with sensor<br />
|all<br />
|Initial target identification / execution / post-attack/escape<br />
|Surveil / respond / detect<br />
|Performance (detection rate, accuracy)<br />
|}<br />
<br />
In the first column, under ''''Tech description'''<nowiki/>', '''technological solutions''' are listed.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
The next column indicates which '<nowiki/>'''Threat types'''' can be mitigated with these technological solutions:<br />
<br />
#''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
#''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
#''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
#''IED'' (explosives) - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
#''PBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
#''UAVIED'' (explosives) - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
#''VBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
#''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
#<br />
<br />
The '<nowiki/>'''Threat phase'''' column states in which phase of the attack the technological solution has the most effect:<br />
<br />
#''Initial Target Identification'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Operational Planning'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Pre-Attack Preparation'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Execution'' (during the attack);<br />
#''Post-Attack/Escape'' (after the attack).<br />
<br />
<br />
Finally, the '<nowiki/>'''Tech use'''' column states the appertaining security function of the technological solution:<br />
<br />
#''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
#''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
#''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
#''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
#''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
#''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
#''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
#''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
#''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
#''Other.''<br />
<br />
<br />
Other [[Measures|measure types]] are: <br />
<br />
*[[Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)|ICT]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Actuators|Actuators]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Physical measures|Physical measures]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Methods|Methods]]<br />
<br />
<br /></div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Information_and_Communications_Technology_(ICT)&diff=14248Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)2020-11-09T14:15:26Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>ICT measures could be used for: communicating, storing, analysing and protecting information. <br />
<br />
The following chart includes various ICT solutions that can be implemented as event driven-measures to mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as a terrorist attack) at an event in a designated area. These are examples derived from the [[PRoTECT research project|PRoTECT]] project. <br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|'''Tech description'''<br />
|'''Threat type'''<br />
|'''Threat phase'''<br />
|'''Tech use'''<br />
|'''Tech criteria'''<br />
|-<br />
|Detection of deviant behaviour online (by combining data science (how to extract and model online behaviour) and social science (which behaviours to address)<br />
|all<br />
|Initial target identification<br />
<br /><br />
|Surveil<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|-<br />
|Vulnerability assessment of individuals before the fact (for example, Multi-Agency Vulnerability Assessment Support Tool (MAVAST))<br />
|all<br />
|Initial target identification<br />
|Surveil<br />
|Performance (accuracy, at face value as data are largely absent)<br />
|-<br />
|GIS system for geographical information<br />
|all<br />
|Execution / post-attack/escape<br />
|Surveil / respond / protect / detect / improvise<br />
|Performance<br />
|-<br />
|Video analytics<br />
|all<br />
|Initial target identification / execution / post-attack/escape<br />
|<br />
|Performance<br />
|} <br />
<br />
In the first column, under ''''Tech description'''<nowiki/>', '''technological solutions''' are listed.<br />
<br />
The next column indicates which '<nowiki/>'''Threat types'''' can be mitigated with these technological solutions:<br />
<br />
#''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
#''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
#''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
#''IED'' (explosives) - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
#''PBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
#''UAVIED'' (explosives) - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
#''VBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
#''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
<br />
<br />
The '<nowiki/>'''Threat phase'''' column states in which phase of the attack the technological solution has the most effect:<br />
<br />
#''Initial Target Identification'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Operational Planning'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Pre-Attack Preparation'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Execution'' (during the attack);<br />
#''Post-Attack/Escape'' (after the attack).<br />
<br />
<br />
Finally, the '<nowiki/>'''Tech use'''' column states the appertaining security function of the technological solution:<br />
<br />
#''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
#''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
#''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
#''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
#''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
#''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
#''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
#''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
#''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
#''Other.''<br />
<br />
<br />
Other [[Measures|measure types]] are: <br />
<br />
*[[Measure type: Sensors|Sensors]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Actuators|Actuators]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Physical measures|Physical measures]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Methods|Methods]]</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Physical_measures&diff=14247Measure type: Physical measures2020-11-09T14:14:54Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>''Physical measures'' could be used for controlling access, impeding an attack or protective materials. <br />
<br />
The following chart includes various Physical solutions that can be implemented as event driven-measures to mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as a terrorist attack) at an event in a designated area. These are examples derived from the [[PRoTECT research project|PRoTECT]] project. <br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|'''Tech description'''<br />
|'''Threat type'''<br />
|'''Threat phase'''<br />
|'''Tech use'''<br />
|'''Tech criteria'''<br />
|-<br />
|Influence attacker physically (for example, intimidate, Less Lethal Weapons (sound, vision))<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Respond / restrict<br />
<br /><br />
|Readiness / Performance<br />
|-<br />
|Physical barriers that are flexible or permanent<br />
|Vehicle attack<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
|Protect<br />
|Readiness / performance<br />
|-<br />
|Urban layout with bollards, planters, et cetera<br />
|Vehicle, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
<br /><br />
|Protect<br />
<br /><br />
|Other: impact, architectural looks<br />
|-<br />
|Reduce the loading on a building by using landscape design<br />
<br /><br />
|VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
<br /><br />
|Protect<br />
<br /><br />
|Cost and other: effectiveness<br />
|-<br />
|Design of roads to prevent the impact of vehicles with a high speed<br />
|Vehicle, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution / Post-Attack/Escape<br />
|Protect<br />
<br /><br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Prevent crowded places with environment design<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
<br /><br />
|Protect<br />
<br /><br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Temporary measures – vehicle barriers, checkpoint, road block<br />
|Vehicle, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical, cost and other: impact on normal operations<br />
|-<br />
|Permanent measures – security gate, (blast resistant) fencing, bollards….<br />
|Vehicle, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical, cost and other: impact on normal operations<br />
|-<br />
|Façade design (include the window and door anchors)<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Explosion resistant glazing<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Bullet proof glazing<br />
|Fire arms attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Prevent progressive collapse<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Prevent roof objects like lightning, panels to fall on the people<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Provide a safe place for shelter<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Products to mitigate or reduce the explosion effects like blast container (place them around the threat) to isolate the threat<br />
<br /><br />
|IED, PBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Other: (It might be effective to protect the surrounding, but also has side effects. E.g. additional risk for EOD)<br />
|-<br />
|Personal protection (vest, helmet, gear) to the first responders and security personnel<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object attack<br />
|Pre-attack preparations / Execution<br />
|Respond<br />
|Physical / cost / performance<br />
|-<br />
|Bomb suit (Explosive ordnance) of the first responders and security personnel<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution / Post-Attack/Escape<br />
|Respond<br />
|Physical / performance<br />
|}<br />
<br />
In the first column, under ''''Tech description'''<nowiki/>', '''technological solutions''' are listed.<br />
<br />
The next column indicates which '<nowiki/>'''Threat types'''' can be mitigated with these technological solutions:<br />
<br />
#''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
#''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
#''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
#''IED'' (explosives) - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
#''PBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
#''UAVIED'' (explosives) - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
#''VBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
#''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
<br />
<br />
The '<nowiki/>'''Threat phase'''' column states in which phase of the attack the technological solution has the most effect:<br />
<br />
#''Initial Target Identification'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Operational Planning'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Pre-Attack Preparation'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Execution'' (during the attack);<br />
#''Post-Attack/Escape'' (after the attack).<br />
<br />
<br />
Finally, the '<nowiki/>'''Tech use'''' column states the appertaining security function of the technological solution:<br />
<br />
#''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
#''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
#''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
#''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
#''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
#''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
#''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
#''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
#''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
#''Other.'' <br />
<br />
Other [[Measures|measure types]] are: <br />
<br />
*[[Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)|ICT]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Sensors|Sensors]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Actuators|Actuators]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Methods|Methods]]</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Physical_measures&diff=14246Measure type: Physical measures2020-11-09T14:14:15Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>''Physical measures'' could be used for controlling access, impeding an attack or protective materials. <br />
<br />
The following chart includes various Physical solutions that can be implemented as event driven-measures to mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as a terrorist attack) at an event in a designated area. These are examples derived from the [[PRoTECT research project|PRoTECT]] project. <br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|'''Tech description'''<br />
|'''Threat type'''<br />
|'''Threat phase'''<br />
|'''Tech use'''<br />
|'''Tech criteria'''<br />
|-<br />
|Influence attacker physically (for example, intimidate, Less Lethal Weapons (sound, vision))<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Respond / restrict<br />
<br /><br />
|Readiness / Performance<br />
|-<br />
|Physical barriers that are flexible or permanent<br />
|Vehicle attack<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
|Protect<br />
|Readiness / performance<br />
|-<br />
|Urban layout with bollards, planters, et cetera<br />
|Vehicle, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
<br /><br />
|Protect<br />
<br /><br />
|Other: impact, architectural looks<br />
|-<br />
|Reduce the loading on a building by using landscape design<br />
<br /><br />
|VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
<br /><br />
|Protect<br />
<br /><br />
|Cost and other: effectiveness<br />
|-<br />
|Design of roads to prevent the impact of vehicles with a high speed<br />
|Vehicle, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution / Post-Attack/Escape<br />
|Protect<br />
<br /><br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Prevent crowded places with environment design<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
<br /><br />
|Protect<br />
<br /><br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Temporary measures – vehicle barriers, checkpoint, road block<br />
|Vehicle, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical, cost and other: impact on normal operations<br />
|-<br />
|Permanent measures – security gate, (blast resistant) fencing, bollards….<br />
|Vehicle, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical, cost and other: impact on normal operations<br />
|-<br />
|Façade design (include the window and door anchors)<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Explosion resistant glazing<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Bullet proof glazing<br />
|Fire arms attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Prevent progressive collapse<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Prevent roof objects like lightning, panels to fall on the people<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Provide a safe place for shelter<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Products to mitigate or reduce the explosion effects like blast container (place them around the threat) to isolate the threat<br />
<br /><br />
|IED, PBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Other: (It might be effective to protect the surrounding, but also has side effects. E.g. additional risk for EOD)<br />
|-<br />
|Personal protection (vest, helmet, gear) to the first responders and security personnel<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object attack<br />
|Pre-attack preparations / Execution<br />
|Respond<br />
|Physical / cost / performance<br />
|-<br />
|Bomb suit (Explosive ordnance) of the first responders and security personnel<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution / Post-Attack/Escape<br />
|Respond<br />
|Physical / performance<br />
|}<br />
<br />
In the first column, under ''''Tech description'''<nowiki/>', '''technological solutions''' are listed.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
The next column indicates which '<nowiki/>'''Threat types'''' can be mitigated with these technological solutions:<br />
<br />
<br />
#''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
#''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
#''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
#''IED'' (explosives) - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
#''PBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
#''UAVIED'' (explosives) - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
#''VBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
#''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
<br />
The 'T'''hreat phase'''' column states in which phase of the attack the technological solution has the most effect:<br />
<br />
#''Initial Target Identification'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Operational Planning'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Pre-Attack Preparation'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Execution'' (during the attack);<br />
#''Post-Attack/Escape'' (after the attack).<br />
<br />
Finally, the '<nowiki/>'''Tech use'''' column states the appertaining security function of the technological solution:<br />
<br />
#''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
#''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
#''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
#''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
#''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
#''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
#''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
#''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
#''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
#''Other.'' <br />
<br />
Other [[Measures|measure types]] are: <br />
<br />
*[[Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)|ICT]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Sensors|Sensors]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Actuators|Actuators]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Methods|Methods]]</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Physical_measures&diff=14245Measure type: Physical measures2020-11-09T14:13:52Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>''Physical measures'' could be used for controlling access, impeding an attack or protective materials. <br />
<br />
The following chart includes various Physical solutions that can be implemented as event driven-measures to mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as a terrorist attack) at an event in a designated area. These are examples derived from the [[PRoTECT research project|PRoTECT]] project. <br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|'''Tech description'''<br />
|'''Threat type'''<br />
|'''Threat phase'''<br />
|'''Tech use'''<br />
|'''Tech criteria'''<br />
|-<br />
|Influence attacker physically (for example, intimidate, Less Lethal Weapons (sound, vision))<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Respond / restrict<br />
<br /><br />
|Readiness / Performance<br />
|-<br />
|Physical barriers that are flexible or permanent<br />
|Vehicle attack<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
|Protect<br />
|Readiness / performance<br />
|-<br />
|Urban layout with bollards, planters, et cetera<br />
|Vehicle, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
<br /><br />
|Protect<br />
<br /><br />
|Other: impact, architectural looks<br />
|-<br />
|Reduce the loading on a building by using landscape design<br />
<br /><br />
|VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
<br /><br />
|Protect<br />
<br /><br />
|Cost and other: effectiveness<br />
|-<br />
|Design of roads to prevent the impact of vehicles with a high speed<br />
|Vehicle, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution / Post-Attack/Escape<br />
|Protect<br />
<br /><br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Prevent crowded places with environment design<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
<br /><br />
|Protect<br />
<br /><br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Temporary measures – vehicle barriers, checkpoint, road block<br />
|Vehicle, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical, cost and other: impact on normal operations<br />
|-<br />
|Permanent measures – security gate, (blast resistant) fencing, bollards….<br />
|Vehicle, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical, cost and other: impact on normal operations<br />
|-<br />
|Façade design (include the window and door anchors)<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Explosion resistant glazing<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Bullet proof glazing<br />
|Fire arms attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Prevent progressive collapse<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Prevent roof objects like lightning, panels to fall on the people<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Provide a safe place for shelter<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Products to mitigate or reduce the explosion effects like blast container (place them around the threat) to isolate the threat<br />
<br /><br />
|IED, PBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Other: (It might be effective to protect the surrounding, but also has side effects. E.g. additional risk for EOD)<br />
|-<br />
|Personal protection (vest, helmet, gear) to the first responders and security personnel<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object attack<br />
|Pre-attack preparations / Execution<br />
|Respond<br />
|Physical / cost / performance<br />
|-<br />
|Bomb suit (Explosive ordnance) of the first responders and security personnel<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution / Post-Attack/Escape<br />
|Respond<br />
|Physical / performance<br />
|}<br />
<br />
In the first column, under ''''Tech description'''<nowiki/>', '''technological solutions''' are listed.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
The next column indicates which '<nowiki/>'''Threat types'''' can be mitigated with these technological solutions:<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
#''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
#''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
#''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
#''IED'' (explosives) - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
#''PBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
#''UAVIED'' (explosives) - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
#''VBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
#''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
<br />
The 'T'''hreat phase'''' column states in which phase of the attack the technological solution has the most effect:<br />
<br />
#''Initial Target Identification'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Operational Planning'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Pre-Attack Preparation'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Execution'' (during the attack);<br />
#''Post-Attack/Escape'' (after the attack).<br />
<br />
Finally, the '<nowiki/>'''Tech use'''' column states the appertaining security function of the technological solution:<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
#''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
#''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
#''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
#''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
#''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
#''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
#''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
#''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
#''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
#''Other.'' <br />
<br />
Other [[Measures|measure types]] are: <br />
<br />
*[[Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)|ICT]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Sensors|Sensors]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Actuators|Actuators]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Methods|Methods]]</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Actuators&diff=14244Measure type: Actuators2020-11-09T14:13:37Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>''Actuators'' could be used for warning, intercepting or eliminating. <br />
<br />
The following chart includes various Actuator solutions that can be implemented as event driven-measures to mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as a terrorist attack) at an event in a designated area. These are examples derived from the [[PRoTECT research project|PRoTECT]] project.<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|'''Tech description'''<br />
|'''Threat type'''<br />
|'''Threat phase'''<br />
|'''Tech use'''<br />
|'''Tech criteria'''<br />
|-<br />
|Influence attacker in communication (for example, negotiation strategies, security questioning, communication skills)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Respond<br />
|Performance<br />
<br /><br />
|-<br />
|Deception of attacker (for example, distract (i.e., slow down) by unexpected noises or physical barriers)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Respond<br />
|Readiness / Performance<br />
|-<br />
|Loudspeakers<br />
|all<br />
|Execution / post-attack/escape<br />
|Alert<br />
|Physical<br />
|-<br />
|Lights on pathways (maybe in combination with sensor)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution / post-attack/escape<br />
|Respond<br />
|Physical / readiness / performance<br />
|-<br />
|Crowd control (for example, influence techniques or use of social media)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Alert / protect / restrict<br />
|Readiness / Performance<br />
|-<br />
|Non lethal weapons (acoustic, electroshock, et cetera)<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
<br /><br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Weapons to stop the terrorist during the attempted attack<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, vehicle, PBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
<br /><br />
|Cost / compliancy<br />
|-<br />
|Intervention to stop the terrorist during the attempted attack<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
<br /><br />
|Other: effectiveness<br />
|-<br />
|Use of animals as actuator (for example, influencing behaviour in an overt manner (for example intimidation) and a covert manner)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Surveil / respond / detect / restrict<br />
<br /><br />
|Readiness / Performance<br />
|}<br />
<br />
In the first column, under ''''Tech description'''<nowiki/>', '''technological solutions''' are listed.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
The next column indicates which '<nowiki/>'''Threat types'''' can be mitigated with these technological solutions:<br />
<br />
<br />
#''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
#''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
#''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
#''IED'' (explosives) - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
#''PBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
#''UAVIED'' (explosives) - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
#''VBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
#''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
<br />
The 'T'''hreat phase'''' column states in which phase of the attack the technological solution has the most effect:<br />
<br />
#''Initial Target Identification'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Operational Planning'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Pre-Attack Preparation'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Execution'' (during the attack);<br />
#''Post-Attack/Escape'' (after the attack).<br />
<br />
Finally, the '<nowiki/>'''Tech use'''' column states the appertaining security function of the technological solution:<br />
<br />
<br />
#''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
#''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
#''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
#''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
#''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
#''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
#''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
#''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
#''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
#''Other.''<br />
<br />
Other [[Measures|measure types]] are: <br />
<br />
*[[Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)|ICT]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Sensors|Sensors]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Physical measures|Physical measures]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Methods|Methods]]<br />
<br />
<br /></div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Actuators&diff=14243Measure type: Actuators2020-11-09T14:12:59Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>''Actuators'' could be used for warning, intercepting or eliminating. <br />
<br />
The following chart includes various Actuator solutions that can be implemented as event driven-measures to mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as a terrorist attack) at an event in a designated area. These are examples derived from the [[PRoTECT research project|PRoTECT]] project<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|'''Tech description'''<br />
|'''Threat type'''<br />
|'''Threat phase'''<br />
|'''Tech use'''<br />
|'''Tech criteria'''<br />
|-<br />
|Influence attacker in communication (for example, negotiation strategies, security questioning, communication skills)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Respond<br />
|Performance<br />
<br /><br />
|-<br />
|Deception of attacker (for example, distract (i.e., slow down) by unexpected noises or physical barriers)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Respond<br />
|Readiness / Performance<br />
|-<br />
|Loudspeakers<br />
|all<br />
|Execution / post-attack/escape<br />
|Alert<br />
|Physical<br />
|-<br />
|Lights on pathways (maybe in combination with sensor)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution / post-attack/escape<br />
|Respond<br />
|Physical / readiness / performance<br />
|-<br />
|Crowd control (for example, influence techniques or use of social media)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Alert / protect / restrict<br />
|Readiness / Performance<br />
|-<br />
|Non lethal weapons (acoustic, electroshock, et cetera)<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
<br /><br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|-<br />
|Weapons to stop the terrorist during the attempted attack<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, vehicle, PBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
<br /><br />
|Cost / compliancy<br />
|-<br />
|Intervention to stop the terrorist during the attempted attack<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
<br /><br />
|Other: effectiveness<br />
|-<br />
|Use of animals as actuator (for example, influencing behaviour in an overt manner (for example intimidation) and a covert manner)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Surveil / respond / detect / restrict<br />
<br /><br />
|Readiness / Performance<br />
|}<br />
<br />
In the first column, under ''''Tech description'''<nowiki/>', '''technological solutions''' are listed.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
The next column indicates which '<nowiki/>'''Threat types'''' can be mitigated with these technological solutions:<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
#''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
#''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
#''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
#''IED'' (explosives) - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
#''PBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
#''UAVIED'' (explosives) - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
#''VBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
#''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
<br />
The 'T'''hreat phase'''' column states in which phase of the attack the technological solution has the most effect:<br />
<br />
#''Initial Target Identification'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Operational Planning'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Pre-Attack Preparation'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Execution'' (during the attack);<br />
#''Post-Attack/Escape'' (after the attack).<br />
<br />
Finally, the '<nowiki/>'''Tech use'''' column states the appertaining security function of the technological solution:<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
#''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
#''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
#''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
#''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
#''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
#''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
#''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
#''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
#''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
#''Other.'' <br />
<br />
Other [[Measures|measure types]] are: <br />
<br />
*[[Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)|ICT]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Sensors|Sensors]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Physical measures|Physical measures]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Methods|Methods]]<br />
<br />
<br /></div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Sensors&diff=14242Measure type: Sensors2020-11-09T14:11:59Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>''Sensors'' could be used for detection, identification, localisation or tracking.<br />
<br />
The following chart includes various Sensor solutions that can be implemented as event driven-measures to mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as a terrorist attack) at an event in a designated area. These are examples derived from the [[PRoTECT research project|PRoTECT]] project.<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|'''Tech description'''<br />
|'''Threat type'''<br />
|'''Threat phase'''<br />
|'''Tech use'''<br />
|'''Tech criteria'''<br />
|-<br />
|Weapon detector (DEXTER)<br />
|Fire arms attack<br />
|Pre-attack<br />
|Surveil / detect / protect<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|-<br />
|Explosive detector (DEXTER)<br />
|PBIED<br />
|Pre-attack<br />
|Surveil / detect / protect<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|-<br />
|Automatic vehicle behaviour and threat detection (SASSSISLAN)<br />
|Vehicle Attack<br />
|Pre-attack<br />
|Surveil / protect<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|-<br />
|Automatic person behaviour and threat detection (SASSSISLAN)<br />
|Sharp object attack / PBIED<br />
|Pre-attack<br />
|Surveil / protect<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|-<br />
|Automatic aggression detection<br />
|Sharp object attack<br />
|Pre-attack / execution<br />
|Surveil / protect<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|-<br />
|Person re-identification to avoid next attack (DEXTER)<br />
|PBIED<br />
|Post-attack / Pre-attack (next)<br />
|Surveil / detect / protect<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|-<br />
|Automatic crowd behaviour and threat detection (SASSSISLAN)<br />
|Sharp object attack<br />
|Pre-attack / execution<br />
|Surveil / protect<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|-<br />
|mmw-portals (≈30-300 GHz)<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|anomaly detection, slow (person by person)<br />
|-<br />
|mmw walk-through (≈30-300 GHz)<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|anomaly detection (several 100 persons/h)<br />
|-<br />
|radar/microwave (≈3-30 GHz)<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|anomaly detection<br />
<br />
large distance<br />
|-<br />
|THz/IR cameras<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|anomaly detection<br />
<br />
difficult image interpretation<br />
|-<br />
|X-ray backscatter persons<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|forbidden for use in public in Europe – ionising radiation<br />
|-<br />
|X-ray transmission persons<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|forbidden for use in public in Europe – ionising radiation<br />
|-<br />
|X-ray transmission belt systems<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, IED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|checkpoint necessary, slow (bag by bag), ATR possible for explosives, guns and knives<br />
|-<br />
|X-ray backscatter for cars<br />
|Fire arms & VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|covert: needs close proximity to car (drive by), image difficult to interpret, Mobile Portal solution possible, checkpoint situation, driver has to leave the car<br />
|-<br />
|Explosive vapour Detection – High Volume Sampling (HVS)<br />
|IED, PBIED & VBIED attack (potentially chemical attack)<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|not all explosives can be detected, detection rate depends on circumstances (eg temperature), needs time (1-30 minutes), sampling device is portable, detection device is large and expensive, detector usually mass spectrometer based technology<br />
|-<br />
|Explosive vapour Detection – Direct Sampling<br />
|IED, PBIED & VBIED attack (potentially chemical attack)<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|Less sensitive than HVS, lower DR, handheld, limited use, many technology sub categories<br />
|-<br />
|Explosive Trace Particle detection – contact<br />
|IED, PBIED & VBIED attack (potentially chemical attack)<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|contact with object necessary (swab), very sensitive equipment mostly Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) based, but also other technologies success depends on skill operator<br />
|-<br />
|Explosive Trace Particle detection – non-contact<br />
|IED, PBIED & VBIED attack (potentially chemical attack)<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|Mostly Raman-effect based technology, use of laser, eye-safety is an issue when use in public. Proximity measurements (<2 cm) are mature, longer distance (up to several meters) less mature, also bulk detection possible up to 40 m for some explosives (low TRL), line of sight necessary<br />
|-<br />
|Walk Through Metal Detection<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object & vehicle attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|checkpoint necessary, only works if threat contains metal<br />
|-<br />
|Hand held Metal Detector<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object & vehicle attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|depends on skill operator, only works if threat contains metal<br />
|-<br />
|Explosive Detection Dogs<br />
|IED, PBIED & VBIED attack (potentially chemical attack)<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|versatile use, performance varies from dog to dog and in time, expensive<br />
|-<br />
|Pat down<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|often used as alarm resolution, invasive, time consuming, depends on skill of the screener and cooperation of the subject<br />
|-<br />
|Visual inspection of bags, cars, etc.<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|often used as alarm resolution, invasive, time consuming, depends on skill of the screener and cooperation of the subject<br />
|-<br />
|Detection of deviant behaviour offline (for example, security questioning, distinguishing psychiatric patient from terrorist (Rapid Observation of Psychological Disorders (ROPD) tool))<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Surveil<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|-<br />
|Use of animals as sensor (for example, emotions, stress level, use of substances, presence of explosives, and establishing identity)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Surveil / respond / detect / restrict <br />
<br /><br />
|Readiness / Performance<br />
|-<br />
|Risk assessment of individuals on the spot (i.e., stress assessment)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Respond / detect <br />
<br /><br />
|Performance (accuracy)<br />
|-<br />
|Vulnerability assessment of individuals before the fact (for example, Multi-Agency Vulnerability Assessment Support Tool (MAVAST))<br />
|all<br />
|Initial target identification<br />
|Surveil<br />
|Performance (accuracy, at face value as data are largely absent)<br />
|-<br />
|Automatic sprinkler system<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED & VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Respond / protect / overcome<br />
|Performance<br />
|-<br />
|Drones with sensor<br />
|all<br />
|Initial target identification / execution / post-attack/escape<br />
|Surveil / respond / detect<br />
|Performance (detection rate, accuracy)<br />
|}<br />
<br />
In the first column, under ''''Tech description'''<nowiki/>', '''technological solutions''' are listed.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
The next column indicates which '<nowiki/>'''Threat types'''' can be mitigated with these technological solutions:<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
#''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
#''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
#''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
#''IED'' (explosives) - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
#''PBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
#''UAVIED'' (explosives) - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
#''VBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
#''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
<br />
The 'T'''hreat phase'''' column states in which phase of the attack the technological solution has the most effect:<br />
<br />
#''Initial Target Identification'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Operational Planning'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Pre-Attack Preparation'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Execution'' (during the attack);<br />
#''Post-Attack/Escape'' (after the attack).<br />
<br />
Finally, the '<nowiki/>'''Tech use'''' column states the appertaining security function of the technological solution:<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
#''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
#''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
#''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
#''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
#''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
#''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
#''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
#''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
#''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
#''Other.'' <br />
<br />
Other [[Measures|measure types]] are: <br />
<br />
*[[Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)|ICT]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Actuators|Actuators]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Physical measures|Physical measures]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Methods|Methods]]<br />
<br />
<br /></div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Information_and_Communications_Technology_(ICT)&diff=14241Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)2020-11-09T14:10:44Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>ICT measures could be used for: communicating, storing, analysing and protecting information. <br />
<br />
The following chart includes various ICT solutions that can be implemented as event driven-measures to mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as a terrorist attack) at an event in a designated area. These are examples derived from the [[PRoTECT research project|PRoTECT]] project. <br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|'''Tech description'''<br />
|'''Threat type'''<br />
|'''Threat phase'''<br />
|'''Tech use'''<br />
|'''Tech criteria'''<br />
|-<br />
|Detection of deviant behaviour online (by combining data science (how to extract and model online behaviour) and social science (which behaviours to address)<br />
|all<br />
|Initial target identification<br />
<br /><br />
|Surveil<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|-<br />
|Vulnerability assessment of individuals before the fact (for example, Multi-Agency Vulnerability Assessment Support Tool (MAVAST))<br />
|all<br />
|Initial target identification<br />
|Surveil<br />
|Performance (accuracy, at face value as data are largely absent)<br />
|-<br />
|GIS system for geographical information<br />
|all<br />
|Execution / post-attack/escape<br />
|Surveil / respond / protect / detect / improvise<br />
|Performance<br />
|-<br />
|Video analytics<br />
|all<br />
|Initial target identification / execution / post-attack/escape<br />
|<br />
|Performance<br />
|} <br />
<br />
In the first column, under ''''Tech description'''<nowiki/>', '''technological solutions''' are listed.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
The next column indicates which '<nowiki/>'''Threat types'''' can be mitigated with these technological solutions:<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
#''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
#''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
#''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
#''IED'' (explosives) - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
#''PBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
#''UAVIED'' (explosives) - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
#''VBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
#''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
#''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
<br />
The 'T'''hreat phase'''' column states in which phase of the attack the technological solution has the most effect:<br />
<br />
#''Initial Target Identification'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Operational Planning'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Pre-Attack Preparation'' (before the attack);<br />
#''Execution'' (during the attack);<br />
#''Post-Attack/Escape'' (after the attack).<br />
<br />
Finally, the '<nowiki/>'''Tech use'''' column states the appertaining security function of the technological solution:<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
#''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
#''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
#''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
#''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
#''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
#''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
#''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
#''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
#''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
#''Other.''<br />
<br />
<br />
Other [[Measures|measure types]] are: <br />
<br />
*[[Measure type: Sensors|Sensors]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Actuators|Actuators]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Physical measures|Physical measures]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Methods|Methods]]</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Methods&diff=14175Measure type: Methods2020-10-15T13:49:02Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>''Methods'' could be used for procedures, best practices or standards to implement solutions.<br />
<br />
The following chart includes various Methods that can be implemented as event driven-measures to mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as a terrorist attack) at an event in a designated area.<br />
<br />
The chart includes various columns:<br />
<br />
In the first column, under ''''Tech description'''<nowiki/>', '''technological solutions''' are listed.<br />
<br />
The next column indicates which '<nowiki/>'''Threat types'''' can be mitigated with these technological solutions:<br />
<br />
# ''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
# ''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
# ''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
# ''IED'' (explosives) - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
# ''PBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
# ''UAVIED'' (explosives) - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
# ''VBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
# ''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
# ''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
# ''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
<br />
The 'T'''hreat phase'''' column states in which phase of the attack the technological solution has the most effect:<br />
<br />
# ''Initial Target Identification'' (before the attack);<br />
# ''Operational Planning'' (before the attack);<br />
# ''Pre-Attack Preparation'' (before the attack);<br />
# ''Execution'' (during the attack);<br />
# ''Post-Attack/Escape'' (after the attack).<br />
<br />
Finally, the '<nowiki/>'''Tech use'''' column states the appertaining security function of the technological solution:<br />
<br />
# ''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
# ''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
# ''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
# ''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
# ''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
# ''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
# ''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
# ''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
# ''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
# ''Other.''<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|'''''Tech description'''''<br />
|'''Threat type'''<br />
|'''Threat phase'''<br />
|'''Tech use'''<br />
|'''Tech criteria'''<br />
|'''Products/suppliers'''<br />
|-<br />
|Increase resilience LEOs (for example, training, monitoring)<br />
|all<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
|Other (or all)<br />
|Readiness<br />
|Training and monitoring by TNO for Police and MinDef<br />
|-<br />
|Trainings to enhance LEO capabilities (for example, flexibility, communication skills)<br />
|all<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
|Other (or all)<br />
|Performance (measured increase in capabilities)<br />
|Trainings by TNO for Police and MinDef<br />
|-<br />
|Enhance multiparty decision making (for example, reducing bias, improving collaboration)<br />
|all<br />
|all<br />
|Other (or all)<br />
|Readiness / Compliancy<br />
|Multidisciplinair Interactie Raamwerk by TNO for Flood Control 2015 (<nowiki>http://digitalpages.tno.nl/mirror/page/1</nowiki>)<br />
|-<br />
|Planning and Response to an Active Shooter:<br />
<br />
An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide<br />
<br />
November 2015<br />
|Fire arms<br />
|Execution<br />
|SURVEIL, RESPOND, PROTECT, DETECT<br />
|Readiness / Compliancy<br />
|DHS website<br />
|-<br />
|Security and Resiliency Guide: Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Concepts (including for events and sports venues)<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED (explosives)<br />
|Pre-attack preparations, Execution<br />
|SURVEIL, RESPOND, PROTECT, DETECT<br />
|Readiness / Compliancy<br />
|DHS website (<nowiki>https://www.dhs.gov/publication/security-and-resiliency-guide-and-annexes</nowiki>)<br />
|}<br />
Other [[Measures|measure types]] are: <br />
<br />
*[[Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)|ICT]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Sensors|Sensors]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Actuators|Actuators]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Physical measures|Physical measures]]</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Physical_measures&diff=14174Measure type: Physical measures2020-10-15T13:48:17Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>''Physical measures'' could be used for controlling access, impeding an attack or protective materials. <br />
<br />
The following chart includes various Physical solutions that can be implemented as event driven-measures to mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as a terrorist attack) at an event in a designated area.<br />
<br />
The chart includes various columns:<br />
<br />
In the first column, under ''''Tech description'''<nowiki/>', '''technological solutions''' are listed.<br />
<br />
The next column indicates which '<nowiki/>'''Threat types'''' can be mitigated with these technological solutions:<br />
<br />
# ''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
# ''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
# ''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
# ''IED'' (explosives) - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
# ''PBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
# ''UAVIED'' (explosives) - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
# ''VBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
# ''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
# ''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
# ''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
<br />
The 'T'''hreat phase'''' column states in which phase of the attack the technological solution has the most effect:<br />
<br />
# ''Initial Target Identification'' (before the attack);<br />
# ''Operational Planning'' (before the attack);<br />
# ''Pre-Attack Preparation'' (before the attack);<br />
# ''Execution'' (during the attack);<br />
# ''Post-Attack/Escape'' (after the attack).<br />
<br />
Finally, the '<nowiki/>'''Tech use'''' column states the appertaining security function of the technological solution:<br />
<br />
# ''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
# ''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
# ''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
# ''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
# ''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
# ''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
# ''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
# ''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
# ''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
# ''Other.''<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|'''''Tech description'''''<br />
|'''Threat type'''<br />
|'''Threat phase'''<br />
|'''Tech use'''<br />
|'''Tech criteria'''<br />
|'''Products/suppliers'''<br />
|-<br />
|Influence attacker physically (for example, intimidate, Less Lethal Weapons (sound, vision))<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Respond / restrict<br />
<br /><br />
|Readiness / Performance<br />
|Psychological Intervention Guide for PBIED attacks: multidimensional matrix of significant aspects of PBIED in crowd,<br />
<br />
facilitates sense making in using softer methods to delay/protect (by TNO, for FP7 SUBCOP)<br />
|-<br />
|Physical barriers that are flexible or permanent<br />
|Vehicle attack<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
|Protect<br />
|Readiness / performance<br />
|Many available<br />
|-<br />
|Urban layout with bollards, planters, et cetera<br />
|Vehicle, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
<br /><br />
|Protect<br />
<br /><br />
|Other: impact, architectural looks<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Reduce the loading on a building by using landscape design<br />
<br /><br />
|VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
<br /><br />
|Protect<br />
<br /><br />
|Cost and other: effectiveness<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Design of roads to prevent the impact of vehicles with a high speed<br />
|Vehicle, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution / Post-Attack/Escape<br />
|Protect<br />
<br /><br />
|n/a<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Prevent crowded places with environment design<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
<br /><br />
|Protect<br />
<br /><br />
|n/a<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Temporary measures – vehicle barriers, checkpoint, road block<br />
|Vehicle, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical, cost and other: impact on normal operations<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Permanent measures – security gate, (blast resistant) fencing, bollards….<br />
|Vehicle, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical, cost and other: impact on normal operations<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Façade design (include the window and door anchors)<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Explosion resistant glazing<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Bullet proof glazing<br />
|Fire arms attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Prevent progressive collapse<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Prevent roof objects like lightning, panels to fall on the people<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Provide a safe place for shelter<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Products to mitigate or reduce the explosion effects like blast container (place them around the threat) to isolate the threat<br />
<br /><br />
|IED, PBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Protect<br />
|Other: (It might be effective to protect the surrounding, but also has side effects. E.g. additional risk for EOD)<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Personal protection (vest, helmet, gear) to the first responders and security personnel<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object attack<br />
|Pre-attack preparations / Execution<br />
|Respond<br />
|Physical / cost / performance<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Bomb suit (Explosive ordnance) of the first responders and security personnel<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED, VBIED attack<br />
|Execution / Post-Attack/Escape<br />
|Respond<br />
|Physical / performance<br />
|n/a<br />
|}<br />
Other [[Measures|measure types]] are: <br />
<br />
*[[Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)|ICT]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Sensors|Sensors]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Actuators|Actuators]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Methods|Methods]]</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Actuators&diff=14173Measure type: Actuators2020-10-15T13:47:55Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>''Actuators'' could be used for warning, intercepting or eliminating. <br />
<br />
The following chart includes various Actuator solutions that can be implemented as event driven-measures to mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as a terrorist attack) at an event in a designated area.<br />
<br />
The chart includes various columns:<br />
<br />
In the first column, under ''''Tech description'''<nowiki/>', '''technological solutions''' are listed.<br />
<br />
The next column indicates which '<nowiki/>'''Threat types'''' can be mitigated with these technological solutions:<br />
<br />
# ''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
# ''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
# ''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
# ''IED'' (explosives) - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
# ''PBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
# ''UAVIED'' (explosives) - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
# ''VBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
# ''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
# ''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
# ''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
<br />
The 'T'''hreat phase'''' column states in which phase of the attack the technological solution has the most effect:<br />
<br />
# ''Initial Target Identification'' (before the attack);<br />
# ''Operational Planning'' (before the attack);<br />
# ''Pre-Attack Preparation'' (before the attack);<br />
# ''Execution'' (during the attack);<br />
# ''Post-Attack/Escape'' (after the attack).<br />
<br />
Finally, the '<nowiki/>'''Tech use'''' column states the appertaining security function of the technological solution:<br />
<br />
# ''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
# ''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
# ''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
# ''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
# ''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
# ''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
# ''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
# ''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
# ''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
# ''Other.''<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|'''''Tech description'''''<br />
|'''Threat type'''<br />
|'''Threat phase'''<br />
|'''Tech use'''<br />
|'''Tech criteria'''<br />
|'''Products/suppliers'''<br />
|-<br />
|Influence attacker in communication (for example, negotiation strategies, security questioning, communication skills)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Respond<br />
|Performance<br />
<br /><br />
|Security Questioning Protocols<br />
|-<br />
|Deception of attacker (for example, distract (i.e., slow down) by unexpected noises or physical barriers)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Respond<br />
|Readiness / Performance<br />
|Psychological Intervention Guide for PBIED attacks: multidimensional matrix of significant aspects of PBIED in crowd,<br />
<br />
facilitates sense making in using softer methods to delay/protect (by TNO, for FP7 SUBCOP)<br />
|-<br />
|Loudspeakers<br />
|all<br />
|Execution / post-attack/escape<br />
|Alert<br />
|Physical<br />
|Many available<br />
|-<br />
|Lights on pathways (maybe in combination with sensor)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution / post-attack/escape<br />
|Respond<br />
|Physical / readiness / performance<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Crowd control (for example, influence techniques or use of social media)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Alert / protect / restrict<br />
|Readiness / Performance<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Non lethal weapons (acoustic, electroshock, et cetera)<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
<br /><br />
|Physical / cost<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Weapons to stop the terrorist during the attempted attack<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, vehicle, PBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
<br /><br />
|Cost / compliancy<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Intervention to stop the terrorist during the attempted attack<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Pre-attack preparations<br />
<br /><br />
|Other: effectiveness<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|Use of animals as actuator (for example, influencing behaviour in an overt manner (for example intimidation) and a covert manner)<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Surveil / respond / detect / restrict<br />
<br /><br />
|Readiness / Performance<br />
|n/a<br />
|}<br />
Other [[Measures|measure types]] are: <br />
<br />
*[[Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)|ICT]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Sensors|Sensors]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Physical measures|Physical measures]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Methods|Methods]]<br />
<br />
<br /></div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Information_and_Communications_Technology_(ICT)&diff=14172Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)2020-10-15T13:46:40Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>ICT measures could be used for: communicating, storing, analysing and protecting information. <br />
<br />
The following chart includes various ICT solutions that can be implemented as event driven-measures to mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as a terrorist attack) at an event in a designated area. <br />
<br />
The chart includes various columns.<br />
<br />
In the first column, under ''''Tech description'''<nowiki/>', '''technological solutions''' are listed.<br />
<br />
The next column indicates which '<nowiki/>'''Threat types'''' can be mitigated with these technological solutions:<br />
<br />
# ''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
# ''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
# ''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
# ''IED'' (explosives) - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
# ''PBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
# ''UAVIED'' (explosives) - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
# ''VBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
# ''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
# ''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
# ''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
<br />
The 'T'''hreat phase'''' column states in which phase of the attack the technological solution has the most effect:<br />
<br />
# ''Initial Target Identification'' (before the attack);<br />
# ''Operational Planning'' (before the attack);<br />
# ''Pre-Attack Preparation'' (before the attack);<br />
# ''Execution'' (during the attack);<br />
# ''Post-Attack/Escape'' (after the attack).<br />
<br />
Finally, the '<nowiki/>'''Tech use'''' column states the appertaining security function of the technological solution:<br />
<br />
# ''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
# ''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
# ''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
# ''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
# ''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
# ''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
# ''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
# ''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
# ''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
# ''Other.''<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|'''Tech description'''<br />
|'''Threat type'''<br />
|'''Threat phase'''<br />
|'''Tech use'''<br />
|-<br />
|Detection of deviant behaviour online (by combining data science (how to extract and model online behaviour) and social science (which behaviours to address))<br />
|all<br />
|Initial target identification<br />
<br /><br />
|Surveil<br />
|-<br />
|Vulnerability assessment of individuals before the fact (for example, Multi-Agency Vulnerability Assessment Support Tool (MAVAST))<br />
|all<br />
|Initial target identification<br />
|Surveil<br />
|-<br />
|GIS system for geographical information<br />
|all<br />
|Execution / post-attack/escape<br />
|Surveil / respond / protect / detect / improvise<br />
|-<br />
|Video analytics<br />
|all<br />
|Initial target identification / execution / post-attack/escape<br />
|<br />
|}<br />
<br />
<br />
Other [[Measures|measure types]] are: <br />
<br />
*[[Measure type: Sensors|Sensors]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Actuators|Actuators]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Physical measures|Physical measures]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Methods|Methods]]</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Sensors&diff=14171Measure type: Sensors2020-10-15T13:45:36Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>''Sensors'' could be used for detection, identification, localisation or tracking.<br />
<br />
The following chart includes various Sensor solutions that can be implemented as event driven-measures to mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as a terrorist attack) at an event in a designated area.<br />
<br />
The chart includes various columns:<br />
<br />
In the first column, under ''''Tech description'''<nowiki/>', '''technological solutions''' are listed.<br />
<br />
The next column indicates which '<nowiki/>'''Threat types'''' can be mitigated with these technological solutions:<br />
<br />
# ''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
# ''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
# ''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
# ''IED'' (explosives) - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
# ''PBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
# ''UAVIED'' (explosives) - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
# ''VBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
# ''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
# ''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
# ''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
<br />
The 'T'''hreat phase'''' column states in which phase of the attack the technological solution has the most effect:<br />
<br />
# ''Initial Target Identification'' (before the attack);<br />
# ''Operational Planning'' (before the attack);<br />
# ''Pre-Attack Preparation'' (before the attack);<br />
# ''Execution'' (during the attack);<br />
# ''Post-Attack/Escape'' (after the attack).<br />
<br />
Finally, the '<nowiki/>'''Tech use'''' column states the appertaining security function of the technological solution:<br />
<br />
# ''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
# ''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
# ''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
# ''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
# ''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
# ''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
# ''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
# ''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
# ''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
# ''Other.''<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|'''''Tech description'''''<br />
|'''Threat type'''<br />
|'''Threat phase'''<br />
|'''Tech use'''<br />
|'''Tech criteria'''<br />
|'''Products/suppliers'''<br />
|-<br />
|''Weapon detector (DEXTER)''<br />
|Fire arms attack<br />
|Pre-attack<br />
|Surveil / detect / protect<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|''Explosive detector (DEXTER)''<br />
|PBIED<br />
|Pre-attack<br />
|Surveil / detect / protect<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|''Automatic vehicle behaviour and threat detection (SASSSISLAN)''<br />
|Vehicle Attack<br />
|Pre-attack<br />
|Surveil / protect<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|''Automatic person behaviour and threat detection (SASSSISLAN)''<br />
|Sharp object attack / PBIED<br />
|Pre-attack<br />
|Surveil / protect<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|''Automatic aggression detection''<br />
|Sharp object attack<br />
|Pre-attack / execution<br />
|Surveil / protect<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|''Person re-identification to avoid next attack (DEXTER)''<br />
|PBIED<br />
|Post-attack / Pre-attack (next)<br />
|Surveil / detect / protect<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|''Automatic crowd behaviour and threat detection (SASSSISLAN)''<br />
|Sharp object attack<br />
|Pre-attack / execution<br />
|Surveil / protect<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|''mmw-portals (≈30-300 GHz)''<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|anomaly detection, slow (person by person)<br />
|L-3 Provision, Rohde & Schwarz QPS200, Smiths Echo, Nuctech<br />
|-<br />
|''mmw walk-through (≈30-300 GHz)''<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|anomaly detection (several 100 persons/h)<br />
|Evolv Edge, APSTEC HSR, R&S (Camero) Easycheck<br />
|-<br />
|''radar/microwave (≈3-30 GHz)''<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|anomaly detection<br />
<br />
large distance<br />
|Rapiscan Counterbomber<br />
|-<br />
|''THz/IR cameras''<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|anomaly detection<br />
<br />
difficult image interpretation<br />
|THz - no COTS equipment on the market<br />
<br />
IR – ELBIT IR camera<br />
|-<br />
|''X-ray backscatter persons''<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|forbidden for use in public in Europe – ionising radiation<br />
|Rapiscan (discontinued product)<br />
|-<br />
|''X-ray transmission persons''<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|forbidden for use in public in Europe – ionising radiation<br />
|Smiths Detection B-scan<br />
|-<br />
|''X-ray transmission belt systems''<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, IED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|checkpoint necessary, slow (bag by bag), ATR possible for explosives, guns and knives<br />
|many commercial systems available<br />
|-<br />
|''X-ray backscatter for cars''<br />
|Fire arms & VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|covert: needs close proximity to car (drive by), image difficult to interpret, Mobile Portal solution possible, checkpoint situation, driver has to leave the car<br />
|Rapiscan (many products)<br />
|-<br />
|''Explosive vapour Detection – High Volume Sampling (HVS)''<br />
|IED, PBIED & VBIED attack (potentially chemical attack)<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|not all explosives can be detected, detection rate depends on circumstances (eg temperature), needs time (1-30 minutes), sampling device is portable, detection device is large and expensive, detector usually mass spectrometer based technology<br />
|SEADM, Karsa<br />
|-<br />
|''Explosive vapour Detection – Direct Sampling''<br />
|IED, PBIED & VBIED attack (potentially chemical attack)<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|Less sensitive than HVS, lower DR, handheld, limited use, many technology sub categories<br />
|Rapiscan Mobile trace, Fido<br />
|-<br />
|''Explosive Trace Particle detection – contact''<br />
|IED, PBIED & VBIED attack (potentially chemical attack)<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|contact with object necessary (swab), very sensitive equipment mostly Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) based, but also other technologies success depends on skill operator<br />
|Bruker, Nuctech, Rapiscan, Smiths Detection, L-3 and others<br />
|-<br />
|''Explosive Trace Particle detection – non-contact''<br />
|IED, PBIED & VBIED attack (potentially chemical attack)<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|Mostly Raman-effect based technology, use of laser, eye-safety is an issue when use in public. Proximity measurements (<2 cm) are mature, longer distance (up to several meters) less mature, also bulk detection possible up to 40 m for some explosives (low TRL), line of sight necessary<br />
|Thermo Fisher (True/First defender), ALAKAI, ENEA (prototype, low TRL)<br />
|-<br />
|''Walk Through Metal Detection''<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object & vehicle attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|checkpoint necessary, only works if threat contains metal<br />
|Ceia, Rapiscan, Garret<br />
|-<br />
|''Hand held Metal Detector''<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object & vehicle attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|depends on skill operator, only works if threat contains metal<br />
|Ceia, Rapiscan, Garret<br />
|-<br />
|''Explosive Detection Dogs''<br />
|IED, PBIED & VBIED attack (potentially chemical attack)<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|versatile use, performance varies from dog to dog and in time, expensive<br />
|mostly police, military, though commercial parties do exist (PMT, Twickelerveld)<br />
|-<br />
|''Pat down''<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|often used as alarm resolution, invasive, time consuming, depends on skill of the screener and cooperation of the subject<br />
|Screeners can be supplied by private security companies (G4S, Securitas)<br />
|-<br />
|''Visual inspection of bags, cars, etc.''<br />
|Fire arms, sharp object, PBIED, chemical, biological & radiological attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Detect<br />
|often used as alarm resolution, invasive, time consuming, depends on skill of the screener and cooperation of the subject<br />
|Screeners can be supplied by private security companies (G4S, Securitas)<br />
|-<br />
|''Detection of deviant behaviour offline (for example, security questioning, distinguishing psychiatric patient from terrorist (Rapid Observation of Psychological Disorders (ROPD) tool))''<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Surveil<br />
|Performance (detection rate)<br />
|Rapid Observation of Psychological Disorders (ROPD) tool: <br />
<br />
translation of a psychopathology diagnostic tool for healthcare professionals into manageable questions with everyday terms for safety professionals (TNO)<br />
|-<br />
|''Use of animals as sensor (for example, emotions, stress level, use of substances, presence of explosives, and establishing identity)''<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Surveil / respond / detect / restrict <br />
<br /><br />
|Readiness / Performance<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|''Risk assessment of individuals on the spot (i.e., stress assessment)''<br />
|all<br />
|Execution<br />
|Respond / detect <br />
<br /><br />
|Performance (accuracy)<br />
|Rapid Resilience Scan: estimates the effects of behavioral measures on a target. The RRS is being developed for measuring stress and resilience in a criminal context (by TNO)<br />
|-<br />
|''Vulnerability assessment of individuals before the fact (for example, Multi-Agency Vulnerability Assessment Support Tool (MAVAST))''<br />
|all<br />
|Initial target identification<br />
|Surveil<br />
|Performance (accuracy, at face value as data are largely absent)<br />
|Multi-Agency Vulnerability Assessment Support Tool (MAVAST): supports multi-agency teams (for example, police, justice, municipality, social work) in identifying the level of vulnerability of an individual to radicalise in a violent way (by TNO for H2020 Pericles)<br />
|-<br />
|''Automatic sprinkler system''<br />
|IED, PBIED, UAVIED & VBIED attack<br />
|Execution<br />
|Respond / protect / overcome<br />
|Performance<br />
|n/a<br />
|-<br />
|''Drones with sensor''<br />
|all<br />
|Initial target identification / execution / post-attack/escape<br />
|Surveil / respond / detect<br />
|Performance (detection rate, accuracy)<br />
|n/a<br />
|}<br />
Other [[Measures|measure types]] are: <br />
<br />
*[[Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)|ICT]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Actuators|Actuators]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Physical measures|Physical measures]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Methods|Methods]]<br />
<br />
<br /></div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Information_and_Communications_Technology_(ICT)&diff=14170Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)2020-10-15T13:42:50Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div>ICT measures could be used for: communicating, storing, analysing and protecting information. <br />
<br />
The following chart includes various ICT solutions that can be implemented as event driven-measures to mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as a terrorist attack) at an event in a designated area. <br />
{| class="wikitable"<br />
|'''Tech description'''<br />
|'''Threat type'''<br />
|'''Threat phase'''<br />
|'''Tech use'''<br />
|-<br />
|Detection of deviant behaviour online (by combining data science (how to extract and model online behaviour) and social science (which behaviours to address))<br />
|all<br />
|Initial target identification<br />
<br /><br />
|Surveil<br />
|-<br />
|Vulnerability assessment of individuals before the fact (for example, Multi-Agency Vulnerability Assessment Support Tool (MAVAST))<br />
|all<br />
|Initial target identification<br />
|Surveil<br />
|-<br />
|GIS system for geographical information<br />
|all<br />
|Execution / post-attack/escape<br />
|Surveil / respond / protect / detect / improvise<br />
|-<br />
|Video analytics<br />
|all<br />
|Initial target identification / execution / post-attack/escape<br />
|Surveil / respond / protect / detect<br />
|}<br />
<u>The chart includes various columns that are explained here.</u> <br />
<br />
In the first column, under ''''Tech description'''<nowiki/>', '''technological solutions''' are listed. <br />
<br />
The next column indicates which '<nowiki/>'''Threat types'''' can be mitigated with these technological solutions:<br />
<br />
# ''Fire arms'' attack - small calibre pistol or semi/full-automatic rifle;<br />
# ''Sharp object'' attack - knifes, machete, other sharp and blunt objects;<br />
# ''Vehicle'' attack - use of vehicle as a weapon by ramming large crowds;<br />
# ''IED'' (explosives) - left/concealed in objects or goods (based on home-made or commercial explosives);<br />
# ''PBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed on a person (suicide or carrier);<br />
# ''UAVIED'' (explosives) - explosives delivered by a remote-controlled airborne device;<br />
# ''VBIED'' (explosives) - explosives concealed inside a vehicle (or its cargo);<br />
# ''Chemical'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
# ''Biological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed);<br />
# ''Radiological'' attack - threat object concealed in goods or carried items (e.g. canister or UAV dispensed).<br />
<br />
The 'T'''hreat phase'''' column states in which phase of the attack the technological solution has the most effect:<br />
<br />
# ''Initial Target Identification'' (before the attack);<br />
# ''Operational Planning'' (before the attack);<br />
# ''Pre-Attack Preparation'' (before the attack);<br />
# ''Execution'' (during the attack);<br />
# ''Post-Attack/Escape'' (after the attack).<br />
<br />
Finally, the '<nowiki/>'''Tech use'''' column states the appertaining security function of the technological solution:<br />
<br />
# ''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
# ''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
# ''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
# ''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
# ''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
# ''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
# ''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
# ''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
# ''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
# ''Other.''<br />
<br />
<br />
Other [[Measures|measure types]] are: <br />
<br />
*[[Measure type: Sensors|Sensors]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Actuators|Actuators]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Physical measures|Physical measures]]<br />
*[[Measure type: Methods|Methods]]</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measures&diff=14169Measures2020-10-15T13:22:24Z<p>Dolinda: </p>
<hr />
<div><br />
[[File:ae.png|25px|right|This is a page providing background in a specific field of expertise]]'''Measures''' are provisions made or actions taken to protect an object or subject from risk.<br />
<br />
Measure types can be classified by their temporal application: structural or event-driven measures. Structural measures are more geared towards permanent solutions, such as infrastructural improvements, in order to reduce the risk of criminal acts taking place in the areas where these measures are applied. Event-driven measures have a more temporal nature and can be implemented in order to ensure extra risk reduction and mitigation for (large scale) events. These are intended for more high impact crimes such as (terrorist) attacks.<br />
<br />
==Structural measure types to protect an object or subject from risk==<br />
Structural measures are permanent solutions that mediate the risk of a [[Crime|criminal]] act. These measures can be further classified by their point of application in the process of a criminal act. From the perspective of a criminal, all measures reduce the perceived attractiveness of a target. Identified points of application are:<br />
<br />
*Increasing perceived effort<br />
*Increasing perceived risk<br />
*Decreasing anticipated reward<br />
*Controlling contributing circumstances<br />
*Other<br />
<br />
All measure types can be classified in one of these categories. The table below displays for each of the measure types in Securipedia, which point of application it works on. <br />
<br />
By clicking the "?" a brief description of the measure is provided.<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
! style="background:#f0f0f0;" |'''Increasing perceived effort'''<br />
! style="background:#f0f0f0;" |'''Increasing perceived risk'''<br />
! style="background:#f0f0f0;" |'''Decreasing anticipated reward'''<br />
! style="background:#f0f0f0;" |'''Contributing circumstances'''<br />
! style="background:#f0f0f0;" |'''Other'''<br />
|-<br />
|[[Measure: Target hardening|Target hardening]]{{#tip-info:Target hardening is the measure of strengthening the security by increasing the required effort to commit crimes to or at an object}}||[[Measure: Surveillance|Surveillance]]{{#tip-info:Surveillance is the measure of monitoring the behaviour, activities, or other changing information, usually of people for the purpose of influencing, managing, directing, or protecting.}}||[[Measure: Target removal|Target removal]]{{#tip-info:Target removal is the reduction of risk by removing the perceived attracting aspects from an [[attractive object]]}}||[[Measure: Controlling disinhibitors|Controlling disinhibitors]]{{#tip-info:Controlling disinhibitors is the reduction of risk by removing or regulating disinhibiting substances or circumstances}}||[[Measure: Deflection|Deflection]]{{#tip-info:Deflecting crime is the reduction of risk by creating circumstances that direct criminals to less critical objects}}<br />
|-<br />
|[[Measure: Access control|Access control]]{{#tip-info:Access control is the reduction of risk by regulating and controlling the flows of traffic into and out of an area or object}}||[[Measure: Intervention force|Intervention force]]{{#tip-info:A intervention force is the measure of having adequate resources (first responders) to react to emergencies in order to minimize impact and restore a normal situation as soon as possible.}}||[[Measure: Removal of crime motivator|Removal of crime motivator]]{{#tip-info:Removal of a crime motivator is the reduction of risk by removing the benefits of a crime}}||[[Measure: Facilitating compliance|Facilitating compliance]]{{#tip-info:Facilitating compliance is the measure of reducing risk by decreasing crime by making it easier for the public to behave according to the local rules.}}||Creating awareness / stimulating conscience{{#tip-info:Creating awareness is the measure of increasing the mental reserves of people to committing crimes}}<br />
|-<br />
|[[Measure: Directing traffic flows|Directing traffic flows]]{{#tip-info:Directing traffic flows is the measure of reducing the opportunities for a criminal to approach a suitable target by physically separating the flows of traffic}}||[[Measure: Screening|Screening]]{{#tip-info:Screening is the measure of reducing risk by identifying all traffic entering and/or exiting a certain area or object}}|| ||Rule setting{{#tip-info:Rule-setting is the measure of erecting legal or regulatory restrictions of a temporal and/or local nature in order to reduce risk}}||<br />
|-<br />
|[[Measure: Removing means|Removing means]]{{#tip-info:Removing means is the reduction of risk by ensuring the tools or other means conductive to crime are not available}}||Increase punishment{{#tip-info:Increasing punishment is the reduction of risk by the increase of the negative consequences of crime when caught}}|| ||[[Measure: Ownership|Ownership]]{{#tip-info:Ownership is the reduction of crime by establishing an environment where there is a clear separation between public and private space}}||<br />
|-<br />
| || || ||[[Measure: Maintenance|Maintenance]]{{#tip-info:Maintenance is the measure of discouraging crime by designing places with management and maintenance in mind}}||<br />
|}<br />
<br />
==Event-driven measure types==<br />
<br />
<br />
Event driven-measures are temporal solutions that can mediate the risk of a high-impact crime (such as an attack) at an event in a designated area. These measures, in turn, can be broken down into various technology categories that could assist in the mitigation of [[Vulnerability|vulnerabilities]]: <br />
<br />
The '''five technology categories''' in event-driven measures are:<br />
<br />
# ''[[Measure type: Information and Communications Technology (ICT)|ICT]]'' that could be used for communicating, storing, analysing and protecting information. Examples are: WiFi, IoT, Encryption, VPN, et cetera;<br />
# ''[[Measure type: Sensors|Sensors]]'' that could be used for detection, identification, localisation or tracking. Examples are: cameras, facial recognition, acoustic sniper localisation, et cetera;<br />
# ''[[Measure type: Actuators|Actuators]]'' that could be used for warning, intercepting or eliminating. Examples are: sirens, anti-drone drones, HPM vehicle stopping, et cetera;<br />
# ''[[Measure type: Physical measures|Physical measures]]'' that could be used for controlling access, impeding an attack or protective materials. Examples are: tourniquets, portable rising steps, bomb blast window film, et cetera;<br />
# ''[[Measure type: Methods|Methods]]'' that could be used for procedures, best practices or standards to implement solutions. An example is the ISO 31000 Risk Management<br />
<br />
In this application, the term technology should be interpreted in the broadest sense of the word. It includes both hard technologies and soft technologies. Hard technologies are tangible devices or components (e.g. computers and software). Soft technologies include the human areas of decision making, strategy development, training, and concept formation (e.g. methodologies or procedures).<br />
<br />
Each technology is (part of) a security measure, providing some basic security function as a response to a (potential) threat. As used in the EU VAT, there are ten different technology uses that range from before, during and after an attack. The technology uses are:<br />
<br />
# ''Alert'' - used for alerting public (e.g. sirens, texting service);<br />
# ''Surveil'' - used for situational awareness (e.g. cameras, social media tools);<br />
# ''Respond'' - used for responding to an attack (e.g. security personnel, non-lethal weapons);<br />
# ''Protect'' - used to protect assets (people, buildings, infrastructure);<br />
# ''Detect'' - used for detecting a weapon or weapon use (e.g. entry scanning equipment);<br />
# ''Overcome'' - used for overcoming a sudden vulnerability (e.g. extra concertina wire);<br />
# ''Improvise'' - created on the spot from available means (e.g. use police vehicle as a road block);<br />
# ''Restrict'' - used for restricting public access (e.g. safety barriers);<br />
# ''Adapt'' - used for changing circumstances (e.g. moving assets to a safer location);<br />
# ''Other.''<br />
<br />
The following examples illustrate the potential needs for these event-driven, technological solutions by indicating their support towards mediating risk and mitigating vulnerabilities:<br />
<br />
*Enhancing the surveillance of an area to for instance count crowds, monitor allocation of citizens or identify occurrences of objects or behaviors. By enhancing this surveillance, a municipality and the other local actors can identify anomalies or assess the impact at certain moments in time before an attack or respond faster to incidents and aid citizens.<br />
*Enhancing the cooperation between different actors (between own forces as well as completely different actors). In the cases of terrorist attacks, actors do not stand alone and need to cooperate in order to prevent, responds and recover from terrorist attacks. By enhancing the cooperation in could create more effective deployment of forces, better communication between them and faster (real time) sharing of information like images or videos to get ahead of the threat.<br />
*Enhancing alerting and evacuating of citizens during an attack by putting in place early warning systems and effective evacuation pathways. Potential innovative technology solutions could enhance the warning systems and evacuation pathways for specific public spaces.<br />
*Enhancing the existing knowledge and train forces specifically for protecting public spaces against terrorism, as anti-terrorism expertise is often missing at local government. There is a need of knowing were and how this knowledge can be obtained as well as how to train personal in the future.<br /><br />
<br />
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<div>#REDIRECT [[Measure type: intervention force]]</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Facilitating_compliance&diff=14159Measure type: Facilitating compliance2020-10-09T15:09:16Z<p>Dolinda: Dolinda moved page Measure: Facilitating compliance to Measure type: Facilitating compliance</p>
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<div>[[Category:Measure]]'''Facilitating compliance''' is the [[measure]] of reducing risk by decreasing crime by making it easier for the public to behave according to the local rules.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
The idea behind facilitating compliance is to reduce circumstances that might be used as an excuse for committing crimes. For example, not having public waste bins might be used as an excuse for littering, long lines as excuse to get in without paying or a dilapidated appearance as an excuse for vandalism.<br />
<br />
== Examples ==<br />
* Providing ample waste bins<br />
* Providing 'graffiti boards' where messages can legally be painted<br />
* Providing public urinals<br />
* Using [[Measure: Directing traffic flows| directing traffic flows]] to ease right and discourage wrong behaviour, like one-way turnstiles to discourage using an exit for entry or clear signs indicating the preferred route around a closed or one-way road.<br />
* Providing taxi stops in bar district to prevent driving under influence<br />
* Rehabilitation programs for addicts<br />
* Ensuring an adequate level of [[Measure: Maintenance| maintenance]]<br />
* Making clear rules are monitored and acted upon[[Image:Welsh bilingual cycling sign 2.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Sign in Wales indicating a prohibition to bicycle and at the same time that these rules are monitored and acted upon.]]<br />
* Several techniques employed against shoplifting, as described in [http://phys.org/news/2015-06-mall-nudge-shoplifters.html this article]<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
Security issues where this measure can be effective and influenced by the urban planner, are{{#tip-info:these measures are not or less appropriate or effective against <span style="color:silver">greyed-out</span> security issues}}:<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Burglary</span>{{#tip-info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || <span style="color:silver">Physical assault</span>{{#tip-info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || <span style="color:silver">Destruction by riots</span>{{#tip-info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || <span style="color:silver">Mass killing</span>{{#tip-info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Ram-raiding</span>{{#tip-info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| <span style="color:silver">Sexual assault</span>{{#tip-info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || <span style="color:silver">Destruction of property by fanatics</span>{{#tip-info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Pickpocketing</span>{{#tip-info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || <span style="color:silver">Vandalism</span>{{#tip-info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Robbery</span>{{#tip-info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || <span style="color:silver">Graffiti</span>{{#tip-info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Raid| Raid]]{{#tip-info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || <span style="color:silver">Antisocial Behaviour</span>{{#tip-info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Vehicle theft</span>{{#tip-info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
When taken right, measures to facilitate compliance can be quite natural and subtle to the public and be seen as an extra service rather than as a restriction. One should realize the limitation of this measure though, as it primarily targets the 'opportunity crimes' and it will therefore be better suited to low-level crimes like antisocial behaviour, graffiti and vandalism and less suited to the higher-level crimes. <br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
Instances of poor quality urban spaces and dilapidated environments discourage the voluntary adherence of rules, encouraging undesirable activity.<br />
<br />
In order to facilitate people to comply with existing rules, an efficient and effective urban planning process is required to address an area’s underlying vulnerabilities and disinhibitors of crime. For example, by designing for easier maintenance and promoting a sense of ownership, a perception of oversight in an area can be established by the urban planner. This will reduce the circumstances which are being used as an excuse for committing crimes and will promote rule compliance.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
Facilitating compliance can both be used to serve security and safety goals; warning people for dangerous situations and informing them about a requirement to use hard hats in a construction area is an example of the latter. As the measure of facilitating compliance does not impose new rules, but only provides incentives and support to voluntarily uphold existing rules, this measure has no side effects.<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
An important [[Social aspects|social aspect]] of facilitating compliance is the responsiveness of this measure to citizens' felt security needs. In general, it is not easy to address citizens' by built infrastructure in order to influence their behaviour in using that infrastructure. The reason for this is that – among other things due to [[culture aspects]] – citizens ‘read’ built urban environment in different ways: One central tenet in [[environmental psychology]] is that meaning intentionally embodied in built environment is not always decoded by citizens' according to that intention. <br />
<br />
Practical addressing of social aspects and aspects of [[security culture]] as they apply to facilitating compliance can best be accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure of facilitating compliance should include tests of usability in relevant social contexts. Suitable methods to assess the appropriateness of the measure of facilitating compliance from the citizen point of view, and that can also help supporting implementation of the measue, include [[Planning for Real]]. This helps assess risks and how to address it, giving emphasis on cultural contexts. At the same time, the method aims at creating conducive contexts for security-enhancing cooperation among neighbours, experts and local interest groups.<br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
From a [[The economics of crime|rational-economic]] perspective, security measures that facilitate compliance can be regarded as a help for individual agents to comply to the laws. Put differently, they alter the risk-benefit analysis of agents in such a way that these agents will refrain from any illegal or unwanted activities (see the case example below). This process of reducing the risk of crime automatically also leads to a reduction of the negative [[Economic effects of crime|economic impact (of crime)]]. The provision of 'graffiti boards' (where messages can legally be painted), for example, will not just prevent material and immaterial damage to other urban objects, but will also prevent [[Secondary economic impact|indirect]] economic damage to the economy, as it contributes to a safe and whole environment, attracting investors, tourists, richer citizens, etc.<br />
<br />
''Case example: Fake security systems''<br />
{{quote|With the help of fake security systems (camera's, signs, dog warnings, etc.) one can create the impression of a monitored secure asset without the high investment and maintenance cost of the real version. This kind of security is all about perceived security, and for sure cheaper than real cameras.}}<br />
<br />
As for all other security measures, there are also cost involved with the controlling of disinhibitors. The cost of facilitating compliance contain the relatively straightforward [[Economic effects of anti-crime security measures#Direct (primary) costs of security|direct expenditures]] on capital equipment and operational cost (both temporary and permanent) such as investments in public urinals, rehabilitation programmes for addicts, waste bins, etc. In addition, facilitating compliance measures can generate various types of [[Economic effects of anti-crime security measures#Indirect (secondary) costs of security|secondary costs effects]]. If this will happen, depends, amongst others, on the impact of these measures on the perceived security of citizens, consumers and investors, or if the measures influence the reachability of an area, etc.<br />
<br />
In order to decide if this specific security measure makes sense from an economic point of view, the urban planner should not just map both the cost and benefits of facilitating compliance measures (both direct and indirect), but also wonder if there exist potential alternative security measures that have a better value for money ([[Social cost-benefit analysis|benefit-cost ratio]])<ref>See also the [[Economic tools#Economic assessment step by step|'''flow chart''']] of an economic assessment.</ref>. On top of that, one should always consider how stakeholders (citizens, suppliers, customers, employees, etc.) are affected by the considered measures, and to which extend. How will potential criminals/terrorists, for example, react? Will they easily find ways to ignore the foreseen security measures, or will the facilitating compliance measures force them to comply to the laws ([[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|the economics of criminal/terrorist behaviour]])? [[Economic tools]] such as the [[social cost-benefit analysis]] (first question) and [[Economic Impact Study|economic impact study]] (second question) can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security.<br />
<br />
In terms of benefit-cost ratio, facilitating compliance can be considered as a type of security measure which in a relatively subtle way increases security, in contrast to measures such as security guards, big concrete walls and barb wire that may be pervasive, but can also arouse feelings of fear and anxiety<ref>Coaffee, J., P. O’Hare, and M. Hawkesworth (2009): The Visibility of (In)security: The Aesthetics of Planning Urban Defences Against Terrorism. Security Dialogue 2009 40:489.</ref>. Hence, the measure of facilitating compliance is an example of the [[designing out approach]], or as an aspect of [[Sustainable design|sustainable design]], which seeks a balanced consideration of social, economic, cultural and environmental aspects in urban design. In general, these kind of measures demand larger initial investments than traditional security measures, but at the same time they are able to avoid future costs due to the long-term prevention of crime.<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
There are several possibilites to facilitate compliance of traffic. As written above, this can be done using measures for [[measure: Directing traffic flows|directing traffic flows]] to ease right and discourage wrong behaviour, like one-way turnstiles to discourage using an exit for entry or clear signs indicating the preferred route around a closed or one-way road. <br />
<br />
One of the principles of the Dutch approach ''Sustainable Safety'' is predictability, which is a means of facilitating compliance as well. As explained in <ref name="duurzaamveilig">http://bicycledutch.wordpress.com/2012/01/02/sustainable-safety/</ref>, road design should be so consistent that road users instantly understand what they can expect and what is expected of them on a certain type of street or road. The road design itself gives information about the type of road/street. If the street is paved with bricks, there are parked cars and the street is shared with cyclists and gives access to homes, the road user will instantly know and feel this is a 30km/h (19mph) local access street. However, if the road has two carriageways separated by a median, there is no parking and cyclists have their own cycle paths, it is clear to the road user that this is a through road.<br />
<br />
Another principal of the Sustainable Safety approach is ''Forgivingness''; Humans make errors and willingly or unwillingly break rules. This is a given that cannot be changed. So roads and streets should be designed in such a way that this natural human behavior does not lead to crashes and injuries. An example is a shoulder with a semi-hard pavement. A road user coming off the main road will not crash immediately; the semi-hard shoulder will give this road user the ability to get back to the main carriageway. The equivalent for cyclists is a curb with a different angle; 45 degrees in stead of 90 degrees. Hitting this curb with your front wheel will not immediately result in a fall. Forgivingness towards other road users is enhanced when road design leads to a predictable behavior of road users. A result of this principle is that motorized traffic sometimes gives priority to cyclists even if they don’t have it. Because it is so clear where the cyclists want or need to go the motorist anticipates their behavior and gives the cyclist more room than he or she is legally obliged to, often to the surprise of especially foreign cyclists <ref name="duurzaamveilig"/>.<br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Facilitating compliance first requires the selection of those areas and types of risk where compliance is sought to be facilitated. This involves [[Ethics aspects|ethics]] issues because limited resources will probably not allow addressing all relevant urban areas. This may lead to the creation of different levels of security in society. Therefore, investigating human and societal needs regarding target hardening should be a priority. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
Legal considerations when considering facilitating compliance measures are:<br />
* [[legal aspects#Appearance|Appearance]] - Measures for facilitating compliance may for example cause visual clutter<br />
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<div>#REDIRECT [[Measure type: Facilitating compliance]]</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Controlling_disinhibitors&diff=14157Measure type: Controlling disinhibitors2020-10-09T15:09:04Z<p>Dolinda: Dolinda moved page Measure: Controlling disinhibitors to Measure type: Controlling disinhibitors</p>
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<div>[[Category:Measure]]'''Controlling disinhibitors''' is the [[measure]] of reducing risk by removing or regulating disinhibiting substances or circumstances.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
Disinhibitors can be defined as substances or circumstances that decrease the inhibitions of an offender to commit crimes. Studies<ref>Greenfield, Lawrence A, ''Alcohol and crime, and analysis of national data on the pravalence of alcohol involvement in crime'', prepared for the Assistant Attorney General's National symposium on alcohol abuse and crim, April5-7, 1998, Washington D.C.</ref> have shown that drugs, but above all alcohol are conductive to some forms of crime<ref>About 1 in 3 convicted offender had been drinking alcohol at the time of their crime.</ref>, particularly violent crimes.<br />
<br />
It should be noted that not only behaviour-altering substances can influence natural inhibitions, but for instance untidy environments or environments in disrepair can stimulate vandalism and other crimes.[[Image:One of York's less scenic spots - geograph.org.uk - 1130246.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Cluttered, untidy and unstructured spots attract crime]] In addition to this, environmental conditions, like overly high temperatures in crowds or gatherings, can affect the public's mood and decrease inhibitions to aggressive behaviour.<br />
[[image:Broken bottle.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Alcohol can be an important disinhibitor of vandalism and other unwanted behaviour]]<br />
== Examples ==<br />
* School restroom thermostats kept at 17°C<br />
* Repainting of playground equipment in bright colours<br />
* Beautification programs (e.g., landscaping, painting, maintenance)<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
Security issues where this measure can be effective and influenced by the urban planner, are{{#tip-info:these measures are not or less appropriate or effective against <span style="color:silver">greyed-out</span> security issues}}:<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Burglary</span>{{#tip-info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || [[Security issue: Assault|Physical assault]]{{#tip-info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || [[Security issue: Destruction by riots|Destruction by riots]]{{#tip-info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || <span style="color:silver">Mass killing</span>{{#tip-info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Ram-raiding</span>{{#tip-info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| [[Security issue: Sexual assault|Sexual assault]]{{#tip-info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || <span style="color:silver">Destruction of property by fanatics</span>{{#tip-info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Pickpocketing</span>{{#tip-info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || <span style="color:silver">Vandalism</span>{{#tip-info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Robbery|Robbery]]{{#tip-info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || <span style="color:silver">Graffiti</span>{{#tip-info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Raid</span>{{#tip-info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || <span style="color:silver">Antisocial Behaviour</span>{{#tip-info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Vehicle theft</span>{{#tip-info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
In controlling disinhibitors one should be aware that at least part of the people will actively seek circumstances that will diminish their inhibitions. Any measure taken to control disinhibitors should be planned to include alternative sources of disinhibitors: early closing hours for the bars will not suffice if people can bring their own alcohol to alternative locations and 'party on'.<br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
Without a sense of ownership, good levels of maintenance and a clearly defined role, urban settings fall prey to opportunistic crimes. The absence of perceived restrictions, such inadequate surveillance measures and a lack of target hardening, will enable people to engage in anti-social or criminal behaviour.<br />
<br />
Urban planning can be used to limit the instances of poor quality and ill-defined functional areas. This can ameliorate the perceived lack of inhibitors in line with the needs of the community as well as the area’s intended land use goals. The control of disinhibitors is directly tied into the application of other measures such as removing means and removal of crime motivators.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
Disinhibitors will not only affect the behaviour of people regarding criminal behaviour, but rather their behaviour in general. This means that controlling disinhibitors will generally not only affect security, but also safety: when people are more in control of their actions, accidents as a result of reckless driving or driving under influence will decrease as well as injuries as a result of rowdy behaviour or loss of balance due to intoxication.<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
Controlling disinhibitors is an example of the [[designing out approach]], or as an aspect of [[Sustainable design|sustainable design]], which seeks a balanced consideration of social, economic, cultural and environmental aspects in urban design. An important [[Social aspects|social aspect]] is the responsiveness of the measure of controlling disinhibitors to citizens' felt security needs. The measure will only be responsive if based on identification of citizens' self-perceptions of vulnerability and resilience, and felt security gaps. <br />
<br />
Practical addressing of social aspects and aspects of [[security culture]] in security-related urban planning can best be accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure of controlling disinhibitors should include usability tests in relevant social contexts. A practical method to support social considerations in planning for controlling of disinhibitors is, for example, the [[safety audit]] that focuses on local and context-specific solutions to address security issues.<br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
From a [[The economics of crime|rational-economic]] perspective, behaviour-altering substances influence the natural inhibitions of individual agents in such a way that they do not think rational anymore. As a result, these agents do not longer perform a 'risk-benefit analysis' of a potential crime, resulting in for example aggression and violence. Untidy environments or environments in disrepair, on the other hand, are examples of inhibitors that help the criminal to act more or less anonymously and unwitnessed, which is (from a criminal perspective) a rational thing to do. Controlling disinhibitors as a type of security measure prevents people to make 'irrational' decisions in case of behaviour-altering substances, and prevents rational behaviour in case of 'crime-friendly' environments. This will not just prevent violence and crime in terms of economic damage, but will also prevent [[Secondary economic impact|indirect]] economic damage to the economy as it contributes to a safe and whole environment, attracting economic activity (e.g. tourists, businesses, wealthy citizens, etc.). <br />
<br />
As for all other security measures, there are also cost involved with the controlling of disinhibitors. These cost contain the relatively straightforward [[Economic effects of anti-crime security measures#Direct (primary) costs of security|direct expenditures]] on capital equipment and operational cost (both temporary and permanent), and in addition generate various types of [[Economic effects of anti-crime security measures#Indirect (secondary) costs of security|secondary effects]]. Considering the direct and indirect cost of security measures, one should always investigate if the potential benefits of the specific set of security measures outweigh its cost. Of course, the answer to this question depends on many factors and the specific situation. Nevertheless, two fundamental aspects of this economic analysis should always be part of this investigation. These aspects are:<br />
# Are the envisioned measures cost effective from a socioeconomic point of view, or do there exist better alternatives?<br />
# Which specific agents (individuals, companies, sectors, authorities) are affected by the envisioned measures, and to which extend? How do the envisioned measures change/alter the behaviour of these agents, and, of course, the [[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|behaviour of criminals/terrorists (in economic terms)]]? <br />
<br />
[[Economic tools]] can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security (see the case example below). In terms of benefit-cost ratio, controlling disinhibitors can be considered as a type of security measure which in a relatively subtle way increases security, in contrast to measures such as security guards, big concrete walls and barb wire that may be pervasive, but can also arouse feelings of fear and anxiety<ref>Coaffee, J., P. O’Hare, and M. Hawkesworth (2009): The Visibility of (In)security: The Aesthetics of Planning Urban Defences Against Terrorism. Security Dialogue 2009 40:489.</ref>. Since this type of security measure belongs to the [[designing out approach]], and is an aspect of [[Sustainable design|sustainable design]], it is a complex measure that in general demands larger initial investments than traditional security measures, but at the same time they are able to avoid future cost due to the long-term prevention of crime.<br />
<br />
''Case example: A statistical analysis of bar closing hours:''<br />
{{quote|A Scandinavian study on the impact of small changes in bar closing hours on violence concluded that "each additional 1-hour extension to the opening times of premises is associated with a 16% increase in violent crime"<ref>Rossow, I., T Noström (2011): The impact of small changes in bar closing hours on violence. The Norwegian experience from 18 cities. Society for the Study of Addiction.</ref>. Combined with the cost of an average violent event, one could relatively easily determine the socio-economic benefits of a decrease in opening hours as a measure to control disinhibitors. In order to determine the cost-effectiveness, though, one should for example include the decrease in revenues by commercial venues due to the limited opening hours, the lost of customers for taxi drivers, and so on.}}<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
Controlling disinhibitors can have a positive effect on driving behaviour and therefore on traffic. For example, if alcohol use can be reduced, [[Traffic safety|traffic safety]] will be increased. Also creating a pleasant environment can improve the mood of drivers and their driver behaviour. This can for example create a smoother traffic flow with less accidents and congestion. Also, aggression in traffic is less likely to occur in a pleasant environment. <br />
A pleasant environment for traffic also means that the road layout should be understandable and easily driveable. An example of the opposite, a road lay-out which is not pleasant and might increase aggressiveness among drivers, is a narrow road with many narrowing sections where the right-of-way is not regulated. Drivers might get irritated at the narrowing sections when they don't get right-of-way, or try to enforce right of way.<br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Since not all disinhibitors have a criminal quality in themselves, removing disinhibitors may in some cases involve a risk of departure from normal liberal democratic standards. In general, pinpointing specific [[Ethics aspects|ethics aspects]] related to removing disinhibitors needs to consider, among other things, citizen security cultures and citizens' personal concerns. There are no ethics considerations that can be planned or implemented without prior identification and addressing of citizens' perceptions. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
Legal considerations when considering controlling disinhibitors measures are:<br />
* [[legal aspects#City development plan|City development plan / functional zoning]] - Measures for controlling disinhibitors can be contrary to the designated use of an area<br />
<br />
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<div>#REDIRECT [[Measure type: Controlling disinhibitors]]</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Target_removal&diff=14155Measure type: Target removal2020-10-09T15:08:54Z<p>Dolinda: Dolinda moved page Measure: Target removal to Measure type: Target removal</p>
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<div>[[Category:Measure]]Target removal is the [[measure]] of reducing risk by either removing the perceived attractive aspects from an [[attractive object]], or removing the object as a whole.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
If appropriately employed, target removal is one of most effective approaches to crime prevention<ref>[http://www.popcenter.org/library/crimeprevention/volume_01/01poyner.pdf Poyner, Barry, ''what works in crime prevention: an overview of evaluations'', crime prevention studies, 1993]</ref>, as it removes the object or subject suited to commit the crime to.<br />
<br />
== Examples ==<br />
* Removal of money-carrying devices such as pay phones from high-loitering areas[[Image:Pay-phone-TPE97.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Replacement of money pay phones by phones accepting only electronic payments can effectively reduce theft.]]<br />
* Omission of ground-level windows against vandalism<br />
* Concealing or placing out of reach of vulnerable parts<br />
* Using inlaid signs instead of mounted signs against vandalism<br />
* Removal of vandalism-prone street furniture, plants or fixtures or replacing them with less attractive targets<br />
* Removing people vulnerable for robbery and/or assault from high-risk locations by providing alternative routes or means of transport.<br />
* Removing masses as attractive target for fanatics by [[designing out]] crowds and busy places<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
Security issues where this measure can be effective and influenced by the urban planner, are{{#tip-info:these measures are not or less appropriate or effective against <span style="color:silver">greyed-out</span> security issues}}:<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Burglary|Burglary]]{{#tip-info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || [[Security issue: Assault|Physical assault]]{{#tip-info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || <span style="color:silver">Destruction by riots</span>{{#tip-info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || [[Security issue: Mass killing|Mass killing]]{{#tip-info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Ram raid|Ram-raiding]]{{#tip-info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| [[Security issue: Sexual assault|Sexual assault]]{{#tip-info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || <span style="color:silver">Destruction of property by fanatics</span>{{#tip-info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Pickpocketing|Pickpocketing]]{{#tip-info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || [[Security issue: Vandalism|Vandalism]]{{#tip-info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Robbery|Robbery]]{{#tip-info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || [[Security issue: Grafitti|Graffiti]]{{#tip-info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Raid</span>{{#tip-info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || [[Security issue: Antisocial behaviour|Antisocial Behaviour]]{{#tip-info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Vehicle theft|Vehicle theft]]{{#tip-info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
There are no specific environmental conditions required to make target removal effective, but a good target removal measure does require a good understanding what makes a situation attractive for a perpetrator and some creativity to remove the attractiveness of a target without impairing the function of the object (too much).<br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
Urban planning must consider how groups which are particularly vulnerable to criminal acts (women, the elderly etc.) can be removed from high risk locations. This could mean removing needs for such groups to visit these places. For example, bus stops should not be located in isolated areas where potential for entrapment is high. In addition, public facilities such as restrooms, benches and luggage lockers should not be placed in locations of poor visibility where people have the opportunity to loiter. Urban planning should seek to strike a balance between removing a positive contribution to the urban area (e.g. a bus stop) set against the impact such an action may/may not have on reducing crime at this location.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
Some targets might serve a role in providing safety, such as fire extinguishers that are regularly vandalised. Removing these should be done only after considering their effect on safety.<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
Target removal is an example of the [[designing out approach]], or an aspect of [[sustainable design|sustainable design]], which seeks a balanced consideration of [[Social aspects|social,]] economic, [[Culture aspects|cultural,]] and environmental aspects in urban design. For related measures to be effective and accepted by the public, the need to be responsive to the prevailing [[security culture]]. This can best be accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure of target removal should include usability tests in relevant social contexts. The [[safety audit]] is one of the practical measures that could be used. <br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Target removal deters security threats and mitigates its effects, preventing material and immaterial damage for (potential) victims, and [[Economic effects of crime#Secondary economic impact of crime|secondary]] economic damage to local and regional economies (in terms of e.g. a decrease in investments by companies or the relocation of resources). Graffiti, for example, <br />
can have a significant negative impact on real estate prices, on local businesses (as consumers decide to shop in other places), and can lead to the potential loss of funding for community organisation, youth groups and school programs.<br />
<br />
At the same time, however, security measures demand an investment in time, capital and effort by private agents, companies/developers and the public authorities, exacting [[Economic impact|economic cost]]. These cost contain the relatively straightforward [[Economic effects of anti-crime security measures#Direct (primary) costs of security|direct expenditures]] on capital equipment and operational cost such as investments in mounted signs against vandalism or omission of ground-level windows. In addition, security measures can also generate negative [[Economic effects of anti-crime security measures#Indirect (secondary) costs of security|indirect economic effects]] if they have a negative impact on, for example, the perceived security of citizens, consumers and investors, or if the measures influence the reachability of an area, etc.<br />
<br />
Whether the act of target removal as a security measures makes sense from an economic point of view, depends on many factors and is case dependent (see the [[Economic tools#Economic assessment step by step|'''flow chart''']] of an economic assessment). One should first of all compare the potential benefits and cost with other alternatives such as target hardening, access control or punishment. Secondly, one has to take into account which parties are affected by the act of removing means, who is paying for it, whose activities are affected by it, and so on. And last but not least, how the envisioned measure alters the [[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|behaviour of criminals/terrorists (in economic terms)]].<br />
<br />
[[Economic tools]] can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security. In terms of benefit-cost ratio, target removal can be considered as a type of security measure which in a relatively subtle way increases security, in contrast to measures such as security guards, big concrete walls and barb wire that may be pervasive, but can also arouse feelings of fear and anxiety<ref>Coaffee, J., P. O’Hare, and M. Hawkesworth (2009): The Visibility of (In)security: The Aesthetics of Planning Urban Defences Against Terrorism. Security Dialogue 2009 40:489.</ref>. Since target removal belongs to the the [[designing out approach]], and is as aspect of [[Sustainable design|sustainable design]], it seeks a balanced consideration of a variety of aspects in urban design. In general, this demands larger investments than traditional security measures, but at the same time they are able to avoid future costs due to the long-term prevention of crime.<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
As described above, an example of target removal is removing people vulnerable for robbery and/or assault from high-risk locations by providing alternative routes or means of transport. For example, providing more means of public transport or new routes guiding around poor or dangerous areas. Another example, removing masses as attractive target for fanatics by designing out crowds and busy places, can be achieved by providing more open spaces and squares while avoiding areas/corners that cannot be overseen, or by making more areas of a city attractive by creating for example alternative shopping areas and places to go out in other parts of the city, including appropriate road and public transport means.<br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Removing targets can also mean to remove opportunities, such impacting citizens’ freedom to act. An increase in security may be echoed by an increase in restrictions. This needs to be assessed on a case by case basis that considers, among other things, citizen security cultures and citizens' personal concerns. There are no [[Ethics aspects|ethics]] considerations that can be planned or implemented without prior identification and addressing of citizens' perceptions. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
Legal considerations when considering access control measures are:<br />
* [[legal aspects#Development management standards|Development management standards]] - Measures for target removal may conflict with standards that prescribe for example ground-floor window coverage<br />
* [[legal aspects#Appearance|Appearance]] - Measures for target removal may conflict with appearance rules in situations where certain design elements are mandatory that would be conducive to certain forms of crime<br />
* [[legal aspects#Cultural heritage preservation|Cultural heritage preservation]] - Cultural heritage rules may prevent taking some measures for target removal<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure:_Target_removal&diff=14156Measure: Target removal2020-10-09T15:08:54Z<p>Dolinda: Dolinda moved page Measure: Target removal to Measure type: Target removal</p>
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<div>#REDIRECT [[Measure type: Target removal]]</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Removing_means&diff=14153Measure type: Removing means2020-10-09T15:08:41Z<p>Dolinda: Dolinda moved page Measure: Removing means to Measure type: Removing means</p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Measure]]Removing means is the [[measure]] of reducing risk by reducing the availability of tools or other means conductive to crime.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
[[Image:burglar_wheelie_bin.jpg|thumb|right|300px|A wheelie bin can make a handy tool for burglars]]Many forms of crime require tools or materials: burglars use tools to force entry, vandals will use objects to destroy, graffiti artist require spray paint or markers. By making the access to these required tools more difficult, committing the crimes is made more difficult. <br />
<br />
This form of crime reduction is most prominently effective in situations where the required tools are available at or close to the crime location. Arson as a form of vandalism for instance, thrives on the presence of flammable goods and burglars can be greatly aided by the presence of a ladder or wheelie bin to reach unguarded, higher level windows. Making sure these goods are not present, or not accessible can therefore increase the effort needed to commit these crimes.<br />
<br />
== Examples ==<br />
Some examples of removing (the access to) means, are:<br />
* Providing strict access control to debris-prone areas like construction/demolition sites <br />
* Placement of vandalism prone elements far from "hang-out" areas<br />
* Providing lockable sheds for storage of ladders, climbable objects and tools<br />
* Providing an in-house switch for external power sockets (which can otherwise be used by burglars to operate power tools)<br />
* Designing vandal-proof street furniture which can not be de-constructed into elements which can be used as tools for further<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
Security issues where this measure can be effective and influenced by the urban planner, are{{#tip-info:these measures are not or less appropriate or effective against <span style="color:silver">greyed-out</span> security issues}}:<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Burglary| Burglary]]{{#tip-info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || <span style="color:silver">Physical assault</span>{{#tip-info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || [[Security issue: Destruction by riots|Destruction by riots]]{{#tip-info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || <span style="color:silver">Mass killing</span>{{#tip-info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Ram-raiding</span>{{#tip-info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| <span style="color:silver">Sexual assault</span>{{#tip-info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || <span style="color:silver">Destruction of property by fanatics</span>{{#tip-info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Pickpocketing</span>{{#tip-info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || [[Security issue: Vandalism|Vandalism]]{{#tip-info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Robbery</span>{{#tip-info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || <span style="color:silver">Graffiti</span>{{#tip-info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Raid</span>{{#tip-info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || <span style="color:silver">Antisocial Behaviour</span>{{#tip-info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Vehicle theft</span>{{#tip-info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
For this measure to be used effectively, one should have the means to control the access to materials required for committing the crime. This is most prominently the case if these materials are available on location.<br />
<br />
Although this measure relies for a large part on awareness and alertness of residents and municipal services, the urban planner can provide conditions that are either beneficial or detrimental to the removal of means. This is expressed in a well-considered mix and location, functions, design and placement of street furniture. For example, as not placing a glass bus stop in line of sight of a skateboard track. Another example is designing structures in which an easy and effective access control can be maintained, such as providing sturdy and lockable storage space or harden the access to the rear of a residence.<br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
In urban planning terms, reducing the means which are conducive to crime can involve strategies such as the careful locating of public facilities (which are vulnerable to crime such as vandalism) away from crime generating land uses such as schools, entertainment facilities or bars.<br />
<br />
The placement of bins (which can be used as mobile platforms) or trees should be carefully considered to avoid creating unnecessary advantages for opportunistic criminals to gain entry into windows etc.<br />
<br />
Urban spaces benefit from natural surveillance measures which can reduce the prevalence of crime in overlooked or seldom visited areas.<br />
An analysis on whether measures to harden targets should be applied will also assist in identifying areas of potential vulnerability, removing the opportunity to vandalise and cause damage.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/security considerations ===<br />
Some means that can be misused by offenders, serve a role in providing safety, such as fire escapes. Removing these should be done only after considering their effect on safety.<br />
<br />
=== Social considerations ===<br />
An important [[Social aspects|social aspect]] is that removing means can impact citizens' agency, or perception thereof. This can have an effect on citizens capacity to adopt protective measures, which again can influence societal resilience. Practical addressing of social aspects and aspects of [[security culture]] in security-related urban planning can best be accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure of removing means should include usability tests in relevant social contexts. [[Participatory Diagnosis]] is an example of a method to use.<br />
<br />
=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Removing means does not just prevent material and immaterial damage for (potential) victims, but also possibly prevents [[Economic effects of crime#Secondary economic impact of crime|indirect]] economic damage to local and regional economies in case it helps to prevent a frequent occurrence of criminal events. Vandalism, for example, can make the local environment an unpleasant place to live and work, creating a significant negative impact on house prices and local business revenues<ref>Gibbons, S. (2004): The costs of urban property crime. ''The Economic Journal'', 114 (499). ISSN 0013-0133.</ref>.<br />
<br />
The removing of means, on the other hand, requires an investment in time and effort by private agents, companies/developers, and the public authorities, exacting economic cost (see the case example below). These cost contain the relatively straightforward [[Economic effects of anti-crime security measures#Direct (primary) costs of security|direct expenditures]] on capital equipment and operational cost such as the investment cost in vandal-proof street furniture or the in-house switch for external power sockets. In addition, removing means generates various types of [[Economic effects of anti-crime security measures#Indirect (secondary) costs of security|secondary economic effects]]. In essence, by making the access to certain required tools more difficult, will not just limit the mobility of criminals, but also that of the owners and users exacting cost.<br />
<br />
''Case example: Effectiveness of removing means:''<br />
{{quote| In the same way the Association of British Insurers (ABI)<ref>Association of British Insurers (2006): Securing the Nation: The Case for Safer Homes</ref> performed a cost-benefit analysis on [[Measure: Target hardening#Economic considerations|target hardening]] measures for home security, one could do the same for the measure 'removing means'. In general, if there are no means to enter a home, there will also be less burglaries so these measures could be considered as Security By Design measures. The ABI concluded that SBD-measures in total yield benefits of over £1,170 per household (in 20 years), nearly double the average cost of the introduced measures. Removing means will with no doubt contribute to this result.}}<br />
<br />
Whether the act of removing means as a security measures makes sense from an economic point of view, depends on many factors and is case dependent. One should, first of all, compare the potential cost-benefits with other alternatives such as [[measure: Target hardening|target hardening]] or [[Measure: Removal of crime motivator|removal of crime motivator]]. Secondly, one has to take in account which parties are affected by the act of removing means, who is paying for it, whose activities are affected by it, and so on. And last but not least, how the envisioned measure alter the [[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|behaviour of criminals/terrorists]]. [[Economic tools]] such as a business case or an economic impact study can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security (of course in collaboration with insights from criminology, sociology, etc.).<br />
<br />
=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
There are no important mobility considerations of the measure Removing means, since mobility and mobility infrastructure is not a tool that can be removed for committing a crime (except for [[Measure: Access control|access control]], as described in the Examples section) and removing tools that can be used to commit a crime (e.g. a ladder) don't influence mobility.<br />
<br />
=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Removing means also can mean to remove opportunities for agency, such impacting citizens’ freedom to act. Increase in security may be echoed by increase in restrictions. This needs to be assessed on a case by case basis that considers, among other things, citizen security cultures and citizens' personal concerns. <br />
<br />
There are no [[Ethics aspects|ethics]] considerations that can be planned or implemented without prior identification and addressing of citizens' perceptions. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
<br />
=== Legal considerations ===<br />
Legal considerations when considering access control measures are:<br />
* [[legal aspects#Appearance|Appearance]] - Measures for removing means may conflict with appearance rules in situations where certain design elements are mandatory that would be conducive to certain forms of crime<br />
<br />
{{references}}</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure:_Removing_means&diff=14154Measure: Removing means2020-10-09T15:08:41Z<p>Dolinda: Dolinda moved page Measure: Removing means to Measure type: Removing means</p>
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<div>#REDIRECT [[Measure type: Removing means]]</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure_type:_Access_control&diff=14149Measure type: Access control2020-10-09T15:08:34Z<p>Dolinda: Dolinda moved page Measure: Access control to Measure type: Access control</p>
<hr />
<div>[[Category:Measure]]'''Access control''' is the [[measure]] of reduction of risk by regulating and controlling the flows of traffic into and out of an area or object.<br />
<br />
== Description ==<br />
Access control encompasses all modes of traffic. The aim of access control is to determine who can or can't enter a particular area. This discrimination can be done on various characteristics such as whether one possesses a a ticket, has registered in advance, the time of day, the place of entry, the mode of transport, etcetera.<br />
<br />
[[Image:BL33nw.JPG|thumb|right|300px|Boom barrier at a parking]][[Image:Bussluse 05-04-06 02.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Bus trap]]This approach involves architectural features, mechanical and electronic devices, and related means for maintaining prerogatives over the ability to gain entry. Both dynamic measures (moving, acting such as boom barriers or guards) and static measures (passive, such as bus traps or heightened curbs) can function as access control mechanisms. <br />
Another application of access control are environmental zones or low-emission zones (LEZ) with the aim of improving the air quality. Only low-emitting or zero emission vehicles are allowed to a LEZ [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low-emission_zone]].<br />
<br />
==Examples==<br />
Various means of access control are feasible, such as:<br />
* Electromagnetic doors, openable only by qualified personnel<br />
* Door guards<br />
* [[Barrier]]s, both static and dynamic<br />
* Partitioning off of selected areas during "downtime" hours<br />
* Reduced number of building entrances<br />
<br />
== Effectiveness ==<br />
This measure can be effective to a range of security issues. These are{{#tip-info:these measures are not or less appropriate or effective against <span style="color:silver">greyed-out</span> security issues}}:<br />
<br />
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align: center;"<br />
|- style="background:#f0f0f0;<br />
! Financial gain !! Boredom or compulsive behaviour !! Impulse !! Conflict in beliefs<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Burglary</span>{{#tip-info:Burglary is the crime of illicitly entering a building with the intent to commit an offence, particularly (but not limited to) theft.}} || <span style="color:silver">Physical assault</span>{{#tip-info:Assault, is a crime which involves causing a victim to fear or to experience any type of violence, except for sexual violence}} || [[Security issue: Destruction by riots|Destruction by riots]]{{#tip-info:Destruction by riots is the act of vandalism of property by organised groups for a shared rational or rationalised reason.}} || [[Security issue: Mass killing|Mass killing]]{{#tip-info:Mass killing is the crime of purposely causing harm or death to a group of (unknown) people in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion. This threat is exerted out of wilful action by fanatics: terrorists or criminal activists.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Ram-raiding</span>{{#tip-info:Ram raid is a particular technique for burglars to gain access to primarily commercial premises, by means of driving -usually stolen- vehicles into locked or closed entrances, exits or windows.}}|| [[Security issue: Sexual assault|Sexual assault]]{{#tip-info:Sexual assault is assault of a sexual nature on another person, or any sexual act committed without consent}} || || [[Security issue: Destruction by fanatics|Destruction of property by fanatics]]{{#tip-info:Destruction by fanatics is the crime of purposely causing damage in order to make a statement or to influence the public opinion.}}<br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Pickpocketing</span>{{#tip-info:Pickpocketing is a form of theft that involves the stealing of valuables from a victim without their noticing the theft at the time. }} || <span style="color:silver">Vandalism</span>{{#tip-info:Vandalism is the act of wilful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control.}} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Robbery</span>{{#tip-info:Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear. It is used her exclusively for acts committed to individual persons.}} || <span style="color:silver">Graffiti</span>{{#tip-info:Grafitti is the defacement of property by means of writing or drawings scribbled, scratched, or sprayed on a surface in a public place without the consent of the owner or person having custody or control. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| <span style="color:silver">Raid</span>{{#tip-info:Raid is the crime of taking or attempting to take something of value from a commercial venue by force or threat of force or by putting the victim in fear.}} || <span style="color:silver">Antisocial Behaviour</span>{{#tip-info:Antisocial behaviour is an accumulation category of relatively small crimes that highly influence the security perception of citizens. }} || || <br />
|-<br />
| [[Security issue: Vehicle theft|Vehicle theft]]{{#tip-info:Vehicle theft is the crime of theft, or attempt of theft of or from a motor vehicle (automobile, truck, bus, motorcycle, etc.).}} || || || <br />
|-<br />
|}<br />
<br />
== Considerations ==<br />
=== General considerations ===<br />
For access control to work, one has to make sure that alternative entry routes are made impossible. For example, erecting a control post at a stadium is useless if the entrance next to it is unguarded. This means that for this measure to work, the access control has to be active at all entry points and all other access to the area has to be sufficiently blocked.<br />
<br />
In practice this means that this measure usually needs to be accompanied by other measure types, such as [[Measure: Target hardening| target hardening]] and/or [[Measure: Directing traffic flows| directing traffic flows]] to prevent uncontrolled or allowing for undesignated entry points.<br />
<br />
For access control to be effective in an urban context, the object or area should support a careful consideration of access and exit points, conforming to the use of the object or area. This holds both for the number of accesses and exits and the measures used to enforce it. A football stadium, for instance, can enforce rather imposing access control measures, in some cases extending to screening and the use of violence to enforce it and still requires quick access and exit of multitudes of people. At a service-oriented facility, this type of access control would be out of place and inappropriate and less imposing and more user-friendly measures of access control are required.<br />
<br />
=== Urban planning considerations ===<br />
Measures to control access to public space should ensure a balance between design for crime prevention and design for the effective use of an environment by legitimate users. Rather than focusing only on organised and mechanical strategies of access control (such as physical barriers), more natural strategies such as territorial reinforcement should be promoted where possible. The clear delineation of spaces (public, private, transitional) serves to reduce ambiguity for users as well as making it easier to identify offenders.<br />
<br />
Planning considerations should account for any inconvenience faced by legitimate users, while seeking to design features that will deny offenders access to targets and reduce their possible opportunities of escape. A considered approach will avoid the ‘militarisation’ of spaces in favour of communicating the nature of public, private and transitional areas to users.<br />
<br />
=== Safety/Security considerations ===<br />
Access control measures tend to be highly visible. This can raise the prominence of an object, which can raise the attractiveness of the object for fanatics.<br />
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=== Social considerations ===<br />
Access control is a technology-based measure to increase resilience. From the [[Social aspects|social]] point of view, any technology-based measure should consider that security mainly refers to the people and society. Material measures to protect should still suggest a sense of welcoming, openness, and inclusiveness.<ref>Coaffee, J. (2010): Protecting Vulnerable Cities: The UK's Resilience Response to Defending Everyday Urban Infrastructure. In: International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 4, 939-954. Retrieved from: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2010/86_4coaffee.pdf [last access: 2012-04-13].</ref> Moreover, in public area's technical solutions are not as effective without the acceptance and participation of the public. This acceptance is, among other things, rooted in [[security culture]].<br />
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Protective and resilience-enhancing measures directed at infrastructure, such as access control, can have negative impact on resilience of social infrastructure and societal resilience. For example, visible protection such as access control points makes people to underestimate risks but makes them reluctant to adopt protective measures themselves as well. This could undermine societal resilience and limit the effects of other measures that are not based on technology, such as [[Measure:_Ownership|ownership]].<ref> Dennis S. Mileti/John H. Sorensen: Communication of Emergency Public Warnings. A Social Science Perspective and State-of-the-Art Assessment. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, 1990.</ref> In addition to this, informing citizens with risks, how to assess risks, and how to prepare for realisation of risks is important.<ref> Dennis S. Mileti/John H. Sorensen: Communication of Emergency Public Warnings. A Social Science Perspective and State-of-the-Art Assessment. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, 1990.</ref> <br />
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Practical addressing of social aspects and aspects of [[security culture]] in security measures such as access control can be best accomplished by appropriately involving citizens, based on a set of introduced methods of [[citizen participation]] as compiled by VITRUV. Ideally, planning for the measure of access control should include usability tests in relevant social context. The [[Sociospatial_perspective|sociospatial perspective]] is an example of an approach to do so.<br />
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=== Economic considerations ===<br />
Access control mitigates the negative [[Economic impact of security threats|(economic) effects of security threats]]. These economic benefits reach beyond the reduction of material and immaterial damage since security threats also indirectly influence the local/regional and national economies, the so-called [[Economic effects of crime#Secondary economic impact of crime|secondary economic impact (of crime)]]. Riots, for instance, make investors nervous and have a distinct (negative) impact on tourism.<br />
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On the other hand, access control measures require investments such as the relatively straightforward [[Economic effects of anti-crime security measures#Direct (primary) costs of security|direct expenditures]] on capital equipment and operational cost (both temporary and permanent), and various types of [[Economic effects of anti-crime security measures#Indirect (secondary) costs of security|indirect economic effects]] (depending on the type of security measures used). The use of access screening by security guards, for example, may imply longer delivery times and disruption of global supply chains and of finely-tuned just-in-time delivery systems<ref name="ftn44"> Stevens (2004): The emerging Security Economy: An Introduction. Published in: OECD (2004): The Security Economy. ISBN 92-64-10772-X</ref>. And access barriers like roller shutters or big chain locks are illustrative examples of measures that easily create an unwelcome environment, resulting in an 'unwelcome environment' that creates negative indirect economic effects comparable to the criminal events itself. As a final example, access control measures can cause negative indirect effects for commercial venues like convenience stores. These negative effects are caused by a decrease in accessibility, reducing the amount of customers and increasing the cost of distribution.<br />
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In order to decide if the particular use of access control measures make sense from an economic point of view (see the case example below), the urban planner should not just map both the costs and benefits of access control measures for the particular case (both direct and indirect), but also wonder if there exist potential alternative security measures that have a better value for money ([[Social cost-benefit analysis|benefit-cost ratio]])<ref>See also the [[Economic tools#Economic assessment step by step|'''flow chart''']] of an economic assessment.</ref>. On top of that, one should always consider how stakeholders (citizens, suppliers, customers, employees, etc.) are affected by the considered measures, and to which extend. Will customers for instance refrain from a visit to a certain shopping mall due to the severe access control measures? And how will potential criminals/terrorists react? Will they easily find ways to avoid the foreseen security measures, or will the access control measure force them to look for other targets ([[The economics of criminal and terrorist behaviour|the economics of criminal/terrorist behaviour]])? [[Economic tools]] can help decision makers to answer these questions and to prevent wasteful expenditures on security.<br />
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''Case example: Examples of cost-effective stand-off security measures against terrorist bomb attacks''<br />
{{quote|One effective way to prevent a terrorist bomb attack is to create (physical) distance between an urban object and a potential detonation location (as addressed with the help of the [[Plan level tools|plan]] and [[Detail level tools|detail]] level tools in VITRUV). This could be done with relatively expensive security guards at checkpoints outside the premise of buildings, but also with the help of access control measures that by design create a standoff zone preventing trucks and cars to come near a building, for instance with the help of some type of (automatic) bollards or natural barriers (e.g. use of water or trees, etc.).}}<br />
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=== Mobility considerations ===<br />
At closed entrances (if only to a particular mode of transport) information should be made available when and where a person/vehicle might gain access.<br />
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Access control in the field of mobility is also applied for congestion charging, for example with the aim to improve the air quality. In London this is applied with camera control with license plate recognition at the entrances/exits of the city. <br />
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In public transport, access control is sometimes applied with chipcards and automatic gates. The chipcards can be personnal. Access is only given to people with a valid chipcard with sufficient saldo. <br />
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At private (company) parkings, acces is often regulated with an automatic barrier and a pole with communication connection to e.g. the reception desk or chipcard (electromagnetic?) control; only people with a company chipcard or people with an appointment to a known employee of the company will get access.<br />
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=== Ethics considerations ===<br />
Identification of people at access control point can raise [[Ethics aspects|ethics]] issues, such as collection and use of personal data. Another aspect are interactions between built infrastructures and human rights (e.g. rights to access and supply). In this context, it is important to consider that access control can have the unintended consequence of systematically excluding certain types of people from access to certain urban space. Therefore, access control can turn out to by a kind of over-sophisticated measure. To prevent issues, one should make sure to be transparent about the discrimination criteria and make sure these conform to anti-discrimination legislation and customs.<br />
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In general, pinpointing specific ethics aspects in resilience-enhancing measures needs to consider, among other things, citizen security culture and citizens' personal concerns. There are no ethics considerations that can be planned or implemented without prior identification and addressing of citizens' perceptions. To support this, VITRUV offers a commented [[Determination_of_security_aspects_-_methods_for_urban_planners#Methods_to_determine_ethics_aspects_in_planning_of_public_spaces|list of methods to determine ethics aspects]] in relevant urban planning.<br />
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=== Legal considerations ===<br />
Legal considerations when considering access control measures are:<br />
* [[legal aspects#Development management standards|Development management standards]] - Access control measures may change connectivity and permeability or site development standards<br />
* [[legal aspects#Safety|Safety]] - Access control measures may change for example the emergency evacuation situation<br />
* [[legal aspects#Building codes|Building codes / building regulations]] - Access control may change for example accessibility for people with disabilities<br />
* [[legal aspects#Traffic impact requirement|Traffic impact requirement]] / road construction - Access control may influence traffic flows<br />
* [[legal aspects#Appearance|Appearance]] - Putting in access control measures may change the appearance of an object<br />
* [[legal aspects#Cultural heritage preservation|Cultural heritage preservation]] - Access control measures may impose on cultural heritage rules<br />
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{{references}}</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Measure:_Access_control&diff=14150Measure: Access control2020-10-09T15:08:34Z<p>Dolinda: Dolinda moved page Measure: Access control to Measure type: Access control</p>
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<div>#REDIRECT [[Measure type: Access control]]</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Talk:Measure_type:_Access_control&diff=14151Talk:Measure type: Access control2020-10-09T15:08:34Z<p>Dolinda: Dolinda moved page Talk:Measure: Access control to Talk:Measure type: Access control</p>
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* Access control of motorways with [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ramp_meter ramp metering]<br />
* Access control of motorway lanes (flexible lane control) with a dynamic red cross sign above the lane (a [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Variable-message_sign variable message sign]), e.g. in case of incidents (see [[Incident management|incident management]]), peak hour lanes and [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reversible_lane reversible lanes], [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-occupancy_vehicle_lane High Occupancy Vehicle lanes] <br />
* [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toll_house Toll houses] or [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toll_plaza toll plazas] for [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tolling tolling] or [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Road_pricing road pricing] )<br />
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I removed this text, bcause it does not concern:<br />
* reduction of risk<br />
* traffic in or out an object or area<br />
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Albert</div>Dolindahttps://securipedia.eu/index.php?title=Talk:Measure:_Access_control&diff=14152Talk:Measure: Access control2020-10-09T15:08:34Z<p>Dolinda: Dolinda moved page Talk:Measure: Access control to Talk:Measure type: Access control</p>
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<div>#REDIRECT [[Talk:Measure type: Access control]]</div>Dolinda